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1 INTRODUCTION 
After lengthy and nerve-racking status negotiations, on 17 February 2008 a long-held 
dream came true for Kosovo Albanians: Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. 
Within a short time, Kosovo has established many of the symbols and requirements of 
an independent state, including a constitution, which took effect on 15 June 2008, a 
national anthem, a flag and state seals, passports, identity cards, driver‘s licenses, an 
intelligence service and a lightly armed civil defense force, the Kosovo Security Force. 
Membership of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund was also achieved 
in June 2009. However, while necessary, none of these are things that make a state 
really viable in the sense of being consistently peaceful, democratic and able to provide 
for the needs of its citizens. 
As of September 2010, Kosovo‘s independence has been recognized by 70 
countries. Serbia still adheres to its vow never to accept Kosovo‘s independence. On the 
UN Security Council, Russia and China also oppose recognition, as do several non-
permanent members. Five of the 27 EU member states – Cyprus, Greece, Romania, 
Slovakia and Spain − still refuse to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state for reasons 
associated with their own minority problems and fears of secession precedents. This 
lack of unity in the EU is one of the reasons for the current weaknesses and only 
moderate achievements of the European Union‘s biggest and most cost-intensive 
mission, the European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), and the paralyzed policy of the 
EU in Kosovo. 
In July 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – which was asked by 
Serbia in October 2008 to rule on whether the declaration was a breach of international 
law − has pronounced that Kosovo‘s declaration of independence is legal, which makes 
Kosovo‘s independence relatively well-established politically. While the ICJ‘s decision 
is a major setback for Belgrade, Prishtina hopes that the ICJ‘s opinion will provide a 
strong impetus for more countries to recognize its status.  
Kosovars had high expectations that independence would be followed by rapid 
progress and development, particularly a swift improvement in their country‘s bleak 
economic position and dire social conditions. However, more than two-and-a-half years 
after independence, the picture is uninspiring and the progress expected by Kosovars 
has largely been absent. 
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Despite the declaration of independence, Kosovo remains at a crossroad and is 
labeled as an ―unfinished state‖. This is not only because general international 
recognition has not been secured but also because the Kosovo government is not in 
control of the whole of its territory, in which the presence of five international 
organizations − EULEX, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the International Civilian Office (ICO) and the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) − is still needed to 
support the development of a stable, European-oriented, multi-ethnic democracy. 
Kosovo‘s fragile and incomplete peace is sustained by some 10,000 NATO troops, 
1,700 international police, judges and prosecutors from the European Union, 200 
international and 500 national OSCE staff members, and 200 ICO staff members. 
As will be analyzed in this study, covering the period from the end of the war in 
June 1999 to July 2010 when the ICJ ruled on Kosovo‘s declaration of independence, 
despite some visible successes in Kosovo over these years, many problems remain. The 
international presence has managed to create a reasonably stable democratic fundament 
which is largely accepted by Kosovars. It has also been possible to establish democratic 
political institutions and to hold free and fair elections. However, much remains to be 
done to develop a democratic political culture. 
Unquestionably the greatest achievement since the end of the war in 1999 is the 
improved security situation and the considerable reduction in direct violence. This was 
demonstrated when there was no renewal of direct violence between Kosovo Albanians 
and Serbs at the time of Kosovo‘s declaration of independence, despite the politically 
strained and emotional climate. Interethnic violence between the two ethnic 
communities is now rare. This positive development can be put down to the presence of 
UNMIK and primarily to the important stabilizing function of KFOR. However, while a 
growing readiness for coexistence has become apparent between Kosovo Albanians and 
Serbs in the Serb enclaves and areas of settlement in the south, this does not apply to 
Kosovo Serb dominated northern Kosovo where the political influence of the Serbian 
government over Kosovo Serbs remains strong. This continues to be the biggest security 
flashpoint. 
While the international organizations have successfully managed to improve the 
security situation, the economic and social position of the country is still calamitous, 
and unemployment and poverty are Kosovo‘s most intractable problems. Kosovo is the 
poorest country in Europe, with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of just €1,759 
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in 2009. One in two Kosovars is without work and there is still no promise of 
improvement. More than half of the population lives on less than €1.42 a day. Kosovo 
also has the youngest population in Europe with 70 per cent below the age of 30. This 
means that every year about 30,000 young Kosovars enter a labor market that can offer 
them very limited prospects. The survival of many Kosovars is only secured by the 
remittances sent by the substantial Kosovar diaspora. 
Thus, using peace and conflict theorist Johan Galtung‘s concept of structural, as 
opposed to direct, violence (See section 2.2), it may be said that direct violence has 
been curtailed, but structural violence (which Galtung describes as violence built into 
the structure of a society, which ―shows up as unequal power and consequently as 
unequal life chances‖1) pervades the young state. 
Against this background, this study will analyze the degree of direct and 
structural violence in Kosovo and will assess the extent to which Kosovo fulfills the 
state function of providing its people with security and welfare. The study will also 
analyze the extent to which Kosovo has moved beyond negative peace towards positive 
peace, which is more than the absence of war and violent conflict.  
The research questions and hypotheses for this study have been developed on the 
basis of a systematic discussion of the relevant theoretical approaches and will be 
presented at the end of chapter two, which deals with these approaches. 
The study is divided into six chapters. In chapter two, approaches to state 
functions and the issues surrounding peace and violence are discussed. The first section 
of this chapter dealing with state functions and fragile statehood is mainly based on the 
approaches of political theorist Ulrich Schneckener. The discussion of state functions 
makes it necessary first to define the terms ―state‖ and ―fragile state‖, and here various 
approaches are presented. After having discussed various definitions of states and 
fragile states, the chapter goes on to examine the state functions of providing security, 
welfare and legitimacy/rule of law. For each of the three functions, indicators are 
provided against which deficits in the particular state function can be assessed. 
Additionally, this chapter looks at different types of statehood, factors that destabilize 
                                                 
 
1
 Johan Galtung: Violence, Peace and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research. Volume 6. No. 3. Oslo 
1969. pp. 167−191. In: Matthew Evangelista (ed.): Peace Studies. Critical Concepts in Political Science. 
Routledge. New York 2005. p. 26.   
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states, factors that stabilize fragile states, the different national actors involved in 
creating stability or instability, threats arising from fragile statehood, international state-
building strategies including its risks and side effects and the unintended consequences 
of international engagement. The chapter closes with some principles for international 
engagement in fragile states. The second section of the theoretical analysis of peace and 
violence is based on Johan Galtung‘s peace theory. First, the distinctions between 
direct, structural and cultural violence are addressed and second, definitions are given of 
negative and positive peace, on which this study draws. At the end of this chapter, the 
research questions and hypotheses for the study are formulated.  
The empirical part of this study starts with chapter three, which begins with a 
delineation of the geographic and demographic characteristics of Kosovo. This is 
followed by an overview of historical developments in Kosovo in recent decades and an 
analysis of the economic situation. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
evolution of Kosovo‘s political system, including an account of the current political 
parties and non-parliamentary groups.  
Chapter four analyzes the extent to which the security function is fulfilled and 
direct violence curtailed in Kosovo. Its first section assesses the security situation in the 
country, the second section analyzes the factors that threaten Kosovo‘s stability and the 
third section examines the tasks of the international and national security providers as 
well as their capabilities, successes and shortcomings in countering acts of direct 
violence and providing a safe and secure environment. 
Chapter five evaluates the extent to which the welfare function is fulfilled in 
Kosovo and structural violence curtailed. The chapter consists of five sections. The first 
examines Kosovo‘s two most serious problems, unemployment and poverty, and 
reviews the impact of the state‘s social protection system on reducing poverty as 
compared with that of migration and remittances. In further sections, Kosovo‘s 
education and health systems are analyzed as well as the extent of social inequality in 
the country, with particular reference to young people, women, minorities and the rural 
population.  
Chapter six summarizes the main results of the study. It discusses the dilemmas 
presented by the international involvement and its contribution to peace-building in the 
context of other missions, and raises the question whether democratization introduced 
from the outside can succeed at all. 
  
5 
The study uses a combination of empirical methods:  
 Participant observation (informal interviews and field notes2) 
 Unstructured interviews  
 Semi-structured interviews 
 Analysis of primary and secondary sources  
Through participant observation, the researcher is able to observe and 
understand the interactions of people from the position of an insider. As a participant, 
the researcher must sustain access once it has been granted, and maintain relationships 
with people in the field. The relationship between the participant as observer and the 
people in the field setting is one of the key components of this method.
3
 Therefore, the 
author‘s tasks and responsibilities during her one-year field mission within the 
framework of KFOR from October 2006 to October 2007 were of considerable 
advantage. Essential information was gathered through informal interviews, resembling 
casual conversation, and unstructured interviews conducted with Kosovar political 
representatives and members of international organizations as well as with ordinary 
Kosovar citizens.  
By participant observation, including informal interviewing combined with the 
development of field notes, and conducting unstructured interviews, a basis for semi-
structured interviews and primary and secondary source analysis was laid.  
A list of key questions was drawn up on the basis of which semi-structured 
interviews were conducted. Of these, 16 interviews were conducted with staff members 
of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York between January and 
May 2009 and 18 interviews were conducted with Kosovar political representatives and 
primarily, the general public throughout Kosovo in September 2009.
4
 All interviews 
were conducted face-to-face, however when further information was required the 
follow-up interviews were done by phone or by e-mail. All semi-structured interviews 
were audio-recorded and transcribed for analysis purposes. Interviews with Kosovars 
were conducted in either English or German. When the interviewee did not speak either 
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of these languages, his or her response was translated by an interpreter during the 
interview. Occasionally, where interview partners‘ ability to express themselves in 
English or German was limited, there have been minor corrections to grammar and 
phraseology to assist understanding.  
Additionally, primary and secondary sources were analyzed on the basis of 
detailed document research. The relevant official documents such as the Kosovo 
Constitution, Kosovar laws and government documents as well as EU and UN 
resolutions and regulations have been included in this study. 
Documents from the following Kosovar and international think tanks have been 
used: International Crisis Group (ICG), Jane‘s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, 
Freedom House, European Stability Initiative (ESI), Kosovar Stability Initiative (IKS), 
and Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED). Another 
important source is studies by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as 
well as the results of the periodically conducted UNDP polls.  
Further documents, analyses, studies and reports − mostly available through the 
Internet − were analyzed from the following organizations: the UN Security Council, 
UNMIK, NATO/KFOR, the OSCE, the US State Department, the World Bank, the ICO 
and the European Union Special Representative in Kosovo (EUSR).  
The main online news sources used in this study are: Southeast European Times, 
New York Times, Die Presse, Der Standard, Die Zeit, Reuters, B92, Radio Free Europe, 
Radio Television Kosovo (RTK) and EULEX Press Releases. Quotations from 
Albanian or German literature have been translated into English by the author.  
The following nomenclature has been adopted in this study: As opposed to the 
Albanian forms ―Kosovë‖ or ―Kosova‖, the form ―Kosovo‖ is used throughout this 
study, following the usage of  most English-language publications. For other Kosovan 
place names, UN practice is followed: both the Albanian and Serbian versions, divided 
by a slash, are used on all occasions.
5
 In this study, the term ―Kosovar‖ embraces all 
inhabitants of Kosovo regardless of their ethnicity. For additional clarity, the author 
distinguishes where relevant between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs.   
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2 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO STATE 
FUNCTIONS AND PEACE   
2.1 State functions and fragile statehood  
Theoretically, in the modern world, the state has to perform a twofold function as 
regards the political order: firstly, the state must organize and guarantee public order 
domestically within its defined territory and secondly, all states together represent the 
international system and, thus, the global order, which they must maintain collectively. 
Ineffective, weak, failing or failed states – which the German political theorist Ulrich 
Schneckener terms ‗fragile statehood‘ – have the tendency to destabilize both functions 
and cause problems at the national, regional and global level. Indeed there are a number 
of states that are unable to provide basic public functions and services to their citizens 
and fall short of performing their duties and responsibilities as members of the 
international community. In other words, fragile states remain unstable, insecure, and 
prone to conflict − putting both the poor and the rich at risk.6    
Fragile states are currently a hot topic for scholars, who have not only produced 
a substantial body of literature on such states, but also coined numerous terms such as 
‗Quasi-states‘, ‗Para-states‘, ‗Anomic-states‘, ‗Shadow-states‘ or ‗Network-states‘ to 
describe types of significant state failure and dysfunction and aspects of inadequate or 
missing service provision and governance in various states in Southeast- and East-
Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America.
7
 Fragile states are by no means a new 
phenomenon, however, Western governments have paid increasingly urgent attention to 
the problem since 11 September 2001. Until that day, fragile statehood was largely 
perceived by Western governments as of purely local importance, and best left to 
development experts and agencies to deal with. However, the events of 11 September 
demonstrated how dangerous failed states such as Afghanistan could be, not only to 
their own people, but to communities around the world, and the issue of fragile states 
became intrinsically tied to the field of international security policy. This led to a 
paradigm shift in security thinking and Western policy makers became aware that if 
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local problems are ignored, they have the potential to produce global risks. The 
phenomenon of state fragility became a matter for international politics since such 
failure can impact beyond the borders of the directly affected state.  
In this context, both the National Security Strategy of the United States and the 
European Security Strategy regard failing and failed states as a security threat to the US 
and the EU. The US National Security Strategy points out that ―America is now 
threatened less by conquering states than ... by failing ones‖8 and the European Security 
Strategy considers that ―state failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global 
governance, and adds to regional instability.‖9 However, to use Ulrich Schneckener‘s 
terminology: 
―Fragile states should not be understood as a threat per se, but as an enabling 
factor or a catalyst for potential threats and … as an obstacle to solving key 
global security issues.‖10  
In this context, as the journal Foreign Policy rightly noted, it remains a challenge to 
work out which failed states are global security threats and which are simply tragedies 
for their own people.
11
 
The report ―A more secure world‖ by the High-Level Panel, initiated by the 
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, emphasizes that the problem of fragile 
statehood plays a central part in today‘s pertinent security problems. The following six 
clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned, now and in the decades 
ahead, were identified by the Panel: (1) Economic and social threats, including poverty, 
infectious disease and environmental degradation; (2) Inter-State conflict; (3) Internal 
conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; (4) Nuclear, 
radiological, chemical and biological weapons; (5) Terrorism; and (6) Transnational 
organized crime.
12
 In order to tackle these security problems, the international 
community needs to address the issue of fragile statehood at the same time. Ulrich 
Schneckener explains this connection between state institutions and the problems that 
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have to be addressed with the help of the following examples: the implementation of 
successful disaster-prevention policies is hardly possible without the involvement of 
state institutions. Likewise, fighting poverty and fairly distributing resources require a 
state framework. Furthermore, the containment of organized crime and the fight against 
transnational terrorist networks call for, among other things, state mechanisms of 
control and means of enforcement. Additionally, the reconciliation of regional conflicts 
and civil wars is directly linked to the creation of legitimate state structures. It follows 
that the stable social, economic, political and cultural development of a society is barely 
conceivable without the framework of a state. At the same time, without state monopoly 
of force there is the risk of a long-lasting civil war with spin-off consequences for other 
states.
13
 Given these considerations, the strengthening of state institutions – in other 
words, state-building − becomes increasingly important for security and development 
policy. However, before examining state functions and state-building, it is imperative 
first to define the ―state‖ as well as the ―fragile state‖.  
2.1.1 Defining the “state”  
The term fragile statehood implies that there also exist forms of non-fragile, properly 
functioning, stable or consolidated statehood. The basis for the analysis of statehood is 
the modern state, as it initially developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth century in 
Europe. Currently prevalent notions of the state have been largely shaped by Max 
Weber. Therefore, this analysis starts with a Weberian definition of the state, namely 
that the state is ―a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory‖14 − ‗territory‘ is one of the 
characteristics of the state. Weber maintains that  
―the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals 
only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole 
source of the ‗right‘ to use violence.‖15  
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In other words, the state is sovereign, meaning that no political authority exists above it. 
The legitimate institutions that Weber mentions are the military and the police, the 
bureaucracy and courts.
16
 However, not only public, but also private actors and 
institutions can use force as long as they are authorized by the state to do so.  
Legal and political philosopher Georg Jellinek holds that the state is 
characterized by three elements. In his Allgemeine Staatslehre (General Theory of the 
State), published in 1900, he argues that the principal elements necessary to any state 
are territory, nation and government (ruling power).
17
  
While Georg Jellinek‘s ―three-element theory‖ is well known in the German 
literature, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State is 
internationally prevalent. This convention, signed on 26 December 1933 at Montevideo, 
Uruguay and entering into force one year later, established the standard definition of a 
state under international law, which is set out in Article 1. In contrast to Jellinek‘s 
definition, the convention refers to four necessary elements of a state:  
―The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; 
and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.‖18  
Additionally, Article 3 of the convention states that ―the political existence of the state 
is independent of recognition by the other states‖ (known as the declarative theory of 
statehood). In contrast to the declarative theory of statehood stands the constitutive 
theory of statehood which refers to recognition by other states as a requirement for 
statehood.
19
  
The Arbitration Commission of the European Community‘s Conference for 
Peace in Yugoslavia (Badinter Arbitration Committee), which was in place between 
1991 and 1993 in order to provide the Conference on Yugoslavia with legal advice, 
follows the Montevideo Convention in its definition of a state. The committee rendered 
15 legal opinions on the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 
Badinter Arbitration Committee Opinion No. 1 states that:  
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―the State is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and 
a population subject to an organized political authority; that such a State is 
characterized by sovereignty.‖20  
The committee also considered that the existence or disappearance of the state is a 
question of fact and that the effects of recognition by other states are purely declaratory.  
Moreover, the state contains an empirical and a juridical aspect, thus entities can 
be states either de facto or de jure. Empirical sovereignty, also called internal 
sovereignty, is defined as ―the state‘s actual physical ability to control territory, 
expropriate the means of violence, administer the population, and shape social and 
political life.‖21 By contrast, juridical sovereignty, also known as external sovereignty, 
―is the theoretical right states have to do such things, and this is achieved 
through diplomatic practices, treaties, and international norms. States earn 
empirical sovereignty, conversely, through physical violence, control, and 
administration.‖22  
In other words, juridical sovereignty refers to external recognition by other members of 
the international system; thus only states that possess juridical sovereignty may enter 
into international agreements and can be admitted to international organizations, such as 
the United Nations. Due to the aspects of international and diplomatic relations, various 
scholars, such as Ulrich Schneckener, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, underline that 
juridical statehood is more important than empirical statehood.
23
  
 In practice, there are a number of postcolonial states that have been recognized 
as having a de jure claim to that territory by at least one other generally recognized 
nation, but lack empirical preconditions. On the other hand, there are entities with 
complete or partial control over their territory that are de facto self-governing, but are 
not fully recognized internationally for political reasons (for instance Somaliland, 
Transnistria, Kosovo, and Northern Cyprus).   
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In addition to the preceding analysis, which primarily concentrated on the 
―older‖ discussion concerning the criteria for statehood, this study will focus on the 
―newer‖ theoretical approach, explained in section 2.1.3, that Ulrich Schneckener uses 
to explicate the core of modern statehood.  
2.1.2 Defining the “fragile state” 
Theorizing about fragile states is a challenge, because of the plethora of terms used to 
describe them and measures of their degree of fragility. However, despite this 
substantial body of literature, there is no universal definition of fragile states. Most 
scholars and organizations characterize fragile states according to their capacity or 
willingness to provide goods and public services. There are also various indicators used 
to measure state fragility and create failed-states indexes and rankings. Just as there is 
no universal definition, there is also no universally agreed list of fragile states. 
Depending on the definition used, there are anywhere between 30 and 50 of them, with 
many moving in and out of fragility. Fragile states are estimated to contain around 14 
per cent of the world‘s population but to account for nearly 30 per cent of those living 
on less than US$1 a day.
24
 Moreover, Paul Collier estimated that ―the cost of a single 
failing state over its entire history of failure, to itself and its neighbors, is around $100 
billion.‖25  
One of the best-known indexes is the Failed States Index, which is jointly 
compiled by The Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, and the journal 
Foreign Policy. The Failed States Index is based on 12 indicators of state cohesion and 
performance – classified into social, economic and political areas – and ranks the 
assessed countries into the four categories of ―alert‖, ―warning‖, ―moderate‖ and 
―sustainable‖. The latest Failed States Index of 2009 ranks 177 countries of which 38 
are assigned to the category ―alert‖ and 93 to the category ―warning‖.26 The 38 states in 
the ―alert‖ category could also be called fragile states.  
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The United Kingdom‘s Department for International Development (DFID) and 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have 
comparable definitions of fragile states, which concentrate on service provision. DFID‘s 
definition of fragile states covers ―states where the government cannot or will not 
deliver core functions to its people.‖27 The most important functions of the state 
considered by DFID are: territorial control; safety and security; management of public 
resources; delivery of basic services; and protection and support for the ways in which 
the poorest people sustain themselves. The OECD Development Assistance Committee 
identifies 43 fragile states, and according to their 2007 definition, states are fragile when  
―state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions 
needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and 
human rights of their populations.‖28  
This definition has subsequently been modified to a state that is ―unable to meet its 
population‘s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the 
political process.‖29   
Canada‘s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy focuses on three fundamental 
components needed for the state to function properly: authority, capacity and 
legitimacy. The degree of fragility of a state is measured by the extent to which the 
actual characteristics of a state differ from the ideal.
30
 Hence, fragile states  
―lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the 
institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and the 
political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home and abroad.‖31  
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) applies the 
term fragile state to ―a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states‖. USAID 
holds that it is more important to understand how far and quickly a country is moving 
from or toward stability than it is to categorize a state as failed or not. Therefore, 
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USAID‘s strategy differentiates between ―fragile states that are vulnerable from those 
that are already in crisis‖. Vulnerable states are those states that are  
―unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic 
services to significant portions of their populations and where the legitimacy of 
the government is in question. This includes states that are failing or recovering 
from crisis.‖  
while states in crisis are those states  
―where the central government does not exert effective control over its own 
territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to 
significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government is weak or 
nonexistent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk.‖32   
The World Bank‘s definition of fragile states was first adopted in 2008, 
replacing the classification ―Low Income Countries Under Stress‖. The World Bank 
applies the term fragile state to ―countries facing particularly severe development 
challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability.‖33 
Their definition of fragile states covers low income countries with a Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score of 3.2 or below. Countries are considered core 
fragile states if their CPIA is below 3.0. Countries are considered marginal fragile states 
if their CPIA score is between 3.0 and 3.2. This involves around thirty countries.  
According to Tobias Debiel a properly functioning state will fulfill six core 
functions: security governance; political governance; judicial governance; 
administrative governance; social governance and economic governance. Hence, fragile 
states are  
―hobbled by marked deficits in producing these ‗goods‘ and this in turn implies 
that the population will as a rule have to contend with a severe lack of security 
and basic social services.‖34  
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Due to the large number of countries affected, he distinguishes between two subtypes: 
unstable states and states at risk or failing states. Moreover, Debiel makes the important 
emphasis that  
―the term ‗fragile states‘ does not cover failed states whose public institutions 
have come close to total collapse and which are virtually unable to provide 
services. However, a country in the process of ‗recovering‘ from armed conflict 
or near collapse will again fall under the category of ‗fragile states‘.‖35 
From the foregoing it is clear that there is a range of ways to define, measure and 
rank fragile states; nevertheless there is significant overlap. For the purpose of this 
study, a broad approach is used that aims to take account of most of the relevant 
definitions. However, it will particularly focus on the approach of Ulrich Schneckener, 
who defines fragile statehood in terms of ―state structures and institutions which have 
severe deficits in performing key tasks and functions vis-à-vis their citizens‖, and thus 
―fragile states are characterized by deficits in governance, control and legitimacy.‖36 
Ulrich Schneckener‘s definition is chosen in order be in line with his definitions of the 
three basic state functions, which will be analyzed in our case study of Kosovo.  
2.1.3 Core functions of the state according to Ulrich Schneckener  
Ulrich Schneckener‘s definition of fragile states demonstrates the need to distinguish 
between the terms statehood and state, and this study will likewise use the term 
statehood to avoid restricting the analysis simply to the state, characterized by the 
government and its bureaucratic apparatus. By contrast, statehood encompasses a range 
of actors such as political parties and public institutions as well as different levels of 
governance such as sub-national and local. Therefore, statehood is a functional term that 
focuses on core state functions, on the political decision-making process and on the 
implementation of decisions as well as on the political order in general.
37
  
This section focuses on Ulrich Schneckener‘s interpretation of the characteristics 
of a state, which can be described as ―new‖ in comparison with some of the ―old‖ 
theoretical approaches presented above. In order to analyze the different forms and the 
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scale of fragile statehood, Ulrich Schneckener distinguishes three basic state functions 
constituting the core of the modern state. His approach is based on the studies of 
Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, who describe the three core functions of a state as 
security, representation and welfare.
38
 The functions distinguished by Ulrich 
Schneckener are security, welfare and legitimacy/rule of law, and he suggests that 
generally, a sustainable state can only be expected when all three functions are fully 
developed. Thus Schneckener‘s approach goes beyond the mere focus on the state‘s 
monopoly of the use of force and this allows authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
regimes, such as North Korea, Cuba, Uzbekistan or Belarus, to be considered as fragile 
states, although they are generally classified as ―strong‖ due to their military capability. 
Such regimes may generally be to some extent stable since they are able to exercise 
their monopoly of force. However, their considerable deficits in terms of the political 
order and public service provision are not expected to improve but rather lead to a 
gradual collapse of the state in certain circumstances (for instance after the death of the 
ruling dictator). Hence, regime stability cannot be equated with state stability. The 
continued existence of certain regimes is in many cases a danger to statehood since they 
undermine the core of the state by authoritarian, feudal or clientelistic structures. 
A number of relevant indicators for each of the three functions can be applied to 
assess the degree of erosion of statehood. Some of these are based on quantitative data 
such as the Human Development Index, the Corruption Perception Index compiled by 
Transparency International, the Freedom House Index of political freedom and civil 
liberties or the World Bank‘s Governance Indicators. However, in order to analyze state 
collapse or non-existence of a function, multiple indicators have to be assessed as 
negative as discussed below.  
2.1.3.1 Security  
A basic state function is the provision of security for its citizens – in terms of both 
internal and external security. The core of this function is the control of the territory by 
means of the state‘s monopoly of the use of force expressed in the enforcement of state 
control over natural resources and in the existence of a national army and police force to 
contain local conflicts and to disarm non-state armed groups. The state has to maintain 
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its monopoly on the use of force as well as its monopoly on raising taxes and revenues. 
The monopoly on the use of force must not be misused or threaten the citizens in 
general or particular groups of citizens. The following indicators are used to assess 
deficits in the security function:
39
  
 degree of control over the integrity of national territory  
 degree of control of external borders 
 presence of continuing or recurring violent conflicts 
 number and political relevance of non-state armed groups  
 condition of the state‘s security apparatus  
 degree of crime and development of crime rates  
 level of threat emanating from the state organs against the citizens (for instance 
use of torture or massacre)  
Human Security  
Since the state often fails to fulfill its security obligations and sometimes even becomes 
a threat to its own people, attention must shift from the traditional concept of national or 
state security to the security of the people – ―human security‖.40 Whereas Ulrich 
Schneckener in his analysis of state functions only focuses on national security, this 
study aims to highlight the particular importance of human security.  
To begin with, it is crucial to emphasize that both concepts of security are 
interdependent in the sense that without national security, human security cannot be 
achieved, and vice versa. While national security concentrates on the defense of the 
state from external attack, human security is ―people-centered‖ and emphasizes the 
protection of individuals and communities from a broad range of threats. The concept of 
human security was officially introduced in the United Nations‘ 1994 Human 
Development Report. The shift away from the traditional concept of national security 
came about because of rising intra-state conflicts in the second half of the twentieth 
century. According to the 1994 Human Development Report, human security means: 
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―first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And 
second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns 
of daily life − whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.‖41  
A more recent definition is given by the Commission on Human Security in its 2003 
report ―Human Security Now‖. There human security is defined as the protection of 
―the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human 
fulfillment.‖42 The 1994 Human Development Report highlights two major components 
of human security: ―freedom from fear‖ and ―freedom from want‖. The Commission 
adds ―freedom to take action on one‘s own behalf‖.43 Consequently, human security is 
more than simply the absence of violent conflict. The Human Development Report 
identifies seven categories of human security: economic security, food security, health 
security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political 
security. Although it is important that human security is not confused with human 
development, both concepts are deeply interconnected: progress in one field adds to the 
chances of progress in the other. Finally, human security is important since it 
complements national security, enhances human rights and strengthens human 
development.
44
 To achieve the goals of human security, the Commission proposes a 
framework based on empowerment and protection of people.  
2.1.3.2 Welfare 
Welfare is the provision of basic public goods and services as well as mechanisms for 
the distribution of economic resources – both traditionally financed by state revenues 
(customs, taxes, fees and dues). The welfare function thus covers the entirety of state 
activities in the areas of social and economic policy, employment, education, healthcare 
and environmental protection policy as well as management of resources and the 
development and maintenance of the public infrastructure. In order to measure deficits 
in this function, the following indicators need to be looked at:
45
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 degree to which particular groups in the population have access to economic 
resources  
 degree of continuing economic and/or financial crises (for instance state pension 
crisis) 
 adequacy of state revenues and expenditures 
 gap between poor and rich (urban−rural divide) 
 level of unemployment or employment  
 inequalities in human development (human development index) 
 condition of public social protection systems  
 condition of the educational and healthcare system 
 condition of the public infrastructure  
 degree of significant environmental problems (for instance shortage of water)  
2.1.3.3 Legitimacy/rule of law 
The state should be able to claim legitimacy by being organized in a way that ensures: 
forms of political participation, legitimacy of decision-making processes, stability of 
political institutions, rule of law, justice, and effective and accountable public 
administration. Indicators of state failure in this function include:
46
 
 limited political freedom 
 limited political participation  
 repression of opposition groups 
 election fraud 
 systematic exclusion of certain groups from decision-making and political 
participation  
 human rights violations 
 rejection of the political regime or the political order 
 no independent court and legal system  
 self-administered justice 
 ineffective public administration  
 level of corruption and clientelism  
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2.1.4 Types of statehood  
Various types of statehood can be differentiated on the basis of capability to perform 
core functions. The classification is mainly based on the particular state‘s performance 
of the security function. However, state functions are interdependent, meaning that 
without reasonably secure conditions, it would be hard to achieve development in the 
other two functions. As former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated: 
―In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, 
security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development 
without security and no security without development.‖47  
Hence, providing security – which is an essential, though not sufficient, prerequisite for 
strengthening fragile states − is a crucial requirement for the development of welfare 
and legitimacy/rule of law. Severe deficits in the welfare and legitimacy functions are 
most likely to have direct repercussions on the security situation. A country which has a 
negative performance in the welfare and legitimacy function is very unlikely to have a 
stable security situation because conflicts between executive bodies and society are 
unavoidable. Various state types are put forward by different authors; Robert Rotberg, 
for instance, refers to strong, weak, failed and collapsed states,
48
 while Ulrich 
Schneckener differentiates between consolidated or consolidating statehood, weak 
statehood, failing statehood and failed or collapsed statehood.
49
 At the positive end of 
the spectrum there is the fully functioning modern nation state, which fulfills all the 
functions, while at the negative end, there is the failed state. However, it is not always 
possible to categorize a particular country exactly according to the four state types; in 
reality, mixed state types exist. Each type of statehood has specific implications for the 
relationship between state and armed non-state actors as well as for the opportunities 
presented to armed non-state actors.  
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2.1.4.1 Consolidated or consolidating statehood 
Ulrich Schneckener‘s category of consolidated or consolidating statehood applies to 
countries where all three state functions have been satisfactorily performed over a 
prolonged period. These countries include the modern democracies of the western 
industrialized countries as well as those states that became OECD members in the mid-
1990s (Korea, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic). In addition, 
there are a number of non-OECD countries such as Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, the 
Baltic States or Slovenia, which are consolidating despite sporadic crises. These states 
are undergoing a transformation process from an authoritarian regime towards a 
democratically constituted state with market economies or have already successfully 
passed this stage (particularly in Southern and Central Europe and to some extent Latin 
America and East Asia). All in all, at the beginning of the twenty-first century there are 
more consolidated states in absolute numbers than ever before. 
2.1.4.2 Weak statehood 
Weak statehood is characterized by shortcomings in the welfare and/or the 
legitimacy/rule of law functions while the state‘s security function is performed more or 
less effectively. In short, the government and its apparatus are not able to provide 
sufficient public services and/or they suffer from severe legitimacy problems. Countries 
with weak statehood can be found in almost all regions; examples include countries in 
Southeast Europe (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania), Northern 
Africa (Egypt), the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran) and some states in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia) and Latin America (Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Peru). As demonstrated by these examples, this category often comprises authoritarian 
or semi-authoritarian regimes that appear strong through their monopoly of the use of 
force, however are quite weak as regards the provision of public services and their 
political and administrative systems, including the rule of law.  
Weak states are more threatened by domestic criminal and terrorist groups than 
by rebels, clan chiefs or warlords. Furthermore, in some cases militias or paramilitary 
groups, organized by state authorities, may become important to suppress regime 
opponents or minority groups. All in all, security governance is still very much 
established, controlled and financed by state institutions (known as ―security 
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governance through government‖), but nevertheless often executed ineffectively − due 
to widespread corruption – and characterized by human rights violations.  
2.1.4.3 Failing statehood 
Failing statehood means that the state is no longer or has never been able to ensure the 
security of its population. The monopoly of the use of force, the exclusive control of 
resources and provision of security is either gravely limited or completely absent, while 
the state nevertheless possesses some control in at least one of the other two functions. 
Examples include Algeria, Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal, 
Yemen, Pakistan or Georgia. These states do not entirely control their territory, and are 
mainly characterized by armed regional conflicts where violent non-state actors occupy 
and control certain regions. However, these states still deliver public services to the 
majority of the population and still have some degree of political legitimacy. Depending 
on the individual case, security governance involves a range of armed non-state actors; 
the government and its security apparatus is just one player among others (known as 
‗security governance beyond government‘). Moreover, failing statehood provides 
favorable conditions for transnational criminal and terrorist networks, which benefit 
from the security gap and the state‘s lack of control.  
2.1.4.4 Failed or collapsed statehood    
Failed or collapsed statehood implies that none of the three state functions is carried out 
effectively; in other words statehood as such has collapsed. A central government may 
still exist, however it has hardly any impact since it lacks resources, capabilities and 
power. Examples of failed statehood are war-torn countries such as Somalia, 
Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the past, 
Angola, Tajikistan and Lebanon also belonged to this category. However, this category 
does not include those countries that collapsed and formed new states from a 
predecessor state. In this case state dissolution finally leads to state-building. This may 
proceed peacefully and amicably (for instance in the Soviet Union in 1991, in 
Czechoslovakia in 1993 or in Eritrea in 1991) or involve violence leading to a military 
conflict (just as in Yugoslavia or Pakistan/Bangladesh). Compared to the other state 
types, this condition is also known as ―security governance without government‖. The 
country is mainly subjugated by relatively dominant and powerful armed non-state 
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actors who rule not only regions and townships, but may also have power over natural 
resources, trade and businesses as well as international humanitarian aid. They act as the 
central security providers, depending mainly on violence, repression and intimidation, 
but sometimes also on popular support. Under these conditions, the presence of 
warlords, mercenaries, criminals or marauders is particularly significant. However, 
failed statehood is not tantamount to chaos or anarchy; it rather implies that the state-
run political order is replaced by a fragile and contested form of political order 
established by a number of different non-state actors.
50
  
Based on the discussion above, the criteria for the classification of state types are 
represented in Table 1.  
Table 1: Types of statehood 
(+: Function is fulfilled; +/−: Function is reasonably fulfilled; −/+: Function is 
rudimentarily fulfilled; −: Function is not fulfilled; N.N.: All combinations possible) 
 
Security Welfare 
Legitimacy/ 
Rule of law 
Type 1:  
Consolidated statehood 
+ + or +/− + or +/− 
Type 2:  
Weak statehood 
+/− N.N. N.N. 
Type 3:  
Failing statehood 
−/+ N.N. N.N. 
Type 4:  
Failed statehood 
− − − 
Source: Ulrich Schneckener: Fragile Staatlichkeit. States at Risk zwischen Stabilität und Scheitern. 
Nomos. Baden-Baden 2006. pp. 26. 
It can now be assumed that a country‘s stability gradually declines from type 1 
to type 4 while the level of violence or degree of insecurity increases. However, it needs 
to be understood that this assumption says little about the potential for violence and 
conflict within a society. It is definitely possible for there to be a greater potential for 
conflict in a ―weak state‖ than there is in a ―failing‖ or ―failed state‖ although this has 
not led to any use of violence so far. Further, this classification model does not 
constitute stages that have to be passed through by any particular country. It is definitely 
possible for countries of type 2 to turn directly into countries of type 4 or vice versa.  
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2.1.5 Destabilizing factors for statehood 
To improve understanding of fragile states, it is important to know the factors that drive 
fragility. Fragile statehood has a variety of causes, which have to be analyzed separately 
in each individual case. The increasing need for evaluating the causes and consequences 
of fragile statehood has led to the emergence of various indices and indicators aimed at 
measuring the phenomenon. DFID, for instance, identifies weak political institutions as 
the central driver of fragility. Other drivers are: problems associated with economic 
development and natural resources; violent conflict; transitions; external shocks; 
geographical and climatalogical factors and disease as well as the international 
system.
51
 Volker Matthies classifies this large number of factors by differentiating 
between structural, process and triggering factors.
52
 Ulrich Schneckener‘s analysis of 
the reasons for erosion of statehood is based on the same factors, found at three 
different levels: the international and regional (macro) level, the national (meso) level 
and the sub-national (micro) level. 
At the macro level are factors arising from the relation between the country 
concerned and its international and regional environment, for example the activities of 
external actors, and global and regional political developments affecting the country. 
Factors at the national or meso level arise from the relation between the state and 
society or social groups within society, with the activities and disposition of the 
society‘s elites playing a decisive role. Ulrich Schneckener regards these factors as 
pivotal for the analysis of state failure. The sub-national or micro level concerns the 
relation between the state and sub-national actors such as regions, municipalities or 
local population groups.
53
 
2.1.5.1 Structural factors  
Structural factors − also known as ―root causes‖ or ―background factors‖ − are 
conditions which result from natural features of a country (such as mineral resources or 
climate) and long-term political, cultural and socio-economic characteristics (ethnic 
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diversity, demographic development, ―colonial legacy‖, regional power constellations). 
According to Matthies, structural factors point to the existence of the potential for 
conflict and violence. The de facto outbreak of violent conflict, however, is dependent 
on the process factors.  Structural factors conducive to violent conflict include: unequal 
life and development opportunities; poverty and social inequality; disproportionate 
distribution of scarce resources; repression; lack of opportunities for political 
participation; discrimination and exclusion of certain groups; lack of effective 
institutions and processes for peaceful transfer and distribution of power as well as 
social stress and insecurity due to far reaching processes of transformation.
54
 
2.1.5.2 Process factors 
Process factors – also known as ―aggravating factors‖ or ―accelerators‖ – are conditions 
which in the medium term (five to ten years) spur and further the erosion of statehood. 
In contrast to structural factors, the focus here is on the response of the actors involved 
(in particular of the elites) to internal or external crises. Examples of process factors are: 
political instrumentalization of social discontent or of ethnic/cultural differences; 
increase of political or religious extremism, repression by the state, corruption and 
mismanagement, separatist tendencies and economic crises.
55
  
2.1.5.3 Triggering factors 
Triggering factors are occurrences that precipitate an abrupt deterioration within days or 
weeks. They may arise out of longer-term developments, but have a sudden catalytic 
effect. Some examples of triggering factors are: military intervention by external actors; 
military coups and revolutions; outbreak of civil war; massive measures of repression 
(massacres of the opposition); social unrest, infiltration of weapons; cross-border 
refugee flows and famine.
56
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2.1.6 Stabilizing factors for fragile statehood 
Fragile states do not inevitably collapse. Despite their shortcomings and deficits, some 
can be quite stable, albeit functioning at a relatively low level. In some cases, deficits in 
statehood and governance persist over decades, and may even intensify on occasion, 
without causing a complete breakdown of state structures. Fragile states possess some 
degree of stability though this is likely to be vulnerable to crises and conflicts. The so-
called stabilizing factors in operation involve a range of social practices and political 
mechanisms, often developed by ruling elites, which on the one hand serve to maintain 
their power but on the other hand also maintain the state structures. These practices 
include: political patronage and clientelism and neo-patrimonial structures − meaning 
that powerful ―patrons‖ try to woo relatively powerless and poor ―clients‖ with benefits 
in exchange for votes; cooptation of certain groups into the elite; forms of power-
sharing which offer access to economic resources and political participation to certain 
social groups; the mobilization of traditional structures and informal practices of self-
organization (for instance ethnic networks) to maintain basic functions; the inauguration 
of ―quasi-reforms‖ where there is no real intention to bring about fundamental change; 
and the use of repression. Such strategies do not give rise to sustainable statehood or 
development, but are rather an integral part of the dilemma. The challenge is to 
transform or remove them in a way that does not add to tensions and instability. 
Furthermore, in most cases, a transformation and reformation of statehood would 
require elites and other privileged groups to renounce some of their power and 
privileges. This issue becomes even more complex when armed actors are involved.
57
 
2.1.7 National actors
58
   
To assess the strategies for external intervention in the affairs of a fragile state, it is 
essential to identify and analyze the role of the most important local individuals and 
groups. The national actors‘ interests and influence are of key importance since they 
may either support external reforms in their own interest, or block them entirely. The 
following questions have to be taken into consideration: What is the national actors‘ 
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concept of statehood? Who is interested in reforms aimed at consolidating state 
structures? Who, in contrast, benefits from a weak statehood? Who is virtually 
promoting the erosion of statehood? How effectively can the respective actors achieve 
their goals? To what extent are the actors supported by the population? With whom 
should external actors cooperate to reform and transform statehood?  
Tobias Debiel and Ulf Terlinden distinguish between three types of relevant 
national actors: reformers, preservers and spoilers or veto actors.
59
 Ulrich Schneckener 
draws on their analysis, suggesting the classifications: change agents, status-quo actors 
and spoilers that will be examined below.
60
  
2.1.7.1 Change agents 
As the term implies, change agents are social actors that want to change the status quo 
in order to remedy grievances and reform state structures. However, change agents are a 
heterogeneous group within which there can be different views on the state and its 
society. Therefore, change agents‘ goals as well as the extent of their objectives can 
vary, though they share a dismissive attitude towards the incumbent rulers. They do not 
only include western-oriented reformers but also civil society representatives, public 
officials, journalists and others.  
2.1.7.2 Status-quo actors 
This group, either driven by their own interests or encouraged by those in power whom 
they serve, aims at securing and consolidating the status quo. They have already made 
their careers within the existing system, benefit from the current situation and fear to 
lose their power, income, status or privileges. Status-quo actors can be found almost 
everywhere; whether in the bureaucracy, in the executive branch, in political parties or 
in the economy and include actors who are able to block changes simply by ignoring 
them or interposing obstacles. Heads of state or government may act as ―blockers‖, as 
may the army leadership or leaders of political parties or groups. Status-quo actors may 
easily be induced to join one of the other groups of either change agents or spoilers, 
particularly in unstable times of major change. Flexible status-quo actors who perceive 
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that they could profit from change may join forces with the change agents, while others 
who fear to lose their position may ally with the spoilers.  
2.1.7.3 Spoilers 
According to a definition used by Stephen John Stedman, spoilers are  
―leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens 
their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to 
achieve it.‖61  
Ulrich Schneckener follows this approach and identifies spoilers as actors  
―who have the potential to disturb, undermine, or completely truncate processes 
of post-conflict state building, leading to violence flare-ups … [and] constantly 
question the concept of the state‘s monopoly of the use of force.‖62  
Typical spoilers can be armed non-state groups as well as religious or traditional 
authorities and external actors (neighboring countries and transnational criminal 
networks) that have an interest in destabilizing the country.  
Additionally, Stephen John Stedman distinguishes between spoilers inside and 
outside a peace process. An inside spoiler may sign a peace agreement and indicate 
readiness to realize a settlement, but was not negotiating seriously or in the end refuses 
to implement key obligations under the agreement. Outside spoilers are parties that are 
excluded from a peace process or who exclude themselves, and use violence to attack it. 
While inside spoilers use strategies of stealth, outside spoilers often use strategies of 
violence.  
Two examples of spoilers‘ accomplishments can be found in Angola in 1992 and 
Rwanda in 1994. In both cases, the victims of the failed peace were much more 
numerous than the casualties of the preceding war. The success or failure of spoilers can 
be influenced by the international actors involved. Where they have developed and 
implemented effective strategies for dealing with spoilers, damage has been limited and 
peace has prevailed. However, where international actors have not succeeded in creating 
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and implementing such strategies, spoilers have gained ground. Therefore, it is of 
utmost importance that external actors do not ignore spoilers; only by understanding 
their position is it possible to manage them and keep peace effectively. The dilemma is 
that in most cases peace-building activities have to be driven forward against the 
interest of spoilers, yet progress can only be achieved when some potential spoilers are 
integrated into the processes. Therefore, the challenge is to include them as stakeholders 
in a peaceful transformation process. To manage this, international actors need an 
intimate knowledge of the situation in the country concerned.  
The interesting question is why some actors show no interest in peace processes 
and post-conflict state-building. Ulrich Schneckener identifies four reasons for their 
alienation, which may be summarized as need or grievance, greed, creed, and autism of 
violence.
63
 The first reason, need or grievance, applies when the actors feel that their 
political claims have not been heard; grievances have not been resolved or their needs 
have not been met. Under these circumstances, spoilers will continue to fight for their 
goals and undermine the peace process by threatening, or in the worst case using 
violence. Greed is a factor when actors who benefited economically and politically from 
the conflict now fear to lose their power or sources of income. A peace process would 
imply relinquishing their economic and political benefits. The third set of influences, 
which Ulrich Schneckener categorizes as ―creed‖, is at play when actors see their 
collective and individual identities endangered or insufficiently respected by the peace 
process. They fear discrimination and social marginalization, so often demand 
compensation for current or former injustice suffered as well as special rights to 
maintain their cultural, ethnic or religious traditions and beliefs. In some cases the 
identity of a group is closely linked to control of a specific territory or access to special 
sites (historical sites or religious sanctuaries), which a peace agreement – according to 
the concerned party – should respect. The approach to this problem draws on theories 
about the recognition of cultural or ethnic groups, which is considered a precondition 
for political solutions in many conflicts. Finally, it may be that spoilers have succumbed 
to what Ulrich Schneckener terms ―autism of violence‖ over the years, in the sense that 
for them the conflict has turned into a way of life and profession and they are unable to 
envisage any other attitude. Such attitudes are maintained and supported by charismatic 
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leadership, strong religious and ideological beliefs, and a moralistic approach to the 
parties in the conflict, under which the enemy is perceived as unequivocally evil. These 
perceptions are also reinforced by conspiracy theories. This group of spoilers frequently 
loses touch with reality and views acts of terror and atrocity as a purge and salvation. 
They are no longer susceptible to political solutions; in other words, they are 
incapacitated for peace. 
Although the term spoiler carries a negative connotation, it must be recognized 
that some spoilers – albeit rather few − may interfere in political processes in a 
constructive manner. Some spoilers raise quite plausible objections to an agreement; for 
instance when it only aims at stability and excludes justice and reconciliation, when it 
rewards the ―wrong party‖ (the warlords), or when it becomes apparent that certain 
regulations will entail new discriminations and injustice. In other words, not everybody 
who opposes an agreement and is deemed a spoiler is at the same time an opponent of 
peace. Therefore, the crucial question is how constructive or destructive these actors 
will be in the course of the international engagement and how successfully the 
international actors manage to involve the different parties in the peace process.
64
  
However sophisticated the classification system is, actually using it to classify 
national actors may not always be easy. For one thing, the actors‘ behavior may differ 
according to the area being addressed by the peace process, e.g. security, welfare or 
legitimacy/rule of law. They might support change in one field, but act as a status-quo 
actor or even spoiler in another. Their behavior might also change over time. A spoiler 
under certain political circumstances may be transformed into a change agent when the 
political situation changes. It must also be recognized that some actors may present 
themselves as reformers to western aid donors but block change in reality.
65
  
What is clear from the analysis is that a thorough understanding of the various 
national actors is crucial if state-building activities by external actors, from UN peace 
operations to development NGOs, are to succeed.  
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2.1.8 Fragile statehood as a global security threat 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the West‘s approach to fragile states changed 
considerably in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. No longer was fragile statehood 
and its impact seen simply in the context of humanitarian emergencies or of threats to 
regional security and stability. From that day on, fragile states were identified as having 
the potential to produce global risks, and became an issue of utmost importance for 
international security. Ulrich Schneckener identifies four closely interrelated threats that 
are fostered and fueled by fragile statehood: terrorism, ―new wars‖, armed non-state 
actors and shadow globalization.
66
  
2.1.8.1 Fragile statehood and terrorism 
Fragile statehood does not cause terrorism, but rather is a breeding ground for terrorism 
and a factor promoting the development of the infrastructure essential for terrorists. On 
the one hand, the conditions of fragile statehood may give rise to local terrorist 
structures, which often have a transnational impact, while on the other hand, fragile 
states may serve as bases for the global activities of transnational terrorist networks 
such as al-Qaeda. Areas outside the control of the state are particularly favorable for 
establishing training camps. Moreover, terrorist groups skillfully take advantage of state 
deficits to finance their activities, spread their messages or recruit followers. However, 
failed states or civil war regions do not necessarily provide an inviting environment for 
transnational terrorist groups; they prefer those fragile states that possess an adequate 
technical infrastructure but have at the same time severe difficulties in controlling the 
country.
67
  
2.1.8.2 Fragile statehood and “new wars”   
The collapse of state structures is often connected with civil wars and violent conflicts 
described by Mary Kaldor, Herfried Münkler and other scholars as ―new wars‖.68 In 
Mary Kaldor‘s publication New and Old Wars, her central argument is that during the 
1980s and 1990s a new type of organized violence developed, particularly in Africa, 
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Eastern Europe and Asia. Fragile states are considered to be particularly vulnerable to 
these so-called new wars, which are characterized by ―a mixture of war, crime and 
human rights violations.‖69 The actors are global and local as well as public and private. 
A further characteristic of the new wars is the changed mode of warfare with strategies 
drawn from experience of both guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency. The object is 
to achieve power over the population by eliminating everyone considered an outsider or 
holding opinions that are frowned upon, and by spreading terror and destabilization. 
The strategic goal of these wars is to stimulate extremist politics based on fear and 
hatred and they weaken and finally destroy the state structures. However, they do not 
only involve non-state actors; even state actors participate in plundering resources or 
setting up militias. Kaldor sees the key to any long-term solution in  
―the restoration of legitimacy, the reconstruction of the control of organized 
violence by public authorities, whether local, national or global. This is both a 
political process – the rebuilding of trust in and support for public authorities – 
and a legal process – the reestablishment of a rule of law within which public 
authorities operate.‖70  
2.1.8.3 Fragile statehood and armed non-state actors  
Armed non-state actors are characterized by two features: firstly, they are eager and able 
to use violence to achieve their goals and secondly, they are not integrated into state 
institutions such as regular armies, police or special forces. They may, however, be 
officially or informally supported by state actors, and state officials themselves may be 
involved in their activities, particularly for personal gain. The following armed non-
state actors can be distinguished: 1) rebels or guerrillas; 2) militias or paramilitaries; 3) 
clan chiefs or ―big men‖; 4) warlords; 5) terrorists; 6) criminals and gangs; 7) 
mercenaries and private security companies and 8) marauders.
71
  
Fragile states allow these armed non-state actors considerable scope, and they 
can seriously hamper the successful performance of the three core state functions 
discussed in section 2.1.3. They systematically undermine state institutions and exploit 
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the control and legitimacy deficits of the government. In particular, capable actors, such 
as rebels, militias, warlords or clan chiefs, may even replace the state by providing a 
limited degree of security and offering some kind of welfare to the local population, 
although these services are often arbitrary and unreliable and have the potential to 
further destabilize the state‘s legitimacy. The results are rival claims to or oligopolies of 
force.  
2.1.8.4 Fragile statehood and “shadow globalization” 
Eroding state structures facilitate, due to the government‘s lack of control and 
legitimacy, the development of transnational illegal activities, which in turn contribute 
to the process of collapse and create new problems for the whole region. Typical 
activities are: money laundering, petty crime, transnational corruption, trafficking in 
human beings, drug trafficking, smuggling of arms, unregulated transshipment points, 
inter-regional smuggling routes and illegal migration. The establishment of 
transnational ―black markets‖, which could also be referred to as ―shadow 
globalization‖, is attended by a significant expansion of the informal and criminal sector 
since conventional sources of income gradually cease to exist for the majority of the 
population. Thus, aspects of fragile statehood are transferred from one country to 
another and simultaneous processes compound themselves until ultimately almost all 
states of the region are affected by shadow globalization. As Tobias Debiel puts it, ―… 
local conflicts can ... easily spread to bordering states by ‗spillover‘ effects and embroil 
the entire sub region.‖72 Examples of such cumulative developments can be found in 
West Africa, Central Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Western Balkans, Central and 
Southern Asia or in the Caucasus.  
All these developments – terrorism, new wars, armed non-state actors and 
shadow globalization − are by no means limited to the most serious cases of state 
collapse, where statehood is virtually inexistent (such as Somalia, Afghanistan or the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo), but also take place in a range of countries that have 
limited state structures and where statehood is on the brink. It is important to keep such 
states in mind, particularly when there is a need to take preventive measures against 
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looming erosion of state capacity. Given the four threats that fragile states are exposed 
to, it is in the international community‘s interest to pay attention to them and to take 
action to consolidate institutions and structures in these states. As Francis Fukuyama 
stated,  
―state-building is one of the most important issues for the world community 
because weak or failed states are the source of many of the world‘s most serious 
problems.‖73  
Given this perception, it is important to analyze the ways in which the 
international community deals with fragile states. According to Debiel, four distinct 
modi operandi can be identified:
74
   
1. Non-engagement and conscious passivity 
2. Exerting influence and pressure on local forces (for instance through assistance and 
support programs)  
3. The threat and use of coercive measures (through diplomatic, economic or military 
sanctions. Military measures may range from imposing a no-fly zone – for instance 
over Iraq – to the employment of special forces − for instance in Sierra Leone – or 
even to extensive military operations − for instance in Kosovo)  
4. The (short-term) assumption of government functions (via protectorates or quasi-
protectorates. This is the most prevalent form of intervention and was adopted in 
Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor)  
In practice, however, a combination of these approaches is applied, particularly 
because external actors often cannot agree on a common position but rather pursue their 
own interests and priorities. Also, as highlighted by Debiel, international actors often 
reverse their policy after a phase of extensive action. However, this sequence of 
reactions – ignoring, posturing, intervening and then reversion to ignoring again might 
be the least successful way to promote state-building processes. 
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However, before moving on to address the issue of state-building – or 
―statehood-building‖ in Ulrich Schneckener‘s terminology75 − it is necessary to provide 
a working definition of state-building that will be drawn on in this paper.  
2.1.9 International actors and the process of state-building and peace-
building 
This section defines the terms state- and nation-building as they will be used in this 
study. The chapter intentionally does not compare the numerous theoretical approaches 
(for instance of Francis Fukuyama, Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, Jochen 
Hippler, James Dobbins, Karl Deutsch and others) not only because there already is a 
substantial body of analysis comparing these approaches, particularly in connection 
with Kosovo,
76
 but also because state- and nation-building is not the main focus of this 
case study. The chapter‘s focus is rather on the international actors‘ state-building 
strategies and the challenges these actors have to face. This chapter starts by providing 
two definitions that will be applied throughout this study.  
Francis Fukuyama defines state-building simply as ―the creation of new 
government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.‖77 He differentiates this 
from nation-building, which in contrast ―focuses on society as a whole and in particular 
on the development of a common national identity,‖78 while stressing that the two 
processes are likely to go hand in hand. State-building activities might well be part of 
further-reaching nation-building efforts; while state-building will not be successful if 
the state and its policies are out of tune with the aspirations of society as a whole. 
Theoretically, state-building should foster the consolidation of peace in a number of 
ways. However, state-building activities do not necessarily lead to greater stability at 
least in the short or medium term. They may even provoke quite the opposite state of 
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affairs, particularly in weak or failing states, since some mechanisms, structures or 
institutions that provided a certain stability have to be jettisoned.  
State-building can be conducted in three basic ways, each of them requiring 
different external measures: first, stabilizing and strengthening existing institutions and 
structures; second, reforming, transforming and reshaping existing institutions and 
structures and third, rebuilding and establishing structures and institutions which either 
were absent before or did not exist in this form. Of course, these three approaches may 
not be seen separately from each other, but often need to be pursued simultaneously.
79
  
State-building through stabilization focuses on reinforcing already existing 
institutions and structures. Regime change is generally unnecessary; the focus is rather 
on supporting local elites in resolving grievances and curtailing processes of erosion. 
Measures include strengthening the security apparatus, consolidating law enforcement, 
tackling corruption and supporting political participation. States where such efforts are 
appropriate are already in a democratization process, which needs to be further 
supported by external actors. An example of state-building through stabilization is 
provided by the European Union‘s Stabilization and Association Agreements, part of 
the Stabilization and Association Process with the Western Balkan states.
80
  
The second approach to state-building – reform – focuses on improving, 
transforming and reshaping existing state structures and institutions. Regime change is a 
possibility in the medium or long term. Measures include reform of the security sector 
and the police, constitutional reform, promotion of democratization and macroeconomic 
reforms. This type of state-building is appropriate to most fragile states, but particularly 
to those countries in which a democratization process is still imminent. An example is 
the 2001 Ohrid Agreement in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
The third type of state-building – rebuilding – focuses on reconstructing and 
establishing new state structures and institutions and is thus the most far-reaching 
variant. It is primarily related to post-conflict societies in which most state structures 
have collapsed in the course of a war, but also to states where essential elements of 
statehood never existed. In most cases regime change is a necessary precondition for 
rebuilding. Measures include the establishment of police and armed forces, the 
establishment of an independent judiciary and political and administrative structures, 
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the promotion of a civil society and the creation of an independent media. Examples for 
this type of state-building are in Bosnia since 1996 and Kosovo since 1999.  
2.1.9.1 International state-building strategies: risks and side effects 
External actors involved with a fragile state can differ considerably in their assumptions 
for instance about the role of the state, the behavior of national actors, the causes of 
fragile statehood, the priorities in state-building, the necessary resources and the 
necessary time frame for change. They consequently pursue different state-building 
strategies, based on their diverse world views. These strategies can roughly be assigned 
to the main International Relations (IR) theories. In general, Ulrich Schneckener 
distinguishes between four state-building strategies: ―Liberalization First‖; ―Security 
First‖; ―Institutionalization First‖ and ―Civil Society First‖.81 Although these will be 
analyzed separately below, it is important to appreciate that the four strategies are 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Moreover, these strategies are followed 
simultaneously. Table 2 will summarize the main distinctive features of the four 
strategies.  
―Liberalization first‖ constitutes the most prevalent model in development 
policy. It focuses on political and economic liberties and aims at democratization and 
the establishment of market economies. The strategy derives from the liberal approach 
of the IR-theories, in particular the theorem of democratic peace, according to which 
democratic market economies are seen as the best guarantor of peace and stability in 
internal as well as external affairs. This theory further assumes that democracies are less 
susceptible to conflict than non-democracies and do not go to war against each other. 
According to the ―liberalization first‖ strategy, fragile states suffer from a lack of 
transparent and democratic governance structures and the absence of economic 
freedom, which is reflected in limited access to global markets, technological 
backwardness and lack of investment. The ―liberalization first‖ strategy is based on a 
top-down approach, applied over the short- to mid-term (five to ten years) and 
concentrates on the following priorities: holding free and fair elections; protecting 
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political liberties and private property; promoting good governance in terms of effective 
administration and extensive economic reforms, including privatization processes and 
market liberalization to achieve or improve integration into international markets. With 
the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the ―liberalization first‖ 
strategy was modified and expanded by welfare aspects such as poverty reduction, and 
the development of educational and public health systems.  
The ―security first‖ strategy argues that, first and foremost, ―security and 
stability must be established as the essential foundation for long-term development in 
fragile states.‖82 This is also a top-down approach, deriving from the international 
relations theory of realism, and follows the principle that ―there can be no development 
without security‖. Therefore, external actors should focus on providing physical 
security and in particular the restoration of the state‘s monopoly on the use of force. The 
―security first‖ perspective emphasizes that without security a country cannot begin a 
democratization process. This strategy also has a short- to mid-term time frame and its 
priorities are: curtailing the activities of armed non-state actors; security sector reform 
combined with programs aimed at disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) of combatants; training of armed forces, border troops, the police and the 
judiciary; the transformation of war into peacetime economies; the fight against crime 
and the strengthening of the state‘s ability to effectively control its territory and its 
borders. 
Traditional United Nations peacekeeping missions followed the ―security first‖ 
approach because their main goal was to stabilize the situation by separating the 
conflicting parties or to monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement. However, the 
international actors‘ spectrum of tasks has widened and this approach is no longer 
adequate given the multidimensional character of today‘s missions.  
The ―institutionalization first‖ strategy focuses on strengthening legitimate and 
effective institutions at the national and local level to enable them to deliver crucial 
services. This is again a top-down approach, on a mid- to long-term timescale (ten to 20 
years). Its activities are primarily concerned with: establishing and strengthening 
political institutions (parliaments, councils); promoting the rule of law (for instance 
establishing constitutional courts); strengthening and reforming public administration, 
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in particular tax, customs and fiscal authorities; fighting corruption; establishing a 
welfare state; and creation of institutions and procedures for conflict management and 
dispute settlement (for instance ombudsman offices and arbitration panels). Crucial to 
the legitimacy of such measures is the participation of all relevant societal groups in 
these institutions. Therefore this strategy is compatible with informal or formal power-
sharing models and other forms of political participation, which do not necessarily have 
to meet democratic standards. The main idea of any power-sharing model is  
―that two or more ethnic groups have to rule the common polity jointly and take 
decisions by consensus. No single group can decide important matters without 
the consent of the other(s).‖83  
The fourth strategy places civil society at the center of state-building activities 
and consequently – unlike the other approaches − adopts bottom-up processes. The 
basic assumption of adherents to this strategy is that a consolidation of the state and its 
institutions must emanate from the very bottom of society and must be supported by 
society as a whole. The goal of the strategy is the empowerment of civil society. 
Therefore, advocates of this approach focus on the following activities: improving 
opportunities for political participation; developing the media and a (critical) public; 
supporting disadvantaged and marginalized groups; advising governments to respect 
basic civil liberties and human rights (for instance freedom of the press, rights to free 
speech, freedom of assembly); promoting NGOs, human rights groups and other 
associations; fostering projects relating to women‘s and children‘s rights, education, 
culture and social work. In the case of post-conflict countries, further measures include 
the provision of basic humanitarian services, psychological support, the repatriation of 
refugees and displaced persons, methods of non-violent conflict management and 
reconciliation processes. 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the four state-building strategies.  
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Table 2: State-building strategies 
Strategy Examples of priorities 
Time-
horizon 
IR-theory 
Liberalization 
First 
Democratization, 
economic reform, 
privatization, integration 
into the world economy  
Short- to 
medium 
term 
(5−10 years)   
Liberal 
approaches, 
particularly 
democratic peace 
theory 
Security 
First 
Strengthening the state‘s 
monopoly of force, 
strengthening the security 
apparatus, security sector 
reform 
Short- to 
medium 
term 
(5−10 years)   
Realist 
approaches 
Institutionalization 
First 
Strengthening political 
and administrative 
institutions, promoting the 
rule of law 
Medium- to 
long term  
(10−20 years) 
Institutionalist 
approaches  
Civil Society 
First 
Strengthening social 
cohesion, enhancing 
political participation, 
supporting NGOs, 
associations, parties 
Medium- to 
long term  
(10−20 years) 
Social-
constructivist 
approaches 
Source: Ulrich Schneckener: Addressing fragile statehood: dilemmas and strategies of international 
statebuilding. In: Volker Rittberger. Martina Fischer (eds.): Strategies for Peace. Contributions of 
International Organizations, States, and Non-State Actors. Barbara Budrich. Opladen 2008. p. 210. 
Each of these strategies may have a number of possible adverse effects and 
unintended consequences. The ―liberalization first‖ strategy underrates the destabilizing 
potential of rapid democratization and the liberalization of markets. On the one hand, 
particularly in post-conflict situations, elections often tend to polarize and fuel tensions 
between the various social groups. On the other hand, economic reforms generally serve 
the interests of certain families or clans who already rank among the economic elite. 
These processes deepen the economic divide and privatization in particular is often 
related to corruption, ―shadow-economies‖ and economic crime. This hinders the 
development of public welfare institutions, financed via taxes and fees. 
The stability- rather than reform-oriented ―security first‖ strategy runs the risk of 
turning into a ―security-only‖ strategy. The concentration on the state security apparatus 
may cause the establishment and consolidation of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian 
structures that have a negative effect on other areas of state-building; for example, 
allowing the ruling elites to gain further political power, which enables them to block or 
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rescind reforms, repress oppositional forces or marginalize certain population groups. 
All these processes could in the long-term bring about unintended destabilization.  
Notwithstanding the ―institutionalization first‖ strategy‘s broader agenda of 
measures to establish public institutions, it has the tendency to strengthen those actors 
whose primary intention is to secure their position in power rather than to consolidate 
statehood.  
While the ―civil society first‖ strategy‘s adherents act on the assumption that a 
badly organized civil society is the core problem, they overlook the fact that most 
fragile states are afflicted by the weakness of public institutions, while private and 
social actors may be powerful. The state is inundated by non-state actors who have 
taken over its functions. The support of NGOs and civil actors runs the risk of 
strengthening just those parallel structures and thus hampering the development of a 
legitimate state order. To exclude this risk, it is crucial for external actors to have a 
good knowledge of the various national actors‘ interests.84  
As noted at the beginning of this section, different international organizations, 
multilateral donors and governments involved with a fragile state often pursue different 
strategies and sometimes a mix of strategies is deployed by a single organization. Often 
different actors within a single international bureaucracy or government with contrary 
strategic preferences and differing policy backgrounds compete with one another. For 
instance development ministries usually tend to support the ―liberalization first‖ or 
―civil society first‖ strategy, while defense and interior ministries favor the ―security 
first‖ approach. The simultaneous deployment of diverse strategies is one of the reasons 
for the often criticised lack of coordination between the various external actors. The 
larger the international engagement, the worse are the consequences of this factor. The 
problem of international actors facing challenges of strategic coordination is strongly 
articulated by Jones Bruce. For Bruce, international actors‘ efforts to end civil wars  
―suffer from an inconsistency in conflict management strategies across different 
phases of the peace process; those who mediate agreements sometimes fail to 
coordinate with those who must implement them. All too often different actors 
pursue different strategies within a given phase of the peace process. Or, when 
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they do agree on a strategy, their efforts to operationalize it are at times diffuse 
and contradictory.‖85 
2.1.9.2 Unintended consequences of international intervention 
Apart from the lack of coherence described above, other problems and dilemmas are 
connected with an international intervention, which confront both external actors in the 
field as well as those at headquarters. In general, every external intervention runs the 
risk that the conditions in the particular country will confound all the good intentions. 
There can be many reasons for this including lack of political will on the part of those 
involved, or their ignorance, lack of knowledge or incompetence. In this context, 
Elizabeth Cousens underlines that  
―international actors often lack knowledge of local terrain, languages, histories, 
and habits. [However], war-torn societies need highly context-sensitive 
approaches to build political stabilization, reform and reconstruction, and 
international efforts that are informed enough to adapt themselves to changing 
circumstances in real time.‖86  
The biggest challenge in the field is to avoid or minimize counterproductive effects, 
such as weakening statehood or increasing conflicts as much as possible. Here, decisive 
factors might be how these challenges are tackled, what national actors are chosen to 
cooperate with, how they are influenced and whether measures to stabilize, reform or 
rebuild are encountered with resistance.
87
  
This section will highlight the main problems that have the potential to have a 
negative effect on the outcomes of state-building.  
The first challenge arises from the fact that international state-building 
comprises four interdependent levels of interaction which crucially impact upon the 
outcome. The first level of interaction is between the national actors (conflict parties) 
themselves, the second level is between local and external actors and the third is 
between the different external actors. The fourth level of interaction concerns the 
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internal structure of the external actors. This is the level of national capitals or 
headquarters of international organizations such as New York or Brussels. In theory, 
these levels should be closely connected and cooperate with each other in order to be 
successful. However, the reality is quite different and there are huge deficiencies in 
cooperation. This can partly be explained by the varying criteria that exist on each level 
− the different objectives and priorities external and internal actors pursue as well as 
their diverse time frames. Moreover, external actors in the field and external actors at 
headquarters have to work under different conditions and often have a different 
understanding of the situation. Consequently, a gap often widens between the actors in 
the field who are confronted with the difficulties on the ground and the actors at 
headquarters who are busy with bureaucratic procedures. For the latter, factors that have 
little to do with the actual situation in the field often play a decisive role.
88
  
Every external intervention changes the situation in the country concerned. This 
is of course intended since some national actors are intentionally supported while efforts 
are made to hold others back. Consequently, this leads to changes in the local power 
structures, which can contribute to an increase in social problems and conflicts. In the 
worst case, external actors themselves may become a target for extremists or other 
actors; and thus become a conflict party themselves and unintentionally add to 
instability.  
For Ulrich Schneckener, some other dilemmas that might occur at the field level 
and to which external actors have to find case-specific solutions also play an important 
role: external support versus rent-seeking behavior; ―ownership‖ versus external 
hegemonic control; security-first versus a comprehensive approach; dealing with 
spoilers and para-state structures and finally the duration dilemma.
89
 Each of these 
challenges will be briefly addressed below.  
External actors often face the problem that local political elites‘ cooperation is 
driven by the desire to maximize ―political rents‖ and external funds. This intensifies 
their dependence on external support and presents the risk that clientelistic structures 
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and the ―shadow-economy‖ are strengthened by financial or humanitarian support and 
that short- or medium-term reforms are hindered. 
The problem of ―ownership‖ versus external hegemonic control involves the 
extent to which state-building measures should be managed by local or external actors. 
On the one hand, it is crucial that important decisions are taken by the national actors 
themselves (ownership) and that they assume responsibility for certain measures. On the 
other hand, however, the preference for ownership risks overlooking that in critical 
cases significant measures or decisions are neglected. This problem comes close to the 
so-called ―footprint dilemma‖ discussed by Paris and Sisk who rightly argue that  
―a dominant international presence (a ―heavy footprint‖) may be required to 
maintain security and to oversee (or even enforce) the implementation of a peace 
agreement, including the process of initiating political and economic reforms; on 
the other hand a less intrusive international presence (a ―light footprint‖) may be 
required to allow local political, social, and economic life to achieve a post-
conflict equilibrium on its own terms.‖90  
Another challenge is deciding the strategy that should be the external actors‘ 
main focus. Should they primarily concentrate on improving security and consolidating 
the security sector or should they take a broader approach. As already discussed in the 
previous section, each strategy has its pros and cons. In the end what is crucial is 
whether external actors are able to combine the particular advantages of the different 
strategies and to what extent they are able to benefit from the interdependencies 
between the different approaches. Since none of the strategies can succeed on its own, 
they have to be adapted to the particular circumstances.  
The spoilers and para-state structures considered in earlier sections often present 
international state-builders with another dilemma. The challenge is to push through 
state-building measures against the interests of those actors while at the same time 
trying to integrate them into the processes.  
External actors must deal with the fact that the political interest, their mandate, 
budget and projects are only temporary. National actors are aware of this time frame 
which may determine their own actions. Therefore, those who have limited interest in 
change will try to retard the external actors‘ initiatives. However, for change agents, the 
situation is parlous since they fear being left alone by the international community 
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eventually. Since they cannot be sure of long-term support, they might not even make 
themselves known.  
In this context, the ―duration dilemma‖ noted by Paris and Sisk is an issue. 
While state-building requires long-term international engagement in a country, Paris 
and Sisk point out that prolonged or open-ended presence of the international 
community in a state also has side effects:  
―first, over time, important segments of the local population tend to grow 
increasingly irritated – or even hostile – towards the continued presence of 
powerful outside actors, which can, in turn, undermine externally-assisted 
statebuilding efforts. Second, very lengthy or open-ended missions can produce 
… passivity within the local population, including a lack of interest in taking on 
the responsibilities of self-government.‖91 
In addition to these problems at the field level, the following issues arising at the 
headquarters level are also of importance for the success or failure of a state-building 
mission: coordination and coherence; political focus; strategic and operative planning 
and resource provision as well as legitimacy.  
Coordination and coherence are among the most prominent examples of external 
actors‘ difficulties in state-building. Coordination involves consultation between the 
various actors, information sharing on projects and mutual assistance with common 
problems. Coherence, as discussed in detail above, involves the need for activities to 
interact, developing a common strategic approach and avoiding discrepancies. 
However, to coordinate activities and to achieve coherence often proves challenging 
due to the different starting points taken by the actors as described above.  
 The extent to which the international community is able to maintain the political 
focus on state-building over the longer term is crucial. If political attention declines so 
too does public interest and both have a considerable effect on the provision of financial 
and human resources. 
Another problem is that most external actors do not develop any systematic 
state-building strategies and have difficulties planning concrete measures. In practice, 
the norm is for international organizations to make ad-hoc decisions and requests to 
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their members to provide resources. The fundraising processes may also prove to be 
difficult. Moreover, there are often discrepancies between pledged and actual funds.  
The last dilemma facing external actors relates to legitimacy. International state 
builders have to strive to assure the legitimacy of their actions, which is often 
challenging. On the one hand, they need to meet the diverse expectations of the national 
population, including particular interest groups or the ruling elites of the country 
concerned. On the other hand, their activities also have to be considered legitimate in 
their own country. Moreover, external governments, seeking the support of their 
national constituencies for an international mission, incline to formulate their mandate 
in a way that often proves ineffective in the field, and ultimately proves to generate 
neither successful outcomes in the field nor please their own public. 
2.1.9.3 Principles for international engagement in fragile states and 
situations  
If, as Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk suggest, ―at best, the many dilemmas of postwar 
state-building can only be managed, not resolved,‖92 what is crucial is that international 
actors are aware that there are dilemmas and undertake an analysis of them. Since 
international engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, the OECD has 
adopted some generally agreed principles that can help maximize the positive impact of 
the engagement and minimize unintentional harm. The organization lists the following 
―Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations‖, which 
are aimed at supporting international actors to promote constructive engagement 
between national and international stakeholders in countries with problems of weak 
governance and conflict:
93
  
1. ―Take the context as the starting point.‖ It is crucial for international actors to 
understand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the 
strategic response that is required.  
2. ―Do no harm.‖ International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions 
and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and 
governance analysis.  
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3. ―Focus on state-building as the central objective.‖ International engagement should 
focus on two main areas: firstly, supporting the legitimacy and accountability of 
states and secondly, strengthening the capability of states to fulfill their core 
functions.  
4. ―Prioritise prevention.‖ A greater emphasis on prevention will reduce fragility, lower 
the risk of future conflict and contribute to long-term global development and 
security.  
5. ―Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives.‖ The 
challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. Possible tensions and trade-
offs between objectives need to be addressed. 
6. ―Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.‖ Real or 
perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and conflict, and can lead to 
service failures. Gender equity, participation of youth, social inclusion and human 
rights should be promoted.  
7. ―Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.‖ Where 
governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, 
international actors should seek to align assistance. Activities which undermine 
national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems, should be avoided 
and functioning systems within existing local institutions should be strengthened.  
8. ―Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors.‖ 
International actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and 
civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities. Coordination 
should avoid inconsistencies and thus avoid undermining stabilization efforts.  
9. ―Act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.‖ Assistance to 
fragile states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity 
and respond to changing conditions on the ground.  
10. ―Avoid pockets of exclusion.‖ International actors need to address the problem of 
―aid orphans‖ – states where there are no significant barriers to engagement, but 
international engagement and aid volume is low to avoid destabilization.  
Peacekeeping guidelines that, while of a different style, are nevertheless 
complementary to those of the OECD, are offered by Jan Pronk, who served as the 
Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation between 1973 and 2002. His fifteen 
guidelines focus on the way United Nations peacekeepers should actually behave in the 
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field, which is ultimately of considerable importance to the success or failure of a 
mission. Even though state-building missions aim to create conditions for sustainable 
self-government in the country concerned, by providing assistance to national 
authorities rather than imposing foreign rule, in practice the authority wielded by 
international state-builders is intrusive, no matter how well meaning it may be. 
Therefore, the behavior of the individuals involved is important. Disrespectful behavior 
will reinforce resentment of the intrusion, while appropriate behavior may help allay it. 
Pronk‘s guidelines are as follows:94  
1. ―United Nations peacekeepers in a country are visitors. Their presence is temporary. 
Their function is catalytic, no more. Peace ought to be home grown. 
2. There is no peacekeeping without peace. Peace, to be made by the parties to a conflict 
themselves, should precede efforts to keep the peace. 
3. The sovereignty of a state has to be respected, but brought into balance with the 
protection of the people within that state. Keep that balance! 
4. Respect national traditions and domestic cultures. 
5. International staff members should respect national staff members, their views and 
their positions. They are vulnerable: they have no ticket to leave the country. They 
know their country better than you. National staff members should have patience 
with international staff members. They could have chosen comfort back home. They 
are idealists, or anyway, they have once been idealists. 
6. All UN staff members have the duty to follow a unified approach, in whichever 
agency they work, as peacekeepers or as humanitarian and development workers. 
That implies a commitment to the same goals and a duty to respect the same 
boundary conditions, for instance those set by the Security Council representing the 
international community. A unified approach by all UN agencies also implies the 
duty to consult each other about each other‘s work, the duty to cooperate and to use a 
common infrastructure and common services. Finally this unified approach requires 
the acceptance of a unified command. 
7. Delegate, decentralize, trust your staff and show this to them. 
8. Work as a team. 
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9. The field is more important than headquarters. People in headquarters should 
understand this. But those who are working in the field, when critical about 
headquarters, should be aware that they are not ―the‖ field, but that, farther away, 
other colleagues may consider them too as a headquarter. 
10. Never be satisfied. There is no room for complacency, despite many achievements. 
11. Insecurity, risk, uncertainty and political pressure are not a hindrance, but a 
challenge. They are not exceptions to a normal and stable pattern. They are not 
exogenous factors, but inherent to peacekeeping. 
12. Fight bureaucracy. Fight also the bureaucrat in yourself. … keep the spirit of a 
pioneer. 
13. Care for people. People first. 
14. Peacekeeping is a calling, not a job. 
15. Please, stay.‖ 
While the OECD‘s principles apply to state-building generally (as illustrated for 
instance by principle number three: ―focus on state-building as the central objective‖), 
Pronk is specifically addressing peacekeepers. Nevertheless, both sets of guidelines are 
relevant to all those dealing with fragile states In particular, Pronk‘s guidelines for 
individual behavior have general application. 
The distinction between state-building and the tasks of peacekeeping and peace-
building highlighted by the two sets of guidelines, as well as the subject of the next 
subchapter which focuses on peace as understood by Johan Galtung, necessitate a brief 
definition of the terms related to peace support operations. The ―Agenda for Peace‖, 
which was produced by former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, 
provides the basis for defining these terms.  
The Agenda for Peace, which analyzes the UN‘s capacity for maintaining peace 
and makes recommendations on how to strengthen and improve it, defines four 
consecutive phases of international action to prevent or control conflicts. Those phases 
are: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-
building.
95
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Preventive diplomacy is defined as ―action to prevent disputes from arising 
between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit 
the spread of the latter when they occur.‖96 
Peacemaking is ―action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through 
such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United 
Nations.‖97  
Peacekeeping is ―the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, … 
normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently 
civilians as well.‖98 
Post-conflict peace-building is ―action to identify and support structures which 
will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.‖99 
Peace-building measures may include: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
programs; repatriating refugees; de-mining; advisory and training support for security 
personnel; monitoring and supervising electoral processes; advancing efforts to protect 
human rights; reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting 
formal and informal processes of political participation.  
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2.2 Basic elements of peace theory according to Johan 
Galtung 
These theoretical approaches to achieving, maintaining and reinforcing peace do not 
answer the fundamental question of what ―peace‖ actually means. A full understanding 
of this term, whose interpretation often varies according to the user, is essential to 
answering one of the underlying questions addressed by this study, namely the extent to 
which signs of a so-called ―positive peace‖ can be discerned in Kosovo after 11 years of 
international intervention. To define the terms ―peace‖ and ―violence‖ this study draws 
on the peace theory put forward by Johan Galtung, one of the founding fathers of peace 
and conflict studies. 
2.2.1 Definition and types of violence  
In one of his earliest substantive contributions – ―Violence, Peace and Peace Research‖ 
(1969) − Galtung understands ―peace‖ as ―absence of violence.‖100 However, he notes 
that this is not a definition since it is an obvious case of obscurum per obscurius.
101
 For 
Galtung, creating peace obviously ―has to do with reducing violence (cure) and 
avoiding violence (prevention). And violence indicates harming and/or hurting.‖102 
Consequently, a definition of peace depends on how ―violence‖ is defined and, to know 
about peace, an adequate understanding of violence is required first. Thereby, Galtung 
notes that it is not so important to find the definition or the typology because there are 
obviously many types of violence. It is rather more important to identify theoretically 
significant dimensions of violence that focus thinking, research and action towards the 
most important problems.  
In general, violence is referred to as the infliction of somatic harm by an actor 
with the intention to hurt (direct violence). However, for Galtung this concept is drawn 
too narrowly. He extends it to include mental harm and thus states that ―violence is 
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present when human beings are being influenced in a way that their actual somatic and 
mental realizations are below their potential realizations.‖103 He highlights that one of 
the characteristics of violence is that it is avoidable by further defining it as ―any 
avoidable impediment to self-realization.‖104 This definition goes beyond the mere 
focus on somatic or direct violence and includes what he calls ―structural violence‖. 
Finally, Galtung defines violence as  
―the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what 
could have been and what is. Violence is that which increases the distance 
between the potential and the actual, and which impedes the decrease of that 
distance.‖105  
Galtung‘s key words ―actual‖ and ―potential‖ make the definition similar to the concept 
of violence held by Ted Gurr, who assumes that people engage in violence due to 
―relative deprivation‖ − the discrepancy between what people think they deserve and 
what they actually get. Gurr‘s assumption is that ―the potential for ... violence varies 
strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a 
society.‖106  
Galtung‘s practical example is that a person dying from tuberculosis in the 
eighteenth century could not be described as suffering violence because at the time 
death from the disease was completely unavoidable. However if a person dies from 
tuberculosis today, when tuberculosis is curable, then violence is present according to 
his definition. In other words, when the potential is higher than the actual and the actual 
is avoidable, then violence is present. ―When the actual is unavoidable, then violence is 
not present even if the actual is at a very low level.‖107 Another example helps to clarify 
this. Life expectancy of just thirty years during the Stone Age was not an expression of 
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violence, but the same life expectancy today − whether due to wars or social injustice or 
both – would fall, according to the definition, under the rubric of violence.  
To the two types of violence he defined initially − direct (personal) and indirect 
(structural) violence − Galtung later added a third type − cultural violence − which he 
described in his 1990 work of that name.
108
 Thus, violence was once more redefined as 
―avoidable insults to basic human needs and more generally to life, lowering the real 
level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible.‖109  
2.2.1.1 Direct violence  
Direct or personal violence (from here on referred to simply as direct violence) is the 
most feared form of assault and is defined as physical violence, which is concrete and 
visible with a will to harm/hurt.
110
 For instance, when a war is fought there is direct 
violence since killing or injuring a person certainly puts his actual somatic realization 
below his potential somatic realization. In contrast to structural violence, direct violence 
needs a sender or an actor who intends its consequences (so is also termed personal 
violence). Direct violence is visible as behavior. However, violent human action does 
not emanate from nowhere but has roots. Two roots are: firstly, a structure that itself is 
violent by being too repressive, exploitative or too tight or too loose for people‘s 
comfort and secondly, a culture of violence.
111
  
2.2.1.2 Structural violence  
Indirect or structural violence (hereafter referred to simply as structural violence) as 
indicated above, ―is built into the structure, and shows up as unequal power and 
consequently as unequal life chances.‖112 Therefore, there is no individual provoking 
the gap between the potential and the actual and from whom the harm emanates. 
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Structural violence is invisible, with no will to harm. It kills slowly but may be as much 
or more destructive than direct violence. It is the unequal distribution of resources, and 
in particular, the unequal distribution of the ―power to decide over the distribution of 
resources‖113 that give rise to structural violence. In this context, the resources that are 
unequal are not only material or economic (unequal distribution of income), but also 
non-material, such as unequal education chances, limited healthcare and illiteracy. The 
situation is still further intensified when the people with low incomes have inadequate 
education, poor health and little power at the same time. Given these characteristics, 
structural violence can be equated with ―social injustice‖ or can further be described as 
―human insecurity‖, a term that will be further explained below. Both direct and 
structural violence impinge upon physical and psychological integrity, basic material 
needs (for instance for nutrition and health), human rights (such as freedom of 
expression, free movement, need for mobilization, need for work) and psychological 
needs (solidarity, friendship, happiness and self-actualization).  
2.2.1.3 Cultural violence 
Cultural violence is defined as  
―those aspects of a culture ... – exemplified by religion and ideology, language 
and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be 
used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.‖114  
Cultural violence is invisible, but there may be a clear intent to harm, even kill, 
indirectly, through words and images; in short, symbolically. This is the violence of 
priests, intellectuals and professionals, while the military focus on direct violence and 
the economy often builds and is based on violent structures.
115
 One way cultural 
violence works is by altering the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or 
at least to yellow/acceptable. Galtung highlights that entire cultures can hardly be 
classified as violent and therefore he uses the expression ―aspects of culture‖ in his 
definition of cultural violence. Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence 
look and even feel right; as an example Galtung refers to the theory of a ―Herrenvolk‖ 
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(master race). While Galtung describes direct violence as an event and structural 
violence as a process with ups and downs, he views cultural violence as ―an invariant, a 
‗permanent‘, remaining essentially the same for long periods, given the slow 
transformation of basic culture.‖116 
Galtung holds that the potential for violence is in human nature; however 
circumstances cause the realization of that potential. Thus it follows that ―cultural and 
structural violence cause direct violence‖, making use of violent actors who rebel 
against the structures and using the culture to legitimize their use of violence as an 
instrument.  
Galtung demonstrates the interrelation between direct, structural and cultural 
violence using a violence triangle (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Direct-Structural-Cultural violence triangle according to Johan Galtung 
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Source: Johan Galtung: Violence, War, and their Impact. On Visible and Invisible Effects of Violence. 
Forum for Intercultural Philosophy 5/2004. Online via Internet: URL: http://them.polylog.org/5/fgj-
en.htm  [accessed 19 04 2010]. 
Violence can start at any corner of the direct-structural-cultural violence triangle 
and is easily transmitted to the other corners.
117
 These three types of violence can be 
differentiated as described above between visible and invisible violence. The triangle 
has built-in vicious cycles. For Galtung, the visible effects of direct violence are: the 
killed, the wounded, the displaced and the material damage. However, the invisible 
effects may be even more brutal: ―direct violence reinforces structural and cultural 
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violence.‖118 And this, in turn, may lead to even more direct violence. Although the 
cultural and structural aspects of a conflict are invisible, they play the most important 
role during its rehabilitation and reconciliation. What follows is that peace must also 
develop in the culture and in the structure, not only in human minds.  
Galtung contrasts the violence triangle with a peace triangle in which cultural 
peace creates structural peace, with symbiotic, equitable relations between diverse 
partners, and direct peace, with acts of cooperation, friendliness and love. This could be 
a virtuous rather than a vicious triangle, and also be self-reinforcing. This virtuous 
triangle would be achieved by working on all three corners at the same time, not 
expecting that basic change in one will automatically cause changes in the other two.
119
  
2.2.2 Defining peace 
―Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding.‖ 
−Albert Einstein 
 
Galtung noted that ―an extended concept of violence leads to an extended 
concept of peace.‖120 In other words, one consequence of redefining violence was the 
need to revise also the definition of peace. Consequently, Galtung differentiated 
between two types of peace and coined the terms ―positive‖ and ―negative‖ peace.  
2.2.2.1 Negative and positive peace 
For Galtung, negative peace is at hand when there is an absence of direct violence, 
while positive peace exists only when there is an absence of both direct and structural 
violence. Disarmament is an important aspect of negative peace since it withdraws the 
option to resort to violence and can be a link to building the social and economic 
conditions for positive peace. A further core idea that Galtung highlights is that peace 
should be pursued by peaceful means. Tobias Debiel points out that negative peace 
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could also be referred to as fragile peace: ―Even though a temporary settlement has been 
found to blatant warlike clashes, the economy, state and society remain shaped and 
influenced by structures of violence.‖121  
The interpretation of peace that will be used throughout this study refers to 
Galtung‘s definition of positive peace, which is  
―more than the absence of violence; it is the presence of social justice through 
equal opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection 
and impartial enforcement of law.‖122  
Figure 2 below demonstrates the extended concepts of violence and peace, 
where peace is not merely the absence of direct violence (negative peace) but also 
absence of structural violence (positive peace).  
Figure 2: The extended concepts of violence and peace 
 VIOLENCE 
 
 
 
DIRECT VIOLENCE    INDIRECT VIOLENCE                (social injustice) 
   (Personal violence)       (Structural violence) 
 
 
 
Absence of personal violence Absence of structural violence 
or              or 
    negative peace    positive peace                     (social justice) 
 
 
 
     PEACE  
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According to Galtung‘s peace theory, bringing about peace is thus not only a 
matter of controlling and reducing the overt use of violence, but also involves attempts 
to introduce measures of social justice or ―human fulfillment‖123 – a term that later 
replaced social justice in Galtung‘s work − and has to do with development. Therefore, 
Galtung connected peace theory not only with conflict theory but also with development 
theory. And peace research is equally connected with conflict research and development 
research. While conflict research is more relevant for negative peace, development 
research is more relevant for positive peace, though with significant overlaps.
124
  
According to this definition of positive peace, peace-building should be a 
process by which a society moves beyond negative peace towards positive peace, as 
demonstrated in social structures and institutions. Kenneth Bush argues that peace-
building should be ―a twofold process of deconstructing the structures of violence, and 
constructing the structures of peace.‖125  
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2.3 Assimilating Schneckener and Galtung‟s theories: 
Specification of research questions and hypotheses   
The theoretical and conceptual outline of this study is mainly based on Ulrich 
Schneckener‘s theory of state functions and Johan Galtung‘s theory of violence and 
peace. In simple terms, the study will relate the security function to direct violence and 
the welfare function to structural violence.  
The main assumptions for the relationship between the realization of state 
functions and the degree of negative and positive peace are:  
 Assessing the extent to which the security function is fulfilled implies assessing 
the extent of direct violence, and  
 Evaluating fulfillment of the welfare function implies evaluating the extent of 
structural violence.  
 If the security function alone is fulfilled, then there is peace, but it is negative 
peace, while  
 If both security and welfare functions are fulfilled, then positive peace is 
achieved.  
The following figure illustrates these relationships: 
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Figure 3: The extended concepts of violence and peace in relation to security and 
welfare 
VIOLENCE 
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            PEACE 
Source: Based on Johan Galtung‘s extended concepts of violence and peace (see Figure 2).  
On the basis of these assumptions, the following general research questions have 
been developed:  
 To what extent is the state‘s security function fulfilled and direct violence 
curtailed? 
 To what extent is the welfare function fulfilled and structural violence curtailed? 
 To what extent has Kosovo moved beyond negative peace towards positive 
peace? Are any early indications of positive peace visible?  
Starting with these general research questions, additional research questions can 
be formulated. The first set of questions (category ―A‖) pertains to the development of 
positive peace; the second set of questions (category ―B‖) concerns the international 
organizations‘ role in and contribution to establishing a basis for positive peace in 
Kosovo and the third category (category ―C‖) applies to the national actors‘ efforts to 
achieve positive peace.  
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Category ―A‖ questions:  
 What is the likelihood of Kosovo achieving positive peace?  
 Where can structural violence be identified?  
 How has the economic situation developed in Kosovo since 1999 and what 
dangers result from its poor economic position?  
 Under what conditions can increasing structural violence result in direct 
violence?  
Category ―B‖ questions:  
 What are the various international actors‘ tasks in Kosovo and with what 
problems and dilemmas are they confronted?  
 To what extent did the international organizations provide the basis for the state 
functions of security and welfare and where can shortcomings be found?  
 To what extent did the international organizations provide the basis for positive 
peace beyond the existing negative peace?  
 How successful was the international engagement in Kosovo from the point of 
view of Kosovars on the ground in contrast to that of the international actors?  
Category ―C‖ questions:  
 To what extent do Kosovo‘s institutions provide security and welfare to its 
citizens; where can shortcomings be detected and where is the state falling short 
of fulfilling these functions?  
 What does the population perceive to be the greatest threats?  
 Whom does the population blame for inadequate performance of the welfare 
function?  
These research questions will be addressed in the context of an analysis of 
Kosovo‘s political system, the economic situation, and the state of the security and the 
welfare system in Kosovo.  
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3 KOSOVO  
The Republic of Kosovo (formerly the province officially named Kosovo and Metohija 
within the Republic of Serbia) is situated in the central Balkan Peninsula, in South-
Eastern Europe. It is landlocked, and is surrounded by mountain ranges and hills. There 
are borders with Serbia in the north-west and north-east, the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia in the south, Albania in the south-west, and Montenegro to the west. 
           Map 1: Kosovo 
 
Source: Statistical Office of Kosovo: Online via Internet: URL: http://www.ks-
gov.net/ESK/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=122&Itemid=24 
[accessed 29 06 2009]. 
Most of Kosovo‘s southern border with Macedonia is composed of the Sar mountain 
range, which is an extension of the mountain complexes of Northern Albania. The 
highest peak is 2,565 meters, which is also the highest in Kosovo. The mountains are 
Alpine, and are used primarily as summer pastures by the local farmers.  
Though much of the terrain is mountainous, there are two large plains: the 
Kosovo Plain to the east, and the Dukagjini or Metohija Plain in the south-west. 
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Between them runs a range of hills that occasionally reach above 1,000 meters. The 
central part of this region is known as the Drenica. 
The climate of Kosovo is predominantly continental: warm summers and cold 
winters with Mediterranean and Alpine influences. 
The terrain also includes several rivers and lakes. The two most important rivers 
in Kosovo are the White Drin in the southern part of Kosovo, which flows into the 
Adriatic Sea, and the Ibar River in the north-west, which flows into the Morava and 
Danube Rivers and ultimately into the Black Sea.
126
 
Kosovo is divided into 37 administrative divisions, known as municipalities.
127
 
Its capital is Prishtinë/Priština. Other large towns include Prizren/Prizren, in the south-
west, Pejë/Peć in the west and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica in the north. The municipality of 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica is divided by the Ibar river into a southern district, which is mostly 
inhabited by Kosovo Albanians, and a northern district, which is predominantly Serb.  
The principal language in Kosovo is Albanian, although the Serb population 
speaks Serbian. According to the Constitution of June 2008, both Albanian and Serbian 
have official status throughout Kosovo, while Turkish, Bosnian and Roma may also be 
granted official status at a municipal level.
128
  
Islam and Christianity, both Orthodox and Catholic, coexist in Kosovo. Islam, 
mainly Sunni, is the main religion, professed by some 85 per cent of the population. 
Islam in Kosovo is not extremist. Kosovo Albanians‘ religious traditions and their life 
styles are western oriented.
129
 The minority Bosniak, Gorani, and Turk populations are 
also largely Muslim. The Serbs, by contrast, are principally adherents to Orthodox 
Christianity, as represented by the Serbian Orthodox Church. Around eight per cent of 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are Roman Catholic.
130
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3.1 Geographic and demographic characteristics 
Reliable statistics, essential for long-term project planning, budget projections, and 
decision-making, are sadly lacking where Kosovo is concerned. All that can be stated 
categorically is that its area equals 10,887 square kilometers (4,203 square miles) – 
stretching up to 190km North to South and 150km East to West. Even something as 
simple as the size of the population is based on estimates. 
The last reliable census figures date back to 1981. The 1991 census, which was 
organized by the Serb authorities, was boycotted by ethnic Albanians. Considerable 
population fluctuation during and after the war in 1999 further complicates the picture. 
As of July 2010, estimates range between 1,804,838 to 2,180,686 inhabitants.
131
 If 
accurate, this would amount to about 200 persons per square kilometer. Kosovo‘s ethnic 
composition is 92 per cent Kosovo Albanians and 5.3 per cent Kosovo Serbs, with the 
remaining 2.7 per cent made up of other minority groups such as Bosniak, Gorani, 
Roma, Turk, Ashkali, and Egyptian.
132
 Table 3 shows Kosovo‘s population by ethnic 
origin between 1971 and 2010. 
Table 3: Kosovo population by ethnic origin 
Year Total 
population 
Ethnic origin (%) 
Albanian Serbian Others 
1971 1,243,093 73.7 18.4 7.9 
1981 1,584,440 77.4 13.2 9.3 
1991 1,956,196 81.6 9.9 8.5 
2010 2,180,686 92 5.3 2.7 
Source: Based on the Statistical Office of Kosovo: General Statistics. Kosovo in Figures 2007. p. 12. 
Statistical Office of Kosovo: Key Indicators of Population.  
Areas where Kosovo Serbs form the majority of the population are in the 
municipalities of Leposaviq/Leposavić, Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok, Zveçan/Zvećane and 
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the northern part of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica − all in the far north of the territory − and in 
the southern municipality of Shtërpc/Štrpce (see Map 1). The International Crisis Group 
aptly describes the difference between North and South Kosovo:  
―Crossing the river feels like traversing a border within the EU‘s Schengen zone: 
there are no signs or formalities, but suddenly everything is different: license 
plates, street and shop signs, currency and the language heard on the street. The 
North is part of Kosovo but feels like part of Serbia.‖133 
The lack of reliable census data has caused difficulties in planning national and 
international projects and in specifying budget allocations to the municipalities. 
Moreover, it may have deterred possible investors. Census delays have also resulted in a 
lack of real data on poverty, employment, and educational levels in Kosovo. The 
Statistical Office of Kosovo has been preparing for a new official census since 2003. 
Three test censuses have been conducted, the most recent being between 27 October 
and 10 November 2008 in six municipalities (Prishtinë/Priština, Prizren/Prizren, 
Dragash/Dragaš, Mamushë/Mamuša, Lipjan/Lipljan, Vushtrri/Vučitrn).134 Following 
these, the Statistical Office of Kosovo proposed to set the date of the official census as 
early as possible in 2009. However, in June 2009, Kosovo‘s government set a new date 
for the census, which is now scheduled to take place between 30 March and 11 April 
2011.
135
 
Kosovo is characterized by its higher-than-average population growth – indeed, 
the highest in Europe since World War II. Figure 4 illustrates Kosovo‘s continuous 
population growth in absolute numbers. The period of greatest growth was 1981–91, 
with an increase of 371,756 inhabitants. 
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Figure 4: Kosovo population by censuses 1921−91 and the 2006 and 2010 
estimate 
 
Source: Based on the Statistical Office of Kosovo: Population Statistics. Demographic changes of the 
Kosovo population 1948−2006. pp. 7. 
The fertility rate varies enormously between rural and urban areas, and between 
Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serbian families. In general, a Serbian family is 
considerably smaller than an Albanian family, though the fertility rate of Albanians is 
declining and currently averages 2.5 children per Kosovo Albanian woman while in 
1981 it was 6.74 in rural areas and 2.74 in urban areas.
136
  
Kosovo‘s infant mortality rate is among the worst in Europe: for every 1,000 
live births, between 35 to 49 babies die.
137
 Kosovo also has the youngest population in 
Europe, with an average age of 25 years. Of the total population, 33 per cent are under 
14 years old, 61 per cent are aged between 15 and 64, and six per cent are 65 and 
over.
138
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As of 2007, Kosovo males had an average life expectancy of 67 years compared 
with 71 for females.
139
 Figure 5 compares the life expectancy indices of the Balkan 
countries and shows that Kosovo ranks lowest in terms of life expectancy in the whole 
Balkan region. The life expectancy index a component of the Human Development 
Index, shows how countries rank relative to one another in terms of life expectancy at 
birth, where an index over 0.800 points to high human development; between 0.500 and 
0.800 to medium human development; and below 0.500 to low human development.  
Figure 5: Life Expectancy Index in the Balkan region, 2007 
 
      Source: UNDP Kosovo: Energy for Development. Kosovo Human Development Report 2007. p. 4.  
The overall illiteracy rate in Kosovo is about 5.8 per cent,
140
 but typically higher 
among women, in rural areas and among older residents. Almost 14 per cent of women 
over 15 years old living in rural areas are defined as illiterate; the rate for comparable 
men is 4.0 per cent.
141
  
One way of measuring Kosovo‘s overall level of development is by using the 
UNDP‘s human development index (HDI). (The compiling of the HDI, which combines 
the three indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income into a 
composite index, was a breakthrough in that it creates a single statistical indicator for 
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both social and economic development. The index sets a minimum and a maximum for 
each dimension, called goalposts, and then shows where each country stands in relation 
to these goalposts, expressed as a value between zero and one.
142
 In short, the HDI 
measures a country‘s average achievements in three basic aspects of human 
development: health, education and standard of living. Health is measured by life 
expectancy at birth; knowledge by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the 
combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio; and standard of living 
by GDP per capita.
143
)  
Kosovo‘s performance as measured by the HDI is the lowest in the Balkans as 
shown in Figure 6. Kosovo is not ranked in the UNDP‘s global human development 
index, but its overall HDI score would place it in the ―medium human development‖ 
category. 
Figure 6: HDI scores of Balkan countries, 2007 
 
    Source: UNDP Kosovo: Energy for Development. Kosovo Human Development Report 2007. p. 3.   
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3.2 Key historical events  
Both Albanians and Serbs consider Kosovo to be their land, and the political tensions 
and disputes on this matter date back many centuries. For the Serbs, Kosovo is a region 
of great strategic and economic importance, as well as the cradle of the Serbian nation. 
It is the location of the legendary battle against the Ottoman conquerors in 1389, and 
has a heavy concentration of Serbian historical, religious and cultural monuments. Serbs 
have tried to substantiate their claim that before they arrived in the region in the sixth 
and seventh centuries, Kosovo was almost uninhabited, and that Albanians only arrived 
in the fifteenth century with the Turks. On the other hand, Albanians claim that they are 
Kosovo‘s original inhabitants, indeed the descendants of the ancient Illyrians.144  
The Serbian description of Kosovo as the cradle of the Serbian nation gives the 
impression that Kosovo was a Serb heartland from the outset. However, the reality is 
different. Roughly 900 years separate the Serb migration into the Balkans in the sixth 
century and the final Ottoman conquest in 1459. However, Kosovo was Serb-ruled for 
only the last two-and-a-half of those nine centuries, or less than one-third of the entire 
period. Bulgarian tsars held Kosovo from the 850s until the early eleventh century, and 
Byzantine Emperors until the final decades of the twelfth.
145
  
There are numerous theories about the exact origins of the Illyrians, and whether 
or not they are the ancestors of the modern Albanians. However, according to 
international scholars, the Albanian claim seems plausible. The fact that this region was 
inhabited by other people before the Serbs did not fit in with the Serbian account of 
their history and so appears to have been simply excluded from the record. This 
argument over whether the Illyrians were the ancestors of the Albanians continues, even 
today, to divide Serbian and Albanian accounts of Kosovo‘s history. 
While the Serbs‘ claim to Kosovo originated mainly from a selective reading of 
history and nationalist mythology, the Albanians, by contrast, can rely on a second 
empirical argument based on demography. Albanians point to the fact that they 
constitute more than 90 per cent of the population and thus outnumber Serbs or any 
other nationality.  
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Balkan history in modern times is characterized by a sequence of battles and 
wars, fomented by foreign powers and domestic interest groups intentionally deploying 
nationalist ideology. In keeping with this trend, although history was not the root cause 
of the war in Kosovo, it was heavily used as a political propaganda instrument. 
Albanians and Serbs have their own immiscible and mythologized perspectives of the 
past with which they seem to have difficulty coming to terms. This chapter aims both to 
dispel historical claims that emanate from nationalist mythology rather than historical 
facts, and to highlight the way communist education often used a selective view of 
history and suppressed facts that interfered with a more accurate account.  
Since Serbian and Albanian political leaders both appeal to the past to explain or 
justify their policies, it is necessary to begin this account in ancient times to pinpoint 
events that influenced the later period. However, it should be noted that the events of 
ancient history cannot have any implications for modern politics. By looking at these 
events, one seeks to understand why the people of Kosovo behave as they do today.  
Research into the Iron Age has shown that a culture with distinct features that 
can without doubt be called Dardanian existed in the eighth century BC in the territories 
that written sources later called Dardania. The Dardanians can, with a degree of 
certainty, be considered Illyrians.
146
  
History becomes a little more focused when the area was conquered by Rome 
and incorporated into the Roman Empire. Illyrians, who spoke a proto-Albanian 
language, lived outside the towns in the Roman province of Dardania, which included 
Kosovo and Skopje. Throughout the third and fourth centuries AD, the Illyrian regions 
suffered numerous invasions by Teutonic tribes, the Goths, the Huns and the Avars. By 
the sixth century, the Slavs had begun to cross the Danube and Serbs and Croats, who 
were first described as one people, descended into the Balkans. However, these large 
migrations did not wipe out pre-existing societies in the central Balkans. In the seventh 
century, Serbian principalities arose in Rascia (to the north of modern day Kosovo), 
where Slavic immigrants merged with autochthonous people. 
During the tenth century, the central Balkan regions became the scene of conflict 
between the Byzantines and the Bulgarians. The Bulgarian Empire, which comprised 
most of the land between the Black Sea and the Adriatic, including all Albanian 
inhabited regions, was defeated by the Byzantines, who then reestablished their rule 
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over the Albanian speaking regions. In 1054, the Christian world finally split into the 
Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches and as a result, the Albanian people of 
the Balkans came under the influence on the one hand, of the Greeks and Slavs and, on 
the other, of Rome and Venice.
147
 
In the 1160s the new medieval Serb kingdom of the Nemanjids emerged, and 
was to dominate the history of the region for the next 200 years. By the time King 
Stefan Nemanja I abdicated in 1196, he had conquered the whole of Eastern Kosovo. In 
1216 his son Stefan II took over Western Kosovo and so the whole territory of Kosovo 
was now under Serbian rule. One year later, Stefan II was crowned King of Serbia by a 
papal legate who had been sent from Rome especially for this purpose. During the 
Nemanjids‘ rule Kosovo became the administrative and cultural center of the Serbian 
state. 
In the thirteenth century, several Serbian territorial expansions occurred, 
however the height of the medieval state was reached under Stefan Dusan in the 
fourteenth century. Under Dusan‘s rule Serbia was the major power in the Balkans, and 
the multi-lingual empire stretched from the Danube to the Gulf of Corinth, with the 
capital in Skopje. In 1346, Dusan was crowned ―Emperor of the Serbs and the Greeks‖ 
by the Serbian Patriarch. With his death in 1355, the empire began to break up. Dusan‘s 
son, Tsar Uros, succeeded, but his death in 1371 at the Battle of Marica in Bulgaria 
against the invading Ottomans marked the end of the Nemanjids dynasty.  
The truth is that the Battle of Marica was far more decisive in opening up the 
Balkans to the Turks and in weakening the Serbs than the later and more famous Battle 
of Kosovo, which was fought on 28 June 1389 near today‘s Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo 
Polje (The Field of Blackbirds), just outside Prishtinë/Priština. 
However, it was the Battle of Kosovo that played a unique role in forming 
Serbian mythology and identity. According to classical Serbian history, the Serbian 
Prince Lazar was defeated by the invading Ottoman Turks at Kosovo Polje, and in the 
Serbian view, medieval Serbia‘s fate was sealed. The Serbs, critically weakened in this 
seemingly decisive battle, subsequently became part of the Ottoman Empire. The 
Serbian myth says that Serbia alone fought against the Ottomans, but the reality seems 
to have been different. There is historical evidence that it was a Christian alliance of 
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Serbs, Bosnians, Croats, Hungarians and Albanians that confronted the Ottoman 
army.
148
  
Over the next 600 years, the Battle at Kosovo Polje has exercised a powerful 
grip on the Serbian imagination; the call to ―avenge Kosovo‖ was an emotional one 
during the nineteenth century reawakening of Serbian nationalism.  
However, the Serbian inclination to describe this battle as decisive is puzzling 
since Serbia was able to continue to resist the Ottoman Empire for a further 70 years. 
The remainder of Serbia was only conquered by the Islamic Ottoman Turks in 1459 
with the fall of its last capital, Smederevo. It was this that marked the end of medieval 
Serbia.
149
  
The crusade of Varna in 1444 and the second battle of Kosovo in 1448 between 
the Hungarian Kingdom and the Ottomans both ended in devastating Hungarian losses. 
However, they provided the basis for the major revolts against Ottoman rule led by the 
well-known Albanian nobleman Gjergj Kastriot or ―Skenderbeg‖ (meaning Lord 
Alexander in Turkish), today‘s Albanian national hero. Skenderbeg fought against the 
far larger and better equipped Ottoman army for 25 years, until his death in 1468. 
Skenderbeg‘s successes became highly significant to the Albanian people and have been 
heroically embellished to form part of the Albanian mythology.  
Nevertheless, during the centuries of Ottoman rule, Albanians converted to 
Islam in large numbers led by the most powerful individuals and families. By accepting 
Islam they gained opportunities to build their careers in society and state, which was the 
Ottoman strategy in all the territories inhabited by Albanians, and beyond.
150
 
Meanwhile, the ethnic balance of the region steadily changed in favor of Albanian 
speakers as Kosovo Serbs migrated northwards.  
A crucial development took place during the Austro-Ottoman wars in the 
seventeenth century, when Serbs left Kosovo in large numbers. In 1690, refusing to 
convert to Islam and fearing carnage, the Orthodox Patriarch of Pejë/Peć, Arsenije, 
turned to the Austrian Emperor Leopold I for support. Thereupon, Leopold I granted the 
Serbian population asylum in the Habsburg territories where they also enjoyed special 
political and religious status. (Popular tradition is that about 37,000 Serbian families 
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migrated from Kosovo to Vojvodina and Hungary, though in fact it was only some 
30,000 people in all).
151
 This exodus, known as the Great Serb Migration, shifted the 
majority of Serbs northward to the region of Belgrade where they have remained ever 
since. Additionally, the abolition of the patriarchate at Pejë/Peć in 1766 substantially 
diminished the importance of Kosovo as a Serbian cultural center. As a result, Kosovo 
became underpopulated and Kosovo‘s fertile land quickly attracted a new wave of 
immigrants from the mountains of Albania. Most of the new arrivals became Muslims 
in order to register their rights to the newly possessed land. Ethnic Albanians 
increasingly identified with the region, and by the late nineteenth century, Prizren had 
become an important center of Albanian culture and national consciousness.
152
  
The nineteenth century was characterized by uprisings associated with the 
emergence of nationalism. Prince Miloš Obrenović, who led the second of two Serb 
rebellions, secured complete autonomy for Serbia in 1833. 
After repressing a major revolt in Bosnia in 1875, the Ottomans almost managed 
to conquer Serbia, and in 1877 Russia, joined by Serbia and Montenegro, declared war 
on the Turks. The international crisis that followed was resolved first with the Treaty of 
San Stefano in 1878 and then with its revision, the Treaty of Berlin. The treaty 
recognized the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania while Bulgaria was 
granted autonomy and Bosnia-Herzegovina came under Austro-Hungarian rule. The 
ceding under the treaty of Albanian-inhabited territories to Slavic states caused 
extensive resentment and led to a resistance movement in Kosovo against the Treaty of 
Berlin and finally against Ottoman rule itself.  
The Albanian national movement in Kosovo began when 300 Albanians called a 
meeting in Prizren where they founded the Prizren League. The political aims of the 
league were to prevent the dismemberment of the Albanian territories of the Ottoman 
Empire, to defend Albanian territorial integrity and to unite the four Albanian-inhabited 
provinces of Janina, Monastir, Shkoder and Kosovo into one political and 
administrative unit − still under the umbrella of Ottoman rule. In a letter to Britain‘s 
delegate to the Berlin Congress, the league declared:  
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―Just as we are not and do not want to be Turks, so we shall oppose with all our 
might anyone who would like to turn us into Slavs or Austrians or Greeks, we 
want to be Albanians.‖153  
As the Ottoman Empire weakened, the League considered total autonomy within the 
Empire as the best option to preserve their interests and safety. The League gradually 
became anti-Christian, and the Muslim leadership encouraged a policy similar to 
―ethnic cleansing‖. As a result increasing numbers of Serbs left Kosovo for Serbia.154  
The independence of Albania and Serbia‘s territorial gains − including Kosovo − 
in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 worsened Serbian–Albanian relations. Serbia asserted 
an historical claim to Kosovo, whether it was predominantly inhabited by Albanians or 
not, and the policy of the Serbian State towards Kosovo has been based on this claim 
ever since.
155
 In 1918, Serbia, including Kosovo, entered the new ―Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes‖, renamed Kingdom of Yugoslavia after 1929. 156  
Throughout the inter-war period, Serbia tried to resettle Serbs in Kosovo in order 
to turn round the population imbalance. However, this so-called ―colonization‖ process 
was met with resistance from local ethnic Albanians.
157
 During the ―first Yugoslavia‖, 
Kosovo had no special status but was considered as a district in Southern Serbia. 
Albanians were discriminated against in political, economic, social, and cultural 
spheres, and many were forced or intimidated into leaving. In July 1921, Kosovo 
Albanians presented a petition to the League of Nations requesting reunion with 
Albania. The petition stated that since 1918, Serbs had killed 12,371 people in Kosovo 
and imprisoned 22,000. However, this request was turned down.
158
  
During World War II, Kosovo was annexed to Greater Albania under Italian 
patronage, while the northern tip of Kosovo was occupied by Germans, and a strip of 
land in Eastern Kosovo went to Bulgaria.
159
 Consequently, Serbs, especially recent 
settlers, were driven out. After World War II, the pre-war situation was restored, with 
the Albanian population achieving greater rights from the mid-1960s onwards. Until 
then the Albanian repression continued to some extent while Aleksandar Ranković 
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served as Yugoslav Minister of the Interior. Ranković was a Serbian communist as well 
as a nationalist and was removed from office in 1966 after having bugged Tito‘s 
conversations. For the Albanians in Kosovo the removal of Ranković was a turning 
point in their fight for national rights.
160
 
After World War II, Yugoslavia under Marshal Josip Broz Tito became a 
Communist federation, the Federative People‘s Republic of Yugoslavia. The 
Constitution of 1946 established six socialist republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia), Vojvodina became an autonomous 
province, while Kosovo remained an autonomous region, with lesser competencies than 
an autonomous province. 
The Yugoslav constitution of 1963 promoted Kosovo to an ―autonomous 
province‖. Amendments of 1971 were incorporated in the Yugoslav constitution of 
1974 which remained in force until the final break-up of Yugoslavia. These gave the 
autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina a status almost equivalent to that of 
the six republics, with their own direct representation on the main federal Yugoslav 
bodies. The constitution also gave the autonomous provinces the right to issue their own 
constitutions.
161
  
However, the constitution of 1974 failed to meet the aspirations of the Kosovo 
Albanians who were demanding a Kosova-Republika. The status of Vojvodina and 
Kosovo differed from that of the republics in that the statehood of the regions was not 
accepted. In the constitution of 1974, Albanians were merely defined as a nationality of 
Yugoslavia and not as a nation, which is why Kosovo was given autonomy but not 
designated a republic. The sovereignty implied in being designated a nation also 
contained the crucial right to secession.
162
 By calling for a republic, Kosovo Albanians 
referred to their distinct ethnicity and the reality that Kosovo, with an area of 10,887 
square kilometers and a population of more than one million, was no less entitled to 
republic status than Montenegro with an area of 13,812 square kilometers and a 
population of only 550,000.
163
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On the other hand, the constitution of 1974 did require that  Kosovo Albanians 
received equal rights to Serbs. Albanian rights were increased step by step, and a 
process of what was seen as political, economic and cultural Albanianization began in 
Kosovo, with Albanians largely taking over the province‘s administration. These 
concessions to Albanians promoted Albanian nationalism, encouraging on the one hand 
emigration from Albania to Kosovo and on the other hand an increasing Serb 
emigration from the province. The already small Serb minority reduced gradually so 
that in the census of 1981 Albanians made up 77 per cent of the population while Serbs 
only made up 13 per cent.
164
 Serbs also left Kosovo because of its poor economic 
situation,
165
 which deteriorated further because, in general, the Serbs who left were 
better educated and technically qualified than the new Albanian immigrants; by now, 
the province lagged far behind the rest of Yugoslavia economically. 
3.2.1 The Serbian−Albanian dispute over Kosovo  
With the potential for instability already high, an economic downturn combined with 
rapid population growth led to pressure on resources, which led to riots by Albanian 
students in 1981, one year after Tito‘s death. A student demonstration in 
Prishtinë/Priština, initially calling for better university conditions, developed into a 
political mass revolt demanding that Kosovo be granted full republic status. Thousands 
of workers, especially Trepča miners, along with teachers, students, civil servants and 
Albanians from all walks of life, gathered in the streets to shout slogans: ―Kosovo 
Republic‖, ―Stop the Exploitation of Trepča‖, ―Protect the Rights of Albanians Outside 
Kosovo‖, ―Improve Living Conditions for Students and Workers‖, ―Stop Repression, 
Free Political Prisoners‖.166 Among today‘s Albanians, the 1981 demonstrations are 
considered a key political turning point of the Yugoslav era. Following the protest, 
Prishtinë University was described as a hotbed of Albanian nationalism, and Yugoslav 
security forces re-established a stronger grip over the province. Despite Kosovo‘s 
autonomy, renewed Serbian repression began. This encouraged the rise of Albanian 
nationalism and, last but not least, the emergence of extremism. Extremist Albanians 
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who clamored for an ―ethnically clean‖ Kosovo, widespread threats and violence led 
once again to Serb migration from Kosovo.  
Serbian nationalism was also given renewed impetus by these developments, 
which Slobodan Milošević used to take over Serbia‘s leadership. One expression of 
Serbian nationalism was the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts published in September 1986, which called for a revocation of Kosovo‘s autonomy 
and de-Albanianization of Kosovo.
167
  
From the mid-1980s, increasing Serb nationalism under Milošević exacerbated 
tensions in the province. Milošević became head of the Serb Communist Party in 1987 
and president of the Serbian Republic in 1989. He stripped Kosovo of its autonomy and 
used the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo to reassert Serbia‘s dominance. 
Milošević‘s regime tried to set up direct jurisdiction over Kosovo by limiting the rights 
of Albanians through a systematic campaign for their social exclusion. Serbia took 
direct control of the province‘s administration, forced many Kosovo Albanians from 
their jobs, and overhauled the education system to make education for Kosovo 
Albanians much less accessible. Jobs could now easily be given to the ―more educated‖ 
Serbian population. Many inequitable laws were passed; one that outraged many 
Albanians was a law which prohibited the shift of real property from a Serb to an 
Albanian. By imposing these harsh living conditions, Milošević tried to change the 
ethnic balance of Kosovo in favor of the Serbs. As William G. O‘Neill writes,  
―Milosevic and other Serb extremists even talked of ‗demographic genocide‘ to 
describe the relatively high Albanian birthrate in Kosovo and the ever increasing 
Albanian share of Kosovo‘s population, coupled with Serb emigration.‖168 
Recurrent demonstrations by Albanians were quashed forcibly. The most 
noteworthy riot was the five-day demonstration for national liberation and autonomy by 
expelled mineworkers from Trepča in November 1988. In February 1989, another 
hunger strike by miners broke out; many miners and mine managers were arrested and 
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imprisoned for up to 14 months. These events are remembered and romanticized today 
as Kosovo‘s own Solidarity movement − the earliest sustained resistance to Serbian 
oppression under Milošević.169 
Another incident that is always mentioned by Kosovars is the removal of 
Albanians from their jobs in state institutions in the summer of 1990. In April of that 
year, thousands of Kosovo Albanian schoolchildren were reportedly poisoned by Serbs. 
Violence resulted and Albanians attacked the homes of local Serbs. In response, Serbia 
took over the police force in Kosovo and transferred 25,000 policemen from Serbia to 
the province. By the end of the summer more than 15,000 Kosovo Albanians had been 
removed from state jobs.
170
 
The dismantling of Kosovo‘s autonomy was completed in September 1990 when 
the Serbian constitution was changed and Kosovo was redefined as a region within the 
Serbian republic. Under ―emergency measures‖, Albanian workers were expelled en 
masse from state institutions and a process of forced Serbianization began. The 
Albanian community responded by declaring Kosovo a republic, naming Dr Ibrahim 
Rugova as President, and organizing parallel political structures. In September 1991, the 
Kosovo parliament approved an independence resolution, which was then confirmed by 
referendum. In October 1991 the parliament declared Kosovo an independent 
republic.
171
  
Ibrahim Rugova was elected as President of Kosovo in May 1992. As head of 
the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), which had been founded  in December 1989 
as a peaceful resistance movement to Serbian rule, Rugova had stood up for achieving 
independence by peaceful means, following Gandhi‘s example of passive resistance. 
Rugova embodied the struggle for independence for the Kosovars and was much 
respected internationally for his moderate position and non-violent methods. The LDK 
established a parallel government to provide education and health services to the 
Albanian population; many Albanians were either excluded from or chose not to use the 
equivalent services provided by the Serbian government. The policy pursued by Rugova 
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and the LDK was three-fold: to prevent violent revolt; to ―internationalize‖ the problem, 
which meant seeking forms of international involvement; and to deny systematically the 
legitimacy of Serbian rule by creating a Kosovo Republic.
172
  
In the beginning, Rugova‘s strategy of passive resistance was widely supported 
by the Kosovo Albanian population, and up to the Dayton Peace Accord of November 
1995, the Kosovo Albanian answer to Belgrade‘s apartheid-like regime was non-
violent. However, the situation began to change when Rugova‘s methods failed to yield 
results. A radicalization process began especially among young Kosovo Albanians and 
eventually created a massive student movement as well as a small, but efficient, militant 
and armed underground.  
In the Dayton Agreement, which ended the Bosnian War, Kosovo was totally 
neglected and the international community failed to arbitrate between Kosovo 
Albanians and the Serb government. Since the international community made no serious 
efforts to resolve the province‘s ongoing problems, Rugova came under increasing 
attack from radicals who claimed that his pacifism was tantamount to passivity. Many 
Kosovo Albanians were deprived of their hopes and perspectives, and began to believe 
that Rugova‘s policy of ―passive resistance‖ had failed. An armed resistance emerged in 
1997 with the first public appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) − in 
Albanian, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK)
173
 − whose main goal was to secure the 
independence of Kosovo.
174
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3.2.2 The war in Kosovo 
The political crisis in Albania contributed to the KLA‘s increasing power. In the spring 
of 1997, the collapse of a massive pyramid financial scheme drove about two-thirds of 
the population into abysmal poverty and provoked widespread unrest. Weapons depots 
all over the country were looted by desperate people. Soon, tens of thousands of 
Kalashnikovs and other automatic weapons were circulating throughout the country. 
The KLA now had easy access to small arms at a low price, significantly increasing its 
firepower.
175
 
With the frustration of Dayton and the sudden availability of weapons, the 
character and intensity of the armed resistance changed. The KLA became more 
sophisticated in its methods and increased its activity in 1997 and early 1998, with 
attacks especially on Serb police stations and police officers. 
When in February 1998, innocent civilians, mostly women and children, were 
killed by Serbian forces in the KLA stronghold of Drenica, interethnic tensions 
escalated and the KLA began a guerrilla war against the Serb Yugoslav authority. The 
police reportedly burned homes and killed dozens of ethnic Albanians in the ensuing 
raids. This fighting sparked the first mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo, with 
thousands now displaced from their homes. As the bloody incidents increased, the 
major Western powers finally paid attention to the problem. In March 1998, the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) in its Resolution 1160 condemned ―the use of excessive force 
by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well 
as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army.‖176 Starting in July 1998, 
Milošević steadily increased the level of violence against the Albanian majority and by 
September there were an estimated 200,000 displaced ethnic Albanians.
177
 When the 
guerrilla war continued and Milošević‘s ethnic cleansing campaign progressed, NATO 
threatened Milošević with air strikes – demanding that the Serbian army stop attacks on 
civilians and security forces withdraw from Kosovo within 96 hours. After negotiations 
with the US envoy Richard Holbrooke, a ceasefire agreement was reached in October 
1998. Milošević agreed to pull back the bulk of his military forces from Kosovo, allow 
the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and permit the deployment of 
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the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). Following the agreement, the KVM 
was deployed, consisting of 1,500 international observers,
178
 to monitor the 
implementation of the agreement.
179
  
Despite the presence of an international observer force, violence continued and 
the situation worsened significantly. On 15 January 1999 about 45 Albanians, some of 
them children, were found murdered in the village of Reçak/Račak. Ambassador 
William Walker, the head of the OSCE Mission, immediately accused the Serbs of 
being responsible. Belgrade, however, asserted that the KLA had staged the massacre to 
justify Western intervention. The Reçak incident later became the basis of one of the 
indictments of war crimes against Milošević.  
As fighting continued into February, the six-nation Contact Group – the United 
States, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and Italy − organized a conference with Serb 
and Kosovar leaders in Rambouillet, near Paris, in order to negotiate an end to the war. 
The international community‘s proposals called for the disarmament of the KLA and 
the withdrawal of Serb forces. This was to be secured through the stationing of a 
30,000-strong peacekeeping force in Kosovo under the umbrella of NATO. The plan 
also provided for a restoration of Kosovo‘s autonomy and its independent institutions, 
but left the issue of future status for reconsideration after three years.
180
 Milošević 
rejected this proposal, declaring that the presence of a NATO force to supervise its 
implementation in Kosovo would be an unacceptable infringement of Serbian 
sovereignty. Since no agreement was reached, another conference was held in Paris (on 
15−18 March 1999) where the proposal was signed by the Kosovo Albanians. Once 
again, Milošević refused to sign, and the negotiations failed a second time.  
Finally, NATO launched the threatened bombing campaign over the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999, without specific UNSC authorization. After 
78 days, Milošević capitulated, agreeing to admit the Kosovo Force (KFOR)181 into 
Kosovo and withdraw his forces. The first elements of KFOR, a contingent of military 
forces from NATO and non-NATO countries, entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999, with an 
initial strength of 50,000. By 20 June, the withdrawal of Serbian forces was complete. 
Under the Military Technical Agreement signed by KFOR and the governments of the 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia at the end of the conflict, the 
international security force was authorized to ―take all necessary action to establish and 
maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its 
mission.‖182 
One of the impacts of the Kosovo war was the massive flight of people from 
their homes. At least 500,000 were internally displaced and over 6,000 killed. It is 
estimated that over 800,000 Kosovo Albanians fled to neighboring Albania, 
Montenegro, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during the course of the 
conflict.
183
  
3.2.3 Kosovo under UN administration 
On 10 June 1999, the UNSC passed Resolution 1244, mandating KFOR‘s presence and 
the creation of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), which was to  
―provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of 
Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while 
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-
governing institutions‖, with the goal of ―facilitating a political process designed 
to determine Kosovo‘s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet 
accords.‖184  
UNMIK consisted of four different components − called ―pillars‖ – which were 
subordinate to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Each pillar 
was led by a Deputy SRSG appointed by the Secretary-General, and run under the 
auspices of different international organizations. Pillar I was originally led by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and dealt with 
humanitarian affairs and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons in the 
immediate post-conflict emergency phase. However, with the emergency phase over, 
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Pillar I was taken over by the UN directly and reformulated in May 2001 as the Police 
and Justice Pillar. Since then, the pillars have been as follows:
185
  
 Pillar I: Police and Justice, led by the UN.  
 Pillar II: Civil Administration, led by the UN.  
 Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
186
 
 Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European 
Union.  
Based on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, UNMIK‘s main 
responsibilities include: 
 promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in 
Kosovo;  
 performing basic civilian administrative functions;  
 organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government, including the holding of elections; 
 transferring its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting 
the consolidation of Kosovo‘s local provisional institutions and other peace-
building activities;  
 facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo‘s future status; 
 overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo‘s provisional institutions to 
institutions established under a political settlement; 
 supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
reconstruction; 
 supporting humanitarian and disaster relief aid; 
 maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces; 
 protecting and promoting human rights; and  
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 assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to 
their homes in Kosovo. 
UNSCR 1244 made no mention of the really burning question: who would have 
ultimate authority over Kosovo? The lack of clarity intensified extremist views on both 
the Kosovo Albanian and the Kosovo Serb sides. Both utilized the ambiguity of 
Kosovo‘s future political status to legitimize their aggression. Albanian extremists 
fostered the fear that the Serbs might return, since Yugoslavia‘s sovereignty over 
Kosovo remained unsettled by the resolution, and argued that it was therefore important 
to expel as many Serbs as possible and destroy their homes. Kosovo Albanians also 
pursued a policy of removing any incentive Serbs might have to return to Kosovo, thus 
strengthening Kosovo‘s claim for independence. Likewise, Serb extremists encouraged 
the remaining Serbs not to cooperate with UNMIK or KFOR, since Kosovo was still 
part of Serbia and all decisions regarding local administration, public services and 
security should still come from Belgrade. Serbs who were willing to cooperate with 
international organizations were threatened by Serb extremists. This ambiguity over 
Kosovo‘s future status hampered efforts to promote interaction between the two 
communities.
187
  
In April 2002, UNMIK chief Michael Steiner introduced UNMIK‘s core 
political project, the ―standards-before-status‖ policy, as a stopgap to put off pressure 
within Kosovo for independence. The policy stated that if the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government (PISG) made progress towards achieving certain standards, Kosovo‘s 
final status could be addressed in mid-2005. The eight standards concerned functioning 
democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee returns and 
reintegration, economic progress, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade and the 
establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps.
188
  
Whatever progress had been achieved was utterly shattered by the March riots of 
2004, the worst fighting between Serbs and Albanians since the end of the war. What 
started as demonstrations against UNMIK and the perceived lack of progress toward 
independence turned into riots that claimed a total of 19 lives, of whom 11 were Kosovo 
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Albanians and eight were Kosovo Serbs. In all, 954 persons were injured in the course 
of the clashes. Approximately 730 houses belonging to minorities, mostly Kosovo 
Serbs, were damaged, along with 36 Orthodox churches, monasteries and other 
religious and cultural sites. In less than 48 hours, 4,100 minority community members 
were newly displaced, exceeding the 3,664 that had returned throughout 2003.
189
 
KFOR‘s and UNMIK‘s responses were disorganized and negatively affected their 
credibility, particularly amongst Serbs. According to a Serbian woman interviewed by 
the author:  
―KFOR didn‘t do anything to prevent that violence. The only thing that they did 
was they evacuated Serbs from monasteries, from certain areas − villages − and 
that‘s it. They really didn‘t do anything to stop the violence, which is a shame in 
my view.‖190  
Igballe Rogova, a participant in the demonstrations in 2004, gives the following account 
of the riots:  
―It started with protests against UNMIK, and I‘m a witness, I was in the streets 
myself protesting against UNMIK. But then, I don‘t know where this group 
came from. It was very well planned; this mysterious extremist group was sent 
into the crowd and said ‗let‘s go and burn the churches‘. Young people followed 
them and we went home; we said ‗no, we don‘t want violence‘. Still today we 
don‘t know who they were, this mysterious group. So the situation turned 
violent, and I blame the international community for that. I don‘t blame 
Albanians.‖191  
In response, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan dispatched the Norwegian 
diplomat Kai Eide as a special envoy to investigate the situation in Kosovo. Eide 
reported in October 2005 that there was nothing to gain from further delay in resolving 
the status question. The failure to take action would only lead to further instability. In 
November 2005, the Contact Group produced a set of ―Guiding Principles‖ for the 
resolution of Kosovo‘s future status. Some key principles included: no return to the pre-
March 1999 situation, no changes in Kosovo‘s borders, and no partition or union of 
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Kosovo with a neighboring state.
192
 Annan then appointed Martti Ahtisaari, former 
president of Finland, to lead the future status process. From February through 
September 2006, Ahtisaari‘s office engaged the negotiating teams of Kosovo and Serbia 
in several rounds of direct talks in Vienna. 
3.2.4 The way to independence  
After a significant delay to allow for Serbia‘s 21 January 2007 elections, Ahtisaari 
presented his draft Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement to both 
Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština on 2 February, covering a wide range of issues related to 
Kosovo‘s future. The status negotiations were formally closed on 10 March, and the 
proposals were put before the UNSC on 26 March. The Security Council could not 
agree on a resolution backing supervised independence, so the Troika
193
 initiated 
another round of negotiations between Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade. Talks ended on 
10 December without a compromise status settlement. At a summit on 14 December, 
EU leaders discussed preparations to proceed towards supervised independence based 
on the Ahtisaari plan, which would include the deployment of the 1,800 strong 
European Union security and rule of law mission (EULEX).  
Two months later, on 17 February 2008, Kosovo made a unilateral declaration of 
independence. In the declaration, Kosovo committed to fulfilling its obligations under 
the Ahtisaari Plan, embracing multi-ethnicity as a fundamental principle of good 
governance, and welcoming a period of international supervision. Kosovo‘s 
independence was quickly recognized by the United States and most European Union 
countries. Serbia, backed by Russia, called the declaration illegal. Kosovo Serbs soon 
elected their own assembly
194
 as an act of defiance against Kosovo‘s new constitution, 
which came into effect on 15 June 2008.
195
  
As of September  2010, 70 countries have recognized Kosovo including 22 EU 
member states and the United States. Five EU member countries, Cyprus, Greece, 
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Romania, Slovakia and Spain refuse to recognize Kosovo due to their own minority 
problems. The rate of recognitions is currently less than one a month and Kosovo is not 
yet recognized as a member of the United Nations. However, in May and June 2009, the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank voted to admit Kosovo as a full member 
and in July 2010, the International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo‘s declaration of 
independence is legal under international law, leading Prishtina to hope that this 
advisory opinion would provide a strong impetus for more countries to recognize its 
status. 
3.2.5 The EU in Kosovo 
According to the international community‘s plans, UNMIK was to be succeeded,  after 
the declaration of independence, by an international mission undertaken by the EU, as 
set out in the Ahtisaari plan. Belgrade strongly opposed the replacement of UNMIK by 
an EU mission operating on the basis of Kosovo‘s independence and its new 
constitution based on the Ahtisaari plan, and succeeded in enforcing its own idea of a 
status neutral EU mission, in parallel with a continuing, albeit reduced UNMIK 
presence. In November 2008, the UN Secretary-General submitted the so-called ―Six-
Point Plan‖, negotiated between the UN and Serbia, which provided for a status-neutral 
role for the EU mission and the extension of UNSCR 1244. Under the ―Six-Point Plan‖, 
the protection of the rights of the Kosovo Serb population with regard to policing, 
customs, justice, transportation and infrastructure, the borders of Serb communities and 
Serb Orthodox religious heritage was transferred to the Serbian government.
196
 Kosovo 
Albanians strongly objected to the plan, arguing it amounted to a de facto partition of 
the country on an ethnic basis and violated the constitution.  
 On 16 February 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo – 
EULEX Kosovo (Lex is the Latin for law) − was launched by the EU Council. It was 
initially headed by Yves de Kermabon, who will be succeeded on 15 October 2010 by 
Xavier Bout de Marnhac of France, appointed Head of Mission on 27 July 2010.
197
 
EULEX reached its initial operating capability on 9 December 2008 and its full 
operational strength on 6 April 2009. The mission‘s aim is to assist and support the 
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Kosovo authorities in rule of law matters, particularly in the areas of police, judiciary 
and customs.
198
 EULEX is implementing its mandate throughout Kosovo, and has 
largely taken over from UNMIK − the full handover took place in December 2008. 
Since then, UNMIK has no longer been operational, in the sense of lacking executive 
powers; some UNMIK staff remain but its presence is drastically reduced.
199
 As of 
September 2009, UNMIK‘s operational strength had dwindled to 150 staff members 
including eight UNMIK police officers (compared with about 4,387 UNMIK police 
officers in 2000).
200
  
In addition to EULEX, the EU is represented in Kosovo by:
201
 
 the European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo 
 European Union Special Representative (EUSR)/International Civilian 
Representative (ICR) 
 the Presidency of the European Union 
 the EU Member States 
The European Commission Liaison Office in Kosovo opened in September 2004 
and is responsible for realizing the European agenda in Kosovo with the aim of 
promoting Kosovo‘s accession to the European Union. The Liaison Office‘s role 
includes deployment of enlargement tools under the Stabilization and Association 
Process
202
 and fostering Kosovo‘s regional and European integration. It is further 
supposed to strengthen Kosovo‘s institutions, develop the economy and realize the 
achievement of European standards. 
The mandate of the EUSR for Kosovo is based on the EU‘s objective in Kosovo 
which is to ―support and assist the Kosovo authorities in developing a stable, viable, 
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peaceful and multi-ethnic Kosovo, cooperating peacefully with its neighbours.‖203 
Therefore, it is the task of the EUSR in Kosovo, Dutchman Pieter Feith, to offer the 
EU‘s advice and support to the Kosovo government in the political process; to provide 
overall coordination of the EU presences in Kosovo (for instance the European 
Commission Liaison Office and EULEX); and to contribute to the development and 
consolidation of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo. The EU 
Special Representative reports to the Council of the European Union, the inter-
governmental body representing the 27 EU member states.
204
 
Pieter Feith currently holds a double mandate being not only the EUSR in 
Kosovo, but also the International Civilian Representative for Kosovo. He was 
appointed to this role on 28 February 2008 in Vienna by the International Steering 
Group, which consists of states which have recognized the independence of Kosovo and 
support the full implementation of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement. The ICR is charged with supervising the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Proposal by the Kosovo government,
205
 and is assisted by the 
International Civilian Office in the execution of this mandate. The EUSR/ICR has 
therefore status-neutral as well pro-independence functions. This ambiguity has aroused 
reasonable doubts about whether the EU has a clear and common policy in Kosovo. 
In addition to the EU presence itself, EU member states are represented in 
Prishtinë/Priština on a bilateral basis and are also active in supporting Kosovo towards a 
European future. 
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3.3 Kosovo‟s economy 
The declaration of independence was not the panacea that many Kosovo Albanians had 
hoped for; two-and-a-half years after independence, Kosovo‘s feeble economy has still 
not improved. The labor market is extremely depressed with about 48 per cent of the 
state‘s two million inhabitants unemployed, and poverty remains widespread. 
According to the World Bank, 45 per cent of the population is poor and 15 per cent 
extremely poor.
206
 Living standards in Kosovo are far lower than in neighboring 
countries. Per capita GDP amounted to €1,759 in 2009 and the average monthly pension 
is only around €45.207 As shown in Figure 7, economic factors are now by far the most 
important cause of anxiety among Kosovo Albanian and other minorities, being cited as 
their main concern by 71 per cent of those questioned in a 2010 UNDP survey, while 
for Kosovo Serbs economic and safety concerns are equally important (both cited by 31 
per cent).  
             Figure 7: Main reason for feeling worried and anxious by ethnicity, 2010 
              
               Source: UNDP Kosovo: Fast Facts. Early Warning Report 27. March 2010. p. 4.  
The roots of economic hardship in Kosovo date back to the former Yugoslavian 
era. Despite having much arable land − 53 per cent of Kosovo‘s total land area is 
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agricultural land
208
 − and rich mineral resources, Kosovo has always been the poorest 
and the least-developed part of the former Yugoslavia. Agriculture is mainly based on 
subsistence farming for individual households, characterized by small farms, low 
productivity and the lack of advisory services, nevertheless, agriculture contributes 
around 19 per cent of Kosovo‘s overall GDP and is still one of the country‘s biggest 
employers, providing jobs for 16.5 per cent of the population, primarily on an informal 
basis.
209
 During the 1970s and 1980s, Kosovo‘s development became a priority for the 
former communist regime and significant investments were made in infrastructure and 
extractive industries. Thus, over the two decades 1970−90, the share of industry and 
mining in Kosovo‘s output increased from one-third to one-half, whilst that of 
agriculture fell. However, this improvement was not lasting due to the suspension of 
Kosovo‘s autonomy in 1989 and the increase in Serbian repression, so that by the mid-
1990s output had fallen back to the levels of the 1970s. Throughout the 1990s, 
Kosovo‘s economic and social climate was contaminated by poor economic policies, 
international sanctions, limited trade and financial accessibility, and ethnic conflict. 
World Bank data indicate that Kosovo‘s GDP contracted by 50 per cent between 1990 
and 1995, falling to less than $400 per capita.
210
 During this period, industry, mining 
and infrastructure were characterized by massive disinvestment in net terms. Many 
public enterprises fell into decline and cooperatives broke up. Throughout the 1990s, 
the vast majority of Kosovo Albanians were removed from their jobs, which led to 
increasing unemployment combined with a wave of migration. Diaspora remittances 
became the main source of income and the economy was progressively replaced by 
shadow economic activities.
211
 
The economic impact of the war in Kosovo was fatal and brought an already 
struggling economy to a halt. Industrial output collapsed and agricultural production fell 
sharply. The heaviest impact was on private property, especially on family economies 
and businesses, as well as private enterprises. 
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Following the cessation of hostilities in June 1999, the institution entrusted with 
managing the disastrous economic situation was the European Union. According to 
UNSCR 1244, the European Union and other international organizations were  
―to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and 
stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the 
implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe … in order to 
further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional 
cooperation.‖212  
For this purpose, the EU decided to establish and finance the ―European Union Pillar‖ 
(UNMIK Pillar IV for Economic Reconstruction).
213
 The EU, as a regional player, then 
took the lead for a UN mission for the first time. The pillar‘s mandate was threefold: 
firstly, the reconstruction of key infrastructure and economic development; secondly, 
the establishment of economic institutions and their transfer to local authorities and 
thirdly, the promotion of peace and stability.
214
 
3.3.1 Economic development  
With the international engagement, it became obvious that the economy of Kosovo 
would need fundamental structural changes to develop into a free-market oriented 
economy ready to prepare for entry into the EU. Basic economic legislation and easy 
business registration laid the foundations for the development of private small- and 
medium-sized enterprises after 1999. The institutionalization of a sound currency was 
given first priority. The immediate introduction of the deutsche mark, later replaced by 
the euro, provided a low inflation environment for most of the post-conflict period.
215
  
The first phase of the international administration in Kosovo was the emergency 
stage, characterized by massive reconstruction of damaged and destroyed houses and 
infrastructure along with the provision of basic services. One of the key priorities of 
donor programs was to reconstruct Kosovo‘s basic infrastructure. Over 50,000 houses 
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have been rebuilt, providing homes for about 300,000 people, and 1,400km of roads 
have been repaired.
216
  
The construction of health clinics and schools has ensured that the basic 
infrastructure for health and education services is largely in place. However, while 
reports often like to emphasize this, the term basic infrastructure can be misleading. In 
most rural villages it often means a ruinous building without essential equipment or 
sanitary facilities. In short, despite billions of euros spent on reconstruction, people still 
often live in life threatening conditions.  
Kosovars‘ own initiatives, which have resulted in some remarkable rebuilding 
activity, have primarily been backed by foreign donor support, totalling approximately 
€2.7 billion between 1999 and 2007.217 A total of €1.96 billion of donor funds had been 
spent by the end of 2003.
218
 However, donor support has been gradually decreasing 
since 2001. Grants fell by 70 per cent between 2000 and 2003 and have continued to 
decline.
219
 In 2008, foreign aid amounted to €275 million, down from €352 million in 
2007 and €465 million in 2006.220 Nevertheless, Kosovo remains the biggest recipient 
of donor aid in the region. Overall EU assistance to Kosovo is estimated at over €1 
billion for the period 2007−10, covering support to Kosovo‘s political and economic 
development and financing the EU contribution to the international presence in 
Kosovo.
221
 
As donor aid declined, a brief reconstruction-driven boom in Kosovo was not 
sustainable. While GDP rose by 21.2 per cent in 2000, the growth rate fell back to only 
3.8 per cent in 2005 and has remained around this level apart from an uptick to 5.4 per 
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cent in 2008 as shown in Table 4.
222
 Much higher growth is needed to improve the 
calamitous labor market situation.  
Table 4: Real GDP growth and GDP per capita, 2005−09 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Real GDP growth (%) 3.8 3.9 3.9 5.4 3.8 
GDP per capita (euro) 1,482.1 1,519.8 1,611.0 1,759.0 1,759.0 
Sources: Based on the World Bank: Kosovo Economic Memorandum. 17 May 2004. p. ii.  
Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo: Annual Report 2008. June 2009. p. 20. 
Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo: Annual Report 2009. June 2010. p. 19.  
Economic growth is still highly dependent on the diaspora and foreign aid. In 
2009, remittances from the diaspora totalled about €500 million, approximately 13−15 
per cent of Kosovo‘s GDP.223 Donor financed activities and aid are estimated to be 
equivalent to around eight per cent of GDP.
224
 Although domestic production in Kosovo 
was very low at the end of 2000, SRSG Bernard Kouchner took a favorable view of the 
economic achievements of the reconstruction phase. ―The power plants, roads and 
schools are all functioning. The shops are full. Building is booming. Kosovo begins 
2001 with a solid economic framework and a balanced budget,‖ Kouchner stated in a 
New Year‘s speech.225 Although the emergency phase was definitely characterized by 
essential economic improvements, Kouchner‘s assertion seems something of an 
overstatement in light of the fact that even today most roads and schools are in a state of 
disrepair and households and businesses suffer power cuts for several hours each day. 
Kosovo‘s energy and transport sectors are still underdeveloped and in poor condition.226 
These are major obstacles to achieving economic competitiveness and a business 
environment conducive to solid growth and development. The following 
macroeconomic data, however, speaks for itself.  
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After the groundwork was laid, the EU Pillar created the necessary legislation to 
regulate the basic requirements of a market economy, including regulations relating to 
company registration, property rights, internal and external trade, external investment, 
transportation, procurement, telecommunications and energy.
227
 The key measures 
aimed at making Kosovo more competitive in regional and European markets are 
analyzed below. 
Banking and Insurance 
One of UNMIK‘s first moves was the establishment of the Banking and Payments 
Authority of Kosovo. This institution became the Central Banking Authority of Kosovo 
in August 2006, with increased capacities and reinforced independence. The Central 
Banking Authority is a public entity with the authority to license, supervise and regulate 
financial and insurance institutions operating in Kosovo and simultaneously performs 
central banking operations with the exception of issuing a currency.
228
 According to the 
EU Pillar‘s end of mission report, accomplishments have been the restoration of public 
confidence in the banking sector and an increase in deposits in commercial banks from 
€93 million to over €1.1 billion between 2000 and 2007.229 Despite the global financial 
and economic crisis, the banking sector in Kosovo has remained stable. 
European and regional integration 
The European Council has often affirmed that the future of the Western Balkans lies 
within the European Union. In February 2008, the Council reiterated its commitment 
fully and effectively to support the European perspective for the Western Balkans. It 
asked the Commission to use community instruments to further economic and political 
progress and to propose concrete measures to enable the broader region to advance 
towards European integration.
230
 The so-called Stabilization and Association Process 
(SAP) is the strategic framework within which Western Balkan countries are to advance 
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towards EU accession via Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA).
231
 Early 
on, Brussels tried to incorporate Kosovo into the SAP; however, because this was 
devised to apply to sovereign countries, the EU Pillar supported the creation of a tailor-
made instrument for Kosovo – the SAP Tracking Mechanism (STM) – which was 
introduced in March 2003. Following a similar procedure to that applied to sovereign 
states participating in the SAP, regular STM meetings are supposed to evaluate 
Kosovo‘s progress on political, economic and institutional reforms.232 Additionally, as 
regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries is a significant aspect of the 
SAP, the EU Pillar, in close collaboration with Kosovo institutions, has aimed to 
integrate Kosovo into the region in areas of common interest, such as energy, transport, 
trade, combating crime and corruption, repatriation of refugees and border control.
233
 
However, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.3.3, the refusal of five EU 
member states to recognize Kosovo‘s independence has so far prevented the EU from 
integrating the independent Kosovo into the SAP.
234
  
Trade regime and customs administration 
Kosovo was subject to the former Yugoslav trade regime and customs administration 
until June 1999. Between 10 June 1999, when UNSCR 1244 mandated UNMIK, and 3 
September 1999, there were no customs check points at  Kosovo‘s borders. Goods 
flowing into Kosovo were not subject to tariff or non-tariff barriers. In September 1999, 
the UNMIK Customs Service was formed, which established customs border controls in 
Kosovo and promulgated an external trade regime and customs administration.
235
 The 
adoption of a trade regime was considered to be crucial in order to stimulate private 
sector-led economic growth and reconstruction and create the conditions for thriving 
                                                 
 
231
 European Commission: Online via Internet: URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_
eu/sap/index_en.htm [accessed 17 11 2009]. 
232
 European Union Pillar: The 10 Key Achievements. End of Mission Report 1999−2008. p. 15. 
233
 EU Presidency statement. Western Balkans – fostering the integration momentum. 28 March 2009. 
Online via Internet: URL: 
http://www.eusrinkosovo.eu/pdf/March09Western%20Balkans.pdf [accessed 17 11 2009]. 
234
 Vedran Dţihić. Helmut Kramer: Kosovo after Independence. Is the EU‘s EULEX Mission Delivering 
on its Promises? Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. July 2009. p. 19.  
235
 The World Bank: Kosovo. Economic and Social Reforms for Peace and Reconciliation. Technical 
Paper No. 509. Washington, DC 2001. p. 58.  
  
97 
exports.
236
 In December 2008, the UNMIK Customs Service became Kosovo Customs. 
The EULEX Customs Component monitors, mentors and advises this body but only 
exercises customs executive responsibilities when required.
237
  
As a result of UNMIK reforms, Kosovo now has one of the most open trade and 
investment regimes in Europe with the aim of attracting foreign investment and building 
up the domestic tax base to reduce dependence on aid funding and remittances. The tax 
system, which has been created from scratch, consists of customs duties, excise tax and 
value-added tax (initially a sales tax) on imports, currently set at a flat rate of 16 per 
cent. Kosovo has among the lowest export and import levies in the region. The tariff on 
imports is ten per cent while exports are tariff free.
238
 Exemptions exist for imports of 
raw materials and for pharmaceutical goods, which are zero rated. Excise tax on fuel, 
tobacco, alcohol and luxury goods is between ten and 50 per cent of the value of the 
goods, varying according to product, or a fixed amount per specified quantity. The rate 
of personal income tax ranges from zero to ten per cent according to the level of annual 
income, with the highest rate applicable to those with salaries above €450 a month. 
Corporate tax rates also vary according to the level of earnings. The highest rate applies 
to entities earning more than €50,000 a year and was reduced to ten per cent of earnings 
(half the previous figure) in 2009.
239
  
The bulk of Kosovo‘s tax revenues is collected at the border. Revenue collected 
by Kosovo Customs accounted for about 70 per cent of total government revenues in 
2009, up from 60 per cent in 2007.
240
 In 2009, Kosovo Customs collected €635 million, 
compared to €605 million in 2008 and €114 million in 2000.241 Despite increased tax 
revenues, Kosovo had a budget deficit of €8.1 million in 2008 and €85.6 million in 
2009.
242
 
Besides the collection of revenue, Kosovo Customs is also responsible for 
fighting crime and smuggling of drugs and other prohibited goods. The European 
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Commission reports that anti-smuggling units have started to patrol on all roads, with 
the exception of those in northern Kosovo. However, trains coming from Serbia into 
Kosovo are not subject to customs or other controls.
243
  
Kosovo also benefits from non-reciprocal, customs-free access to the EU market 
based on the EU Autonomous Trade Preference Regime.
244
 Furthermore, in December 
2008, Kosovo was nominated as a beneficiary country under the US Generalized 
System of Preferences program, which is designed to promote economic growth in the 
developing world. Under this program, a wide range of products Kosovo might seek to 
export are eligible for duty-free entry to the United States.
245
  
Starting in 2001, the Western Balkan countries took part in a network of bilateral 
free trade agreements. Between 2003 and 2006 the EU Pillar negotiated and signed such 
agreements between Kosovo and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This regime was replaced in 2006 by the 
enlargement of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) aimed at 
integrating Kosovo into regional economic structures.
246
 CEFTA members now include: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro and Serbia, creating a regional free trade area for over 25 million people to 
which Kosovo exporters have duty free access.
247
 At the end of November 2008, the 
Kosovo Customs Director General introduced new ―Kosovo Customs‖ stamps, and 
communicated their introduction to the CEFTA members. However, products carrying 
these Kosovo ―certificate of origin‖ stamps are currently refused entry into, or transit 
through, Serbia and are charged with Customs duties by Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
products originating from a non-CEFTA party.
248
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Trade  
With both agriculture and industry devastated by the war and output improving only 
sluggishly, Kosovo is heavily dependent on imports. As shown in Table 5, exports – 
virtually non-existent in the aftermath of the conflict – have recovered somewhat in the 
ensuing years, particularly since the privatization of some of the leading manufacturers, 
but they remain very low, reaching a peak of €198 million in 2008 before falling to 
€165 million in 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. Kosovo urgently needs 
to increase exports as its domestic markets are too small to underpin economic revival. 
However, export capacity is hampered by Kosovo‘s poor road, rail and air transport 
infrastructure as well as the slow recovery of domestic production. The latter factor has 
also increased dependency on imports. As shown in Table 5, imports have risen steadily 
since the end of the war and the trade deficit has widened. After a further slight rise in 
imports to €1.93 billion in 2009, the deficit stood at approximately €1.8 billion.249 
Table 5: Exports and imports, 2001−09 (€‟000 ) 
Year Exports Imports Trade balance 
2001 10,559 684,500 -673,941 
2002 27,599 854,758 -827,159 
2003 35,621 973,265 -937,644 
2004 56,567 1,063,347 -1,006,780 
2005 56,283 1,157,492 -1,101,209 
2006 110,774 1,305,879 -1,195,105 
2007 165,112 1,576,186 -1,411,074 
2008 198,463 1,928,236 -1,729,773 
2009 165,328 1,935,541 -1,770,214 
     Source: Statistical Office of Kosovo: External Trade Statistics 2009. June 2010. p. 10.  
The main categories of imports in 2009 were: machinery and transport 
equipment (23 per cent), manufactured goods (19 per cent), food and live animals (17 
per cent) and mineral fuels (15 per cent). Manufactured goods were the predominant 
export category, accounting for 51 per cent of the total in 2009. Inedible raw materials 
                                                 
 
249
 Statistical Office of Kosovo: External Trade Statistics 2009. June 2010. pp. 5. 
  
100 
other than fuel accounted for 23 per cent, food and live animals 9.0 per cent, and 
machinery and transport equipment 5.0 per cent.
250
 EU countries and CEFTA member 
states, with which Kosovo conducted 74.4 per cent of trade in 2009, remain its main 
trade partners.
251
 
Privatization 
Among the many factors hampering Kosovo‘s economy since the end of the 1999 
conflict is lack of foreign investment due to the country‘s longstanding status issue, the 
complex relationship with Serbia and the volatile security situation. Foreign direct 
investment rose from €250 million in 2006 to €420 million in 2007 but fell back again 
in 2008 to about €350 million.252  
The authorities hoped to attract foreign investment through sweeping 
privatization of Kosovo‘s moribund state-owned industry, but the program was dogged 
by so many problems that foreign investors were, if anything, still more deterred, and it 
has totally failed to revive the economy. 
There are three basic classes of enterprises in Kosovo. Privately-owned 
enterprises now make up the majority of the business sector in terms of both  numbers 
of firms and share of output but there is also a large publicly owned sector with its roots 
in the former communist regime, which features two types of operation: publicly owned 
enterprises (POEs) and socially owned enterprises (SOEs), Under Communism, POEs 
corresponded roughly to state-owned enterprises in other socialist countries, but social 
ownership was a concept unique to the former Yugoslavia, in which enterprises were 
owned neither by the state, nor by employees, but by ―society‖.253  
Before 1999, SOEs were considered the flagships of industrial and agricultural 
development and made up the backbone of Kosovo‘s economy, accounting for 90 per 
cent of all industrial entities. However, both SOEs and POEs suffered from under-
investment, mismanagement and frequent management changes and became 
increasingly ineffective over the years. The EU Pillar opted against propping them up 
and focused instead on boosting the private sector. The aim was to reshape Kosovo‘s 
economy to become self-sustainable, driven by private domestic and foreign 
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investment, and this was pursued through a massive transfer of assets into the private 
sector. In 2002, the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), a component of the EU Pillar, was 
established to administer and restructure Kosovo‘s 25 POEs and to privatize the SOEs. 
Kosovo‘s major POEs, such as the Prishtina International Airport, Kosovo 
Electricity Corporation (KEK), Post and Telecommunications of Kosovo (PTK), 
Kosovo Railways, district heating enterprises, and landfill, water, waste and irrigation 
services, were all incorporated in 2005−07.254 Incorporation has clarified these 
companies‘ legal status and allowed the establishment of proper management and 
oversight procedures. It took place in two steps: first, POEs were turned into Joint Stock 
Companies – (JSC) under the Law on Business Organizations and then the assets were 
transferred to newly created operating companies, wholly owned by the parent JSC – a 
process known as ―spin off‖.255 
The KTA‘s first so-called privatization wave involving six SOEs began on 15 
May 2003. Only 22 bidders − of which only five were foreign investors − took part and 
the six enterprises were finally sold for only €4.6 million. The second wave involving 
18 enterprises was initiated on 2 July 2003. There were considerably more bidders with 
180 participating, however the vast majority of them –157 bidders – were again local. In 
2003−04 the privatization process nearly ground to a halt. Unsettled property rights in 
particular posed a big obstacle. The third wave, planned to take place at the end of 2003, 
had to be cancelled due to disagreement with the UN administration and was only 
reopened on 14 July 2004.
256
 The legislation was finally modified in April 2005 and the 
KTA restarted the process. 
Little progress has been made on privatizing SOEs located in Serbian 
community areas (such as the Brezovica ski resort or the Trepca mine) where local 
leaders, supported by Belgrade, continue to counter the process. Due to the interethnic 
sensitivities, the UN ordered the KTA to refrain from pushing privatization forward 
without local consent.
257
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Privatization was considered to be essential to economic development in Kosovo 
and Kosovars initially attached much importance to the process. Therefore, the standstill 
was strongly resented by Kosovars, who came to regard the privatization process 
generally as complete failure on the part of UNMIK.  
For example, Hamdi Berisha, former translator for the UNMIK Police, criticizes 
the execution of the process: 
―UNMIK did absolutely nothing to improve Kosovo‘s economy. They had this 
Kosovo Trust Agency whose job was to deal with privatization. They privatized 
all former state-run companies and they sold these companies for a cheap price. 
People thought that … locals would get jobs and that there would be some 
improvement in the economy, but it created more and more unemployment. 
Nothing improved because they didn‘t really choose at all who they‘re selling 
these properties to. They just wanted to sell for a cheap price.‖258  
Bekim Kryeziu, translator for the Swiss KFOR, was disappointed by the 
standstill of the privatization process:  
―The privatization process in Kosovo was a disaster … UNMIK didn‘t try to do 
anything concrete for the economy. We have had a quite well-known woman, 
her name was [Marie] Fucci [Director of the Kosovo Trust Agency], she stopped 
the privatization process for almost three years. Not a single firm or enterprise 
was privatized until [Joachim] Rücker came, the former head of UNMIK Pillar 
IV.‖259 
On 30 June 2008, the KTA was replaced by the Privatization Agency of Kosovo 
(PAK) and as of August 2010, there had been 45 waves of privatization (30 by KTA).
260
 
During 2009, tender processes were launched for 114 SOEs, increasing the total number 
of privatized enterprises to 569 by the end of 2009 when total privatization proceeds 
amounted to €451 million (11.7 per cent of GDP).261 Kosovo‘s three largest exporters 
are privatized companies: the mining company ―Ferronikeli‖, the ―M&Sillosi‖ flour 
mill and the steel factory ―Llamkos‖.  
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Energy supply 
Energy is a politically hot topic in Kosovo, as achieving an adequate supply is 
fundamental to any further economic development and one of the Kosovo government‘s 
main objectives. Although Kosovo possesses the world‘s fifth-largest proven reserves of 
lignite, with estimated 11−14 billion tons, ten years after the conflict the country still 
suffers from chronic power shortages due to the poor electricity supply system. There 
are numerous challenges including inadequate maintenance, billing and collection 
problems and weak management of the energy provider, combined with 
underinvestment, despite persistently high subsidies from the budget.  
―The private sector is considered the best booster of the domestic economy, but 
almost 80% of local entrepreneurs ... have identified energy shortages as the 
main problem in business development, ahead of tax problems and 
corruption,‖262  
says Shpend Ahmeti, executive director of the Institute for Advanced Studies GAP, a 
Kosovo think-tank. This deters investors and hampers the revival of Kosovo‘s small 
industrial sector. The Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance estimates that 
unreliable power supply has cost micro-, small- and medium-sized businesses alone 
over €1 billion annually, to the severe detriment of employment, investment and 
exports.
263
 The energy crisis is also detrimental to general welfare as well as security in 
Kosovo.  
The electricity sector is dominated by KEK (Korporata Energjetike e Kosovës), 
which is Kosovo‘s most difficult utility to modernize. The Corporation is a publicly 
owned enterprise, which was incorporated in 2006 as a JSC and is now fully managed 
by local staff.
264
 Currently all necessary steps are underway to allow the company‘s 
privatization, but so far KEK still controls all four aspects of the business including coal 
mining, generation, network and supply.
265
 The energy system is based on two lignite 
mines and two old lignite power plants, ―Kosova A‖ and ―Kosova B‖. In addition KEK 
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runs two small hydro power plants, transmission and distribution networks covering the 
whole of Kosovo and the supply division handling energy sale functions.
266
 
Over the past decade KEK has undergone several waves of reform. In 1999, the 
company was in a very poor condition. Therefore, UNMIK, through the EU Pillar, was 
given the responsibility for improving KEK as well as building up a modern energy 
sector from scratch. Since 1999, approximately €500 million from donors and a similar 
amount from Kosovo‘s consolidated budget have been mobilized to upgrade KEK‘s 
efficiency. However, only a small part of this large sum has been spent on restoring the 
power plants,
267
 Kosovo‘s ongoing energy problems have not been solved and the 
energy sector continues to face severe difficulties.  
UNMIK was also tasked to draw up a legal framework for the industry, create 
new institutions and cooperate with partners at the local and international level. To 
establish the legal framework, four important laws were passed as UNMIK Regulations: 
The Law on Energy, the Law on Electricity, the Law on the Energy Regulator and the 
Law on the Independent Commission of Mines and Minerals. Two new regulatory 
authorities were set up providing independent oversight of the sector: the Energy 
Regulatory Office and the Independent Commission for Mines and Minerals.
268
 To 
promote cooperation in the region and European integration, UNMIK signed the Athens 
Memoranda in 2002 and 2003, which created a Regional Electricity Market in 
Southeastern Europe. A further treaty, the Energy Community Treaty, signed in October 
2005, created a single energy market in the EU and Southeastern Europe. Its objective is 
to improve energy efficiency and the security of energy supply through unimpeded 
trade in electricity and coordinated sector investments.
269
 
While EU and UNMIK reports highlight their achievements in the energy sector, 
Kosovars view it as clearly one of UNMIK‘s biggest failures. Corruption is a big 
problem, involving not only KEK but also UNMIK itself, which has been particularly 
prone to corruption in this area. Many factors, such as the limited service provision have 
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also contributed to KEK‘s extremely tainted public image. However, the biggest blow 
to its reputation was a scandal early in the postwar period. In 2003, following 
allegations of high-level corruption, the former head of the KEK supervisory board, Jo 
Trutschler, was convicted in Germany of embezzling €3.9 million.270 Although the 
authorities say the case put an end to corruption in the sector, the incident caused such a 
stir that people still talk about it today, and KEK and UNMIK have fought a public 
perception of widespread corruption ever since. The UNDP poll results of January 2010 
indicate that about 50 per cent of Kosovars still perceive KEK as the most corrupt 
institution in the country,
271
 and UNMIK‘s blemished reputation has never recovered as 
the author‘s interviews confirm: 
―UNMIK came to Kosovo with the idea to fight corruption; however UNMIK 
itself had corrupt people in their organization. Corruption within UNMIK is 
almost at the same level as it is in our institutions. Let‘s take KEK for example; 
so many millions have been invested. With this huge amount of money we 
should have a nuclear power plant and not such an old power plant. So much 
money was spent and we have only one guy who got punished, a German – Jo 
Trutschler – who got only four years in prison for stealing about four million 
euros.‖272  
Billing and collection presents a further serious problem that continues to affect 
KEK. According to the European Commission 2009 Progress Report on Kosovo, 
technical and financial losses continue to be high. Commercial losses accounted for 20 
per cent of KEK‘s potential earnings from marketable energy and a further 20 per cent 
was stolen by customers who illegally connected themselves to the network. Only some 
60 per cent of the energy available for sale was paid for and KEK‘s efforts to send out 
disconnection teams have had only a limited impact. In 2008, the corporation lost some 
€90 million through stolen power.273 Since 2004, KEK has divided the territory of 
Kosovo into three service categories – A, B and C – according to electricity bill 
payment levels. All Serbian enclaves due to their poor payment record have been 
categorized as ―C‖. In these areas, KEK conducts collective electricity disconnection. 
However, these measures are not solving the problem, but are leading to considerable 
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protests, with consequent impact on security in the country. Demonstrations due to 
power outages are frequent, particularly among Kosovo Serbs, who perceive the 
disconnections as politically motivated and ethnically discriminatory.  
Kosovo‘s electricity demand has been constantly rising, and it is projected to 
continue to grow significantly over the next 20 years, calling for extensive new 
generation capacity. However, a lifetime of poor maintenance has severely limited the 
capacity of the power plants. The two lignite plants should be able to provide 1,478MW 
of electricity; however the effective operating capacity is less than 900MW. The 
hydropower plants, with a total installed capacity of 43 MW, produce less than 
35MW.
274
 This situation and the dilapidated state of KEK mean Kosovo must rely on 
costly power imports amounting to €42 million in 2008.275 In the worst case, the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance reports that the average cost of imported power could 
come to €500 million per year before long.276  
To resolve the longstanding tensions over limited energy supply, the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance has two main objectives for the electricity sector: firstly, the 
privatization of the KEK distribution and supply systems and secondly, the 
development of a new power plant.
277
 It is hoped that the privatization of KEK will 
improve and expand the distribution network, enhance performance in both supplying 
electricity and collecting revenue, and improve the security of supply and service 
quality to both residential and business consumers. KEK needs significant investment as 
well as a strong management, which only a private strategic partner can provide. 
Privatization will also remove the electricity sector from dependence on government 
subsidies, which can then be diverted to other government initiatives such as education 
and healthcare.  
In July 2009, the Government of Kosovo in close cooperation with the US 
Government, the World Bank and other organizations, decided to build a new power 
plant ―Kosova Re‖ or ―Kosovo C‖ that is hoped to provide 24-hour power to Kosovo‘s 
population and end the frequent power cuts. The project, which will cost around €3.5 
billion, is the largest investment to be made in the country since independence. The new 
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coal-based power plant is expected to add 2,100MW to the country‘s power capacities. 
The work is planned to start in 2011 and should be completed by 2015 or at the latest by 
2017. The new plant is aimed at not just stabilizing the energy situation in Kosovo and 
providing the population with continuous power but also, most importantly, at boosting 
the economic development of the country.
278
  
State revenues and expenditure 
Given the fragile state of the economy, the Kosovo government‘s revenues are small, 
reaching only €1,146.7 million in 2009 or around 30 per cent of GDP. This was a 
considerable improvement (21.7 per cent) over the previous year, but still far from 
adequate, and government spending, up 29.7 per cent to €1,232.3 million, exceeded 
revenues.
279
 
The pitiful inadequacy of the resources available to the government relative to 
Kosovo‘s needs is due not only to the disastrous state of the economy but also to the 
weakness of the tax gathering machinery. The ratio of tax revenues to GDP in Kosovo 
is below the average of countries in the region, which stands at 36 per cent of GDP. Tax 
revenues collected at the border continue to represent the main source of revenue.
280
   
Government spending reached 32 per cent of GDP in 2009, which is the highest 
this ratio has been in the postwar period. However, this ratio is still low compared to the 
average in the region, which stands at around 38 per cent. Capital outlays amounted to 
10.3 per cent of GDP in that year, with road infrastructure accounting for a massive 
39.7 per cent of the total.
281
 While investment in infrastructure is essential to developing 
the economy and ameliorating the serious unemployment problem, the government‘s 
decision to deploy so much of its limited resources to infrastructure is questionable 
since it leaves so little for spending on welfare. It is arguable that the serious security 
implications of the extreme poverty in Kosovo mean that welfare spending should be 
given a higher priority.
282
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Figure 8 shows the Kosovo government‘s revenues and expenditure.  
     Figure 8: Kosovo government budget, 2001−09 (€ million) 
 
Source: Based on the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo: Annual Report 2005. May 2006. p. 36.  
Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo: Annual Report 2009. June 2010. p. 31. 
Government revenues and expenditure are projected to fall in 2010 to €1,029.2 
million and €1,156.6 million respectively,283 so unless Prishtina can find additional 
resources, either  by borrowing, or from aid, spending cuts pose another threat to the 
fragile socio-economic situation.
284
 
3.3.2 Conclusion 
In the two-and-a-half years since independence Kosovo‘s bleak economic position has 
not improved and continues to be characterized by severe unemployment, low 
productivity, very low exports and a widening trade gap, a small domestic market, poor 
infrastructure and chronic energy shortages. 
Popular outrage at the situation grows and could significantly undermine 
political stability. The March 2010 UNDP poll shows 63 per cent of Kosovars ready to 
take part in protests about the state of the economy, which, since May 2008, is 
increasingly blamed on the government rather than, as in the past, on UNMIK. Recent 
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polls show that over 90 per cent of Kosovars now hold their own government to 
account.
285
  
The EU‘s failure to solve Kosovo‘s economic problems can partly be explained 
by the strategic dilemmas often facing international organizations described in chapter 
2.1.9.1. In this instance, the immediate priority was to improve security, but while 
pursuing this objective, the development of a comprehensive economic strategy 
received too little emphasis. Economic aid measures have not been adequately tailored 
to the conditions in Kosovo and consequently have largely failed to strengthen local 
institutions.
286
  
For Kosovo to develop a sustainable economy, foreign assistance remains 
crucial. Foreign financial support, direct investments and remittances from the 
diaspora
287
 are needed to spur economic growth and mitigate social grievances.    
Among the many priorities on which Kosovo‘s economic future depends are an 
effective strategy for strengthening small- and medium-sized enterprises as the basis of 
the national economy, the significant betterment of economic relations with Serbia and 
improvements in basic infrastructure, particularly energy provision.  
The long-term policy is to integrate Kosovo into the EU, but Kosovo‘s current 
economic weakness makes it impossible to set a timetable for reaching this goal. A 
more immediately achievable objective is greater integration with the economies of the 
Western Balkan countries in preparation for potential EU accession and this needs to be 
pursued with vigor. 
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3.4 The political system of Kosovo 
Several constitutional reforms between 1946 and 1974 increased Kosovo‘s autonomy, 
but did not acknowledge the rising interethnic tensions between Kosovo Serbs and 
Albanians. After 1974, the Serbs felt discriminated against by the dominating Kosovo 
Albanians, who intensified their pursuit of republican status for Kosovo from 1980 
onwards. Unease between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, increased simultaneously 
with the rise of nationalism among all ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, and in Kosovo this 
culminated in 1989 with the abolition by Serbia of the autonomous status that Tito had 
granted in 1974. This resulted in the progressive decline of the former Yugoslav 
political system in Kosovo and the emergence of the Kosovo Albanian political system.  
Political demands led to the creation and rise of a myriad of underground 
political groups and armed formations in Kosovo. During the first phase from 1989 to 
the international engagement in 1999, the Kosovo Albanian political arena was 
dominated by a single political party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja 
Demokratike e Kosovës − LDK) under Ibrahim Rugova although it faced a challenge 
from the more militant KLA.
288
  
When the international community took responsibility for the province‘s 
administration in 1999, Kosovo had undergone a major political change. The Kosovo 
Albanians had almost completely opted out of the official ex-Yugoslav political process 
and had organized a system of parallel institutions.  
In 1999, a pluralistic party system started to emerge, with many former KLA 
leaders engaging themselves in the political scene. A number of them founded the 
Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës – PDK), which drew upon 
remnants of the KLA, while others participated in founding a separate political party, 
the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës – AAK).289 
However, these and other Kosovo Albanian parties were essentially nationalist 
groupings, focused almost exclusively on the achievement of independence, and at the 
time of writing they have yet to be clearly defined by any other political agenda. As 
Shkelzen Maliqi writes:  
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―Kosovo Albanian political organisations are not real parties, but merely 
pluralised elements of a national liberation movement whose overriding goal is 
the establishment of an independent Kosova.‖290  
Meanwhile, Kosovo Serb political parties are merely extensions of parties in Serbia.
291
 
Voting remains largely based on clan and regional ties, complicating the effort to create 
a stable democratic government.
292
  
3.4.1 The parliamentary system 
Kosovo‘s constitution, which came into force on 15 June 2008, established the 
country‘s electoral system and the structure of the unicameral Kosovo Assembly. Under 
the constitutional framework, the President of Kosovo is the head of state and represents 
the Republic of Kosovo internally and externally. The president is elected by the 
assembly in a secret ballot and serves a term of five years with the right to stand for re-
election once. The Prime Minister is the head of government and is also elected by the 
Kosovo Assembly. The assembly consists of 120 seats, of which ten are guaranteed for 
ethnic Serbs, and ten for other minorities. Of these, there are four seats for the Roma, 
Ashkali and Egyptian communities, three seats for the Bosniaks, two seats for the 
Turks, and one seat for the Gorani community.  
 Kosovo now features a plethora of small competing parties. However, currently 
the main parties are the PDK, led by Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi; the LDK, formerly 
led by Ibrahim Rugova and subsequently by President Fatmir Sejdiu; and the AKR, led 
by Behgjet Pacolli.  
Since 1999, the main Kosovo Albanian political parties have moved towards a 
moderate position, working within institutional frameworks and participating in the 
legislative and executive bodies. The more extreme parties are small and without real 
public support. Particularly since the Kosovar declaration of independence, none of the 
                                                 
 
290
 Shkelzen Maliqi: The Albanian Movement in Kosovo. In: David Dyker. Ivan Vejvoda (eds.): 
Yugoslavia and After. A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth. Longman. New York 1996. p. 
151.  
291
 UNDP Kosovo: Human Development Report Kosovo 2004. The Rise of the Citizen: Challenges and 
Choices. Prishtina 2004. pp. 60.   
292
 Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010. Kosovo (2010). Online via Internet: URL: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=7972  [accessed 27 08 
2010].  
  
112 
main parties have had an interest in appearing to be extreme, since the political reality is 
that Kosovo needs support from the international community.
293
  
Given the lack of distinguishing political agendas, Kosovar voters tend to be 
influenced by the personality of the party leaders regardless of their political platforms. 
For example, the people of the Drenica region, a stronghold of the KLA, would always 
vote for Thaçi, while voters in the Dukagjini region always support AAK leader 
Ramush Haradinaj.  
Personal connections are an even more important influence on voting, given 
Kosovo‘s family- and clan-based society. Supporters may join a party because of a 
personal connection with the party‘s leader, or kinship with one of the party‘s 
representatives – regardless of whether that relative has a major or minor role. As a 
result of this phenomenon, parties tend to produce internal cliques − often 
geographically based − with strong leaders who support the candidates regardless of 
their political agenda.
294
  
This may change as the parties develop their individual post-independence 
political platforms on which all are currently working, but at present only the New 
Kosovo Alliance (Aleanca Kosova e Re − AKR), has a well-defined platform (see 
below).
295
  
Parties represented in parliament are partly funded by the state. As the largest 
party, PDK receives about €500,000, LDK about €300,000, and AAK about 
€150,000.296 However, these subsidies cover only a small percentage of the parties‘ 
expenses. 
The Office of the Auditor General of Kosovo, the highest institution of 
economic and financial oversight in Kosovo, provides an independent evaluation of the 
accountability and financial practices of the government‘s ministries, municipalities and 
public-owned enterprises
297
 − but while the Office of the Auditor General conducts 
audits for all other organizations funded by the Kosovo budget, strangely it is not 
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legally obliged to audit the political parties. Neither the Office of the Auditor General 
nor the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) is entitled to investigate funding of 
political parties. Therefore, the general perception among Kosovars is that corruption 
among political parties is widespread. The central administration/government is ranked 
fourth in the list of Kosovo institutions where citizens perceive ―large-scale‖ 
corruption.
298
 The Anti-Corruption Action Plan is addressing the problem and proposes 
the creation of an independent agency to review the activities of parties and 
candidates.
299
 
The Central Election Commission is currently in charge of evaluating political 
parties‘ financial reports. The purpose of these audits is to ensure that Kosovo‘s 
political parties understand and uphold transparency as an essential value in their 
developing democratic society. Auditors from the Central Election Commission have 
found many serious instances of underreported expenditure, which implies that the 
income used to finance campaign expenditure has also been underreported to a similar 
extent.
300
 
As of September 2009, the Central Election Commission lists 40 registered 
political parties in Kosovo, representing all ethnic communities.
301
 The following 
sections analyze the most important of these. 
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3.4.1.1 Kosovo Albanian political parties 
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)
302
 
The PDK, headed by Hashim Thaçi, formerly the political leader of the KLA, has close 
links with Albanian groups in the United States, Switzerland and Germany. PDK stands 
for an independent, free and democratic Kosovo like all other ethnic-Albanian political 
parties. The party has stated it now considers itself centrist and wants to adopt a social 
democratic ideology. It has ties with social democratic foundations abroad.   
Thaçi, who founded the PDK in 1999, is famous for his role in the Rambouillet 
peace talks where he managed to sideline Rugova to become the Kosovo Albanian 
negotiating team‘s leader. With the PDK‘s victory in the 2007 elections, Thaçi became 
Prime Minister and is known as the man who led Kosovo to independence.
303
 
Like many parties in former communist countries, the PDK struggles with the 
negative connotations of left wing parties, and clearly needs to improve its image as a 
party of guerrillas. The PDK is mainly supported by poor, rural, Albanian dominated 
regions, which experienced much violence and loss of life during the war, such as the 
Drenica Valley, the former KLA stronghold, where many of the bloodiest battles were 
fought. 
Today, the party is remarkably tolerant of and cooperative with local Serbs, 
offering them Serbian as an official language, special municipalities, special positions in 
institutions and right of veto on laws that deal with minority rights.  
To date the party has yet to formulate its agenda. Besides independence for 
Kosovo, its top priorities are social justice and the fight against youth unemployment 
and corruption.
304
  
Summed up, the PDK can be described as a Social Democratic party and the 
main leftist (moderate left) party in Kosovo, despite Hashim Thaçi having stated that 
the PDK now considers itself centrist.  
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Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 
The LDK, now led by President Fatmir Sejdiu, was the main political party before the 
1998−99 war when its former leader, Ibrahim Rugova, became famous for his policy of 
passive resistance.
305
 When Rugova‘s passive resistance did not achieve the goal of 
independence, the LDK was thrust aside by the KLA. Notwithstanding this, the party 
won the 2001 and 2004 elections and has been in government ever since. Following the 
2007 elections, the LDK formed a coalition government with the PDK.
306
 
LDK leader, Rugova was Kosovo‘s president from 2002 to 2006, when he died 
of lung cancer. The parliament then nominated Fatmir Sejdiu, who had been president 
of the LDK since its inception in 1989, as the country‘s new president.307 Rugova‘s 
death seemingly marked the end of the party‘s supremacy in Kosovo politics; he had 
kept the fractious LDK together. However, Sejdiu‘s first weeks in office impressed 
international observers as he brought valuable maturity and impartiality to the role. His 
approval rating reached 90 per cent by December 2008.  
The party portrays itself as modern and democratic, uniting Kosovo Albanian 
traditions with their future aspirations. Its orientation is liberal; favoring a free market 
economy. Other priorities are European integration, education − in the student‘s native 
language – authentic development of culture, fair social policy, accessible healthcare, 
and guaranteed minority rights.
308
    
The LDK is in contact with liberal parties elsewhere in the world and has 
requested membership of the Liberal International.
309
 Summed up, the LDK is a 
conservative and liberal conservative party and is the main right wing (moderate-right) 
party in Kosovo.  
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New Kosovo Alliance (AKR) 
The New Kosovo Alliance was founded in March 2007 by Behgjet Pacolli, a successful 
businessman and owner of the general contracting and engineering company Mabetex, 
and the main source of the party‘s finance. Effective management of the economy is its 
main concern and development is given a high priority. According to its website:  
―For Us, New Kosova Alliance, the driving force of our activity is the Sovran 
and Independent state of Kosova, prospered, with developed economy and 
integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures.‖310  
Although the 2007 elections were the first in which the AKR competed, it won 
12.3 per cent of the votes, or 13 seats in the assembly,
311
 making it the third biggest 
party in parliament and the largest official opposition to the PDK–LDK coalition. The 
party‘s ideological platform is centrism. 
Democratic League of Dardania (LDD)  
The LDD was originally called the Democratic League but was renamed to avoid 
confusion with the LDK; Dardania is an ancient name for Kosovo. The LDD was 
founded in January 2007 by the former speaker of the Kosovo Assembly, Nexhat Daci, 
who in December 2006  failed to win the leadership of the LDK and left to establish his 
own party: the LDD. Daci was acting president of Kosovo from the death of Ibrahim 
Rugova on 21 January 2006 until 11 February 2006 when Fatmir Sejdiu was elected 
president. The party‘s slogan is: pavarësi, paqe, prosperitet − independence, peace and 
prosperity. The LDD has a liberal-oriented platform. Initially, the party held seven seats 
in the Assembly of Kosovo and increased this to 11 in the 2007 elections when it 
managed to win 10.1 per cent of the votes.
312
 The LDD is a liberal conservative party 
and the second largest right-wing (moderate-right) party in Kosovo.  
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Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK)  
The AAK is headed by Ramush Haradinaj, a former Kosovo Liberation Army 
commander. Like the PDK, the party struggles with its image of representing Albanian 
militants.  
In the 2007 elections, the AAK won 9.6 per cent of the votes making it the fifth 
largest party in parliament.
313
 Its main support comes from the Dukagjini region, which 
includes the towns of Pejë/Peć and Deçan/Dečani, considered to be bases of Haradinaj 
and KLA activities during the war. It is clear that the party would lose ground without 
its leader Haradinaj, who is said to have about two to six thousand people ready and 
available to take his orders if Kosovo‘s security were to be threatened.314  
Following the October 2004 election, the LDK chose the AAK as its coalition 
partner and the party entered government in December, with Haradinaj named Prime 
Minister. Although his tenure was brief, it was evaluated positively by many Kosovo 
Albanians and the international community due to his efforts to raise standards in 
Kosovo. He resigned in March 2005 after he was indicted by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The indictment alleged that Haradinaj committed 
crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war between March 
and September 1998. On 3 April 2008, Haradinaj was found not guilty and returned to 
Kosovo where he received a hero‘s welcome and immediately resumed his duties as 
president of the party.
315
 
The AAK is now known as a moderate, pro-European party in the center of the 
political spectrum, which is in favor of ethnic cooperation. Economic priorities set by 
the party are the creation of new jobs, promotion of small and medium sized business, 
development of infrastructure, and privatization. In addition, women and youth are well 
represented in the party, in line with the party‘s priority of promoting youth and a more 
prominent role for women in society.
316
 Summed up, the AAK is located slightly to the 
right of center on the political spectrum. 
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3.4.1.2 Kosovo Serb political parties 
Although the majority of Kosovo Serbs boycotted the 2007 elections, a small number of 
Kosovo Serb parties participated, winning the ten seats reserved for Serbs. Chief 
amongst these are Slobodan Petrović‘s Independent Liberal Party (Samostalna 
Liberalna Stranka – SLS) and a coalition of smaller Serb parties led by Slaviša 
Petković‘s Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija (Srpska Demokratska 
Stranka Kosova i Metohije – SDSKiM). All disapprove of independence for Kosovo but 
nevertheless are aware that that their role is to engage with the authorities in 
Prishtinë/Priština. 
Other main Kosovo Serb Political Parties include the Serbian List for Kosovo 
and Methohija (Srpska lista za Kosovo i Metohiju – SLKM) and the Serbian Movement 
of Resistance in Kosovo (Srpski Pokret Otpora Kosova I Metohije – SPOKM). In 
general, the Kosovo Serb Parties stand for better living and political conditions for the 
Serbian community in Kosovo.  
Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM) 
The Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija is essentially a new form of the Koalicija 
‗Povratak‘ (Return), a wide coalition of Serbian-based parties formed to gather the 
Serbian political forces in Kosovo who supported the 2001 elections. The coalition 
participated under its new name in the 2004 elections.
317
 As the name ‗Return‘ implies, 
the coalition‘s goal is the return of Kosovo to Serbian rule.  
The SLKM is led by Oliver Ivanović, an engineer from Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, 
who in the past was regarded by the international community as public enemy number 
one. He was held responsible for the ―bridge watchers‖ who took much of the blame for 
the cleansing of northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica of its remaining ethnic Albanians.
318
 He 
also regularly accused the United Nations of miserable failures. 
However, Ivanović is a changed man and has become one of the more moderate 
Kosovo Serb leaders. He has concluded that Belgrade does not necessarily have the 
interests of the Kosovo Serbs in mind when it calls for election boycotts, and the party 
has suggested it might take up its reserved seats in the assembly and ministerial 
positions, in the face of Belgrade‘s disapproval. Privately, SLKM leaders say that local 
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Serbs need to compromise with the Albanian majority in order to survive and remain in 
Kosovo. They complain that Belgrade‘s position takes too little account of the daily 
reality of Serb life in Kosovo.
319
 
Since the SLKM is a diverse coalition of parties existing in Serbia, it cannot be 
assigned a specific political orientation.  
Serbian Movement of Resistance in Kosovo (SPOKM) 
The Serbian Movement of Resistance in Kosovo was formed by Momcilo Trajkovic, a 
local opponent of Milošević‘s Kosovo policy. Trajkovic opposed Kosovo‘s 2001 
general elections and the SPOKM also boycotted the general elections in 2004.
320
 
The SPOKM is an extremely radical party which strongly opposes Kosovo‘s 
independence as illustrated by the word ―resistance‖ in the party‘s name. The party can 
neither be placed on the right nor the left of the political spectrum; it sometimes holds 
both extreme left and extreme right positions.  
Serbian Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija (SDSKiM) 
This party is a vehicle for the party leader Slaviša Petković, a Kosovo Parliament 
member who was appointed Minister for Refugees in the 2004 government by Ramush 
Haradinaj. During his term as minister, Petković was accused by his own community of 
misusing public funds and of not caring enough for the Serbian community. He is at 
times openly critical of Belgrade, however might sometimes be using this merely as a 
cover-up. 
The SDSKiM together with the SLS can be assigned to the right-center of the 
political spectrum. 
3.4.1.3 Radical parties 
The 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by the formation of a number of 
Albanian nationalist groups in Kosovo, which were particularly motivated by the 1981 
demonstrations.
321
 These small groups, which were to serve as the predecessors of the 
KLA and its political wing the Popular Movement of Kosovo (Lëvizja Popullore e 
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Kosovës – LPK), were often called Marxist-Leninist or Enverist, after Albania‘s 
communist dictator, Enver Hoxha. This is deceptive. Although initially their ideas were 
conveyed in Marxist jargon, they were not Marxists, or even Enverists, but old-
fashioned nationalists. At the time of the LPK‘s formation, Enverism and Marxism were 
a façade to avoid being accused of fascism. Another advantage of identifying with the 
Albanian regime was that these small groups received financial and other support from 
Enver Hoxha.
322
  
In 1982,
323
 a year after the important student demonstrations, the Kosovo 
National Movement, also known as the LPK was formed by the union of four leftist 
political organizations: the National Liberation Movement of Kosovo and Other Parts of 
Albanian Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Marxist-Leninist Organization, the Communist-
Marxist-Leninist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia and the Red National Front. The 
LPK transformed itself into the KLA in the 1990s.
324
  
In addition to the LPK (which still exists today under a different name) there 
were a multitude of other organizations. However, the two most important political 
parties which supported the armed resistance against the Serb regime were the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo or in Albanian, Lëvizja Kombëtare për 
Çlirimin e Kosovës (LKÇK) and the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo or 
Lëvizja Popullore për Republikën e Kosovës (LPRK).  
Popular Movement of Kosovo (LPK) or Socialist Party of Kosovo (PSK) 
The Popular Movement of Kosovo − now Socialist Party of Kosovo (Partia Socialiste e 
Kosovës − PSK) − was formed in 1982 by the unification of several smaller Albanian 
Marxist-Leninist factions. The LPK was always an underground movement in Kosovo, 
but an openly dissident movement in Switzerland where many of its activists lived in 
exile. In the beginning, the movement was supported by Enver Hoxha‘s communist 
government in Albania. The LPK‘s initial objective was the liberation of Kosovo from 
Belgrade‘s repression and Pan-Albanianism − the unification of all Albanian inhabited 
areas of the Balkans. After the collapse of communism in Albania, the LPK also 
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renounced its Marxist-Leninist roots; however, it kept its habit of covertness, 
underground cells and radicalism.
325
 
After Milošević‘s raids in Kosovo, the LPK drew closer to Prishtinë/Priština 
University‘s student protesters, including Hashim Thaçi who was still a student at that 
time. They arrived at the decision to prepare for an armed struggle in the early 1990s. 
Moreover, they began building a network of secret cells across Kosovo and got in touch 
with well-known armed groups such as that led by Adem Jashari. It is no wonder that 
many high-ranking KLA members have their roots in the LPK, which was one of the 
key sources for what became the KLA and is seen as LPK‘s armed wing.326  
The LPK, currently led by party chairman Emrush Xhemajli changed its name in 
2009 to Socialist Party of Kosovo. The PSK modified its radical views and is turning 
more to political debate rather than radical methods. Nevertheless, it still ranks among 
the most radical Albanian parties in Kosovo, however with little public support. Now 
that attaining Pan-Albanianism is no longer a possibility, the PSK has increasingly 
given up on this objective. Instead, members perceive that the independence of Kosovo 
by itself helps towards the establishment of a Union of Kosovo and Albania. 
The PSK can be classified as a leftist party which is currently in transition from 
extreme left to moderate left.
327
  
National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKÇK)  
LKÇK is a former underground movement founded in 1993. Like the LPK, the LKÇK 
supports the idea of a Greater Albania. The party also networks with Albin Kurti‘s 
Vetëvendosje movement, which, while not extremist, shares some  LKÇK views. The 
LKÇK is probably the most radical political force at present operating in Kosovo, 
opposing the Ahtisaari plan and the presence of the international community in Kosovo, 
which is seen as an occupying force, as well as the current government, which it accuses 
of abandoning the idea of a Greater Albania. The party does not refrain from revolts 
against international personnel and
 
represents the extreme left in Kosovo.
328
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3.4.1.4 Recent elections and results 
On 17 November 2007, Kosovo held parliamentary and municipal elections. Some 97 
political entities were certified to run, including 33 Kosovo Serb political entities, 
despite pressure from Belgrade to boycott the elections. Following pressure and 
intimidation, four Kosovo Serb political entities withdrew from the race on 31 
October.
329
 The elections were marked by low voter turnout of about 40 per cent and a 
near total boycott by the Kosovo Serb community.
330
 Only about 2,000 Kosovo Serbs 
south of the Ibar River participated in the ballot. 
The 2007 elections changed the political landscape of Kosovo. As shown in 
Table 6 below, the PDK won 34.3 per cent of the votes, the LDK 22.6 per cent, the 
AKR 12.3 per cent, the LDD 10.0 per cent, and the AAK 9.6 per cent. The Reformist 
Party ORA (Partia Reformiste ORA
331
) did not pass the five per cent threshold, and thus 
were awarded no seats. Smaller minority parties also made some gains. Ultimately, 
these results led to a coalition between the LDK and the PDK, and the elevation of 
Hashim Thaçi to be Prime Minister of Kosovo. The AKR, LDD and AAK form the 
opposition. 
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Table 6: Parliamentary election results 17 November 2007 
Parties Votes % of votes Seats 
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) 196,207 34.32 37 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 129,410 22.63 25 
New Kosovo Alliance (AKR) 70,165 12.27 13 
Democratic League of Dardania (LDD) 57,002 9.97 11 
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) 54,611 9.55 10 
ORA Reformist Party  23,722 4.14 / 
Justice Party  9,789 1.73 / 
Others  30,760 5.38 4 
Reserved seats for representatives of 
designated minority ethnic groups  
/ / 20 
Total   571,666 100.00 120 
Source: Europa World Online: Kosovo Assembly (Kuvendi i Kosovës/Skupština Kosova) (Kosovo). 
London, Routledge. United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV). Online via Internet: URL:  
http://www.europaworld.com/external?url=http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ks.dir.7626735135123 
[accessed 13 08 2008]. 
On 15 November 2009, municipal (mayoral) elections were hold in Kosovo. 
These were the first since Kosovo‘s declaration of independence and hence the first to 
be organized by local authorities. The elections have been praised by the EU and US as 
a milestone in Kosovo‘s transition to a democratic sovereign state. A total of 37 parties, 
19 electoral associations and two coalitions put forward candidates.
332
 Although voter 
turnout was higher than at the 2007 parliamentary elections, it remained low, at about 
45 per cent. The Serb election boycott was successful in the north (particularly in the 
two northern municipalities of Leposaviq/Leposavić and Zveçan/Zvečan), while in the 
rest of the country a significant number of Serbs participated in the elections. According 
to the think tank Jane‘s, in Serb municipalities voter turnout reached 24 per cent.333 The 
generally low voter participation reflects the frustration and disappointment Kosovars 
feel about their leaders for failing to rectify the high unemployment rate and the bleak 
economic situation of the country.
334
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3.4.2 Non-parliamentary groups 
The KLA was incontrovertibly the best known of the ethnic Albanian insurgent groups 
operating in the western Balkans during the 1990s. Nevertheless, other groups were also 
active during this period. Among these groups were: the National Liberation Army 
(NLA) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) or in Albanian, 
Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare – UÇK, and the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja 
and Bujanovac (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Presheves, Medvegjes dhe Bujanovcit – UÇPMB) 
in south Serbia. All three groups should not be seen as completely separate entities.
335
 
They all fought for the same objective: a Greater Albania, and there was a great deal of 
interconnection between them. Together they represent the nationalist Albanian 
movement, both within Kosovo and beyond in ―ethnic Albania‖. 
The KLA is no longer an active force, but two official branches continue to 
exist: the War Invalids Association and the War Veterans Association.
336
 Members of 
the War Veterans Association threatened several times in 2007 that if Kosovo were not 
granted independence from Serbia, they would take up arms again, and they still claim 
that they are prepared to do so if there were any threat to Kosovo, such as the return of 
the Serbian army and police, however this scenario does not seem likely.
337
 
Even today, some members of the War Veterans and the War Invalids 
Association, still stand for a unified Albanian state. This position, which is also not 
supported by the majority of Kosovars, puts them at odds with Prime Minister Hashim 
Thaçi, who has turned his back on this course and now perceives Albania as a neighbor 
and not a potential mother state. While the leaders of these associations support Thaçi 
because of his former position as KLA leader, many ex-KLA members feel that he 
betrayed them.  
Little is known about a more obscure armed group called the Albanian National 
Army or in Albanian, Armata Kombëtare Shqiptare (AKSh). AKSh was primarily 
composed of members from other insurgent groups who collaborated in organized 
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crime. The membership of all these groups overlap, therefore it is no coincidence that 
the KLA and the NLA have the same Albanian acronym, UÇK.  
3.4.2.1 Non-state armed groups  
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
―The KLA has to rank as one of the most successful military organizations in 
history. Its success has nothing to do with its military prowess; it won no battles. 
It is, rather, thanks to the fact that emerging on to the scene at the right place, at 
the right time, it was able to have NATO win its war for it.‖338 
The KLA‘s exact origins remain vague. Nevertheless, its political ancestry can 
be traced back to the network of overlapping Marxist-Leninist and clandestine groups 
described earlier.
339
 After World War II, small, subversive groups arose with the goal of 
detaching Kosovo from Serbia and Yugoslavia. In 1961, Adem Demaçi, who became 
known as the Kosovar Albanian Nelson Mandela, founded one of the first underground 
movements for Kosovo‘s liberation from Yugoslavia: the Revolutionary Movement for 
Albanian Unity.
340
  
As political tensions mounted, subversive groups began to proliferate. However, 
the events that really mobilized these tiny, hard-line nationalist groups were the student 
demonstrations of 1981, initially provoked by poor university conditions but quickly 
turning political.  
Thus, the KLA was founded in December 1993 with the straightforward 
objective of liberating Kosovo from the Serb repression. The extent of this objective, 
however, varied from member to member. While some wanted an independent Kosovo, 
the majority fought for a Greater Albania.  
From 1993 to 1997, some KLA members received military training in secret 
camps in Albania. At the start, the KLA was a small organization, mounting sporadic 
attacks on Serbian police officers and state officials as well as Albanians who were 
perceived to be collaborators. The majority of weapons flowed in from Albania and the 
organization itself was to some extent financed by donations from the Albanian 
diaspora.  
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The catalyst for a decisive increase in KLA support and which turned it away 
from Rugova‘s policy of passive resistance was the Dayton Peace agreement in 
November 1995. The Kosovars were discouraged and frustrated by the outcome of the 
agreement, which made no mention of Kosovo, leading to growing radicalism among 
young Albanians and escalating violence between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians.  
The formation of the KLA was not at first declared openly, with some rumors 
suggesting its initial attacks were the work of the armed wing of the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (Lëvizja Nacional-Çlirimtare e Kosovës), a 
known Albanian émigré group operating out of Switzerland since 1981. Rumors also 
linked the attacks to the LPK, which was formed in 1982 by the unification of several 
smaller Albanian Marxist-Leninist factions.
341
 Meanwhile, Rugova denied the KLA‘s 
existence and claimed that the violence was the work of the Serbian secret police. 
Things changed in 1997, when the KLA‘s problem of acquiring sufficient 
weapons was eased by supplies deriving from Albanian army depots looted in the chaos 
following the disastrous pyramid-investment-scheme crash. 
The KLA openly appeared in Kosovo for the first time in November 1997 when 
three masked men at the funeral of an Albanian teacher, killed by Serbian security 
forces, declared in public: ―Serbia is massacring Albanians. The Kosovo Liberation 
Army is the only force fighting for the freedom of Kosovo. We shall continue to 
fight.‖342  
In February 1998, US Special Representative Robert Gelbard expressed concern 
about the escalating violence in Kosovo and characterized the actions of the Serb forces 
as merely an exercise in demonstrating police power while he described the KLA as a 
terrorist organization.
343
 This labeling of the KLA as terrorists might have been 
perceived by Slobodan Milošević as a green light to act ruthlessly in Kosovo. Within a 
week of Gelbard‘s statement, Serb forces launched major actions against KLA-
supportive areas around Kosovo and slaughtered the KLA leader Adem Jashari, who 
became the KLA‘s first martyr, and other members of the famous Jashari clan.344 
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During 1998, the influence of the KLA continued growing. Sporadic attacks 
became increasingly frequent and coordinated. For Kosovo Albanians, the KLA became 
a movement worth joining. The consequence was a change in the balance of political 
power: the influence of Rugova and the LDK started to weaken. For the Serbs and the 
international community, the KLA became a serious political force, whose influence 
continued to be crucial even after the end of fighting. The KLA had to be included in 
any political negotiations so that it did not become a base for the development of 
terrorism in Kosovo.
345
  
The speed of its emergence and growth in popularity during 1998 meant that the 
KLA essentially became the hub of a diverse collection of political groups and armed 
formations. Many villages and groups that had armed themselves affirmed they were 
part of the KLA and used the name ―UÇK‖ while never truly belonging to it.346 
In March 1999, as it became clear that the Paris peace talks would collapse, the 
Serbs started a massive pre-emptive offensive against the KLA, which was followed by 
NATO‘s 78-day bombardment of Serb assets.  
 The KLA was officially disbanded in September 1999 and many KLA veterans 
were recruited into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) − in Albanian, Trupat e 
Mbrojtjes së Kosovës.
347
  
Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UÇPMB)  
The UÇPMB, an offshoot of the KLA, was a guerilla group named after three small 
Serbian municipalities on the border with Kosovo that are predominantly inhabited by 
ethnic Albanians: Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac. The group‘s objective was for the 
three municipalities to secede from Serbia and be incorporated into Kosovo. In 2000, 
NATO estimated the UÇPMB‘s total strength at 800, while Serbian sources put it at 
1,500.
348
  
The disarmament of the KLA in 1999 marked the beginning of the UÇPMB‘s 
operations. The Military Technical Agreement − which was signed on 9 June 1999 
between KFOR and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
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Republic of Serbia – established a three-mile ―Ground Safety Zone‖ along Kosovo‘s 
border with the rest of Serbia, which was out of bounds for Yugoslav Army units as 
well as for NATO forces. Only light-armed local Serbian police were permitted to enter 
this buffer zone. Members of the UÇPMB took advantage of these conditions and 
started to make incursions into the Ground Safety Zone. As their attacks increased, 
Serbian police were pushed back and had to stop patrolling the zone.  
 NATO, tried to end the assaults by using the political influence of the former 
political leader of the KLA, Hashim Thaçi. Through his intervention and mediation, the 
UÇPMB agreed to end the violence in March 2000. Notwithstanding the pledge, the 
group‘s activities escalated in November 2000 when UÇPMB members killed four 
Serbian police officers in one of their most violent attacks.
349
  
Following negotiations, the UÇPMB withdrew, but clashes continued until May 
2001 when the group was disbanded and formally ceased to exist. It is very likely that 
some members simply replaced the logos on their uniforms and continued fighting in 
the National Liberation Army in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
350
  
Albanian National Army (AKSh) 
The AKSh is a shadowy pan-Albanian extremist armed group that has existed in some 
form since 1999. However, as is typical of small clandestine groups, it is hard to define 
and prone to splintering, hence it is not possible to provide a definitive date for its 
foundation.
351
  
In March 2003, AKSh, which had always been regarded as a Macedonia-focused 
group, appeared in Kosovo and claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in the 
region. It was declared a terrorist organization by UNMIK in 2003 after it bombed the 
Zveçan/Zvečan railway bridge in northern Kosovo.352 Until its involvement in the 
March 2004 riots, AKSh actions had claimed no lives, except for those of two of its 
own members who blew themselves up in the Zveçan/Zvečan attack. But this soon 
changed. The emergence of AKSh − in other Balkan countries as well as Kosovo – in 
2003 and its attacks, however disorganized, were alarming to security forces. 
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The attacks credited to AKSh generally show a low level of planning and 
competence. Its modus operandi is described as low risk. Its leaders live underground in 
Macedonia and the group has very little popular support across the Albanian-majority 
areas in the southern Balkans.  
Again, as it is a clandestine organization, little concrete is known about the 
numbers involved. While intelligence sources like Jane‘s report 200 members across the 
region, of whom 50 to 70 are in Macedonia, the Associated Press reported that ―an 
AKSh paramilitary commander in Kosovo, who identified himself as Preka, said the 
AKSh could immediately conscript 12,000 people to ‗defend this land to the last 
soldier,‘ adding they were patrolling all northern Kosovo towns bordering Serbia.‖353 
Due to its cross-border character, AKSh‘s actions in neighboring countries could pose a 
spillover threat to Kosovo.  
In the months prior to Kosovo‘s declaration of independence, AKSh made 
several appearances in short films broadcast by local media. In October 2007 for 
example, AKSh appeared on Radio Television Kosovo and announced it was  prepared 
to defend Kosovo from a potential Serb invasion.
354
  
The AKSh‘s political and fundraising source is the Front for Albanian National 
Unification (Fronti për Bashkim Kombëtar Shqiptar − FBKSh). FBKSh‘s aim is the 
unification of the ―Albanian lands‖355 and their people into a single Albanian national 
state. Gafurr Adili, who claims to be the AKSh spokesman in Tirana, and also claims to 
lead FBKSh, said in 2007 that AKSh ―had fighters and supporters in every corner of 
Kosovo, in every community, village, town, even in parliament, the old or the new 
one.‖356 According to a public statement by FBKSh in June 2009, AKSh has stopped its 
activities in Kosovo due to the fact that Kosovo is now independent and has its own 
police, the KFOR presence and most notably the newly established Kosovo Security 
Force. On this basis, FBKSh claims that there is no longer any need for AKSh to be 
active in Kosovo. The public statement also included proposals to discharge Gafurr 
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Adili from his position as the AKSh spokesperson because FBKSh insists that he is a 
liar and doing significant harm to the Front.
357
  
The group‘s exact goals seem to be rather confused. Freedom House argues that 
the AKSh supports ―creating a ‗Greater Albania‘ in the Balkans.‖358 In contrast, 
Arberi,
359
 who claims to be the leader of the AKSh, has explained that the group is ―not 
fighting for Pan-Albanian unification, but to protect the territorial integrity of Kosovo if 
it is threatened.‖360 Jane‘s intelligence reviews argue that while AKSh endorses a 
radical Pan-Albanian ideology that aims to unify all Balkan territories inhabited by 
ethnic Albanians, its primary driving force simply seems to be continuation of violence 
for criminal purposes.
361
 In this context it is necessary to draw a distinction between the 
real AKSh and groups that simply use the name of AKSh as a cover for criminal 
activities. AKSh is trying to discourage this because it considers that AKSh stands for 
much higher ideologies.
362
 
AKSh has always been considerably smaller and less organized than the NLA. It 
now provides a home for more radical former KLA, NLA and UÇPMB members who 
reject political dialogue, and it is possible that parts of the AKSh may represent a 
residual KLA. Kosovo Albanian leaders consider the group‘s activities as obstructive to 
the work of the international institutions. Prior to the declaration of independence, 
Kosovo politicians feared that the group could damage efforts to resolve Kosovo‘s 
status through internationally mediated negotiations.  
Jane‘s emphasizes that information on AKSh provided by Serb and Macedonian 
media should be treated with caution and skepticism − for example, the claim in the 
Serbian media in August 2003, that Islamic terrorists were training in Kosovo.
363
 The 
intelligence services of these countries describe the AKSh as a ―large and formidable 
force closely linked to Islamist extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda‖.364 However, such 
claims are politically motivated and no evidence has ever been produced to support 
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them.
 
There is no tradition of radical, political Islam among ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo, Macedonia and southern Serbia; and AKSh is avowedly secular.
365
 As 
emphasized by the International Crisis Group,  
―there is no risk that significant numbers of Muslims in Kosovo might support 
Islamist extremists; such a development would contradict their religious 
traditions, their political views, and their life styles, which are emphatically 
Western.‖366  
Bridge Watchers (Cuvari Mosta)  
After the end of the NATO air campaign in 1999, the Serbs that remained in Kosovo did 
not immediately accept the newly established UNMIK administration. Those who lived 
in the predominantly Kosovo Serb municipalities, principally in the north, established 
parallel security, judicial, administrative, education and public-health structures linked 
to those in Serbia, which continue to be a problem.
367
  
In a 2003 report on parallel structures in Kosovo, the OSCE stated that one of 
the main entities involved in parallel security in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica was the 
so-called Bridge Watchers
368
 − organized groups of Serb civilians who patrol and 
monitor the Serbian side of the Ibar river bridge in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica.
369
 They 
consider themselves as a security organization with three main functions: to prevent 
Kosovo Albanians from entering the north of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica; to gather 
information on KFOR and UNMIK Police and to gain information on any Kosovo 
Albanian living in the north. They are not permitted to carry weapons, but show 
considerable skills in using unconventional and makeshift arms. 
Though consisting of local volunteers in civilian clothes, their organization and 
communication skills suggest that they were originally employees of the Serbian 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Yugoslav Army, with funding apparently coming 
from the Serbian authorities.  
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From mid 2002, the Bridge Watchers started to lose political support from 
Belgrade and from the local population.
370
 In November 2002, SRSG Michael Steiner 
and the late Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Dindić signed an agreement on northern 
Kosovo, in which Belgrade handed over control of parallel institutions to UNMIK and 
agreed to the establishment of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) north of the Ibar. 
Although the Bridge Watchers continue to pursue their activities, intelligence 
sources such as Jane‘s state that they have lost covert funding from Belgrade. One 
indicator of this loss of income is that they have increased racketeering activities against 
Serbian businesses. Although the Bridge Watchers were more visible at the time of 
Kosovo‘s declaration of independence, fears of widespread Serb violence were not 
borne out.
371
 
3.4.2.2 Non-state political movements 
Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (Movement for Self-Determination) 
Not everyone in Kosovo accepts the necessity for the strong presence of the 
international community, which some see as an obstacle to progress in the country. The 
Kosovo Albanian political movement Vetëvendosje, (Self-determination) stands for the 
independence of Kosovo as a corollary of Kosovo Albanians‘ right to self-determination 
and demands the withdrawal of the international organizations. Led by the activist Albin 
Kurti, the movement is based on a clear political agenda but it does not function in the 
same way as other political groupings and does not participate in elections. 
Vetëvendosje had its origins in the widespread activities of the Kosovo Action 
Network (KAN), whose goal was ―the creation of active citizens in Kosovo, dedicated 
to the promotion of universal values in the field of human rights and freedoms, equality 
and social justice.‖372 KAN was founded in 1997 by international activists and led by 
the American writer Alice Mead. The network initially campaigned against Serbia‘s 
occupation of and dictatorship over Kosovo. 
UNMIK‘s fifth anniversary, on 10 June 2004, was marked by a demonstration 
against UNSCR 1244 where protesters pledged themselves as citizens and activists to 
fight UNMIK‘s anti-democratic regime. A year later, on 12 June 2005, when Kosovo‘s 
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status negotiations were supposed to begin, the slogan Jo Negociata – Vetëvendosje! 
(―No Negotiations – Self Determination!‖) was daubed on the UNMIK headquarters for 
the first time, which Vetëvendosje sees as the defining moment when KAN evolved into 
a political movement, in response to what it saw as unambiguous signs that the future 
status of Kosovo would be negotiated with Serbia.
373
 
Vetëvendosje‘s leader, Albin Kurti was born in 1975 in Prishtinë/Priština and 
emerged as a student activist during the 1990s, organizing demonstrations against the 
Milošević regime. He worked as a translator in the office of the General Political 
Representative of the KLA, Adem Demaçi, and during the NATO airstrikes of 1999 he 
was arrested by Serbian forces. Initially sentenced to 15 years in jail, he was pardoned 
and released in December 2001. 
On his release, Kurti organized a number of demonstrations against UNMIK, 
which he perceives as an anti-democratic neo-colonial institution with unlimited 
powers. When the final status negotiations began, Vetëvendosje became increasingly 
active in organizing non-violent demonstrations calling for an independent Kosovo and 
an end to the status talks, claiming that they divided Kosovo‘s territory. Vetëvendosje‘s 
activities, particularly its demonstrations, have always been characterized by non-
violence. Albin Kurti, who considers non-violent movements as the greatest invention 
of this century, argues:  
―Our demonstrations are gatherings where people march, where activists deliver 
speeches, and where there is a massive action: 700 bottles with red paint have 
been thrown on UNMIK and the Government‘s buildings; a huge pile of garbage 
we had collected over a week in the streets of Prishtina has been thrown from a 
truck… .‖374 
The revolutionary movement has indeed avoided injuring anyone in the course of its 
activities; demonstrators have only damaged property, especially UNMIK‘s, by writing 
thousands of slogans on UNMIK buildings and deflating tyres or overturning dozens of 
EULEX cars in August 2009. Activists have also several times expressed their 
displeasure by throwing rotten eggs at Serbian officials. Since the protests are non-
violent, forces have no pretext for attacking them in public.  
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On 10 February 2007, the movement led a significant rally protesting against 
Martti Ahtisaari‘s proposal of ―supervised independence‖ for Kosovo. The UNMIK 
police fired tear-gas and rubber bullets into the crowd, injuring 80 people, while two 
unarmed protesters were killed by rubber bullets fired by Romanian UNMIK Police 
officers.  
Following the rally, Albin Kurti was arrested again and placed under house 
arrest. (He was released on parole prior to the declaration of independence in February 
2008.) At the same time, Kosovo Minister of the Interior, Fatmir Rexhepi, and the head 
of the international UNMIK Police, Stephen Curtis, resigned. A UN investigation found 
evidence of excessive use of force and noted the unauthorized use of rubber bullets, 
which were banned after the lethal incident. No one has been prosecuted for this failure 
and UNMIK allowed the Romanian police officers to leave Kosovo.
375
  
The self-determination movement still exists and continues to be active. Albin 
Kurti remains a strong critic of the international mission. 
―Despite Kosova‘s declaration of independence, we will continue to be governed 
by an unelected and unaccountable international administration, which consists 
now of not just one, but three missions: The International Civilian Office, 
EULEX and UNMIK,‖376  
Kurti argues. Vetëvendosje is the only organization in Kosovo that vehemently opposes 
the international presence in the country. At present, the movement advocates 
unsupervised independence from the international organizations. Albin Kurti claims that 
while Kosovo‘s declaration of independence was a step forward because of the 
international recognition it achieved, at the same time the declaration took Kosovo three 
steps back because it was tied by the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan to executive 
supervision by two international missions on the basis of UNSCR 1244.
377
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The government is not responsive to Vetëvendosje‘s demands and critiques. 
Since it is categorized as radical by both internationals and the government, the 
government does not respond to its criticisms.
378
 
3.4.3 Conclusion  
The desire for independence among Kosovo Albanians was powerful enough to turn 
them into radicals and extremists in their struggle against the Serbian repression. Today, 
however, it can be seen that political extremism has gradually declined since the end of 
the war in Kosovo. At present, political parties, groups and movements are very 
unlikely to threaten security and stability. 
This chapter‘s analysis of the creation of Kosovo‘s political system and the 
current political parties shows that Kosovo has made significant progress in the 
development of a non-violent and democratic political culture. Through the 
international engagement, a reasonably stable democratic basis could be established and 
Kosovars largely accept democratic rules. It has also been possible to create political 
institutions and to hold parliamentary and municipal elections in compliance with 
international standards and without major problems. The 2009 municipal elections have 
been praised by the EU and US as a milestone in Kosovo‘s transition to a democratic 
sovereign state.  
It has been shown that none of the parties in power have any interest in 
appearing extremist. None of the main ethnic Albanian parties in Kosovo‘s multiparty 
system, which is to some extent organized around clan or regional ties, are positioned 
far from the center ground. The three radical parties: the SPOKM, the LKÇK and to 
some extent the PSK, are all small, have little public support and do not pose a threat to 
the security situation in Kosovo.  
Among the political movements in Kosovo, Vetëvendosje is the only one that 
directly confronts both internationals and the government and which is categorized by 
them as radical. However, Vetëvendosje is not a violent organization; its activities are 
mainly focused on staging demonstrations which are characterized by non-violence.  
Outside the political system, the threat from extremist armed groups has also 
declined. Without doubt, before the declaration of independence, the international 
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community‘s greatest fear was that violence could emanate from impatient Kosovo 
Albanian groups perceiving the status negotiations as a protracted stalemate. 
Achievement of their goal has changed the picture. Of the largest and best known armed 
formations the KLA, the KPC and the UÇPMB have all been dissolved and no longer 
pose a threat to Kosovo‘s security.  
One group that continues to exist and might pose some problems is the War 
Veterans Association comprising former KLA fighters, with the continued enthusiasm 
among its members for a unified Albanian state.  
Former die-hard members of the KLA, as well as of the NLA and UÇPMB, 
could find a home with the AKSh which is, however, reportedly no longer active in 
Kosovo. Therefore, the threat of AKSh should not be exaggerated as is sometimes the 
case in the media.  
In advance of Kosovo‘s declaration of independence, it was in the interests of 
both Belgrade and some Kosovo Albanians to highlight the existence of Albanian 
armed groups. Before February 2008, some Kosovo Albanians thought they could 
badger the international community to grant Kosovo‘s independence more quickly by 
referring to a revival of armed insurgency.
379
 At the same time, Serbian politicians tried 
their utmost to demonstrate that Kosovo was incapable of governing itself, with Serbian 
newspapers highlighting that Kosovo needed to remain within Belgrade‘s control.380 
One article stated, that, if given independence ―the Albanian-controlled areas of Kosovo 
would sink even deeper into … jihad terror under a ‗government‘ composed of war 
criminals.‖381 The presence of armed groups, threatening civilians, was deftly used to 
emphasize these arguments.  
Kosovo‘s declaration of independence in February 2008 did not provoke any 
terrorist or extremist activity. As will be discussed in the next chapter, two-and-a-half 
years after Kosovo becoming independent, the security situation has remained calm and 
stable and the absence of renewed violence since the proclamation marks one of the 
                                                 
 
379
 Kosovo‘s resurgent armed groups. In: Jane‘s Terrorism and Insurgency News. 31 January 2008. 
Online via Internet: URL: http://www.janes.com/news/security/terrorism/jtsm/jtsm080131_1_n.shtml 
[accessed 27 07 2009].  
380
 Kosovo, Black Hole of Organized Crime. In: Byzantine Blog. Orthodox Journal. 10 October 2006. 
Online via Internet: URL: http://byzantinesacredart.com/blog/2006/10/kosovo-black-hole.html [accessed 
28 07 2009]. 
381
 Kosovo Independence: End of Europe. In: Global Research. 15 February 2008. Centre for Research 
and Globalization. Online via Internet: URL:  
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8098 [accessed 28 07 2009]. 
  
137 
biggest achievements of the new state. As the above examples reveal, insurgent groups 
are sometimes invoked by the media simply to pursue a political goal. Certainly, 
stability can be influenced by the way any incidents involving insurgent groups are 
reported by the media in Kosovo and Serbia, and the media is consequently having 
more influence on the security situation and interethnic relations than the balaclava-clad 
men themselves.
382
  
For the Kosovo Albanians, the current struggle is to reorganize Kosovo 
internally, leaving no space for political extremism. Nevertheless, elsewhere in the state 
there are factors that could create a fertile ground for violence.  
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4 THE FUNCTION OF SECURITY IN RELATION 
TO PEACE 
Based on Ulrich Schneckener‘s indicators of the state‘s security function discussed in 
section 2.1.3.1, this chapter‘s aim is to analyze and evaluate the extent to which the 
security function, in terms of national as well as human security, is fulfilled in Kosovo. 
Thus, the chapter starts with an overview of the security situation in the country. In 
addition to the international organizations‘ perspective, a particular focus is on 
Kosovars‘ personal perceptions of security, with insights gained from the author‘s 
interviews. Excerpts from these appear throughout the chapter. Since the security 
situation in Kosovo is dominated by relations between the Albanian and Serb 
communities, examination of this issue is an integral part of the analysis. 
The second section of the chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the factors 
and actors that threaten Kosovo‘s stability. However, unemployment and poverty, the 
predominant threats, are not dealt with here. Given their significance, they are analyzed 
thoroughly in the context of the evaluation of Kosovo‘s social protection system in 
chapter five. The threatening factors that are examined in this section are: crime and 
corruption, lack of rule of law, and religious and political extremism.  
The final section of the chapter examines the actors that are supposed to provide 
security, concentrating on the efforts of first, the international security providers and 
then the national security providers to counter acts of direct violence and establish a 
safe and secure environment in Kosovo. The assessment of the successes and 
shortcomings of these institutions and Kosovars‘ satisfaction with their performance is 
an essential part of this section.  
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4.1 Security situation in Kosovo 
Two-and-a-half years after Kosovo declared independence, the overall situation in the 
country has not deteriorated as much as expected by some critics, particularly in Serbia, 
nor has as much progress been achieved as promised by the Government of Kosovo or 
its foreign sponsors. Unquestionably, the greatest achievement has been the marked 
improvement in security with no renewed (large-scale) violence between Kosovo 
Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. The deployment of the international UNMIK police force, 
the particularly significant stabilizing presence of KFOR and the establishment of the 
Kosovo Police have gradually improved the security situation since 1999 and created an 
atmosphere in which the tasks of civil reconstruction could be assumed.
383
 Three 
benchmarks of development and achievement since 1999 that speak for a positive 
change in the current security situation − which will be examined more closely below − 
stand out. Firstly there is the reduction of violence, with the exception of the March 
riots of 2004 involving Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. Unfortunately this 
incident was a noticeable setback in progress towards a stable, multi-ethnic and 
democratic Kosovo. Secondly, there has been a growing readiness for coexistence 
between the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs since 2008 apart from in northern 
Kosovo and thirdly, the establishment of the Kosovo Police which is analyzed 
separately in chapter 4.3.4. 
Despite some civil unrest and security incidents, the overall security situation in 
Kosovo in the period before and after Kosovo‘s declaration of independence remained 
―calm though tense‖  according to the UN Secretary-General‘s March 2008 report to the 
Security Council on the UNMIK mission.
384
 The interethnic violence that many had 
feared has largely been avoided and the mass exodus of Kosovo Serbs that some, 
including the Belgrade authorities, also expected has not taken place. This can be 
explained by KFOR‘s determined presence and strength, which restrained the Serbian 
government from even adumbrating military measures to prevent Kosovo‘s 
independence. There were only two significant incidents. Two days after the declaration 
of independence, Kosovo Serbs attacked two border crossings between Kosovo and 
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Serbia and destroyed the border posts, forcing UN and Kosovo Police personnel to 
retreat. The situation has since calmed down, although the potential remains for 
violence, if authorities in Prishtinë/Priština or the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) 
try to assert their authority aggressively in Serb-dominated northern Kosovo.
 
A month 
later, on 17 March 2008, Kosovo Serb protests against Kosovo institutions such as the 
UNMIK Court and Detention Center in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica claimed the life of 
a Ukrainian UN police officer and left a number of KFOR soldiers, UNMIK police 
officers and Serb demonstrators wounded. UNMIK later announced it had proof that 
Serbian Interior Ministry personnel played a role in the violence around the 
courthouse.
385
 
The current security situation in Kosovo is assessed as ―calm but fragile‖.386 The 
latest Secretary-General‘s report on the UNMIK mission of April 2010 indicates that 
there has been no increase in the number of security incidents, including those affecting 
the minority communities, compared with the previous reporting period. However, the 
persistence of incidents – albeit low level – not only continues to deter returnees but 
also nourishes feelings of insecurity, anxiety and fear among Kosovars, particularly 
among Kosovo Serbs.
387
 
4.1.1 Personal perceptions of security  
According to a January 2010 poll, conducted by UNDP, about 62 per cent of Kosovars 
feel safe while outside on the street, while 29 per cent feel unsafe as shown in Figure 
9.
388
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Figure 9: Feeling safe on the street 
 
            Source: UNDP Kosovo: Fast Facts. Early Warning Report 27. March 2010. p. 6. 
Those Kosovars who feel unsafe are mainly Kosovo Serbs, amongst whom only 
1.3 per cent feel somewhat safe outside on the street as of June 2009, whereas, some 71 
per cent of Kosovo Albanians and some 67 per cent of other minorities feel very safe or 
somewhat safe (see Table 7). 
Table 7: Feeling safe by ethnicity 
 K-Albanian K-Serb Others All ethnicities 
Very safe 25.5% n/a 23.7% 20.5% 
Somewhat safe 46.0% 1.3% 43.4% 37.4% 
Somewhat unsafe 14.4% 29.6% 16.7% 17.5% 
Very unsafe 7.8% 52.4% 9.2% 16.1% 
NA 6.3% 16.7% 7.0% 8.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: UNDP Kosovo: Early Warning Report Kosovo. No. 25. April−June 2009. September 2009. p. 29.  
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Overall, the major threats to family security identified by Kosovars, across 
ethnicities, are: theft (23 per cent), organized crime (19 per cent) and poverty (15 per 
cent) followed by murders, traffic accidents, robberies, drugs, kidnappings and 
infectious diseases.
389
  
The author‘s interviews, conducted in September 2009 throughout Kosovo, do 
not only support the finding that Kosovo Albanians feel very much safer than Kosovo 
Serbs, but also highlight the threats to security that Kosovars perceive. Petrit Hysaj, a 
Kosovo Albanian interviewed, put it aptly:  
―As far as external threats are concerned, the situation in Kosovo is quiet and at 
a desirable level, thanks to KFOR … But there are internal security problems 
such as lack of social security, for example. There is the lack of a proper health 
system; let‘s take swine flu for instance: Kosovo is not prepared to deal with it 
and I feel threatened by pandemics in Kosovo should they happen here. The 
same goes for other insecurities concerning thefts, criminal gangs, drugs and 
stuff like that – these are all internal factors that really challenge the internal 
security situation.‖390  
4.1.2 Interethnic relations  
Because of these security concerns, returns by displaced minorities, particularly Kosovo 
Serbs, slowed down after Kosovo‘s declaration of independence. According to 
UNHCR, the total of voluntary returns by minorities between 2000 and 2009 was 
19,525 (out of the approximately 250,000 people who fled from or within Kosovo in 
1999). Of those, there were 12,145 returns from Serbia and 2,793 returns within 
Kosovo.
391
 The returns statistics show a drastic decline in the number of voluntary 
returns by minorities in 2008 when about 679 voluntary minority returns (including 231 
Kosovo Serbs) were reported in comparison with 1,816 returns (including 585 Serbs) in 
2007 and 1,669 (including 615 Serbs) in 2006. However, the latest figures seem to show 
that returnees are increasing again. In 2009, 851 minority returns (including 348 
Kosovo Serbs) were reported. Between January and February 2010, 259 displaced 
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minority community members (including 90 Kosovo Serbs) voluntarily returned to 
Kosovo.
392
  
Lack of trust between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians is sustained by the 
backlog of unsolved interethnic crimes and the unsolved fate of missing persons. 
Bringing perpetrators of crimes to justice and openly condemning such incidents would 
help to reduce anxieties among the communities and encourage a feeling of increased 
personal security.
393
 Perceptions of insecurity are compounded by insufficient progress 
in prosecuting perpetrators of violence as well as a general lack of trust in the judiciary, 
due not only to the backlog of unresolved cases, but also to the ethnic bias displayed by 
court officials and the weak representation of minority groups in the judiciary.
394
  
In general, relations between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs have relaxed 
significantly since the war and there is a growing readiness for coexistence. However, 
this is not true of the entire country: interethnic relations remain strained in northern 
Kosovo where the majority is Kosovo Serb. A Kosovo Serb woman from the ethnically 
mixed village of Çaglavicë/Čaglavica near Prishtinë/Priština describes relations 
between Albanians and Serbs in her village as follows:  
―I think the situation right now is much better; for instance here in this village 
Čaglavica, which is kind of a suburb of Priština. It‘s a mixed village at the 
moment and we have several Albanian shopping malls. Every day when I go 
there, I see many Serbs, just ordinary people, villagers, who don‘t speak 
Albanian …, going freely to these Albanian shops … I think that these contacts 
among ordinary people, without an international presence, are more important 
than some of the efforts that the international community made to bring 
Albanians and Serbs together. Ten years after the war, people are more relaxed 
… but not thanks to the international community, thanks to ordinary people.‖395  
Kosovo Albanians also see interethnic relations gradually changing for the better 
as described by foreign ministry official Sylë Ukshini:  
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―Relations with other minorities such as Bosniaks and Turks can actually be 
described as good. Many people [Kosovo Albanians] are in contact with Serbs 
and I personally see prejudices slowly withering away.‖396  
A UNDP Early Warning Report of June 2009 confirms these views. The results 
indicate that the majority of Kosovo Albanians (74 per cent) and minorities other than 
Kosovo Serbs (61 per cent) believe that interethnic relations are improving, while some 
32 per cent of Kosovo Serbs believe the same.
397
 An important indicator of interethnic 
relations is the willingness of the two main ethnic communities to work and live 
together. The UNDP survey in January 2010 shows 29 per cent of Kosovo Serbs willing 
to work with Kosovo Albanians, but there have been significant fluctuations over the 
years, as shown in the chart below. Meanwhile a fairly steady percentage – around 46 
per cent – of Kosovo Albanians would be willing to work with Kosovo Serbs as shown 
in the chart. 
Figure 10: Interethnic relations 
 
            Source: UNDP Kosovo: Fast Facts. Early Warning Report 27. March 2010. p. 7.  
Results of the UNDP Early Warning Report – borne out by the author‘s 
interviews – reveal that Kosovo Serbs are the most pessimistic ethnic community in 
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Kosovo. About 52 per cent of Kosovo Serbs believe that relations between Kosovo 
Serbs and Kosovo Albanians will never normalize, whereas, only about 18 per cent of 
Kosovo Albanians and 17 per cent of other minorities are of the same opinion.
398
 
According to UNDP‘s March 2010 survey, and also reflected in the interviews, 
the factors influencing interethnic relations are viewed differently by Kosovo Albanians 
and Kosovo Serbs. Among Albanians, 53 per cent see interference by Belgrade as the 
main adverse influence on ethnic relations and a further 19 per cent cite Kosovo Serbs‘ 
unwillingness to be integrated into Kosovo society. For Kosovo Serbs, the main factors 
are insufficient efforts by Kosovo Albanians to integrate them (cited by 57 per cent of 
those questioned) and the attitude of Albanian leaders (19 per cent).
399
 Elisabeth Abazi 
expresses the Albanian viewpoint: ―Albanians and Serbs cannot coexist as long as Serbs 
living in Kosovo continue to favor being ruled by Belgrade.‖400  
While relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs have relaxed in the Serb 
enclaves and areas of settlement in the south of Kosovo, tensions continue in the north, 
where the political influence of the Serbian government on Kosovo Serbs remains 
strong. Though Belgrade is less active in Kosovo than it used to be, Northern Kosovo 
still continues to be a security flashpoint, particularly the divided town of 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica where the security situation remains fragile. Nevertheless, KFOR 
translator, Bekim Kryeziu, is optimistic about the situation there:  
―When I go to Northern Mitrovica as a translator, I notice that the situation there 
has changed one hundred per cent compared to 2004, 2005 and 2006. The 
population has started to return to their homes and the parallel structures are not 
as strong as they used to be thanks to the work of EULEX. The Serbs have tried 
to close roads two or three times and to prevent the installation of cameras at the 
border and customs posts, however EULEX‘s reaction was determined: so far 
and no further.‖401 
Kosovo Albanians perceive the influence of the Serbian regime not just as an 
obstacle to the country‘s development and stability but also under certain conditions as 
a serious security threat. Professor Xhabir Hamiti at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in 
Prishtinë/Priština is clear on this point: ―The biggest threat [for Kosovo] I see in the 
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future is the Serbian regime in Belgrade, which is trying to keep Kosovo under its 
control.‖402 Sylë Ukshini shares this opinion, stating:  
―We do not see any danger from the Serbs living here, whether they make up 
five per cent, ten per cent or 15 per cent [of the population]. This minority does 
not present any hazard for Kosovo. The danger comes from the Serbian regime 
in Belgrade.‖403  
Belgrade influences Kosovo Serbs through the parallel structures, which have a 
considerable impact on Kosovo Serb attitudes. Although Serbian local leaders are aware 
of the new reality in Kosovo since independence, they are still hesitant to cooperate 
openly with Kosovo institutions. Meanwhile, Kosovo Albanian leaders try to reach out 
to the Kosovo Serbs, but their efforts sometimes seem more declarative than sincere to 
the Kosovo Serbs. Most Kosovo Serbs want to stay in Kosovo but to live in a parallel 
reality in which their community though in Kosovo is still part of Serbia. This is 
summed up by Dejan Baljošević Head of the CCK Office in Rahovec/Orahovac:  
―We remain living in such conditions and we still hope that we live in Serbia and 
do not want to recognize independence, because we see this as something 
transitional, something temporary, one historical moment.‖404  
Two incidents illustrate the security situation in northern Kosovo. In June 2009, 
ethnic Serbs in Northern Kosovo set up road-blocks near the administrative crossing 
points between Kosovo and Serbia, refusing to allow EULEX police and customs 
vehicles to pass. The protests, in reaction to a change in procedures at the crossing 
points, were condemned by the governments in both Kosovo and Serbia.
405
  
The other incident – which caused considerable unrest − took place in August 
2009 when there were clashes between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in North 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. Around 100 Serbs protested at the resumption of reconstruction 
work on Kosovo Albanian homes, damaged during the war, which had started in April 
2009 in the village of Kroi i Vitakut/Brdjani. The protesters were angry at what they 
considered greater investment in the reconstruction of destroyed Kosovo Albanian 
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homes than in those of Serbs. EULEX and KFOR intervened on a number of occasions 
to separate the two parties. On the one hand, the Kosovo Serbs in the area see the return 
of Kosovo Albanians to their homes in the heights above northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
as unfair, claiming that Serbs cannot return safely to the south. They also see the efforts 
on behalf of the Albanians as a provocation and a first step in displacing Serbs from the 
north. More generally, they do not believe in the impartiality of the internationals. 
Dejan Baljošević says: ―We have to accept all those parties who are present here such as 
UNMIK, OSCE, KFOR and EULEX now, and we think that they are not impartial.‖406 
On the other hand, some Kosovo Albanians complain that the resettlement projects of 
the international community only focus on the Serb community while Albanians are left 
out. This perception of bias on the part of the international community relates to a 
number of activities by external actors apart from the resettlement project in northern 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and not only arouses resentment towards the international 
community but more importantly impedes harmonization between the two ethnic 
communities. Statements from a Kosovo Serb living in the municipality of 
Rahovec/Orahovac and from a Kosovo Albanian living in the municipality of 
Suharekë/Suva Reka illustrate the diametrically opposed views held by the two 
ethnicities on the resettlement project in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. According to 
Dejan Baljošević:  
―There is such great international media attention and support for the ten 
Albanian houses in Brdjani. Everyone is present there: all the KFOR, police, 
EULEX, KPS. And we have 250,000 Serbs that were expelled from Kosovo and 
Methohija and should resettle too but no one really takes care about it and there 
is no great international attention to this problem. … Serbs do not feel that it‘s 
right – such great support for the Albanians, for the ten families, and no support 
for Serbian resettlement. … Serbs ask for reciprocity. The Serbs also want to 
have the Serbs back in the southern part of Mitrovica or the areas where the 
Serbs were before, for example Peć, Dečani, Prizren, wherever.‖407  
In stark contrast, Kosovo Albanian Dugagjin Palushi maintains:  
―Serbs are always given preferential treatment by the internationals – not the 
victims but the perpetrators. This is unfair and is felt by every Kosovar. Unjust 
actions continuously happen. A good example is North Mitrovicë. There are 
many Albanians that are not allowed to reconstruct their houses on their 
property. And for many years UNMIK continues to say: ‗yes we are in favor of 
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all refugees being resettled‘ [but] it is always only about the Serbs and not about 
the Albanians. Albanians also need to be resettled. There are always projects for 
the Serbs but there are none for Albanians. Why? Is that fair? And that is exactly 
what people here are fed up with. People are dissatisfied and one knows that 
Serbia has started its repression over and over again. ... The hot topic is North 
Mitrovicë and unrest may break out at any time.‖408  
These completely conflicting perceptions demonstrate the difficulties of bringing 
the two ethnic communities together. Therefore the international actors need to use 
considerable tact and sensitivity in their efforts to bring Albanians and Serbs closer to 
each other, and need to be aware that some of their moves may unintentionally provoke 
quite the contrary reaction, namely increased estrangement.  
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4.2 Factors threatening Kosovo‟s stability 
In contrast to the years after the war when people in Kosovo were very much concerned 
about interethnic relations, people are now primarily concerned about the poor state of 
the economy, as reflected in high levels of unemployment and poverty. Based on the 
March 2010 UNDP poll, unemployment and poverty are considered to be the main 
factors threatening Kosovo‘s stability by 62 per cent of Kosovars (see Table 8 below). 
Among Kosovo Serbs, however, worsening of interethnic relations continues the 
biggest worry, cited by 38 per cent of those polled, but even here, economic issues 
come a close second, with 30 per cent placing this as their top concern, and in the April 
2009 survey, even the Serbs saw unemployment and poverty as the main threat to 
stability.
409
 Although, the interethnic-relations issue had returned to being the major 
anxiety for Kosovo Serbs in March 2010, unemployment and poverty had become a 
much greater concern to them within a short period, having been identified by only 12 
per cent of Kosovo Serbs as the main factor threatening security in August 2009.
410
 
From the findings of the previous chapter backed up by the author‘s interviews − in 
which Kosovo Serbs identified unemployment as the biggest problem − it can be 
assumed that the majority of Kosovo Serbs citing interethnic violence as the main threat 
live in Northern Kosovo. For minorities other than Serb, interethnic relations are far less 
worrying than for Kosovo Serbs. Only 4.3 per cent of other minority respondents say 
that they are concerned about interethnic relations. For them, just as for the Kosovo 
Albanians, unemployment and poverty, identified by 68.2 per cent, stand out as the 
biggest threats. 
The other main factors seen as threatening stability are corruption and 
mismanagement, and the lack of rule of law. Other factors, cited by a very small 
number of those surveyed, are: deterioration of relations with the international 
community and with neighboring countries, and political and religious radicalism.  
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Table 8: Factors that threaten Kosovo‟s stability  
(percentages viewing factor as the major threat) 
 K-Albanian 
(%) 
K-Serb  
(%) 
Others  
(%) 
Total  
(%) 
1. Unemployment and 
poverty 
63.9 30.0 68.2 62.13 
2. Corruption and 
mismanagement 
13.2 4.4 6.9 12.28 
3. Lack of rule of law 9.1 7.5 4.3 8.73 
4. Further aggravation 
of interethnic 
relations 
2.9 38.3 4.3 5.09 
5. Deterioration of 
relations with 
international 
community 
3.5 2.2 3.0 3.37 
6. Political radicalism 2.5 3.5 n/a 2.43 
7. Deterioration of 
relations with 
neighboring countries 
2.2 0.9 1.7 2.06 
8. Religious radicalism  0.4 11.0 0.9 1.03 
Source: UNDP Kosovo: Fast Facts. Early Warning Report 27. March 2010. p. 6.  
Since the predominant concerns, unemployment and poverty are considered 
separately, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the other issues worrying 
Kosovars. 
4.2.1 Crime and corruption 
The Balkans neither fit the profile of a high crime region nor have a conventional crime 
problem. Those are the main findings of a survey by the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study of crime and its impact on the region. Comparing 
several sets of regional crime data with West European figures reveals a wide gap 
between perceptions and realities. In terms of conventional crime, such as murder, 
assault, rape, robbery, theft, etc., UNODC claims that most of the Balkan region is safer 
than Western Europe. This key fact is often omitted in discussions of crime in the 
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area.
411
 In particular, Kosovo, which still has a considerable image problem, as stressed 
by the Kosovar Stability Initiative, suffers from the widespread perception that it is a 
mafia state, a haven for criminals, with weak institutions in the sole control of corrupt 
family networks.
412
 But the truth is that ―Kosovo in 2010 is far safer and more peaceful 
than it was a decade ago,‖ according to the International Crisis Group,413 and it seems 
that an era of lawlessness is slowly passing. Despite serious problems that cannot be 
overlooked, Kosovo‘s reputation for crime is exaggerated in a number of respects.  
According to UNODC and EULEX data, Kosovo has a low rate of violent crime. 
To illustrate this, Kosovo‘s rates of four conventional crimes − homicide, robbery, 
burglary and theft of motor vehicles – are considered below. However, it is also 
important to note that many forms of conventional crime are often under-reported in 
Kosovo and in the whole Balkan region. Therefore, all data have to be treated with care. 
Homicide, however, almost always comes to the attention of the police due to the 
involvement of several authorities. Homicide, which is defined as intentional killing of 
a person by another, being at the most serious end of the spectrum of violent crime is a 
key crime indicator, providing the best insight into a country‘s experience of violent 
crime.  
Homicide rates are particularly boosted in Kosovo by the prevalence of bitter 
disputes over property, which the legal system is unable to resolve effectively. 
Nevertheless, the annual homicide rate in Kosovo has decreased considerably from 11.8 
per 100,000 people in 2000 to 2.6 in 2006.
414
 The 2009 EULEX Program Report states 
that this is twice the average found in its sample group of EU member states,
415
 which it 
calculates to be 1.14 killings per 100,000 persons, but its sample does not include any of 
the EU member states where homicide rates are considerably higher than in Kosovo, 
such as Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia or Lithuania. Estonia for instance has on 
average 6.3 murders per 100,000 citizens each year and Lithuania an even higher 8.6 
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homicides.
416
 The average homicide rate across all 27 EU states, based on UNODC data 
is 1.92 deaths per 100,000 citizens, far closer to the level in Kosovo, and the country‘s 
homicide rate is well below the United States‘ 5.2 murders per 100,000 citizens per 
year. Kosovo‘s homicide rate is higher than the regional average in the Balkans; 
nevertheless, as Figure 11 shows, lower than in Albania, Serbia and Montenegro.  
Figure 11: Annual homicide rates in the Balkan region (2006−08 data) 
 
Source: Based on UNODC crime and criminal justice statistics online via Internet: URL: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/crimedata.html [accessed 25 05 2010]; the 
Kosovo figure is based on the EULEX Program Report 2009. 
However, the figures must be treated with some caution. The distressing fact 
revealed by a Crisis Group report in the context of homicide is that none of the 
institutions involved in investigating and prosecuting crime – the police, prosecutors, 
courts and internal affairs and justice ministries as well as EULEX – know how many 
crimes have been committed, successfully investigated and prosecuted and what has 
happened to their perpetrators. There is for example a disagreement over the number of 
murders solved in 2009, with the police reporting 52 and prosecutors 58.
417
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In contrast to homicide, other forms of violent crime in Kosovo such as robbery, 
burglary and motor vehicle theft, are well below the EU average as shown in Table 9. 
Most countries in Northern and Western Europe have considerably higher crime 
statistics than Kosovo. To demonstrate this, two countries – the United Kingdom 
(England and Wales only), which has some of the highest crime statistics in Europe, and 
Austria whose figures are about average, have been added to the table below for 
comparison. Kosovo also comes off well in comparison with other Balkan countries, for 
instance the rate of recorded robberies in Kosovo (20 per 100,000 population) is 
considerably lower than in Croatia (28.5) and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (25.15).  
Table 9: Recorded crimes (2008−09 data) 
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Kosovo 441 20.0 4,769 216.7 457 20.7 
Croatia 1,259 28.5 2,981 67,75 1,927 43.6 
FYROM 503 25.15 1,367 68.35 365 17.9 
BIH 773 20.4 n/a n/a 2,439 64.5 
UK 80,116 147.2 n/a n/a 147,342 270.7 
Austria 5,095 61.6 n/a n/a 6,493 78.5 
EU sample 
average
418
 
n/a 107.58 n/a 327.48 n/a 334.6 
Source: Based on data of the EULEX Program Report 2009 and the UNODC crime and criminal justice 
statistics online via Internet: URL: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/crimedata.html 
[accessed 25 05 2010]. 
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These figures make clear that the real problem afflicting Kosovo is not petty 
crime, but large-scale organized crime and high-level corruption. Transnational 
organized crime ranks among the major threats to human security in Kosovo, hindering 
its social, economic, political and cultural development. In general, it is a complex 
phenomenon and comprises a range of activities including drug trafficking; trafficking 
in human beings and firearms; smuggling of migrants; money laundering; large-scale 
theft and international theft of vehicles. According to the Directorate of Organized 
Crime, the daily revenue of organized crime in Kosovo amounts to approximately €1.5 
million; amounting to €550 million per year.419 That the organized crime business 
works so effectively is largely due to the high level of cooperation between the various 
actors, regardless of their ethnicity. In this respect, organized crime groups have an 
advantage over law abiding citizens. While they, as well as the political elites, often 
struggle to work in harmony with fellows of a different ethnicity, organized crime 
groups are multi-ethnic, and national, religious or ethnic affiliations pose no problems 
for them so long as they make a profit. Additionally, of course, cooperation across 
borders does not pose an obstacle for organized crime groups. Thomas Köppl and 
Agnes Székely highlight that ostensibly legal Kosovo Albanian political groups in 
Western Europe and the United States have also been involved in criminal activities. 
These groups, mostly organized as foreign branches of Kosovo Albanian political 
parties, collected huge amounts of money during the 1990s, first for educational 
purposes and then during the conflict, for ―humanitarian‖ affairs.420 
Organized crime may be perceived by some people as offering a form of safety-
net and may come to achieve a certain local legitimacy, with the informal economy 
often more flourishing than the formal economy.  
Drug trafficking in particular is an important source of income for organized 
crime in the Balkans. Based on UNODC‘s World Drug Reports, the majority of opiates 
are transported along the Balkan route to Western Europe – the most profitable 
consumer market. Kosovo is a principal point along this heroin-trafficking route 
between Central Asia and Western Europe. UNODC estimates that between 80 to 100 
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tons of heroin transits Southeast Europe on its way to Western Europe each year, with a 
market value of $25−30 billion.421 
John DiStasio of the International Organized Crime Center in Washington, DC 
notes that some of the ethnic Albanians who emigrated during the 1990s belonged to 
criminal groups who were heavily involved in worldwide narcotics trafficking, 
particularly of heroin. These Albanian organized crime groups have come to dominate 
the heroin trade throughout Europe. It is estimated that ―more than 80% of heroin 
available on the European market has … been smuggled through the Balkans States.‖422 
In 2000, the Assistant Director of Interpol asserted that according to some estimates 
―Albanian networks control about 70% of the heroin market today in Switzerland, 
Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian countries.‖423 UNODC notes that the basis for 
making these estimates is unclear and compares the number of arrests of Albanians for 
heroin trafficking in Western European countries with arrests of other nationals and 
finds that ―the share of heroin trafficking attributable to ethnic Albanians presently 
appears to be much less than the levels estimated in the past.‖424 In Italy only six per 
cent of heroin-trafficking arrests in 2006 involved ethnic Albanians, while 65 per cent 
were of Italians, while in Austria only three of 660 heroin arrests made were 
Albanians.
425
  
While the flow of drugs often has a direct impact on the violent crime rate of the 
region through which it passes (for instance in Central America and the Caribbean), 
UNODC highlights that the drug trade via the Balkans has little impact on local violent 
crime. A reason for this might be that the business in Balkan countries is highly 
organized and reliant on high-level corruption.
426
 
The drug-trafficking business in Kosovo is also assisted by weak border control. 
The Kosovo Border Police operates within the framework of the Kosovo Police. Its 
mission is stated to be to  
―ensure increased border safety and security by preventing, detecting and 
apprehending the criminals involved in border-crossing criminal activities, 
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terrorist activities, human being trafficking, forgery of documents, transportation 
of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, weapons, stolen vehicles and other 
types of smuggling prohibited by law.―427 
However, the young service faces great problems in its fight against drug trafficking. 
Lack of basic infrastructure and equipment, such as drug testing kits or special scanners 
for searching cars, presents the biggest obstacle to effectively performing the mission. 
Cooperation as well as information and data exchange between relevant institutions are 
also poor. Individual cases of corruption and theft also hinder efforts to combat the drug 
trade successfully.
428
 Despite these difficulties, a positive fact is the steady increase in 
drug seizures, investigated cases and arrests, and prosecutions, which speaks for the 
work of the Kosovo Police.
429
 
Moreover, the US Department of State‘s International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report of March 2010 emphasizes that it is ―difficult to estimate the extent to 
which corruption in Kosovo influences drug trafficking.‖430 Kosovo has applied legal 
and law enforcement measures to avert and punish public corruption supporting the 
drug business in any way, but so far results are mixed.  
Organized crime also engages in trafficking firearms. However, trade and 
trafficking of small arms in Kosovo is very limited and is not even mentioned in any of 
the European Commission or UN Security Council reports. UNODC emphasizes that it 
is very unlikely that small arms and light weapons have been transited through Kosovo 
in large numbers in recent years. In this context, an interesting fact is that per capita 
weapons ownership (registered and unregistered) in Southeast Europe is lower than in 
many countries in Western Europe. With 18 firearms per 100 citizens, Kosovo ranks 
lower than many European countries, for instance Finland (69) and Switzerland (61).
431
  
Organized criminal activities in Kosovo that are more lucrative than trafficking 
of firearms are smuggling of cigarettes and fuel and money laundering. According to 
the US Department of State‘s money laundering and financial crimes assessment, 
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―Kosovo does not play a significant role in terms of money laundering. The country 
does, however, have an active black market for smuggled consumer goods and pirated 
products.‖432 A considerable amount of cigarettes and fuel are smuggled into Kosovo. 
Illegal proceeds from domestic and foreign criminal activity are obtained from 
official corruption, tax evasion, customs fraud, organized crime, contraband and other 
types of financial crimes. Most of the proceeds from smuggling go presumably straight 
into the economy, in sectors such as construction and real estate, retail and commercial 
stores, banks, financial services and trading companies.
433
 The European Commission 
2009 Progress Report on Kosovo concludes that the country still lacks adequate 
legislative provisions in this area, however is in the process of drafting and 
implementing new laws to cope with money laundering and financial crimes.
434
  
Members of the international community in Kosovo as well as Kosovars are 
involved in smuggling cigarettes. For example, in April 2010, 16 Romanian EULEX 
officers were caught by Macedonian customs officers smuggling a large quantity of 
cigarettes and alcohol out of Kosovo.
435
  
Kosovo also needs to make considerable progress in the fight against trafficking 
in human beings, particularly trafficking in women and girls, a ―business‖ that 
experienced an upswing after the end of the war in 1999, partly due to the arrival of the 
international community. UNODC highlights that the number of females trafficked to 
the Balkan region increased with the number of deployed peacekeepers.
436
 An in-depth 
examination of trafficking in human beings is made in chapter 5.5.4, which analyzes the 
general problem of violence against women. 
The involvement of internationals, first with prostitution and trafficking in 
women, and then with isolated cases of drug trafficking and smuggling as mentioned 
above, has led to a considerable image problem for the international community whose 
role in the fight against organized crime is much called into question by these incidents. 
Doubts about the internationals‘ pledge of a resolute fight against organized crime could 
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be heard from the very beginning of the international presence in Kosovo and continue 
to be raised. 
Various reports highlight the connections between organized crime and politics 
in Kosovo,
 
with the two political leaders often mentioned in this connection being Prime 
Minister Hashim Thaçi and AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj.
437
 In 2006, the Commission 
of the European Communities noted that ―criminal networks extend to various socio-
economic sectors and into politics.‖438 A February 2005 study of organized crime in 
Kosovo by the German Bundesnachrichtendienst, labeled top secret, but reported by the 
German journalist Jürgen Roth the same year in Weltwoche, stated:
439
 
―Through the key players − for example Thaçi, Haliti, Haradinaj − there is the 
closest interlink between politics, the economy and international organized 
crime in Kosovo. The criminal organizations in the background there foster 
political instability. They have no interest at all in the building of a functioning 
orderly state that could be detrimental to their booming business.‖440 
Marek Antoni Nowicki, International Ombudsman of Kosovo from 2000 to 2005, 
asserts that crime groups in Kosovo became able to operate with apparent impunity due 
to their successful efforts to build close links with political players.
441
 Fabio Mini, 
former Commander of KFOR, describes the interdependence of organized crime with 
politics aptly: ―The same person is a political leader, a chief of clan, a leader of a gang, 
and is corrupting and undermining the stability of the region.‖442 A study by the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs refers to ―multifunction persons‖ in 
whom political, economic and criminal interests conjoin and who have close ties with 
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criminal groups in other parts of Europe.
443
 The entanglement of structures of organized 
crime with the political class presents a major obstacle to positive future development in 
Kosovo.
444
 Therefore, UNMIK made the fight against corruption and organized crime a 
high priority, pledging a ―zero tolerance‖ approach. This, however, was not pursued in 
reality and EULEX‘s efforts in this direction also show gaping holes so far.445 The 
international actors are heavily criticized in Kosovo for their failure to take action 
against political actors involved in organized crime, and Kosovars continue to claim that 
the international community does not crack down hard enough on organized crime. For 
example, Arben Hajrullahu states: 
―The international organizations such as UNMIK or KFOR had plenty of 
information about illegal activities. … They consistently revealed that they had 
information about the involvement of certain local or regional politicians or 
other actors in illegal activities, but they didn‘t do anything against them, or at 
least they did little. And that means that the international organizations 
contributed to the fact that these structures became so powerful and that they 
will be hard to fight because of their power. ... It seems to me that the 
internationals‘ priority was not the political and economic future of Kosovo; the 
main thing for them is that the situation remains calm and under control in the 
short run.‖446  
The author‘s personal experience supports the public perception of the 
international community‘s passivity in the battle against organized crime and 
corruption. The perception within the international community is that resolute 
procedures against large-scale organized crime and high-level corruption would run the 
risk of endangering not only the international operation, but, in particular, the safety of 
the international personnel themselves. Helmut Kramer and Vedran Dţihić also arrive at 
the conclusion that KFOR and UNMIK did not fight organized crime effectively since 
they did not want to put their tentative stabilization policy at stake.
447
 The author‘s 
interviews make clear that the general public is well aware of this tentative approach 
and so inevitably are those deeply involved in crime; thus criminal groups are given the 
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green light to continue their activities unimpeded. A Kosovo Serb woman noted the 
international community‘s strong concern for the safety of their personnel as follows:  
―I think that the international community, all of them – right now it‘s EULEX or 
ICO, before it was the UN and KFOR – are afraid for their own lives. In order to 
protect the lives of their own people they are not that much into the idea of 
dealing with radical elements in Kosovo, with organized crime, with war crimes 
and so on. The priority is to protect their own staff.‖448 
The perception of the presence of organized crime and corruption in politics has 
another adverse impact on Kosovo‘s development and image. It leads to disillusion with 
politics and undermines public confidence in the law enforcement mechanisms, the 
judiciary and civic institutions in general. It weakens the credibility of institutions, 
particularly the courts, and makes it much more difficult to win the trust of citizens 
needed to strengthen the rule of law and ensure the stability of the country as expressed 
by Bashkim Hisari:  
―We are still in the phase of creating the state. I am very critical of our 
government. More than half of our politicians are incapable and the other half is 
corrupt. They do not pursue a policy that makes politics for the public 
benefit.‖449 
More than 40 per cent of Kosovars perceive the central administration as being 
highly corrupt, a phenomenon that is discussed in the following section dealing with 
corruption in general.  
From the above analysis it follows that organized crime and corruption, which is 
a lucrative crime in itself, are frequently interconnected. Corruption, defined by 
UNODC as ―the use of public office for private gain,‖450 is a global and multi-faceted 
phenomenon and may take various forms. In general, distinction must be made between 
petty corruption, such as bribery, and grand corruption, such as extortion, nepotism, 
patronage, embezzlement of public funds, theft of state assets or the diversion of state 
resources. The impact of corruption is destructive; it undermines the rule of law, 
destabilizes democratic institutions, impedes economic development, burdens the 
private sector, discourages foreign investors, diminishes the effectiveness of public 
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policy, adds to governmental instability and undermines trust in government. 
Corruption also has an adverse psychological impact on a people. As Sylë Ukshini of 
the Foreign Ministry puts it: ―corruption destroys the future, hope and even people 
themselves.‖451  
According to a UNDP opinion poll in March 2010, seven per cent of Kosovars 
consider corruption to be the paramount problem facing the country, which ranks it as 
the third most worrying issue after unemployment and poverty (see chapter 5, Figure 
15). Over the years that this poll has been conducted starting in 2002, corruption has 
consistently been identified as the country‘s third or fourth biggest problem.  
Nor has much changed over the past decade in the perception that corruption is 
endemic in most institutions in Kosovo. Energy provider, KEK
452
, is still considered the 
most corrupt institution in the country just as it was in the very first UNDP Early 
Warning Report of 2002. The poll results in March 2010 indicate that almost 50 per 
cent of Kosovars perceive large-scale corruption
453
 in KEK and the courts and 45 per 
cent believe the Privatization Agency of Kosovo is corrupt. Kosovars are also of the 
opinion that large-scale corruption is present in institutions responsible for security and 
welfare, such as the government, where approximately 40 per cent presume corruption 
(see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12: Perceptions of “large-scale” corruption in Kosovo‟s institutions 
 
         Source: UNDP Kosovo: Fast Facts. Early Warning Report 27. March 2010. p. 6. 
According to the World Bank, ―the perception of corruption ... has worsened in 
recent years, despite announced efforts to intensify the fight against corruption.‖454 
Transparency International, in its 2009 Global Corruption Barometer Report, finds that 
on a scale from one to five (in which five is extremely corrupt), Kosovars on average 
give their institutions a rank of 3.4.
455
 A greater or lesser degree of corruption is 
frequently encountered whether in healthcare, education or public services. In summary, 
Kosovars hold that corruption pervades all areas of life in Kosovo. The low opinion of 
institutions and the widespread perception of corruption are often linked to people‘s 
tendency not to perform their own obligations as citizens in terms of payment of taxes 
and for public services such as electricity. 
However, UNDP stresses that there is considerable divergence between people‘s 
perceptions and actual experience of corruption. The ―Combating Corruption in Kosovo 
Citizens Survey‖ of 2004 claims that perceptions of corruption in various public 
institutions did not always align with the amount of actual corruption reported by 
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respondents in their dealings with these institutions, and notes further that ―most 
Kosovans lack experience with these institutions and therefore base their opinions on 
hearsay and media accounts that lead to exaggerated perceptions of corruption.‖456 
Corruption is usually measured through citizen surveys, but as the following data will 
show, results differ greatly.
457
  
In 2007, Transparency International reported that Kosovo ranks as one of the 
four most corrupt economies in the world along with Albania, Cameroon, and 
Cambodia.
458
 According to Transparency International‘s Global Corruption Barometer 
2007 Report, 67 per cent of about 500 respondents claim to have paid a bribe to obtain 
services.
459
 Two years later, the same institution found that only 13 per cent of about 
1,000 respondents had paid a bribe.
460
 The Kosovar Stability Initiative notes that 
Transparency International never explained the significant discrepancy in the surveys; a 
reason to treat these data with caution. 
UNDP provides the following data aimed at giving a rough idea of the real 
extent of corruption. According to the UNDP poll results as of March 2010, 7.0 per cent 
of Kosovo Albanians, 19 per cent of Kosovo Serbs and 3.0 per cent of other minorities 
report that they have experienced a situation in which public officials asked for bribes, 
gifts or other favors in order to perform their services.
461
 Additionally the Kosovar 
Stability 2010 report ―Untying the Knot – The Political Economy of Corruption and 
Accountability in Kosovo‖ compares the data concerning the people‘s perception with 
the actual experience. The report finds that whereas in 2009, about 35 per cent of people 
surveyed thought that there was corruption in the government, only an average of 11 per 
cent said that they ever experienced it. Amongst Kosovo Albanians, the number of those 
who admitted to paying bribes actually declined from almost 35 per cent in 2002 to 
about 11 per cent in 2009.
462
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Since various international surveys show different figures, the information on 
corruption remains sketchy. In addition, the Kosovar Stability Initiative notes that there 
is little data about the actual character of corruption. Surveys can only record the types 
of corruption that are experienced by normal citizens in their daily activities, such as 
bribes to obtain licenses or medical treatment, or bribes to policemen to avoid a fine. 
Hamdi Berisha describes this type of corruption: 
―If you go to the municipality to get a document, they will take you to a lot of 
different offices − just for a simple piece of paper. And every office you go to, 
they ask for money. You have to pay one euro there, and you have to pay two 
euro there and you have to pay three euro in the other office.‖463  
The main reason for corruption at this level is the low salaries of public officials, 
followed by their wish for fast personal enrichment, moral crisis, judicial inefficiency 
and imperfect legislation.
464
 This administrative or petty corruption only has a limited 
impact on the political and economic system compared to grand or political corruption 
that is not captured by such surveys but has a strong influence on perceptions of it.
465
  
Kosovo still lacks proper systems for fighting corruption. The Suppression of 
Corruption Law (Law No. 2004/34) is the main relevant legislation. It provides the legal 
foundation for the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), an independent body 
established in July 2006 that is responsible for detecting, preventing and investigating 
corruption cases. According to the ACA‘s annual report of 2009, the number of cases 
reported to the agency increased from 130 in 2008 to 175 in 2009, an increase of 34.6 
per cent which is believed to emanate from rising trust in the ACA and increasing 
public awareness of the problem. Among the 175 reported cases, the most numerous 
(53) related to judges and other staff of the courts. Of these cases, only 18 were 
forwarded to public prosecutor offices. Officials of other institutions such as KEK, Post 
and Telecommunications of Kosovo, Kosovo Railways, Privatization Agency of 
Kosovo etc. were the subject of 43 cases, of which 13 were forwarded to prosecutors. 
Government officials were the subject of 34 complaints, of which 17 were sent to 
prosecutors. Officials at local government level accounted for 31 cases (17 forwarded), 
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and 14 cases (two forwarded) related to public prosecutor offices. There was also a 
single case referred to prosecutors where the suspects were officials of the Kosovo 
Assembly.
466
 The largest portion of cases referred to the prosecutor involved abuse of 
official duty, followed by unlawful judicial decisions, falsification of official 
documents, embezzlement and accepting bribes.
467
 
The agency‘s successes are meagre since it lacks capacity, cooperation with 
other institutions, funding and political support. The International Policy Analysis 
―Kosovo After Independence. Is the EU‘s EULEX Mission Delivering on its 
Promises?‖ of July 2009 notes that ―The Anti-Corruption Authority … is powerless 
against the corrupt practices in which influential members of the Kosovan political class 
are implicated.‖468 Between the ACA becoming operational in February 2007 and the 
end of 2009, 168 cases proceeded to the public prosecutors and EULEX prosecution. Of 
these, only five have resulted in indictment and another five in arrests.
469
 
The most sensitive cases have been transferred to EULEX, which, says an 
International Crisis Group report, has been working on them slowly.
470
 In April 2010, 
however, EULEX raided the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications and the 
home of the minister Fatmir Limaj
471
 as part of a broader investigation into corruption 
and money laundering. The investigation is linked to several tenders related to the 
construction of roads in Kosovo in the period 2007−09.472 As an article by Balkan 
Insight describes it, ―a number of lucrative building contracts appear to have gone to 
friends and relatives of Fatmir Limaj – and to companies whose experience in the field 
appears to be limited.‖473 Limaj recently gave the mandate for the construction of 
Kosovo‘s first highway to the US−Turkish consortium Bechtel-Enka.474 The 117km 
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highway will link Kosovo with Albania and Serbia and will cost more than €700 
million.
475
  
According to media reports, a Kosovar minister was accused of embezzling €10 
million and Peter Feith, Chief of the International Civilian Office, called upon Prime 
Minister Hashim Thaçi to remove a minister from office due to his involvement in 
corruption, which he failed to do. The allegations apparently concern Limaj. (Thaçi 
himself is also accused of corruption due to his ability to construct what is rumored to 
be a gigantic private villa on his salary of €1,500 a month).476 
In 2008 and 2009 some 1,000km of road were built in Kosovo, costing some 
€170 million. Minister Limaj has been able to command by far the biggest ministry 
budget, amounting to €139 million in 2008, more than ten per cent of Kosovo‘s total 
budget of about €1.3 billion. In 2009, the transport and telecommunications budget 
increased to €160 million and, while the figure decreased in 2010 to €124 million, the 
ministry still receives a bigger share of the overall budget than any other.
477
  
Under the Corruption Law, the ACA in collaboration with other institutions has 
developed the Strategy and Action Plan against Corruption which incorporates concrete 
measures for fighting corruption. The ―Anti-Corruption Strategy 2009−2011‖ which 
replaces the previous ―Anti-Corruption Strategy 2004−2007‖ was approved together 
with the Action Plan in October 2009 by the Kosovo Assembly. Its general objective is 
to prevent and fight corruption in the public and private sectors. To achieve this, the 
strategy identifies seven priority sectors where anti-corruption efforts should be 
focused. These are (1) the political sector; (2) local government; (3) central public 
administration; (4) monitoring and law enforcement agencies and the judiciary; (5) 
public finances and their management; (6) private sector/business operations and (7) 
civil society.
478
 The Action Plan against Corruption was approved to implement the 
strategy and proposes objectives and concrete activities for every institution to prevent 
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and combat corruption. These activities focus on three main pillars: (1) law 
enforcement; (2) corruption prevention and (3) education and public participation.
479
  
Overall, the European Commission notes that Kosovo has made limited progress 
in fighting corruption, which is a key European partnership priority. In particular, the 
legislative and institutional framework needs urgent improvement. Moreover, a track 
record of investigations, indictments, prosecutions and convictions in anti-corruption 
cases needs to be set up.
480
  
The vulnerability of Kosovo as well as of the whole Balkan region to organized 
crime and corruption is a direct result of past economic and political instability. 
UNODC argues that the more social and political conditions normalize, the more 
organized criminal groups will lose their grip.
481
 The incentives and opportunities for 
corruption should further diminish as Kosovo stabilizes; however, this will only be 
achieved if there is considerable strengthening of the rule of law, an issue which is 
discussed in the next section.  
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4.2.2 Rule of law  
Crime and corruption in Kosovo is fostered by weak adherence to, and respect for, the 
rule of law. A deep lack of trust in the judiciary and the perception of the weak rule of 
law contribute to feelings of insecurity among the general population. Before closer 
examination of the problem in this section it is necessary to give a brief explanation of 
what the rule of law means. The term does not have a strict definition, and its 
connotation can differ between nations and legal systems. In general, it describes the 
situation where, as UNODC puts it ―society is governed by mutually agreed regulations 
that apply equally to all, and is implicit in the idea of democracy.‖482 According to 
LexisNexis, the rule of law ―is the principle that no one is above the law‖. It adds that, 
to be effective, the rule of law requires a  
―transparent legal system, the main components of which are a clear set of laws 
that are freely and easily accessible to all, strong enforcement structures, and an 
independent judiciary to protect citizens against the arbitrary use of power by the 
state, individuals or any other organization.‖483  
The critical importance of the concept is highlighted by Lord Bingham, Britain‘s former 
senior law lord, in his 2010 publication The Rule of Law. It is, he says,  
―the foundation of a fair and just society, a guarantee of responsible government, 
and an important contribution to economic growth, as well as offering the best 
means yet devised for securing peace and co-operation.‖484  
Correspondingly, strengthening the rule of law is crucial to Kosovo‘s overall 
development and the government has attempted important steps to achieve this by 
replacing key officials and adopting new laws and regulations. Nevertheless, rule of law 
is still the most fragile aspect of governance in Kosovo and one of the greatest 
challenges for the full consolidation of the country‘s statehood, according to 
KIPRED.
485
 The European Commission‘s latest evaluation of Kosovo‘s judicial system 
is likewise critical, emphasizing that ―Kosovo is at an early stage in addressing 
                                                 
 
482
 UNODC: Crime and its impact on the Balkans and affected countries. March 2008. p. 104.   
483
 LexisNexis: Rule of Law. Online via Internet: URL: http://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/about-us/rule-of-
law/default.aspx [accessed 03 06 2010].  
484
 Tom Bingham: The Rule of Law. Penguin Books. London 2010. 
485
 KIPRED: The Fragile Triangle. Police, judges and prosecutors coordination during criminal 
proceedings response in Kosovo. Prishtina 2010. p. 6.  
  
169 
priorities in the area of justice. The justice system remains weak, vulnerable to political 
interference and inefficient.‖486  
There has been some progress since 1999. Whereas in 2003 Kosovo had a 
percentile rank of only 13 (on a scale of one to 100) on the World Bank‘s Rule of Law 
Indicator, this had improved to 30 in 2008 (the latest available figure). Despite the 
improvement, Kosovo ranks far lower than other countries in the region (for instance 
Croatia has a percentile rank of 55, Montenegro 53, Macedonia 45 and Serbia 41).
487
  
To get a better understanding of why the rule of law is still very weak in 
Kosovo, the current key dilemmas of the judicial system will be examined below.  
The rule of law in Kosovo is based on three main institutions: the police, the 
public prosecutors and the courts, referred to by KIPRED as the ―institutional rule of 
law triangle‖. Kosovars reckon the police to be the most reliable and effective of these 
institutions whose work is hampered by the weaknesses of the prosecutors and judges. 
These in turn accuse the police of ineffectiveness. This chapter focuses on the judges 
and prosecutors. The police will be considered separately in section 4.3.4.  
The fundamental problem in Kosovo is its legal framework, which is an unclear 
and inconsistent mix of former Yugoslav, UNMIK and more recent legislation. An 
urgent update is required, according to the International Crisis Group, as well as the 
adoption of four reforming laws: on Courts, on the Kosovo Judicial Council, on 
Prosecution and on the Prosecutorial Council. Moreover, the Criminal Code, the 
Criminal Procedure Code and the Code of Contested Procedure need amendment.
488
    
 Many programs aimed at strengthening Kosovo‘s judicial system, focus on 
simplifying Kosovo‘s complex court structure with its many different type of courts: the 
supreme court, the commercial court, and the constitutional court – all seated in 
Prishtinë/Priština – five district courts and 24 municipal courts. Additionally, the minor 
offenses court system consists of a high court and 24 municipal courts.
489
 However, the 
main problem is the insufficient number of judges and prosecutors who are 
overburdened with cases and also often afraid to deal with complex cases for personal 
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safety as well as political reasons. Judges in Kosovo currently number 269, which 
means a ratio of only about 14 judges per 100,000 inhabitants. Moreover, of these only 
176 judges completed cases during 2009.
490
 The planned increase to 392 judges would 
provide Kosovo with a ratio of 18.6 judges per 100,000 citizens. However, this is still 
very low in comparison with other countries in the region. For instance in Montenegro 
the ratio of judges per 100,000 citizens is 51, in Croatia 40.9, and in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 22.1. Albania is the exception with a ratio of only 7.4 judges per 100,000 
citizens. The number of prosecutors is even more inadequate. There are currently 89 of 
them, amounting to a ratio of 3.7 prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants. Again, this is 
lower than in most other Balkan countries. Montenegro for instance has a ratio of 13.4 
prosecutors per 100,000 people, Croatia 13 and Bosnia and Herzegovina 7.3.
491
  
The majority of the judges and prosecutors that are currently active in Kosovo 
were educated in the Yugoslav era, which means that they are poorly trained and mostly 
insufficiently informed about new legislation. The judiciary‘s average age is 54 years 
while the average age of the population is 25. As highlighted in the EULEX Program 
Report, 18 per cent of the judges are over the age of 60 and only 27 per cent of them are 
below the age of 50, with a mere 2.7 per cent under 40.
492
 Their relatively advanced age 
and poor educational standard contribute to the citizen‘s general lack of trust in both 
judges and prosecutors.  
In order to build public confidence and trust in the judiciary, a Kosovo-wide 
vetting and reappointment process of all Kosovo judges and prosecutors − incumbents 
and new applicants − was started in 2008 and came to a partial end in February 2010. 
Even those who have never been judges or prosecutors before can apply to become 
either if they meet the requirements. The process was supported by the European 
Commission with a €5 million grant to set up the Independent Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Commission with the mandate to conduct a comprehensive review of all appointments 
for judicial and prosecutorial positions in Kosovo.
493
 Once the Independent Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Commission has completely finished assessing the suitability of all 
candidates, the Kosovo Judicial Council – as the body responsible for ensuring the 
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independence and impartiality of the judicial system
494
 − will again take over the 
routine recruitment of Kosovo judges.
495
 The vetting and reappointment process was not 
accompanied by any action to increase the number of judges and prosecutors and it 
remains doubtful whether the project can effectively contribute to the establishment of a 
professional judiciary and prosecution service that meets international standards without 
tackling the key problem of the lack of staff and overloaded courts. 
The low salaries paid to judges and prosecutors present a particular problem 
since they do not only impact on their motivation, but also leave them vulnerable to 
corruption, as discussed in the previous section. The President of the Supreme Court has 
the highest salary of about €667 per month, a District Court judge gets about €550, and 
a Minor Offenses Court judge only about €393.496 While this remuneration is much 
higher than the average paid to both public and private sector employees in Kosovo, it is 
significantly lower than salaries paid to comparable state officials (for instance to the 
prime minister who earns €1,443 per month).497 The Draft Law on Courts foresees an 
increase in judicial salaries, bringing them to the same level as those of senior civil 
servants and political officials of comparable seniority. However, the increase will not 
be paid until the Law on Courts is in force, which is scheduled for 2013.
498
 Another 
frustration for national judges and prosecutors are the far higher judicial salaries of their 
international colleagues. 
The shortage of judges and prosecutors along with lack of appropriate 
infrastructure, budget constraints, limited courtrooms and lack of support staff have 
resulted in a huge backlog of cases, which is steadily growing. As cited in the EULEX 
Program Report, out of 1,292 non-judicial staff members in the court system, only 2.24 
per cent are legal support staff providing direct professional support to the judges. On 
average, one member of the legal support staff has to support more than seven judges.
499
 
The exact extent of the backlog is unclear and various sources give different figures. 
While the Statistics Department of the Kosovo Judicial Council reports a total of 
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217,810 uncompleted cases, an authority interviewed by the author concurs with the 
International Crisis Group that the figure is about 300,000.
500
 However, one thing is 
clear: the number of cases is increasing faster than they can be dealt with. Municipal 
court judges have the highest work load. At the beginning of 2009 their backlog 
amounted to 173,280 uncompleted cases, which had increased to 200,748 by 31 
December 2009. Over the course of the year, 392,281 cases were newly filed of which 
the courts heard 364,813. The largest backlog in these courts was of civil cases.
501
 The 
International Crisis Group estimates that even if no new cases were filed it would take 
more than eight years to clear the backlog at the present rate. District courts have a 
smaller work load than the municipal courts, with ―only‖ 9,187 uncompleted cases at 
the end of 2009.
502
 The largest part of the backlog there is made up of serious criminal 
cases, which – according to the International Crisis Group – would take about 30 
months to clear, provided that no new cases were filed.
503
 A municipal court judge 
completes on average 281 cases per month compared to 24 completed cases per judge at 
the district courts.  
Inevitably, verdicts in Kosovo‘s courts are extremely arbitrary. Apart from 
where corruption is involved, the pressure under which judges have to work in order to 
resolve as many cases as possible, leads them to arrive at hasty verdicts based on their 
own prejudices, without taking account of evidence, proper procedures and the law. 
KIPRED notes that judges often impose very low fines for crimes such as illegal 
weapon possession, which encourages offenders to repeat their crimes. The problem is 
intensified by the lack of a shared database for judges, prosecutors and the police to 
record and track criminal cases in Kosovo. As a result, judges commonly impose the 
same fines on recidivists as on first-time offenders.
504
 Misconduct of trials is also fueled 
by inadequate infrastructure. Due to the lack of courtrooms, judges are forced to hold 
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hearings in their offices. This not only nurtures the public perception of 
underhandedness and deal-making in the legal system but also facilitates bribery.  
Effective criminal investigation calls for sound teamwork between judges, 
prosecutors and the police, but, as KIPRED highlights, there is an ―overall lack of 
communication between the Kosovo Police, offices of Municipal and District 
Prosecutors and Kosovo Courts.‖505 The absence of a joint database available to judges, 
prosecutors and the police impinges on the coordination of the three institutions as well 
as on the quality of their work. Hence, criminal cases are poorly investigated and are 
often dismissed before charges are brought. 
Symptomatic of the poor coordination between the various arms of the law is the 
absence of reliable crime statistics mentioned earlier. Presumably due to the lack of data 
storing mechanisms, the Kosovo Police neither lists any data on criminal cases on their 
website nor publishes any reports including these figures. The only such data to be 
found appears in reports of various research institutes. However, their data references 
indicate that the statistics were obtained by explicit requests to the Kosovo Police. For 
example, a report published by KIPRED in February 2010 includes crime figures dating 
back to 2007 based on figures obtained from the police. According to the report, of the 
67,170 criminal cases reported to the police in 2007, 10,872 cases remained open. Of 
the 56,298 cases marked as closed, only 5,185 have ended with charges filed against 
perpetrators, whereas 37,589 were referred for prosecution. This means that these cases 
were pending between prosecutors and the police with no progress in the 
investigations.
506
 Though the number of solved cases is high, accounts of how they are 
solved are mostly inadequate. 
All these shortcomings of the legal system are aggravated by the absence of 
effective institutional quality monitoring and control mechanisms to supervise the work 
of judges, prosecutors and the police. As stressed by the European Commission‘s 2009 
Progress Report on Kosovo, the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel, which is 
responsible for inspection, audit and disciplinary investigations within the Kosovo 
justice system, is not fully functional, and the Judicial Audit Unit, which claims that it 
―analyzes and assesses the functioning of general and specific activities of courts and 
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prosecutor‘s offices,‖507 lacks the capacity and resources to fulfill its mission.508 The 
absence of serious supervision of judges and prosecutors at all levels contributes to their 
frequently corrupt and unprofessional behavior. One way of evaluating the judges‘ 
performance is through internal reports. But – according to KIPRED interviews − these 
are ―shallow, formal and general, containing no specific information about individual 
judges‘ performance‖, indicating strong solidarity between court staff ―not to report on 
each other‘s unprofessional behaviour or inefficiency.‖509  
All these problems of the justice system require urgent action and can only be 
tackled effectively by a joint approach involving the Kosovar institutions and 
international organizations, in particular EULEX, as well as the Government of Serbia. 
The most perfectly devised recommendations offered by various national and 
international organizations will not yield any improvements as long as they remain 
merely on paper without high-level political will, coordination and coherence, all of 
which are missing.
510
 Many recommendations, for instance to increase the number of 
judges and prosecutors and to bring their salaries into line with those of other branches 
of government service, have repeatedly been put forward in recent years but so far 
without any progress. As long as Kosovo struggles with a reputation for lawlessness, the 
path to full consolidation of the country‘s statehood will remain stony and the country 
will stay poor and isolated. To what extent the international community, in particular 
EULEX, is a support in establishing a strong and reliable rule of law system and thus 
contributes to a safe and secure Kosovo will be discussed in chapter 4.3.  
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4.2.3 Political and religious extremism   
As shown above in Table 8 religious extremism is perceived to be a security threat by 
only 0.4 per cent of Kosovo Albanians, 11 per cent of Kosovo Serbs and 0.9 per cent of 
other minorities. Political extremism is only identified as a threat by 2.5 per cent of 
Kosovo Albanians and 3.5 per cent of Kosovo Serbs.
511
 This chapter nevertheless 
discusses these issues in order to address misconceptions, not only about the role of 
Islam in Kosovo, but also about political and religious extremism in general in the 
country. Particularly after 11 September 2001, the issue of the potential for Islamist 
extremist-inspired terrorism in and emanating from the Balkans has been frequently 
raised.
512
 Poorly researched and exaggerated reports that describe Kosovo as a haven of 
Islamist extremists have circulated in the media. This section aims to counteract 
impressions created by these reports by analyzing the role of religion in Kosovo and the 
real threat of religious extremism.  
Already pointed out in previous chapters, the Kosovo Albanian attitude to 
religion can be characterized as very tolerant. While most Kosovo Serbs regard the 
Serbian Orthodox Church as an important element of their national identity, Kosovo 
Albanians do not see their religion in the same way. Instead they define their national 
identity through language and have a quite relaxed stance on adherence to Islam. 
Islamic political and religious extremism, as the phenomenon is expressed in the Middle 
East, has very little support in Kosovo. A visible sign of this is that Kosovo Albanian 
women are not veiled and headscarves are largely confined to older and rural women. 
Young Kosovo Albanian women wear revealing western clothes.
513
  
The nineteenth century Albanian poet Pashko Vasa said: ―The religion of 
Albanians is Albanianism.‖514 This describes the Kosovo Albanians‘ attitude aptly and 
is still valid today. Contrary to popular belief, religion per-se was not a contributing 
factor in the conflict between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. Islam did not play 
an important role in the campaign of non-violent resistance to the Serb oppression or in 
the war in 1998−99. The Serb destruction of Islamic facilities and the Kosovo 
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Albanians‘ retaliatory destruction of Serb churches did not stem from religious bigotry 
but were simply aimed at removing the opposing ethnic group.  
Islamic involvement in politics is not an issue for Kosovo Albanians. Article 8 
of Kosovo‘s constitution states ―Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in matters of 
religious beliefs‖. Public schools in Kosovo are not permitted to teach any religious 
views. However, the position is different in Kosovo Serb schools, where Serbian 
Orthodox belief is a compulsory subject for lower and upper secondary levels. Islamic 
religious education is mainly under the control of the Islamic Community of Kosovo 
(Bashkësia Islame e Kosovës), which recently tried to introduce religious studies in 
public schools.
515
 This request has been denied by the Kosovo Ministry of Education so 
far and is not widely supported by Kosovo‘s citizens who are afraid that it could pose a 
danger to Kosovo‘s secularism. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter analyzing the political landscape in 
Kosovo, there is no Kosovo Albanian party with Islamic connections, underscoring that 
the involvement of religion in politics is not of particular interest to Muslims in Kosovo. 
The campaign to introduce religion as a subject in public schools was not welcomed by 
any large political party; only the PDK showed a readiness to cooperate on this issue, 
and only the small Justice Party (Partia e Drejtësisë − PD) supports the idea.516 It seems 
that the Albanian Catholics in Kosovo are more interested in involving religion in 
politics. There are two Catholic parties, however these are very small: the Christian 
Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokristiane për Integrim − PDKI) and the 
Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Shqiptare Demokristiane e 
Kosovës − PSHDK).  
By contrast, the Serbian Orthodox Church has always played a role in politics in 
Kosovo. Just as the Serbian regime in Belgrade is perceived as a threat by Kosovo 
Albanians, so is the Serbian Orthodox Church, along with Bishop Artemije, head of its 
Kosovo eparchy between 1991 and February 2010. Xhabir Hamiti, professor at the 
Faculty of Islamic Studies in Prishtinë/Priština, emphasizes that:  
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―the Serbian Orthodox Church is very deeply involved in politics. Artemije has 
released a statement which is very dangerous in my opinion and also in the 
opinion of all citizens of Kosovo. Artemije has said that there is no other 
solution for Kosovo than a new war.‖517  
Bishop Artemije aimed to convince not only Kosovo Serbs but also Serbs in 
Serbia that Kosovo is an occupied country and belongs to Serbia. His reputation in the 
Western media as a hard-line spiritual leader and extremist derives from statements 
such as ―Serbia should rally its armed forces, declare Kosovo ‗occupied territory‘ and 
buy weapons from Russia to reclaim it. Kosovo was and always will be Serbian.‖518 
Bishop Artemije was removed from his post in February 2010 after allegations that 
millions of euros were embezzled from church and state funds under his leadership in 
recent years.
519
 Given his statements and attitude, it seems clear that far more radical 
views emanate from the Serbian Orthodox Church than from Albanian Islam, which is 
often accused of extremism by Serbia. No such statements have been expressed by 
Kosovo Albanian Muslims – at least not in public.  
Although radical Islam has not been a problem in Kosovo, what is causing 
concern are the attempts of the Wahhabi movement, which does not tolerate religious 
and doctrinal differences, to promote its interpretation of Islam in the country. 
Wahhabism is a branch of Islam that emerged as a reform movement in 
eighteenth century Saudi Arabia. It was led by the reformer Muhammad ibn Abd-al-
Wahhab who preached the need to purge Islamic societies of cultural practices and 
interpretations that had accumulated over the centuries. It remains the dominant form of 
Islam in Saudi Arabia today. Abd-al-Wahhab‘s radical and intolerant doctrine is that 
anything that is external to the expanding social, political and geographical territory of 
the Wahhabis is a legitimate target for subjugation. Those who do not accept the 
Wahhabi doctrine, including other Muslims, are outsiders, against whom it is necessary 
to fight.  
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Many Middle East NGOs, particularly from Saudi Arabia, tried to establish 
themselves in the whole Balkans area via missionary and humanitarian aid projects even 
before the international engagement in 1999. Kosovo Albanians do not support these 
groups, which they regard as unwanted invaders, trying to change the way of Islam that 
has been followed for some hundred years in Kosovo by spreading extremist messages 
all over the country under the guise of assistance programs.
520
 Kosovars‘ perception of 
the Saudi-based ―humanitarian agencies‖, acting under the umbrella of the Saudi Joint 
Committee for the Relief of Kosovo and Chechnya were expressed in two interviews 
with the author. Bekim Kryeziu maintains:  
―For ten years, we have been like a house without a door. Everyone who wanted 
to come in could come in, for instance the various NGOs where we didn‘t know 
what aims they were really pursuing. Honestly speaking, the Wahhabi 
movement has reached a dimension where its danger may not be underestimated 
anymore.‖521 
Petrit Hysaj agrees:  
―Wahhabism is a quite serious threat to the secular order of Kosovo. Wahhabis 
are going around preaching against the West and how the Albanians should turn 
to radical Islam and how Islam should be introduced to the schools. They are 
spreading their activities and try to impose their views and ideas on others. That 
is why they are perceived as quite a serious threat to the secular order of 
Kosovo.‖522  
The Wahhabi presence is also opposed by Muslim clerics. A KIPRED report 
quotes Rexhep Boja, former mufti and President of the Islamic Community of Kosovo 
from 1990−2003 as saying: ―Albanians have been Muslims for more than 500 years and 
they do not need outsiders [Arabs] to tell them what is the proper way to practice 
Islam.‖523 
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KIPRED highlights that the Saudi-based ―humanitarian‖ agencies are actually  
―projecting a doctrine of complete communal isolation that not only sees 
Christians and Pagans as the undesirable other, but also other Muslims who do 
not subscribe to their interpretative principles. Worse still, the underlying 
assumption of their superior values means they are compelled to actively destroy 
all other forms of spiritual expression.‖524  
In order to spread this doctrine, they try to win Kosovars‘ trust through various 
assistance projects such as the rebuilding of mosques and schools. Such relief actions 
are particularly aimed at the rural poor who are less educated, easy to manipulate and 
therefore particularly vulnerable to the illusive promises of Wahhabis as KIPRED 
found.
525
 The International Crisis Group notes that despite Kosovars‘ general rejection 
of Wahhabis, impoverished people may be highly susceptible to the infiltration of well-
resourced organizations.
526
 The authors Iain King and Whit Mason point out that the 
repair of all Kosovo‘s schools funded by the Islamic Development Bank – which gave 
ten times more than other donors – was accompanied by the installation of a free 
Wahhabi mosque in each new school.
527
 According to the International Crisis Group, 
within the first two months that the Middle East groups were active in Kosovo, the 
Saudi Joint Relief Committee reportedly spent more than $1 million in Kosovo, of 
which nearly half was used to support 388 religious ―propagators‖ such as 
missionaries.
528
 
The activities of these ―missionaries‖ in Kosovo not only include reconstruction 
work and the provision of food and health supplies, but also involves offering religious 
education and spreading fundamentalist religious literature. Xhabir Hamiti is deeply 
concerned about the literature they are spreading among Kosovars. He argues that it 
does not only lack academic credentials but is particularly intolerant and full of 
revulsion towards other religious communities and the Islamic traditions of the local 
population.
529
 By providing religious education, lectures and literature, these 
fundamentalist missionaries may damage interfaith relations and endanger the harmony 
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between different ethnicities in Kosovo. In order to attract as many followers as they 
can, they are notorious for offering financial benefits ranging from €300−400 a 
month
530
 to those willing to follow their doctrine, wear a beard and shortened trousers (a 
traditional look for Wahhabis) and convince their wives to wear the niqab or face veil. 
  Although Kosovo‘s young people are strongly western-orientated and well-
inclined towards Western Europe and the United States, some are susceptible to the 
Wahhabi movement, particularly due to the financial benefits offered. The American 
sociologist and political scientist, Jack A Goldstone, writes that young people ―are often 
drawn to new ideas …, challenging older forms of authority.‖531 The Council on 
Foreign Relations also notes that ―In the Muslim world ... large populations of idle 
youth are especially prone to virulent strands of Islam as an alternative force for social 
mobility.‖ and that ―large pools of disaffected youths ... are more susceptible to 
recruitment into rebel or terrorist groups.‖532 As will be discussed in chapter 5.4 Youth 
bulge, high unemployment, poor economic conditions, poverty and lack of prospects 
considerably lower the barrier to joining religious extremist groups, which are often 
seen as the only alternative to social and economic difficulties. A Kosovo Serb woman 
interviewed by the author sums up the problem sympathetically (unlike most Kosovo 
Serbs, she admits the relaxed approach Kosovo Albanians usually have toward 
religion):  
―If you don‘t have anything else to offer people, then people will turn to 
religion, but the worst kind of religion. We in the Balkans never had that radical 
Islam before; we had that kind of Turkish Islam which is very moderate 
compared to the Islam that comes from Saudi Arabia. But unfortunately, because 
of the war, because of the economic problems, unemployed people are very 
much into religion because they feel safe and get some income from these 
organizations. Albanians are [normally] very secular; they don‘t care about 
religion that much, but if we don‘t have anything to offer them instead, then they 
could become a problem. So, Wahhabis could be a threat to Kosovo society in 
the future.‖533 
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An analysis of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Vedran Dţihić notes that 
the Wahhabi movement has been more successful in other Balkan countries, particularly 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, than in Kosovo.
534
  Another interviewee comments on these 
different developments: 
―Before the war, Bosnia was also a very secular country. Unfortunately, because 
of the lousy economic situation − no jobs, no employment, no money, nothing − 
radical Islam became very prevalent in Bosnia after the war. According to some 
assessments right now, around ten per cent of all Muslims in Bosnia support the 
Wahhabi movement, which is a huge percentage … So if we don‘t do something 
here in Kosovo with the economy and with job opportunities, then there is a 
danger that Kosovo will become like Bosnia.‖535 
In summary, the threat of political and religious extremism in Kosovo is low. Wahhabis 
have not been very successful in Kosovo which can be explained by Kosovo Albanians‘ 
liberal attitude towards religion. The most effective counter-weapon against extreme 
Islamist factions is to promote economic development including job opportunities, 
particularly for young people. Kosovo cannot achieve this alone; therefore, regional and 
wider European integration is urgently needed. A KIPRED assessment of religious 
extremism highlights that ―no superficial short-term political solution will be viable 
without the means for a prosperous life.‖536 In general, Kosovars are optimistic 
concerning the future and expect political and religious extremism to wither, says Petrit 
Hysaj: 
―With the improvement of the economy I would probably see them [Wahhabi 
groups] diminishing in the future. Also political extremism is very likely to 
diminish in the future with presumed economic development and increase of 
welfare in Kosovo. So extremism should, in ten years, not have at all to do with 
Kosovo.‖537 
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4.3 International and national security providers 
Security is the product of a multifaceted interaction between national, international, 
social and economic factors. This section focuses on the actors that are supposed to 
maintain security, beginning with the international community. Its primary strategy for 
stabilizing Kosovo and guaranteeing long-term stability was to create and develop the 
capacities of national institutions, transfer competencies to them and finally assist them 
by monitoring and advising. The three main international organizations attempting to 
ensure security in Kosovo are: first, the NATO-led KFOR as the most important 
security provider; second, the much criticized international police force administered by 
the United Nations mission in Kosovo − the UNMIK Police; and third, the European 
Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) that took over from UNMIK in December 2008. 
The national security institution that is considered later in the chapter is the Kosovo 
Police (KP).  
4.3.1 Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
As described in chapter 3.2.2, KFOR was deployed following the 78-day air campaign 
launched in March 1999 by NATO forces against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia to 
halt the humanitarian catastrophe then emerging in Kosovo. KFOR obtains its mandate 
from UNSCR 1244 of 10 June 1999 and the Military Technical Agreement between 
KFOR and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of 
Serbia. Based on UNSCR 1244, KFOR‘s initial mandate was to: 
 deter renewed hostilities, maintain and where necessary enforce a ceasefire and 
ensure the withdrawal and prevent the return into Kosovo of Federal and 
Republic military, police and paramilitary forces 
 demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army 
 establish a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can 
return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional 
administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered 
 ensure public safety and order  
 demine 
 support and coordinate closely with the work of the international civil presence 
(UNMIK)  
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 conduct border monitoring and 
 ensure freedom of movement  
KFOR clearly pursues the ―Security first‖ strategy which was described in 
chapter 2.1.9.1. This is dictated by KFOR‘s mandate which is to establish and maintain 
a safe and secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo. In line with this, one of the 
first key tasks of all the external actors was − as stated in UNSCR 1244 − the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former KLA fighters. By September 
1999, the KLA had handed over to KFOR some 9,000 small arms, 800 machine guns, 
300 anti-tank mines and other weapons. This tally, which seems impressive at first 
glance, is quite low when compared to the strength of the KLA, estimated to be roughly 
20,000 fighters at the end of the war. In the ensuing years, KFOR continuously found 
KLA weapon caches throughout Kosovo. In particular, the discovery in June 2000 of a 
large arms cache amounting to 60 tons of arms and ammunition in the Drenica Valley 
provoked fears that the KLA was dormant rather than disbanded.
538
 In general, the 
disarmament and demobilization process proved more difficult than initially assumed, 
but proceeded peacefully and effectively. The reintegration of former ex-combatants 
also proceeded quite rapidly. Many ex-combatants were successfully reintegrated into 
the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the new Kosovo Police, which was formed 
immediately after the war, or political parties, particularly the PDK and AAK. This 
strategy of reintegrating ex-combatants into the new security sector proved effective, 
with few confrontations between former KLA members and other recruits. The 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former KLA members can be 
considered a successful start on building Kosovo‘s indigenous security institutions.  
The KLA was officially disbanded in September 1999, with the KPC succeeding 
it as an indigenous security force. The KPC was established under UNMIK Regulation 
1999/8 as a civilian emergency response agency, with the following remit as limited by 
law: 1) to provide disaster response services; 2) to perform search and rescue 
operations; 3) to provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas; 4) to 
assist in demining activities and contributing to rebuilding infrastructure and 
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communities.
539
 However, it was widely seen by Kosovo Albanians as an ―army in 
waiting‖.540 The KPC was composed of roughly 5,000 unarmed members, but 200 
members were equipped with small arms for personal protection and 1,800 weapons 
were held in trust by KFOR. Until 2006, the KPC was commanded by the KLA‘s 
former commander in chief, Agim Çeku. The organization was plagued by problems of 
factionalism and infiltration by organized crime and extremists, but NATO advisors 
who worked closely with the KPC, reported that Çeku made the best of a challenging 
task. Çeku was succeeded in 2006 by Lieutenant General Sylejman Selimi, another 
former KLA commander.
541
 
Given KFOR‘s previously listed responsibilities, it plays both an external 
defense as well as an internal security role. This means that it presents a deterrent to any 
offensive irredentist sentiment in Serbia, secures parts of the border in cooperation with 
the Kosovo Police, provides protection to minorities, both from permanent security 
posts and mobile operations, and is available to support the Kosovo Police in the event 
of internal security challenges or man-made or natural disturbances that require 
additional military support.
542
 In addition to the above mentioned mandate, KFOR‘s 
initial tasks also included: assistance with the return or relocation of displaced persons 
and refugees; reconstruction and demining; medical assistance; security and public 
order; security of ethnic minorities; protection of patrimonial sites; border security; 
interdiction of cross-border weapons smuggling; implementation of a Kosovo-wide 
weapons, ammunition and explosives amnesty program; weapons destruction; and 
support for the establishment of civilian institutions, law and order, the judicial and 
penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of the political, economic and 
social life of the province.
543
 
The security of minorities in Kosovo continues to require special attention. To 
guarantee their protection, KFOR is also responsible for patrols near minority enclaves, 
check-points, escorts and donations including food, clothes and school supplies. The 
distribution of food, clothes or other vital supplies as well as assistance with 
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reconstructing homes and schools is the responsibility of KFOR‘s Civil−Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) element – a component of particular importance for the 
mission.
544
  
In addition to these initial tasks, on 12 June 2008, NATO decided to assume new 
responsibilities in Kosovo to support the development of professional, democratic and 
multi-ethnic security structures. In detail that meant assisting with the disbanding of the 
Kosovo Protection Corps and with the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force 
(KSF), as well as assisting the Kosovo authorities to set up a ministry that will 
ultimately exercise civilian control over the Security Force.  
The KPC was deactivated on 20 January 2009 and officially dissolved on 14 
June 2009. A Kosovo-wide recruitment campaign for the new professional, multi-ethnic 
KSF, commanded by Lieutenant General Sylejman Selimi, began on 21 January 2009. 
The KSF‘s 2,500 personnel and 800 reservists will initially take on tasks such as crisis 
response, including peace support operations, response to natural disasters and other 
emergencies, explosive-ordinance disposal and civil protection. The KSF is a lightly 
armed force and has no heavy weapons. Members of the KSF are only authorized to use 
their weapons in life threatening situations.
545
 
Not everyone is sympathetic to the new security force. Serbia has reacted with 
outrage to its formation and Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremić, has branded it as an 
―illegal paramilitary group‖ whose creation is totally unacceptable and ―a direct threat 
to national security, peace and stability in the entire region‖.546 
KFOR is responsible for the process of organizing, training and equipping the 
new force, as well as recruiting new volunteers. The initial operating capability for the 
KSF was reached in mid-September 2009, with some 1,500 personnel. 
At its height in 1999, KFOR deployed about 50,000 soldiers from 39 different 
countries. This number was gradually reduced so that, by the beginning of 2002, 
KFOR‘s strength had decreased to approximately 39,000 troops. As the security 
situation improved, numbers fell further to 26,000 troops by mid-2003 and to 17,500 by 
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the end of 2003.
547
 However, after the March riots of 2004, which led to renewed 
violence between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, KFOR‘s strength was increased 
again by an additional 2,500 soldiers. Since then, however, the security situation has 
continued to improve. Kosovo has not seen any significant ethnic conflict since March 
2004 and Kosovo‘s declaration of independence did not cause any large-scale 
violence.
548
 With the increasingly stable situation, KFOR numbers have again been 
gradually reduced. In June 2009, NATO defense ministers decided to continue this 
reduction and to adjust KFOR‘s positioning in stages to a so-called deterrent presence, 
relying more on flexibility and intelligence than on numbers. This decision was based 
on the positive developments on the ground and the establishment of indigenous self-
sustaining security structures. According to the latest available NATO data – as of 
February 2010 – 9,925 soldiers from 32 countries (25 NATO and seven non-NATO) are 
currently deployed in Kosovo.
549
 The largest contributors are Germany with 1,507 
soldiers, the United States with 1,480 and Italy with 1,409. Austria has the largest 
contingent among the non-NATO countries with 434 troops.
550
 Further troop reduction 
is already under discussion. In June 2010, defense ministers from KFOR-contributing 
nations discussed the next step in the process of reducing the force, which they agreed 
would happen when it was judged appropriate militarily. At the time of writing, it is 
intended to reduce the number of KFOR troops to 5,000 in January 2011 and to 2,700 in 
2012. Despite this reduction, NATO has emphasized that KFOR will remain robust and 
fully capable of carrying out its responsibilities in Kosovo as long as necessary.
551
 
While KFOR‘s wind down is viewed positively by Kosovo Albanians, who see it 
generally as progress and proof of Kosovo‘s improved stability, Belgrade takes a 
negative view, pointing to the uncertain security of Kosovo Serbs.  
In line with the reduction of KFOR‘s footprint in Kosovo, its structure has been 
adapted. Originally, the force was grouped into four Multinational Brigades (MNBs) − 
MNB East, Center, Northeast and Southwest. In order to improve the effectiveness and 
flexibility of the forces, KFOR was restructured in June 2006, with the MNBs replaced 
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by five Multinational Task Forces (MNTFs) – MNTF North, South, East, West and 
Center. In February 2010, KFOR was restructured again and the MNTFs were replaced 
by mission-tailored Multinational Battle Groups (MNBGs) − MNBG North, South, 
East, West and MNBG Center, which also covers the KFOR headquarters in 
Prishtinë/Priština. A Battle Group is at the level of a battalion, consisting of numerous 
companies. The five MNBGs are, like the previous configurations, under a single chain 
of command, headed by the Commander KFOR (COMKFOR), a position that changes 
every six months. 
Despite these changes in KFOR‘s strength and structure, NATO highlights that 
―KFOR will continue to work with the authorities and … will cooperate with 
and assist the UN, the EU and other international actors, as appropriate, to 
support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful 
Kosovo.‖552  
Among all the international organizations that are active in Kosovo, KFOR is the 
most appreciated and trusted by Kosovars, who feel that the force lives up to 
expectations in providing security. Opinion polls, which have been regularly conducted 
by UNDP since 2002, reveal that satisfaction with KFOR, along with the Kosovo 
Police,
553
 has always been much higher than with UNMIK, EULEX and Kosovo‘s 
governing institutions. As shown in Figure 13, the UNDP poll in March 2010 showed 
KFOR and the Kosovo Police viewed positively by 78 per cent and 76 per cent 
respectively of those questioned, compared with 36 per cent and 30 per cent 
respectively in the cases of the Kosovo government and EULEX. 
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 Figure 13: Satisfaction with Kosovo‟s main institutions 
 (percent of population viewing favorably) 
 
 Source: UNDP Kosovo: Fast Facts. Early Warning Report 27. March 2010. p. 1. 
The author‘s conversations and interviews in Kosovo reflect the far greater 
popularity of KFOR compared with UNMIK shown in Figure 13. Artan Kasumi of the 
Department of Human Rights and Communities puts it emphatically: ―I don‘t want even 
to mention UNMIK close to KFOR because it will ruin KFOR‘s reputation.‖554 The 
author asked 14 Kosovars in the course of their interviews to rank their satisfaction with 
KFOR and UNMIK on a scale from one to ten, where one is completely unsatisfied and 
ten is absolutely satisfied. Four gave KFOR a score of ten, eight gave nine, one gave 
seven and the worst score was five, given by a Kosovo Serb. The average satisfaction 
level – a very high 8.8 – compares with only 3.2 accorded to UNMIK. The highest score 
UNMIK received was seven and this was given by only two people. The next section 
will explain why KFOR enjoys such a good reputation. UNMIK‘s relative unpopularity 
will be discussed in chapter 4.3.2 which provides a full analysis of the organization. 
KFOR faced a number of security challenges when it started its work in Kosovo 
in 1999. Its determined actions, however, quickly brought an end to the violent conflict 
between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs in June 1999 and vastly improved the 
security situation over the next few months. The high esteem which KFOR enjoys to-
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day derives from this success. For example, Petrit Hysaj at the OSCE Mission in 
Kosovo says he holds KFOR  
―in the highest regard possible, for the simple reason that without KFOR Kosovo 
would have been in a complete abyss … right after the deployment KFOR 
helped a lot in ending the war .… although there was still a very great danger for 
civilians in Kosovo then. KFOR has worked extremely hard to improve that, as 
well as to secure Kosovo from any possible external or internal threats, but 
primarily external. Thus it is the most respected and most important factor in 
Kosovo‖555.  
The most feared external threat is a military confrontation with Serbia. Since 
Kosovo still does not have the capacity to counter such threats, Kosovo Albanians know 
that KFOR provides the only deterrent and feel that without the force, Kosovo would 
not have reached the present degree of security. 
While KFOR was warmly welcomed in 1999 by Kosovo Albanians, who had 
long been eager for NATO‘s support for their liberation from the Serbian regime, 
Kosovo Serbs were not surprisingly rather dismissive toward NATO‘s involvement 
from the very beginning. This is clearly reflected in the way Kosovars of different 
ethnicities recall KFOR‘s arrival in their country. According to Kosovo Albanian, 
Hamdi Berisha, for example:  
―Everybody knows that KFOR was the liberator of this country. It‘s very hard to 
put the moments when KFOR entered Kosovo into words … I cannot describe 
the feeling … we were extremely happy. It‘s like we were newly born.‖556  
Artan Kasumi agrees that KFOR‘s involvement was ―something which we wanted from 
day one. During the protests on, I think, 1 March 1998, we had this huge slogan: Invite 
NATO; NATO just do it; air strike.‖557 In contrast to this enthusiasm, Kosovo Serb 
Dejan Baljošević tersely comments: ―The involvement of the international community 
in this conflict was completely unnecessary in this direct way.‖558  
Particularly important in winning popular trust and support for KFOR were its 
Liaison Monitoring Teams and CIMIC. The CIMIC elements of the national 
contingents are responsible for providing humanitarian support to the extremely poor − 
regardless of their ethnicity. The scope of its projects not only includes emergency 
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measures such as the distribution of food and clothes, which characterized the first 
phase of the international engagement in Kosovo, but also assistance with 
reconstructing homes, schools, health clinics and other facilities, organizing medical 
treatments and surgeries and initiating projects such as to improve education, 
infrastructure and agriculture.  
However, providing humanitarian assistance to the poor is not the fundamental 
purpose of CIMIC; first and foremost, all its activities are aimed at winning the trust 
and support of the population in order to safeguard the military mission. Therefore it is 
essential that CIMIC builds relationships with national actors, whether political officials 
or ordinary citizens. Through these relationships and in the course of their activities, 
CIMIC soldiers may also get an early warning of any threat to the mission.  
Elisabeth Abazi, teacher and educator in Prishtinë/Priština, praises this aspect of 
KFOR‘s activities:  
―What we Kosovars appreciate is KFOR‘s help for the people, which was 
particularly effective at the very beginning. I, as an interpreter for CIMIC, was 
involved when KFOR built houses for the poor, not to mention the food and 
clothes they provided and the many projects like canalization, schools and many 
others. This was essential and made me very glad. I haven‘t noticed UNMIK 
doing anything like that‖559.   
Kosovars feel that KFOR has the will to be consistently engaged when needed 
and will often even work beyond their mandate as described by Artan Kasumi:  
―I know cases when soldiers independently collected money from their own 
salaries and built houses for families living in extreme poverty … so I don‘t see 
them just as military, I see them as people who are working very hard to bring 
peace.‖560 
Further boosting KFOR‘s reputation is its presence not only in cities, but also in 
very remote rural areas. This is via the Liaison Monitoring Teams, which were set up to 
go out into the community and talk to local leaders and ordinary citizens to gain a better 
understanding of the needs of the general population, assess the political, economic and 
social situation and to ―feel the pulse of the people‖ in order to improve security. 
Liaison Monitoring Team soldiers not only maintain close connections with the 
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municipal authorities, but also with international and non-governmental organizations in 
the area so that they can coordinate their various activities.     
Despite its successes, KFOR has also had shortcomings. All Kosovars 
interviewed by the author emphasized that KFOR‘s biggest failure was its role during 
the March riots in 2004.
561
 The riots raised questions over the extent of progress 
achieved in Kosovo as well as the effectiveness of all international organizations 
involved. Special envoy Kai Eide‘s report on the situation pronounced that:  
―the international community was caught by surprise by the March riots. The 
response was slow and confused both on the military and civilian side … the 
international community failed to read the mood of the majority population, its 
frustrations and impatience. It also failed to understand the potential for 
extremists to mobilize support for ethnic violence and the vulnerability of 
minorities − in particular the Serb population.‖562  
Coordination between the various external actors was ineffective and the reinforcements 
arrived too late. Following the March violence, KFOR launched an immediate process 
aimed at improving its performance, established closer liaison and coordination with the 
UNMIK Police and dramatically improved its intelligence capability.
563
 To prevent 
another outburst of violence KFOR considerably stepped up its activities after March 
2004 and made an increased show of force which was clearly noticeable by Kosovars. 
Artan Kasumi of the Department of Human Rights and Communities describes KFOR 
post-2004 as follows:  
―They have shown their true faces. They can be tough sometimes and they can 
use force if necessary. In fact they have given, and they‘re still giving the 
message to Kosovo people: don‘t force us; don‘t make us do something that we 
don‘t want to do.‖564 
Although KFOR showed considerable shortcomings during the riots, its reputation soon 
recovered and its popularity held up: about 85 per cent of Kosovars were satisfied with 
KFOR in July 2004.  
Apart from their performance, another factor that considerably influences local 
perceptions of external actors in a country like Kosovo is the behavior of international 
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representatives and their knowledge of the country concerned. The author‘s interviews, 
which included detailed questions on these issues showed that KFOR soldiers were 
rated more highly than UNMIK personnel for their behavior and knowledge of Kosovo. 
Those interviewed on average ranked KFOR soldiers‘ behavior at nine on a scale from 
one to ten, while UNMIK behavior scored only five. However, despite this, and the 
generally appreciative comments on KFOR, some behavior by the force aroused 
criticism. This is summed up by Hamdi Berisha: 
―Sometimes UNMIK police and KFOR behavior was very arrogant. They 
treated everybody the same, like criminals and showed brutality during house 
searches and at check points. This could lead to change in the local opinion on 
internationals. We know that they liberated us, but they cannot treat us in the 
same way as the predecessors [the Serbian regime] treated us. They really should 
be very careful how they treat locals, they should differentiate between, let‘s say, 
the good and bad guys.‖565  
In summary, KFOR has actively contributed to the maintenance of a safe and 
secure environment in Kosovo. Thus, even eleven years after KFOR‘s deployment, the 
military presence is still more than welcome. KFOR‘s troop reduction has been viewed 
positively by Kosovo Albanians, but all Kosovars still consider KFOR‘s presence to be 
vital to maintain peace. As Petrit Hysaj of the OSCE puts it:  
―I acknowledge and support the idea of decreasing KFOR to a reasonable 
number, let‘s say to about 7,000 but in my opinion that is the necessary number 
to keep Kosovo at a safe level.‖566  
All Kosovo Albanians interviewed emphasized that it will be necessary for KFOR to 
remain for many years because of the fears and uncertainties described in previous 
chapters. While the Serb community fears the implications of independence, Kosovo 
Albanians, fear the Serb potential for retaliation. They are particularly afraid that 
Northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica could be used to stage provocations, making the Albanian 
population hostages of ―big politics‖. Elisabeth Abazi stresses that:  
―If the Serbs in Kosovo would not continue to live with the government in 
Belgrade, we would not need so many internationals here for such a long period, 
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in particular KFOR. But as long as Serbs continue to live under Belgrade‘s rule, 
we need KFOR to stay on.‖567  
This is echoed by Petrit Hysaj:  
―I would definitely feel very uneasily about the newly created situation [if 
KFOR were to leave now] because I do believe that there is a great possibility of 
another direct conflict with the military or police of Serbia.‖568  
In the current security situation, Kosovo remains ultimately dependent on the 
international military presence for its internal and external security. According to the 
analysis of the author‘s interviews, the conditions under which KFOR, as the main 
security provider and source of stability in Kosovo, could terminate its mission are: 
first, full normalization of Kosovo‘s relations with Serbia and second, development of 
strong armed forces to control Kosovo‘s borders and defend the country against threats 
and the strengthening of the police. While Kosovo Albanians emphasize that KFOR 
needs to step up its support for establishing a capable Kosovo Security Force, Kosovo 
Serbs oppose the creation of the force itself as well as KFOR‘s involvement. In 
February 2009, Kosovo Serbs in Northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica staged a protest 
accusing KFOR of overstepping its mandate in creating the force. While Kosovo 
Albanians consider the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force as a prerequisite for 
a secure Kosovo, Kosovo Serbs see it as a ―step toward further division along ethnic 
lines.‖569 Serbia has reiterated that it does not accept the formation of Kosovo security 
forces since they do not contribute to security in Kosovo.
570
  
Clearly the Duration Dilemma – the local population becoming irritated by or 
hostile towards external actors if they stay too long – does not arise where KFOR is 
concerned. Salih Asslanaj, former mayor of Suharekë/Suva Reka sums up the Kosovar 
view on the continuing presence of the force:  
―KFOR needs to remain in Kosovo for some more time since its absence would 
present the biggest danger of instability. If KFOR left now, a renewed conflict 
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with Serbia would arise and if KFOR were not here, people would pack their 
bags and leave.‖571 
4.3.2 UNMIK Police  
While KFOR has been responsible for ensuring peace and security, UNMIK has been 
acting as the transitional administration for Kosovo. It has assumed the whole spectrum 
of civil administrative functions and services, covering areas such as health, education, 
banking, finance, post and telecommunications.
572
 According to UNSCR 1244, UNMIK 
was also charged with ―maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local 
police forces ... through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in 
Kosovo.‖ To achieve this latter task, an international policing component, the UNMIK 
Police, was set up to construct Kosovo‘s police institutions from scratch. 
At the beginning of the international involvement in 1999, there were no police 
institutions in existence. Just as with the judiciary branch, all police who had served 
under the Serb regime fled with the arrival of NATO forces. Only very few Kosovo 
Albanians had served in the police after 1989, and those who had were highly 
distrusted. Serbian police organizations were characterized by repression and massive 
human rights abuses, and no pattern of democratic or community policing had existed in 
Kosovo. This caused Kosovars to have a very negative perception of the police in 
general. Consequently, the UNMIK Police were regarded with suspicion; they had to 
win the people‘s trust step by step.  
The objectives of the UNMIK Police were established in the 12 July 1999 
Report of the Secretary-General which states:  
―two main goals will define UNMIK‘s law and order strategy in Kosovo: 
provision of interim law enforcement services, and the rapid development of a 
credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service (KPS).‖573  
As defined in this report, these objectives were accomplished in three distinct phases. In 
the first phase, KFOR was responsible for ensuring public safety and establishing order 
using international police serving as advisers. In the second phase, UNMIK civilian 
                                                 
 
571
 Interview with Salih Asslanaj, former mayor of Suharekë/Suva Reka. Suharekë/Suva Reka 15 
September 2009.  
572
 Compare chapter 3.2.3 Kosovo under UN administration for UNMIK‘s tasks.  
573
 United Nations Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo. 12 July 1999. p. 12.  
  
195 
police assumed KFOR‘s law and order tasks and in 1999 established the locally-manned 
KPS (renamed Kosovo Police after independence), whose personnel initially joined the 
UNMIK civilian police. The training of KPS candidates was carried out by UNMIK in 
cooperation with the OSCE, which established the Kosovo Police Service School in 
September 1999 to train the new police officers. This was a classic institution-building 
activity and the police school is one of the success stories of the international 
community‘s work in Kosovo. The third phase, from 2002 until 2008, was characterized 
by a gradual transfer of authority and executive powers from the international police to 
the KPS, whereby the former reduced itself to a monitoring and advisory role.  
When the EULEX mission achieved its initial operational capability on 9 
December 2008, UNMIK lost the last of its executive powers. With that, EULEX Police 
assumed all monitoring, advising and capacity-building needs of the police and justice 
sectors.
574
 While EULEX has a mainly advisory role, it is the Kosovo Police that now 
maintains law and order in Kosovo. 
The UNMIK Police consisted of three units whose responsibilities included: 
routine policing and criminal investigation via the Civilian Police Units; high-risk 
policing through Special Police Units in situations such as crowd control during violent 
demonstrations and civil unrest;
575
 and ensuring compliance with immigration laws and 
border regulations via the Border Police Units.
576
 
Its deployment was agonizingly slow in contrast to KFOR. Only a small initial 
force of 200 unarmed civilian personnel serving in the UN Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had arrived in Kosovo by the end of June 1999.
577
 However, by the end of 
2000, UNMIK Police strength amounted to 4,387 police officers, including Special 
Police Units. As the number of properly trained KPS officers increased, the UNMIK 
Police started to reduce its strength so that by the end of 2003, 3,727 international police 
officers served in Kosovo. During the March riots of 2004, there were 3,248 UNMIK 
police officers. The force was reduced significantly further in December 2008 when 
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EULEX largely took over from UNMIK, and by March 2010, it amounted to no more 
than seven police officers with no executive authority.
578
  
The establishment of the Kosovo Police is UNMIK‘s greatest success story and 
is described as the ―jewel in the crown‖579 of all international efforts in Kosovo. It has 
been successfully built into a multi-ethnic and professional institution that is better 
trained than most other police forces in the region.
580
 The Kosovar peoples‘ satisfaction 
with the work of the Kosovo Police is reflected in the UNDP poll results, which show 
satisfaction with the police at a consistently high level of around 80 per cent since 2002. 
As of January 2010, some 76 per cent of those polled were satisfied with the police, 
making the force the most highly approved of all national institutions in Kosovo.
581
 (see 
Figure 13).  
Although there are differences of opinion between Kosovars and internationals 
on the extent of the UN‘s success in Kosovo, they agree that the establishment of the 
Kosovo Police was an undisputed success. In the words of one Kosovar:  
―The biggest success of the UN mission was the establishment and the 
development of the local police because it was a huge police force that they had 
to build up, train and equip with everything. In other fields I can freely say that 
especially in justice, UNMIK failed completely.‖582  
UNMIK‘s successful institution of the Kosovo Police is also praised by Gerard 
Beekman, Senior Police Liaison Officer at the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) in New York who states:  
―I look at the Kosovo Police Service as a great success of the OSCE and the UN. 
… Our big shortcoming was on the investigation side. We were very poor at 
solving serious crimes.‖583 
Beekman is one of very few among the 16 UN staff members interviewed by the 
author at DPKO who spoke openly about UN policing weaknesses in Kosovo. Many 
UN staffers are unwilling to discuss the serious criticisms that have been leveled at the 
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UNMIK Police, tending to make comments such as: ―We had very good administrative 
officers on the ground, very experienced and they have, you know, full understanding, 
full cooperation, there was no problem.‖584 Beekman‘s comments are drawn upon in the 
following discussion of UNMIK‘s weak points. 
This section is based primarily on the author‘s interviews with Kosovars and UN 
officials, and highlights the main criticisms of the UNMIK Police and UNMIK in 
general. A full examination of UNMIK‘s failures, however, is beyond the scope of this 
study.
585
 The Kosovars‘ evidence is cited to provide a more complete picture of the 
situation on the ground than is provided by the international organizations themselves, 
whose reports were commonly watered down to give only a narrow picture of the 
situation and largely highlight the mission‘s successes; whenever they do speak of 
criticisms, challenges and failures, they provide a very myopic view. This is borne out 
by David Harland, Chief of the Europe and Latin America Division at DPKO, who told 
the author that:  
―Reports of the Secretary-General on UNMIK over the last ten years are 
consistently too optimistic and paint a rosier picture [than was actually the 
case].‖586  
This gives the impression that the international community often lives in a different 
world to the Kosovars. David Marshall describes it as ―living in a bubble‖.  
―No one really knew what was going on. I‘ve got many friends that have been 
there for years, and have no Albanian friends, have no Serb friends and all they 
do is hang out with other internationals and read each other‘s reports.‖587  
The UNMIK Police‘s success in creating the Kosovo Police is all the more 
remarkable considering the highly critical view that the local population has always 
taken of the UN police force. Kosovars most frequently ascribe this dissatisfaction to 
the large number of UNMIK officers from African and Asian countries, whom they 
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considered to be unqualified. Kosovars reason that these policemen could not be 
effective in Kosovo since they are not effective in their own countries. Worldwide, 50 
per cent of the police in peacekeeping missions come from Africa and 35 per cent from 
Southeast Asia.
588
 On average every year, about 45 different countries deployed police 
officers in Kosovo, with more than one-third of the UNMIK contingent coming from 
Asia.
589
 According to KIPRED, more than half of the international police deployed in 
Kosovo came from autocratic or highly corrupt countries.
590
 It was very hard for 
Kosovar police officers to accept colleagues who had no experience of enforcing laws 
in democratic societies or operating in a polite and helpful way.   
As Artan Kasumi of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo put it:  
―I don‘t want to sound racist but I really experienced people from India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe teaching us about 
democracy. I was so disappointed with this organization. That was the first thing 
which gave me this really bad impression of UNMIK.‖591  
Another interviewee who worked as an interpreter for the UNMIK Police explains the 
situation as he experienced it:  
―It was really hard for us to understand how some police officers from some 
African countries or some Arab-speaking countries could pass the test and 
everything and come to Kosovo. They couldn‘t speak a single word in English. 
They knew nothing about policing in this field. So I think what the UN can do is 
be tougher on picking police officers from different countries because the UN‘s 
overall reputation is at stake if UN police officers do not know how to handle 
difficult situations.‖592  
In his work Kosovo − An Unfinished Peace author William O‘Neill gives one reason 
why the quality of UNMIK Police officers was often unsatisfactory. Officers on mission 
assignments, unlike their military colleagues, must be taken from the work they are 
already doing at home – providing security to the taxpayers who pay their salaries. Most 
citizens and police force commanders believe they do not have enough police, so they 
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are not happy to see dozens or even a few of them sent to serve on missions.
593
 This is 
one reason why many countries do not send their best officers abroad, but rather the 
ones whom they would like to get rid of, or at least have a break from for a year.     
Not only UNMIK Police officers but UNMIK staff more widely were criticized 
for unprofessional or incompetent behavior. The following incident was mentioned by 
two interviewees. According to one of them: 
―We had an UNMIK administrator in Suharekë who got his [first] driver‘s 
license in our municipality. He was UNMIK administrator for a municipality 
with 80,000 inhabitants and he said, ‗Look, I was driving through the city today 
all by myself‘. For us, this is unbelievable.‖594 
Such incidents were not conducive to enhancing the mission‘s image and 
quickly contributed to people losing trust. Not only Kosovars perceived UNMIK 
members to be unqualified; some international UN members took a similar view. For 
instance, David Marshall, Human Rights Officer at the UN in New York, confessed: 
―We sent people into senior positions in Kosovo who were not qualified for 
those positions … You put senior people in important posts and if they‘re a 
disaster, it goes downhill; never recovers for years, and that‘s what we‘ve seen 
in Kosovo. I think we‘ve seen some senior positions full of people who were not 
competent. I‘m thinking of the justice system in particular.‖595  
In an international mission, it is often difficult to send people home when they 
are not performing well. As Beekman explains: 
―You have all those different nationalities, and everybody wants to be nice to 
each other. They think ‗we only need to work with each other for a year‘ … 
Sometimes people are not being evaluated properly in the field. It‘s a temporary 
assignment … and so some supervisors don‘t implement performance appraisals 
properly. The appraisals are coming in and saying, ‗He is great, she is great‘, 
even if they are complete zeros.‖596 
Another challenge for UNMIK was that police officers from different countries 
not only come from different legal backgrounds, but also have different approaches to 
policing. Consequently, the training that the Kosovo Police officers were receiving 
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changed frequently and varied according to the nationalities of the officers providing 
the training. The average stay of UNMIK Police officers in Kosovo was about one year, 
and then a new batch of officers would come in and provide training in their own way, 
which was not only confusing but also tiresome for those receiving the training. This 
problem is not unique to UNMIK, but is true for all international organizations, 
including KFOR where soldiers stay on average only six months.  
After handing over authority to the Kosovo Police, Kosovars observed many 
UNMIK Police officers who were no longer committed to performing their duties. A 
typical description of their attitude is as follows:  
―UNMIK police were no longer interested in doing anything and there were 
cases when they were saying, ‗Well, why should we bother ourselves about what 
the local police is doing? This is not our country. We‘re here for one year or two 
years. We are here simply for the money. It‘s their country. They should know 
how to do things and they should handle things on their own.‘ So as time was 
going by, people‘s opinion about UNMIK started to change.‖597  
Beekman confirmed this, emphasizing:  
―Some people will go to a mission to collect money and they‘re not going to do 
any work. They are going to be there for a year; they are getting a break from 
their national police. When the local police and the local population see that, it 
hurts. And it impacts the effectiveness of the mission because people are sitting 
around doing nothing or sitting in front of their computers playing cards … One 
of our commissioners in Kosovo complained about all the grass watchers: all the 
people standing around and watching the grass growing.‖598  
A major weakness of the UNMIK Police was criminal investigation, particularly 
of serious crimes. Many of these crimes were such that their solution depended upon the 
police having good relationships and direct communications with the local community, 
two areas in which UNMIK was particularly weak. This was not only due to language 
barriers, but also to the prevalent lack of commitment to the job. Beekman recounted 
the following example:  
―I had an assignment with three other UN police people and an interpreter. We 
got into the car and drove around − fast by the way. And I said, ‗Is this what we 
do? Windows up, not talking to anybody?‘ And they said, ‗It is what we do. We 
are just driving around‘. And I said, ‗Stop the car, there is an old lady there. I 
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want to go talk to her‘. I took the interpreter and spoke to the old lady. And I 
said to these guys, ‗This is what we should be doing. We should not be sitting in 
cars. We should be out talking to people‘. This has nothing to do with training. 
This is commitment. We have a hundred police contributors from all over the 
world and we can‘t train so many. It‘s well beyond training. It‘s commitment, a 
desire to really want to do your job.‖599  
The incident recorded by Beekman is not an isolated exception. The problem 
runs like a thread throughout the whole mission in Kosovo. International officers 
consistently stay in their cars or offices and fail to make the necessary contact with the 
local people. This applies not only to police tasks but to all UNMIK tasks. As observed 
by Berisha:  
―In the course of the standards-before-status process, UNMIK had to do an 
evaluation on meeting some of these standards. I was involved in the assessment 
and I was shocked by how it was done. You cannot make such an assessment in 
an office. You have to go out into the field and see how things are going and 
make sure that things are done properly. You can‘t just tick the boxes and say 
‗Yes, this is implemented and that is implemented‘. It made me think that this 
was a paper filling mission, without any proper monitoring or proper 
organization.‖600  
Unfortunately, EULEX is also criticized for the same shortcoming.
601
  
The UNMIK Police were also criticized for blatant misconduct. Kosovars often 
complained that officers did not themselves respect the laws they were enforcing, which 
often undermined people‘s confidence in them. Even small things, as Beekman 
explains, undermined UNMIK‘s credibility:  
―Driving while drunk, speeding, not respecting the local laws − the UN people 
think they can park any place. They think they don‘t have to comply with any 
law. It‘s arrogance. Not only big things but also those little things have an 
impact.‖602  
Worse yet was that often no proper corrective action was taken, so UNMIK 
gained a reputation for covering up misconduct. One notorious example of this was the 
February 2007 demonstration described in chapter 3.4.2.2, when Romanian UNMIK 
Police officers killed two unarmed protesters with rubber bullets. This incident 
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provoked a great deal of anger towards the UNMIK Police, particularly because 
UNMIK tried to cover up the incident instead of taking proper corrective action. No-one 
was ever prosecuted for the incident and UNMIK allowed the Romanian police officers 
to leave Kosovo. Among the Kosovars, this created a sharp animosity and distrust 
towards UNMIK and institutions generally.  
Dissatisfaction with UNMIK extends far more widely than the UNMIK Police. 
It has been criticized for failing to achieve many of its defined responsibilities. As noted 
in chapter 2.1.9.2, every international involvement has unintended consequences, and 
the effects of UNMIK‘s shortcomings continue to plague the country today even though 
the mission no longer has any executive power. Some of the weaknesses touched on 
here are elaborated further in other sections of this study.  
UNMIK‘s reputation was low not only among Kosovo Albanians but also 
among Kosovo Serbs. As explained by one Kosovo Serb:  
―None of us is satisfied with the UN here, that‘s for sure. They didn‘t do 
anything. They failed in their priorities of bringing human rights and democracy 
as well as the return process … also from the economic point of view, it‘s been a 
failure.‖603  
Amongst other things, Kosovars expressed frustration at UNMIK‘s fulfillment 
of its political role. While KFOR‘s main responsibility is to provide security, UNMIK 
as its civilian counterpart is a political organization involved in administrative and 
political tasks. Its political role is a fundamental and pivotal reason why UNMIK 
suffered a much lower approval rating than KFOR. Both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo 
Serbs blamed UNMIK for preventing them from achieving their political goals. Kosovo 
Serbs considered UNMIK as an organized attempt to subvert Belgrade‘s authority; 
Kosovo Albanians saw it basically as an obstacle to independence as promulgated at 
various Vetëvendosje demonstrations.
604
 According to one Kosovo Albanian:  
―The general opinion is that UNMIK has primarily stopped political 
developments in Kosovo. The perception is that UNMIK has prevented 
Kosovars from gaining their independence.‖605  
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Thus UNMIK had to struggle with the duration dilemma discussed in the 
theoretical part of this study. Unlike KFOR, which, as described above, offered, and is 
still seen as offering, valuable protection, the prolonged UN presence generated 
considerable resistance, particularly among the Kosovo Albanian population.  
Apart from its political role, the main criticisms of UNMIK relate to: (1) the 
maintenance of Serb parallel structures; (2) the failure to establish human rights and a 
fair and effective justice system; (3) slackness in fighting organized crime and 
corruption; (4) the failure to create an economic development strategy; (5) privatization; 
(6) property rights; and (7) its heavy footprint and slow transfer of competencies to the 
Kosovars.  
First, UNMIK failed to prevent the development of parallel Serb structures in 
areas such as education, healthcare, welfare and local governance, which are the main 
reason why Kosovo remains ethnically divided.
606
 Florim Zeqiri translator for Swiss 
KFOR states: ―UNMIK didn‘t do anything against the parallel structures in Shtërpcë, 
Graçanicë or North Mitrovicë. UNMIK rather cooperated with them.‖607 This problem 
will be explored in greater detail in chapter 5.2.3.1 and 5.3.2.  
Second, as emphasised in the author‘s interview with human rights officer, 
David Marshall, UNMIK failed to guarantee the rule of law in Kosovo, which is a major 
long-term barrier to the country‘s stability.608 Human rights watchdog, Freedom House 
emphasizes that UNMIK failed to create an effective criminal justice system willing and 
able to prosecute war criminals. Moreover, it failed to renew the aging, dwindling 
supply of jurists and thus allowed the backlog of civil and criminal cases to grow out of 
control. As discussed in section 4.2.2, many of these problems remain to this day.  
Third, in the absence of an efficient justice system UNMIK inevitably failed to 
reduce organized crime and corruption, which flourished while they were present in the 
country, as examined in section 4.2.1. Even UNMIK members themselves had their 
hands in corrupt activities. As one Kosovar, put it, ―UNMIK allowed our government to 
become corrupt.‖609 KFOR translator, Florim Zeqiri elaborated:  
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―UNMIK brought some kind of stability. However, the mistake was that they 
closed their eyes to the development of corruption, organized crime, the parallel 
structures, smuggling activities and so on. But now these corrupt people are so 
powerful that nothing can be done against them. UNMIK closed their eyes to all 
these things only to preserve stability.‖610 
Fourth, UNMIK is accused of having failed to implement an economic 
development strategy. Salih Asslanaj, former mayor of Suharekë/Suva Reka, remarked: 
―UNMIK lacked an economic development plan and the little economy that Kosovo had 
was destroyed.‖611 Hamdi Berisha complained:  
―Although they had the overall authority in Kosovo for justice, for police, for 
education, for healthcare, infrastructure, simply everything, they never did 
anything − absolutely nothing. They mostly focused on political matters. 
Economy was the other thing where they did absolutely nothing, zero.‖612  
Fifth, a specific major failure in the context of economic development was the 
privatization process, analyzed in-depth in chapter 3.3.1, which did not boost Kosovo‘s 
economy as intended. Kai Eide, in his report to Kofi Annan in August 2004, asserted: 
―Privatization has become a symbolic issue and a sign of unfulfilled promises by 
UNMIK.‖613  
Sixth, UNMIK did little to solve the unsettled property-rights issues that were a 
major obstacle to the privatization process. Even today there are many cases involving 
Albanian property in northern Kosovo and Serbian property in the rest of Kosovo that, 
as noted by analysts Iain King and Whit Mason, UNMIK was unable to unravel and 
where it was unwilling to impose a solution.
614
  
Seventh, UNMIK‘s policies, which were often characterized as being incoherent 
and poorly coordinated, failed to engender national ownership of the state-building 
process.
615
 UNMIK is heavily criticized for having been slow to transfer competencies 
and responsibility to Kosovan institutions and did not go far enough in engaging and 
empowering Kosovars of all ethnicities in key decision-making. The national ownership 
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dilemma is the flip side of UNMIK‘s ―heavy footprint‖ in its oversight of Kosovo, 
much criticized by KIPRED among others. As Xhabir Hamiti complains:  
―They kept Kosovo under their control, so all big decisions have been made by 
them. The Kosovo government has been like a toy … the government and 
citizens were like an audience.‖616  
Albin Kurti agrees. ―Everything which is domestic here has been subordinated to 
UNMIK in an inclusive and absolute manner.‖617  
Given UNMIK‘s shortcomings, Kosovars pinned great hopes on EULEX and 
expected it to act very differently. However, their hopes remain unfulfilled and EULEX 
is currently considered as just more of the same. The reason for that is explained in the 
next section.  
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4.3.3 EULEX  
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is the largest civilian 
crisis management operation ever launched under the European Security and Defense 
Policy. The mission‘s aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities with enforcing 
the rule of law, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas, which are 
EULEX‘s three components. The mission is not in Kosovo to govern, but is conceived 
as a joint effort with local authorities, in line with the ―local ownership‖ principle. 
EULEX is intended primarily to be a technical mission that will monitor, mentor and 
advise the Kosovo institutions, whilst holding a number of limited executive powers. 
These executive powers apply to some specific areas of competence, such as terrorism 
and organized crime or to the broader field of rule of law, in particular to the 
investigation and prosecution of serious and sensitive crimes, such as war crimes and 
serious financial crimes. The mission was launched by the EU Council on 16 February 
2008. It reached its initial operational capability on 9 December 2008 and its full 
operational strength on 6 April 2009. EULEX has a unified chain of command to the 
EU in Brussels and still works under the general framework of UNSCR 1244.
618
  
The legal basis for EULEX is given by three legal documents: Joint Action 
2008/124/CFSP adopted by the European Council on 4 February 2008, Joint Action 
2009/445/CFSP of 9 June 2009, amending the former and Council Decision 
2010/322/CFSP of 8 June 2010, extending the mission for a period of two years until 14 
June 2012.
619
 Although the initial mandate was for two years (until 14 June 2010) and is 
now extended for another two years, the mission will be considered completed when the 
Kosovo authorities have gained enough experience to guarantee that all members of 
society benefit from the rule of law. 
Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP sets out the mission statement according to which 
EULEX  
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―shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement 
agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in 
further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system 
and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are 
free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised 
standards and European best practices.‖620  
The key priorities of the mission are to address immediate concerns regarding 
corruption and the fight against organized crime.  
In addition to applicants from EU member states, citizens from Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Croatia, Canada and the United States may apply for international 
posts with EULEX. The mission is allocated a maximum strength of around 3,200 
people (1,950 international and 1,250 national staff throughout Kosovo). As of April 
2010, the mission strength amounted to approximately 1,700 international and 1,100 
national staff members.
621
 While the EULEX Police Component consists of 
approximately 1,400 international police officers, the Justice Component comprises 
only around ten per cent of the total EULEX staff, or 300 people. Of these, around 
70 people work in the prison system and there are only about 40 judges and around 20 
prosecutors.
622
 The Customs Component consists of about 75 internationals and 27 
nationals.
623
  
Theoretically, the priorities pursued by the mission sound encouraging. EULEX 
personnel and European Union reports provide an overwhelming list of successes and 
achievements of the mission
624
 that give the impression that EULEX can easily fix the 
country‘s problems. In practice, however, the situation looks different and it seems that 
EULEX is avoiding an honest appraisal of what is actually happening. Kosovars are 
critical of and disappointed with the mission, which has failed to meet their high 
expectations. The legitimacy of the status-neutral EU mission is questioned by both 
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. According to UNDP‘s periodically conducted 
opinion polls, just a little over ten per cent of Kosovars were satisfied with EULEX in 
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May 2008. This figure did rise to a high of over 50 per cent in June 2009 only to fall 
again to 30 per cent in January 2010 (see Figure 13).
625
 Hamdi Berisha expresses his 
frustration with EULEX as follows:  
―Everybody has the idea that EULEX is just the continuation of UNMIK. … The 
only difference is that they have less staff. Although EULEX has had some 
publicity campaigns [saying] that they would do this, they would do that, they 
would improve rule of law, they would improve justice, they will improve 
customs and everything, people don‘t buy that anymore because it‘s only empty 
words.‖626  
Vedran Dţihić and Helmut Kramer, in their study ―Kosovo After Independence. 
Is the EU‘s EULEX Mission Delivering on its Promises?‖, find that EULEX‘s first six 
months were characterized by legal and organizational chaos and emphasize that 
―EULEX, in its role as ‗guardian of democracy and the rule of law‘, has only 
modest achievements to show for its first six months. Closer scrutiny of the 
objectives, legal mandate and activities of the new EU mission gives rise to the 
rather sobering realisation that, basically, the previous, failed policy of UNMIK 
is still being pursued.‖627  
One year after this assessment, little has changed. At the time of writing critics still 
argue that the mission suffers from serious shortcomings and seems to be missing its 
objectives. One important reason for this may be that EU policy in Kosovo is 
determined primarily by the aim of maintaining stability in the region, and fear of 
―rocking the boat‖ makes EULEX excessively timid about necessary steps that might 
arouse antagonism in some quarters. The following examination of EULEX‘s 
effectiveness is primarily based on the author‘s interviews and Dţihić‘s and Kramer‘s 
policy analysis. The two authors in collaboration with a group of Kosovo experts and 
representatives of civil society have worked out a detailed list of policy 
recommendations for the EU and Kosovo authorities. This was published in May 2010 
and presented to the European Parliament in June with the aim of overcoming the 
current deadlock in Kosovo and restoring the EU‘s credibility in the region.628 
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The perception referred to above that EULEX is mainly continuing with the 
largely failed policies of UNMIK is one of the strongest points of criticism,
629
 as clearly 
expressed in the author‘s interviews with Kosovars. Describing the transition from 
UNMIK to EULEX, Artan Kasumi at the Department of Human Rights and 
Communities commented: 
―They [EULEX] only changed the badges; they just removed the plates from 
UNMIK and replaced them with EULEX. … most of them were already here [as 
UNMIK staff].‖630  
Verena Knaus, of the European Stability Initiative in Prishtina, observed: ―You don‘t 
establish the rule of law just by former UN police officers swapping their light-blue 
[UN] berets for dark-blue EU ones.‖631 Albin Kurti, leader of the Vetëvendosje 
movement, puts it even more forcefully:  
―EULEX has the same cars, the same headquarters and many of the same staff as 
UNMIK and it is founded on the same legal basis as UNMIK. Not surprisingly, 
EULEX‘s employees are, like UNMIK, already demonstrating they believe they 
are above the law, here to implement it for us, but not for them.‖632  
That a large proportion (estimated at about 30 per cent)
633
 of EULEX staff moved over 
from UNMIK, that some EULEX personnel come from states which have not 
recognized Kosovo‘s independence, like Romania, and that EULEX personnel enjoy 
legal immunity in Kosovo,
634
 are just a few of the many reasons why people consider 
EULEX to be an extension of UNMIK. The most crucial reason, however, is the fact 
that EULEX continues to operate within the framework of UNSCR 1244, meaning that 
it is deployed as a ―status-neutral‖ mission, which does not recognize Kosovo‘s 
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independence, under the overall authority of the UN.
635
 This has left Kosovo feeling 
cheated and EULEX impaired by confusion, as described by Xhabir Hamiti:  
―A big problem is that people have the feeling that internationals, in particular 
EULEX, do not consider Kosovo as a state and are making agreements without 
asking our government.‖636 
Another weakness inherited from UNMIK concerns EULEX‘s lack of 
commitment, as observed by Hamdi Berisha: 
―EULEX police officers just sit in their offices. I‘ve never seen a EULEX police 
officer patrolling in the street. So I don‘t know how they monitor things. They 
are not here to monitor or to improve things. They‘re just here to show their 
presence.‖637 
It is also questionable whether EULEX can deliver on its promises and promote 
rule of law given its current structure. As was explained in more detail in chapter 4.2.2, 
the rule of law rests on three main institutions: the police, the public prosecutors and the 
courts. While the police are the most effective and strongest of Kosovo‘s rule of law 
institutions, the judges and prosecutors are failing in important respects and are in 
urgent need of support.
638
 However, EULEX‘s overall contribution to strengthening the 
justice system consists of only 40 international judges and only 18 international 
prosecutors, while it employs about 1,400 international police officers. Given that the 
Kosovo Police is the most successful of Kosovo‘s rule of law institutions, while the 
International Crisis Group notes that EULEX is suffering from a lack of judges, and was 
about 40 per cent short of its quota in April 2010
639
, these numbers raise doubts about 
EULEX‘s priorities. Lulzim Peci, current Kosovo‘s Ambassador to Sweden, expresses 
these concerns:  
―EULEX is wrongly structured. It does not meet our needs. The main problem in 
Kosovo is the justice system – the legacy that we have from UNMIK. We have a 
huge backlog of cases. … The EU and many other countries and institutions say 
                                                 
 
635
 Compare chapter 3.2.5 The EU in Kosovo.  
636
 Interview with Xhabir Hamiti, Professor for Islamic Studies in Prishtinë/Priština. Hamiti is referring to 
the fact that EULEX signed a policing protocol with Serbia in September 2009 as part of regional 
cooperation to fight organized crime, smuggling and trafficking in human beings, drugs and weapons 
which was seen as a violation of Kosovo‘s constitution by the Kosovo government.  
637
 Interview with Hamdi Berisha.  
638
 Compare chapter 4.3.4 Kosovo Police and chapter 4.2.2 Rule of law.  
639
 International Crisis Group: The Rule of Law in Independent Kosovo. Europe Report No. 204. 19 May 
2010. p. 15.  
  
211 
that we have the best police service in the region. But they brought us the help of 
1,300 policemen and only 57 judges and prosecutors. We need EULEX but not 
the current EULEX.‖640  
The three different legal systems that exist in Kosovo
641
 and the need to translate 
court documents slow down the work of the few international judges and prosecutors by 
as much as a factor of three.
642
 Also cooperation between the extremely well-paid 
international jurists and the national judges and prosecutors does not always go 
smoothly and is often not based on mutual trust.
643
  
 EULEX is also criticized by Kosovars for not focusing on cases involving 
serious criminals. Instead one of its first moves was to launch into the trial of Albin 
Kurti. The Vetëvendosje leader was accused of ―participating in a crowd committing a 
criminal offence; participating in a group obstructing official persons in performing 
official duties and calling for resistance.‖644 These three offences were allegedly 
committed during the demonstration of 10 February 2007 in Pristina. The Albin Kurti 
trial started on 15 February 2010 and was adjourned several times. On 14 June 2010, 
Kurti was found guilty and sentenced to nine months in jail; however he was released 
immediately in consideration of the time already spent in detention before the trial.
645
  
While EULEX‘s key priorities are to fight organized crime and investigate 
widespread corruption at the highest levels, its efforts in this area within its first year, 
according to the International Crisis Group, ―have shown gaping holes in regulation and 
enforcement.‖646 Dţihić and Kramer also assess that EULEX has not delivered on its 
promises to fight high level crime.
647
 Kosovars are desperately disappointed by this 
failure. Artan Kasumi expresses this as follows:  
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―They [EULEX] are very, very weak. People were expecting a lot more from 
them. I personally was so enthusiastic that finally Europeans were taking over. 
Europeans would not allow some of the things that are going on. [But] organized 
crime now is more or less institutionalized in Kosovo. You have people within 
the system who are part of this corruption. We thought that EULEX would not 
allow such a thing to happen.‖648  
A Kosovo Serb agrees:  
―It‘s the same problem as it was with the UN and some other organizations. 
They are not willing to take some major steps, especially to deal with crimes, 
with war crimes and organized crime. EULEX must do more in order to find the 
perpetrators and bring them to justice.‖649 
During the study presentation of ―Kosovo After Independence. Is the EU‘s EULEX 
Mission Delivering on its Promises?‖, Hannes Swoboda, member of the EU-Delegation 
to Kosovo, tried to argue that EULEX is considered to have failed to deliver because 
Kosovars‘ expectations were simply too high,650 which seems to be a rather 
unsatisfactory excuse. Dominique Orsini, head of the EULEX Policy Unit, presented 
the more convincing argument that: ―It‘s hard to see outcomes after one year. So to say 
after one year that EULEX has failed to tackle organized crime and corruption is too 
fast.‖651 There is some hope that he is right. EULEX seemed to have lost its reluctance 
to take decisive measures against corruption and organized crime in April 2010 when 
EULEX police raided the offices of the transport and telecommunications ministry, in 
connection with a two-year corruption probe linked to a major highway project worth 
€700 million.652 EULEX chief prosecutor, Johannes Van Vreeswijk, has also said that 
EULEX is investigating six other ministers on charges of corruption and organized 
crime, adding that all involved in such activities should ―start sweating‖.653 These recent 
investigations are part of an operational plan to clean up corruption in Kosovo by 
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September 2011, announced on 30 June 2010 by Van Vreeswijk.
654
 For EULEX to 
fulfill its key priorities, it is crucial that the mission now continues to pursue these 
activities and does not return to its inert ―status-quo maintenance‖ strategy. 
Despite the current more vigorous actions against organized crime and 
corruption EULEX‘s achievements so far would not seem to justify the millions of 
euros that the EU is spending on the mission. EULEX‘s mission budget from 16 
February 2008 until 14 June 2010 amounted to €265 million.655 According to Dţihić‘s 
and Kramer‘s findings, the outcome of what they describe as the ―financially most 
lavish civil intervention‖656 of the EU is disappointing. Apart from the failure so far to 
combat high-level corruption, the anticipated success in supporting the rule of law more 
generally has not been achieved, particularly in the north of Kosovo which is still under 
the control of Belgrade. The court in Northern Mitrovica is only partially functional. 
The border crossings with Serbia are monitored but no customs revenues are 
collected.
657
 One of the recommendations made in Dţihić‘s and Kramer‘s policy 
analysis is that the millions of euros involved should be spent much more wisely and 
effectively, for example on Kosovo‘s education and health sectors which are in urgent 
need of improvement.
658
 The expenditure on EULEX should be made proportionate to 
investments directed towards clear improvements in Kosovo‘s social and economic 
situation. There should also be targeted direct investments in small and medium-sized 
enterprises and agriculture to establish economic and social foundations.
659
 
Another recommendation comes from Hamdi Berisha who questions whether 
EULEX is monitoring and advising Kosovo‘s institutions adequately and is strongly 
convinced that there should be greater inclusion of Kosovo‘s general public in decision- 
making. When asked what he would change concerning the international engagement in 
Kosovo, Berisha stated: 
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―I would really stop this petting of the local leaders – that whatever they are 
doing, they‘re doing okay. Internationals say, ‗Kosovo is a democratic country, 
there‘s a lot of improvement, and you [Kosovan politicians] are doing a great 
job‘. This is absolutely not true. They [internationals] should go deep into the 
reality … they should talk to the local people and get their opinions about the 
situation in Kosovo, and not only get what the leaders tell them. But I‘ve the 
feeling that our leaders and the internationals have come to a kind of an 
agreement: ‗you don‘t disturb us and we will not disturb you. You do whatever 
you want and we do whatever we want and we will be okay‘. This should stop 
immediately. I would be very, very critical. If I saw something wrong, I would 
say ‗no, we have to stop this because we are here to improve things. We get paid 
to improve things. We are not here to make friends‘. You do not improve things 
by making friends with the local leaders or local politicians as it is happening 
now. I would be very, very, extremely critical if I saw that something is going 
wrong and say ‗no, we cannot tolerate this‘.‖660  
To reverse EULEX‘s current reputation for inefficiency, Dţihić and Kramer also 
recommend that the EU should launch a fundamental and public evaluation of their 
priorities, specific operations and the strengths and weaknesses of the mission, not only 
internally, but, as also recommended by Hamdi Berisha, in collaboration with 
representatives of Kosovan civil society and independent academics.
661
  
 
Kosovars are not only disappointed with EULEX, but with the EU‘s 
commitment to Kosovo in general. Kosovars have seen little inclination on the part of 
the EU to get a grip on the uncertain political situation in their country and to bring 
Kosovo closer to the EU. Kosovo‘s EU integration process, particularly the visa 
liberalization process which is isolating Kosovo, stand out as fostering frustration with 
the EU. 
As discussed in chapter 2.1.9, an example of state-building through stabilization 
is provided by the European Union‘s Stabilization and Association Agreements, part of 
the Stabilization and Association Process which will support the Western Balkan states 
all the way to their future EU accession.
662
 However, the prospect of EU accession that 
the EU has offered Kosovo has been illusory so far. The refusal of five EU member 
states to recognize Kosovo‘s independence has so far prevented the EU from integrating 
Kosovo into the SAP, which would bring the prospect of EU membership a little closer. 
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Thus, Kosovo is the only country in the region that has not yet signed a Stabilization 
and Association Agreement with the EU.
663
 Worse, there are no immediate plans for 
assisting Kosovo to close the gap on its neighbors. Kosovars aspire toward a European 
lifestyle and becoming part of the EU, however, given the present conditions, Kosovars 
cannot look forward to acceding to the EU in the foreseeable future. So EU rhetoric 
about a European future for Kosovo seems just idle talk to Kosovo‘s citizens who feel 
abandoned by the EU, which has lost all credibility with them. As Arben Hajrullahu 
puts it:  
―The EU is unfortunately incapable of action. It was busy with own affairs 
during the 1990s and still is today. It has always sent and continues to send 
wrong signals. A good example is the EU‘s actions in Kosovo. The region 
should not primarily be seen through the prism of security strategists, it should 
be recognized as part of Europe and integrated into the EU, not only with empty 
words but with actions. Therefore, both sides [the EU and Kosovo] need to act 
and do their homework. But the homework can‘t be finished in this region as 
long as they are not ready to suit the action to the word and act trenchantly to 
solve the problems of the region effectively.‖664  
Against this background, the EU needs urgently to get a grip on the growing frustration 
with the international presence in Kosovo, particularly with EULEX and the 
International Civilian Representative/European Union Special Representative.
665
  
Kosovo is the most isolated country in Europe in terms of visa requirements. At 
the end of November 2009, the EU decided that citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would be able to travel to all countries of the 
Schengen area without visas as of 19 December 2009. The new visa-free regime allows 
those with biometric passports to travel to the Schengen area as tourists for three 
months per six-month period. Persons who intend to work or stay for more than 90 days 
still need visas and work permits. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina were not 
included in this measure, because, the European Commission explained, they had not 
fulfilled conditions in the Western Balkan countries‘ visa liberalization agreement yet, 
but are expected to qualify for visa liberalization by the end of 2010.
666
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There is no such hope for Kosovars. ―For Kosovars, the proposal is an 
unmitigated disaster.  For the EU‘s credibility in Kosovo, it is devastating,‖667 Gerald 
Knaus, of the European Stability Initiative writes. Kosovo is the only country of the 
Western Balkans that still has not been part of the visa liberalization dialogue, and today 
Kosovars can visit fewer countries without a visa than can Afghans for instance. 
Kosovars can only travel to five countries visa free: Albania, Montenegro, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Haiti, which makes Kosovo the most 
isolated country in Europe.
668
 The Commission assured a visa dialogue with the 
perspective of eventual liberalization, conditional on the required reforms. But the EU 
did not announce a visa roadmap as it did for the other Western Balkan countries, 
setting out all the requirements to be met in order to benefit from visa-free travel.
669
  
The visa liberalization policy makes Kosovars once more feel isolated and 
excluded from the EU. Critics in the European Parliament, but primarily Kosovars are 
complaining that the EU is abandoning some of the most fragile states, those that have 
experienced the worst tragedies of the last two decades. This generates considerable 
resentment towards the EU, as clearly expressed by Igballe Rogova of the Kosovo 
Women‘s Network:  
―How can Europe liberalize visas for Serbia and Montenegro, which produced 
genocide? [Their citizens] are freely going around Europe now like nothing 
happened in that region. Serbia was kind of rewarded for its crimes. This makes 
me angry. … I‘m not saying that they should not have granted visa-free travel to 
Serbia and Montenegro, but they should have included all countries: Kosovo, 
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Montenegro. But Kosovo is still 
not part of the visa liberalization process. We call ourselves experiments of the 
EU and this is why I‘m angry. … Peace cannot be built in this way in the region 
by making others angry.‖670  
Bashkim Hisari agrees:  
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―Serbia, a country that was aggressive, was granted the right to travel without 
visa by the EU and Kosovo is not granted visa-free travel although the EU is 
present here. Such actions enforce the people‘s perception that internationals do 
not have a fair attitude towards Kosovo. This is a big problem and if such things 
continue to happen then renewed conflicts may be generated.‖671  
As both statements indicate, the strict and rigid visa policy of the EU needs urgent 
modification since it risks new tensions and problems arising by dividing people into 
Europeans and non-Europeans and also leaves Kosovo a ―visa-ghetto land‖. The 
European Parliament recently noted that the decision not to include Kosovo in the visa 
liberalization process demonstrates a  
―profound contradiction in the EU‘s Kosovo strategy which lies in the 
discrepancy between an enormous aid effort in terms of resources and personnel 
on the one hand and keeping the borders closed to all those whose labour could 
contribute to development on the other hand.‖672  
Given these developments, it is necessary to establish a real prospect of EU integration 
for Kosovo. Empty promises of membership will not help to get development moving in 
the country. 
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4.3.4 Kosovo Police  
As described above, the Kosovo Police – the youngest police organization in the region 
− was established in 1999 in a cooperative effort by UNMIK and the OSCE. Given the 
legacy of the past, it, just as the UNMIK Police, was initially viewed without much 
enthusiasm. However, Kosovars‘ trust in the Kosovo Police has grown quickly, and 
currently some 76 per cent of the population is satisfied with its work (see Figure 13) – 
a tribute to its professionalism. One of the most trusted institutions in Kosovo, the force 
has earned a reputation for honesty and is relatively free from corruption.  
The strength of the Kosovo Police has increased steadily since 1999. It had 
about 6,500 staff prior to the declaration of independence, and, as at December 2009, it 
had around 9,000 employees (police officers and civilian support staff). It has been 
successful in achieving multi-ethnicity in its staffing profile and female representation is 
also high compared to forces elsewhere in the region and in Europe as a whole. As 
shown in Figure 14 below, about 85.8 per cent of Kosovo Police officers are Kosovo 
Albanians (of which 12.38 per cent are women), 9.4 per cent are Kosovo Serbs (1.72 
per cent women) and 4.8 per cent are other ethnic minorities (0.66 per cent women).
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Figure 14: Kosovo Police composition as at December 2009 
 
Source: Kosovo Police: Online via Internet: URL: http://www.kosovopolice.com/?page=2,18 
[accessed 29 06 2010]. 
The Kosovo Police effectively managed the transition to independence. It largely 
prevented interethnic violence and also succeeded in settling a boycott by Kosovo Serb 
police officers. Following the declaration of independence, some 300 Kosovo Serb 
officers left the force, refusing to take orders from the Kosovo Albanian-dominated 
government in Prishtinë/Priština. After waiting patiently for their return for more than a 
year, Prishtinë/Priština set June 2009 as a deadline after which it would start to employ 
new officers. Thereupon, all but 18 of the 300 officers returned to work, realizing that 
they would otherwise lose their jobs and that Serbia would not be able to keep its 
promise to support them financially. However, Serb police officers in the North have 
continued to refuse to report through the chain of command to Prishtinë/Priština.674 
The Kosovo Police now has the primary responsibility for internal security, 
backed up by EULEX in the event of disturbances and by KFOR as a last resort. In 
March 2010, the force assumed responsibility from KFOR for guarding the historic 
Serbian site of Gazimestan, just outside Prishtinë/Priština, which speaks for KFOR‘s 
faith in the police. Furthermore, in April 2010 KFOR handed over control of the 
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Administrative Boundary Line with Albania to the Kosovo Border Police in another 
significant vote of confidence.
675
 
Besides the general patrol, the Kosovo Police now also has a number of 
specialist units: Organized Crime, Forensic and Regional Operational Support units in 
each of the six districts (Prishtinë/Priština; Mitrovicë/Mitrovica; Pejë/Peć; 
Gjilan/Gnjilane; Prizren and Ferizaj/Uroševac). There is also a Kosovo Police 
Protection Unit, a Motorcyclists‘ Unit, a First Intervention Unit and a Canine Unit.  
Despite the successful progress since 1999, much remains to be improved. Some 
of the UNMIK Police‘s shortcomings, examined above, are also apparent in the Kosovo 
Police today as explained in more detail below. The International Crisis Group 
highlights that UNMIK did too little to build up Kosovo‘s policing capacity during the 
decade it ran the territory. It created an indigenous police force but did not train 
independent senior managers or foster strong leaders, thus producing a managerial 
weakness that still handicaps the Kosovo Police.
676
  
One of the force‘s problems is that the ratio of police officers in Kosovo to the 
population is relatively low, so that the burden on officers is considerable. Although the 
figures provided by the International Crisis Group and EULEX vary, they both agree 
that the Kosovo Police in terms of its overall size is one of the leanest police 
organizations in the western Balkans and Europe as a whole. The International Crisis 
Group indicates that Kosovo has between 327 and 398 police officers per 100,000 
citizens, compared to 427 in Croatia and 476 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.
677
  
Another problem is training. Although the Kosovo Center for Public Safety 
Education and Development in Vushtrri/Vučitrn, established by the OSCE in 1999 to 
train the police officers can be considered a success, the training has slipped since the 
Kosovo Police assumed responsibility for training from UNMIK in 2007. Further 
training is either considered as a recreation from duty or shunned because officers do 
not derive any benefit from it. Many station commanders are unwilling to go on training 
courses themselves and do not want to send their officers due to the lack of staff of 
which they complain. 
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Just as in the other sectors, low salaries have considerable implications for the 
overall work of the police. Following a police officers‘ protest about inadequate 
remuneration, the government provided a €3.5 million increase in the police budget in 
February 2010. Two months later the government allowed the police to use another €3.5 
million for salary increases, taken from savings elsewhere in the force‘s budget. The 
two increases will raise the monthly salary of the average police officer by about €80. 
Police salaries currently range between €320 per month for administrative staff to €395 
for investigators and €440 for close protection officers.678  
 The Kosovo Police has inherited the UNMIK Police‘s weakness in investigating 
and solving serious crimes. This is the responsibility of one of the five pillars into which 
the force is organized – the others being operations, border police, personnel and 
training and support services. The crime investigation pillar consists of 520 officers who 
deal with crimes such as homicide, robbery, rape, burglary, terrorism, high-level 
corruption, organized crime and drug and human trafficking, whose impact on Kosovo 
was analyzed in chapter 4.2. The International Crisis Group describes the transfer of 
these responsibilities from UNMIK to the Kosovo Police in summer 2008 as ―poorly 
planned and chaotic‖679. UNMIK failed to train Kosovo‘s officers in the skills needed 
for serious criminal investigation. Furthermore, as assessed by EULEX, Kosovo‘s 
criminal intelligence capabilities are very poor.
680
 The crime investigation pillar has 
simply too little capacity to deal with more than low-level crimes. This is not only due 
to limited experience and training in this area but reportedly also because the police 
remain subject to political interference and ―deferential to powerful government 
figures‖681.  
Another problem is the lack of a database to categorize and record crimes, which 
hampers efforts to fight them as well as cooperation between the police, prosecutors and 
courts, as discussed in chapter 4.2.2.  
 The operations pillar accounts for the majority of Kosovo Police staff. The 
uniformed officers deal with everyday issues, such as traffic control and enforcement, 
and routine patrol work that put them in continuous contact with the public. Therefore, 
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it is these officers who contribute the most to the public‘s satisfaction with and 
confidence in the police. The latter, in particular, is crucial to solving serious and 
organized crime, so the officers of the operations pillar are in a sense key enablers for 
their colleagues of the crime investigations pillar, and the impression they make is 
therefore highly important to the Kosovo Police‘s future. However, EULEX notes that 
they get inadequate direction from supervisors. This leaves patrol officers to use their 
own discretion in deciding how to use patrol time, and some use it as simply time to 
relax. Further, many patrol officers use their own discretion on traffic law enforcement 
and the level of fines, based on their perception of the relative wealth of the driver.
682
 
The large number of deaths in traffic accidents is a serious problem in Kosovo – 41 in 
the first three months of 2010 alone. Therefore, traffic safety has been identified a 
priority by the operations pillar. Theoretically, the police revoke a person‘s driver‘s 
license after three serious traffic violations. In practice, however, this is not 
implemented since the police lack a system that tracks repeated offences. The traffic 
police generally have a reputation for not taking bribes, which makes an important 
contribution to the high level of public satisfaction with the Kosovo Police overall. 
Despite their reputation for honesty, there are inevitably instances of police 
misconduct. As Arsim Berisha, Kosovo Police Station Commander in Suharekë/Suva 
Reka puts it mildly:  
―Now the Kosovo Police is the most trusted institution in Kosovo because the 
KP supports the people and people believe in the KP. But about 8,000 people 
work in this organization, so you also have some bad guys in the KP.‖683  
Investigations of alleged police misconduct are carried out by two units: the Police 
Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK) which deals with serious cases and the Kosovo Police‘s 
own Internal Investigations Unit that examines minor offences. The PIK, an executive 
body of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is an independent mechanism for monitoring 
the police and has two main functions: inspecting and analyzing police performance as 
well as investigating serious complaints of police misconduct.
684
 The Inspectorate is 
understaffed and according to the International Crisis Group it seems that the 
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―government does not stand behind the PIK‖. It was confronted with approximately 
1,700 cases in 2009 and 2,024 in 2008 (of which 300 cases involved the Kosovo Serbs 
who left the Kosovo Police following independence); however, with its current capacity 
the Inspectorate can only scrutinize about 400 complaints per year. The Internal 
Investigations Unit dealt with 866 less serious cases in 2009 (of which 218 complaints 
came from the public, involving such matters as being treated without dignity and 
shouted at, and 648 came from management). Of these, 773 cases have been resolved, 
with the unit recommending 593 disciplinary penalties and four disqualifications. More 
than half of the public‘s complaints were dismissed as ―unsupported‖.685 Increasing the 
effectiveness of the Police Inspectorate and the Internal Investigations Unit requires 
technical help, particularly from EULEX which is currently not supporting the two 
units. Therefore, the International Crisis Groups‘ recommendation to EULEX is to: 
―provide technical help and political support to the PIK and the internal investigations 
unit of the KP‖686.  
EULEX‘s help is also urgently needed to improve policing in north 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, which remains a challenge, and where EULEX is hardly visible. 
The police are the only major Kosovo institution in the north but, while officially part of 
the same organization, Serb police in north Mitrovicë/Mitrovica have only limited 
contact with colleagues in the south. Four northern police stations are largely Serb-
staffed (189 Kosovo Serb officers), but have some 21 Kosovo Albanian officers who 
are mostly deployed in the Kosovo Albanian villages as well as eight Bosniaks.
687
 Many 
Kosovo Serb officers get two salaries, one from Kosovo and one from Serbia. The 
European Commission 2009 Progress Report on Kosovo notes that ―in northern 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, four police stations do not report directly to Pristina, which limits 
the effectiveness of fighting organized crime and conducting undercover operations in 
this area.‖688 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The security situation in Kosovo is intrinsically tied to the political situation as well as 
interethnic relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. In particular, the difficult 
social and economic conditions which Kosovars experience day-to-day have a major 
impact on security. In spite of that, one of the few real achievements in Kosovo since 
1999 is the gradual improvement in security, mainly due to KFOR‘s determined 
presence. The improvement is shown by three positive developments: first, the 
considerable reduction of direct violence; second, the growing coexistence between 
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs particularly since 2008. A major achievement was 
that there was no renewed interethnic violence between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo 
Serbs during the politically strained and emotional situation surrounding Kosovo‘s 
declaration of independence. The third positive development is the successful 
establishment of the Kosovo Police with which around 80 per cent of Kosovars are 
satisfied. The main exception to these positive developments lies in northern Kosovo, 
where the security situation remains precarious and ethnic tensions persist. 
While external factors remain important and the advancement of Kosovo‘s 
relationship with its neighbors, particularly Serbia, will continue to be an important 
aspect in its future security landscape, today‘s greatest difficulties are more internal than 
external and Kosovo‘s main problems are not direct violence but structural violence 
which is still present in many areas. 
Kosovars continue to face serious and persistent social problems. Besides 
unemployment and lack of economic development, corruption, organized crime and 
weak rule of law pose severe threats to the country‘s stability as well as being sources 
of insecurity for citizens. Organized crime remains a serious problem, with criminal 
networks extending into various economic sectors and politics. The fragile rule of law 
and the justice system weaken the other security institutions. All those factors, but in 
particular corruption, undermine trust in Kosovo‘s institutions of government and have 
significant consequences for the long-term process of state- and peace-building. These 
threats require urgent attention in order to ensure that Kosovo‘s future is one that 
promotes stability and improves the lives of all Kosovo citizens.  
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5 THE FUNCTION OF WELFARE IN RELATION 
TO PEACE 
―Ten years after the war and the massive investments and support of the 
international community, it is by no means sufficient to say that the situation is 
calm and under control. Nobody should be pleased with that and that is not a 
criterion. The benchmark should be set according to what prospects, education 
system, health system and infrastructure the population has.‖689 
The previous chapter showed that the international engagement in Kosovo – 
despite its shortcomings – achieved improvements in the security situation by 
considerably curtailing direct violence. However, there is little value in having well-
regulated and efficient security provision if the population is ill-educated, unemployed 
and unhealthy, with little or no prospects for the future – in other words structural 
violence, as defined by Galtung – remains, and, only negative peace has been achieved. 
Establishing positive peace in Kosovo inevitably means paying attention to the social 
situation in the country, as the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan emphasized: 
―A world in which billions are suffering from poverty, hunger, illiteracy and 
disease, and which is not advancing down the road of development, will not be a 
world at peace.‖690 
As described in chapter 2.2.1.2, structural violence is built into the social 
structure itself and is defined as a situation where people are deprived of the basic 
necessities of life. It could also be described as social injustice or human insecurity. 
Examples of structural violence are all forms of discrimination, wide social and 
economic inequalities and a lack of educational opportunities as well as limited 
opportunities due to inadequate health services or unchallenged prejudices in society. 
Structural violence, which inevitably causes conflict and often leads to direct violence, 
is the result of past or current government policies and established social structures, all 
of which need to be effectively addressed by the state. 
Therefore, this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the government‘s 
welfare provisions and the measures it is taking to fight structural violence in the 
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dimensions of social protection, education and health as well as the inequitable 
treatment of certain groups in society (women, young people, minorities and the rural 
population). By providing welfare, governments aim to reduce structural violence and 
establish conditions that diminish the likelihood of new conflicts breaking out. 
Therefore, the main question this chapter deals with is: to what extent is the government 
succeeding in Kosovo? A systematic review of the government‘s service provision in 
the areas listed above will include an assessment of performance against targets in each 
sector. The analysis attempts to answer the following questions: What are the stated 
objectives in each sector? What improvements have been introduced by the 
international administration as well as by the national institutions since 1999? How 
likely are the stated goals to be achieved? Where can shortcomings be found and what 
are the reasons for problems and weaknesses? 
If people are dissatisfied with the government‘s provision of welfare, then they 
are more likely to resort to violence. Additionally, since structural violence often leads 
to direct violence, this chapter assesses the conditions that contribute to, or are 
potentially hospitable to, direct violence and illegal activities. Therefore, an important 
aim of the chapter will be to evaluate public satisfaction with the government‘s 
performance and provision of welfare. 
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5.1. Unemployment and poverty  
While before December 2007, the majority of the population considered the uncertainty 
over Kosovo‘s status as their paramount problem, that perception has changed and 
unemployment and poverty are now perceived to be the greatest threat. In the UNDP 
poll of March 2010, unemployment was seen as the most pressing problem by 47 per 
cent of those responding while a further 25 per cent mentioned poverty (see Figure 
15).
691
 
Figure 15: Kosovars‟ perception of the country‟s paramount problems, 2010 
 
Source: UNDP Kosovo: Fast Facts. Early Warning Report 27. March 2010. p. 5.  
Kosovo has the highest levels of unemployment and poverty in the Balkans, with 
an average annual per capita income of only €1,759 in 2009.692 Studies show that 
Kosovars‘ satisfaction with their family‘s economic situation is, not surprisingly, very 
low – only 23 per cent of Kosovo Albanians, 9.0 per cent of Kosovo Serbs and 14 per 
cent of other minorities regard their household incomes as adequate.
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Desperately poor employment opportunities explain the bleak picture. Only 24.1 
per cent of the state‘s 2.2 million inhabitants were employed in 2008 (see Figure 16) 
and the situation has not improved since. While employment levels slightly increased in 
the first half of the last decade, from 19.6 per cent in 2001 to 29 per cent in 2006, the 
positive trend reversed in 2007 when the employment rate fell to 26.5 per cent. There 
was a further decline to 24.1 per cent in 2008, which is partly explained by a change in 
the statistical treatment of people working on their own small farms.
694
 
Figure 16: Employment rate, 2001−08 
 
    Source: Statistical Office of Kosovo: Labour Market Statistics 2008. Prishtina 2008. p. 16. 
Male and female employment rates differ significantly. While about 38 per cent 
of Kosovo males of working age (15−64 years) were employed in 2008, the 
corresponding figure for females was only about 11 per cent.
695
 
As of June 2009, the number of registered employees was only about 200,000 
with an average wage of approximately €280 per month. About 40 per cent of all 
employees worked in the public sector and received an average monthly wage of about 
€250. This was an increase on the June 2008 figure because of a ten per cent salary 
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increase for civil servants taking effect on 1 January 2009. Teachers‘ salaries also 
improved by an average 30 per cent.
696
 
According to the Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance, the largest 
employment sector is wholesaling and retailing. Its workforce increased from about 
19,000 in 2004 to 24,000 in 2008 while average monthly pay in the sector rose from 
€180 to €226. During the first quarter of 2009, employment rose further to 25,550 but 
pay fell back to about €220 per month.  
Another steadily expanding sector is financial intermediation, which includes 
financial institutions such as banks, microfinance institutions and insurance companies. 
Employees in this sector increased from 2,700 in 2004 to over 4,500 during 2008 and 
there was further slight growth during the first half of 2009 to 4,550. The average 
monthly salary is considerably higher than in other sectors and is currently reported to 
be around €850 per month. However, the average is exaggerated by the relative high 
salaries of senior staff and middle management. Excluding these, the average monthly 
salary in the sector amounts to €400−500.  
  Employment is also expanding in processing industries and construction. The 
processing sector, including food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, wood, chemicals and 
metallurgy, employed roughly 19,000, earning an average monthly salary of €230 
during the first half of 2009. The construction sector employed 7,500 people with an 
average wage of €263.697  
Although average monthly incomes have increased in recent years they are still 
the lowest in the region according to figures from the Statistical Office of Kosovo (see 
Table 10).  
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Table 10: Average net wages per month in euro, 2003−09 
Sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
General services 181 200 200 212 225 243 333 
Public law and order 203 207 206 206 219 221 286 
Education 155 166 174 175 191 233 265 
Healthcare 151 163 169 166 164 167 256 
Economy 180 198 203 195 189 196 306 
Housing 174 178 184 185 178 189 222 
Source: Based on Statistical Office of Kosovo: Kosovo in Figures 2008. p. 33.  
Statistical Office of Kosovo: General Statistics. Quarterly Bulletin January 2010. p. 11. 
These extremely low wages are in stark contrast to the earnings of Kosovars 
working for international organizations. For example, Kosovar interpreters for KFOR 
get an average monthly salary of €427, while interpreters at UNMIK earn €500 and 
€600 a month.698 
There is an even sharper contrast between local incomes of a few hundred euro 
per month and the thousands of euros per month earned by international representatives 
in Kosovo. The extreme differential causes resentment towards the international 
community as already discussed in chapter 4.2.2. 
However, those who are getting paid, however little, can count themselves lucky 
with serious unemployment such a central political and economic problem. The 
Macroeconomic Department of the Ministry of Economy and Finance estimates that 
between 39 per cent and 46 per cent of employable, job-seeking Kosovars are 
unemployed.
699
 The Statistical Office of Kosovo puts the figure at 48 per cent. In line 
with the overall employment figures, these numbers have fluctuated in recent years with 
unemployment declining from 57.1 per cent in 2001 to 39.7 per cent in 2004. However, 
unemployment increased again to 41.4 per cent in 2005 and reached 47.5 per cent in 
2008 (see Figure 17). One of the reasons for the worsening figures given by the 
Statistical Office of Kosovo is that persons engaged in subsistence farming and 
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production were counted as employed until 2007 after which they have been classified 
as unemployed. However, this is at best part of the picture since the upturn in the 
figures started in 2004. 
Figure 17: Unemployment rate, 2001−08 
 
    Source: Statistical Office of Kosovo: Labour Market Statistics 2008. Prishtina 2008. p. 24. 
By the end of December 2009, 338,895 people were registered unemployed. The 
chances of the large majority of these gaining employment were impaired by their 
generally low level of skills.
700
 About 60 per cent of registered unemployed are 
unskilled, with only 26 per cent having secondary education and only 0.9 per cent 
having a university degree.
701
 At the end of June 2009, the cumulative rate of 
employment, defined as employment in relation to the current number of registered 
unemployed, was 1.4 per cent for unskilled persons and 2.69 per cent for those with a 
high school degree, whereas the figure was 19.9 per cent for those with a university 
degree. Women are in a less favorable situation than men at all levels of education.
702
 
The job prospects of the unemployed are further undermined by most of the 
jobless having no previous work experience. Approximately 79 per cent of the males 
and 90 per cent of the females have never worked before. The problem is particularly 
severe for young people between the ages of 15 and 24, with almost all of them trying 
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to get a first job.
703
 Because of its very young population, Kosovo faces the imperative 
of integrating large youth cohorts into the labor market. This heightens the overall 
challenge of youth unemployment. It is expected that roughly 200,000 young people 
will reach working age in the next five years, while the number of people reaching 
retirement age will be approximately 60,000. These combined phenomena will 
contribute to make the labor market still more hostile to young Kosovars.
704
 
Another worrying aspect of the problem is long-term unemployment. Roughly 
90 per cent of jobseekers have been out of work for more than 12 months, making their 
re-employment even more difficult and challenging. This may not only lead to serious 
problems for the unemployed individuals themselves but is also a problem for the 
overall economy since a significant number of the unemployed receive social assistance 
benefits.
705
 
  Youth unemployment is already at an alarming level, with approximately 75 
per cent of young people out of work.
706
 Figure 18 shows that, as well as  the 15–24 age 
group, women are particularly hard hit by unemployment. While 70 per cent of males 
between 15−24 are unemployed, the figure for women in the same age group is more 
than 80 per cent. It can also be seen that unemployment declines steadily with age. 
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Figure 18: Unemployment rates by gender and age group, 2008 
 
            Source: Statistical Office of Kosovo: Labour Market Statistics 2008.Prishtina 2008. p. 23.  
The high unemployment rate in Kosovo inevitably makes a major contribution to 
the prevailing high level of poverty. The latest poverty report by the World Bank, 
published in October 2007, classifies about 45 per cent of the population as poor, 
defined as having a consumption level below the poverty line of €1.42 per adult a day. 
Of these, 15 per cent of the population is classified as extremely poor, defined as living 
below the food or extreme poverty line of €0.93 per adult a day, and having difficulty 
meeting basic nutritional needs. Another 18 per cent of the population is vulnerable to 
poverty.
707
 These poverty rates are dramatically higher than in other Balkan countries as 
illustrated in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Headcount poverty in the Western Balkans (per cent of population), 
2006 
 
Source: The World Bank: Kosovo Poverty Assessment. Volume I: Accelerating Inclusive Growth to 
Reduce Widespread Poverty. October 2007. p. ii. 
Poverty in Kosovo is characterized by its shallowness in the sense that the 
incomes of a large proportion of the population cluster around the poverty line − in 
other words these people are vulnerable to poverty. A 25 per cent decrease in average 
incomes could easily send the 18 per cent of the population currently classified as 
vulnerable below the poverty line. However, a similar increase in income could 
withdraw as many from poverty. 
The poor are mainly concentrated in large families among the unemployed and 
the low-skilled. Households with more than six members have a poverty incidence of 
almost 50 per cent compared with 30 per cent for households that have one to three 
members.
708
 The average household size has dropped in recent years and is currently 
estimated at six persons.
709
 Another factor that strongly influences the family‘s well-
being is the composition of the household. Families with disabled members or more 
dependents (children and elderly) than working adults have a higher incidence of 
poverty. While 14.3 per cent of families with no disabled members are classified as 
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extremely poor, this figure rises to 17.9 per cent if the household has one or more 
disabled members.
710
 
Additionally, households headed by females are more vulnerable to poverty than 
male-headed households. Although only about 4.7 per cent of all households in Kosovo 
are female-headed, their susceptibility to extreme poverty is much higher.
711
 Gender 
differences in education and labor market status are among the reasons for this and will 
be discussed further in chapter 5.5. 
The risk of extreme poverty is the highest among children (17.3 per cent among 
pre-school children and 16.9 per cent among children between 6−14 years) followed by 
the elderly (17.1 per cent). Given Kosovo‘s high birth rate, children between the ages 
0−14 constitute 34.5 per cent of the extremely poor.712 
Not surprisingly, households whose heads have not completed primary school 
have the highest poverty incidence (60 per cent). However, most of the poor have some 
primary education and some have reached secondary level. Poverty incidence reduces 
sharply to about 20 per cent among households headed by university-educated 
individuals. Over 70 per cent of people with vocational and tertiary education are 
salaried employees, compared to 27 per cent of secondary educated individuals.
713
 
Finally, poverty is largely a rural problem. World Bank data estimate that more 
than 60 per cent of Kosovo‘s population live in rural areas,714 and roughly two-thirds of 
all those classified as poor live in rural areas. In 2006, 49 per cent of the rural 
households were poor and 18 per cent extremely poor. In urban areas these figures were 
37 per cent and 14 per cent respectively.
715
 
The large majority of the extremely poor are also infrastructure poor. However, 
infrastructure poverty is prevalent and impinges on all income groups almost equally. 
Almost half the extremely poor do not have access to a central water pipeline and one-
third has to rely on wells. Virtually all the extremely poor make use of wood stoves, and 
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about three-fifth of extremely poor households lack waste disposal facilities and indoor 
flush toilets.
716
 A substantial proportion of the population (about nine per cent) have no 
access to indoor water and proper sanitation. Although access to indoor water taps has 
improved a little, it remains lower in rural areas than in towns. Less than ten per cent of 
the rural population has central heating, while there is higher access in urban areas. Not 
only do people in rural areas have less access to key public services, they also suffer 
from lower quality services where they are available.
717
 
Such pervasive poverty is not surprising in light of the current macroeconomic 
problems, which have been reviewed in chapter 3.3. The poor economic conditions 
make it virtually impossible to enhance standards of living. Without the safety-net 
provided by migration and remittances by migrants, a large part of the population would 
be literally unable to survive. But what can be done beside relying on remittances to 
improve the welfare of Kosovo‘s population and to reduce poverty in future? 
Chapter 3.3. dealing with Kosovo‘s economic position clearly shows that the 
most effective strategy for improving living standards in Kosovo is to achieve economic 
growth that benefits a large part of the population. Since unemployment is the major 
cause of the high poverty rate, growth policies that encourage high employment 
generation need to be implemented. Calculations made by the World Bank show that a 
ten per cent reduction in unemployment would be linked to a six percentage-point 
reduction in poverty. Key sectors where job creation would be particularly beneficial 
are transport, construction and services, including the strengthening of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
In addition, achieving economic growth requires the creation of a well-educated, 
adaptable and healthy work force. A general improvement in the quality of education 
and improved access to secondary and higher education for the poorest need to be 
addressed in order to generate high and sustained growth.
718
 
While improving economic growth is a long-term strategy, in the short term, the 
World Bank recommends the following three concomitant courses of action: firstly, 
improving urban infrastructure and services; secondly, maintaining migration flows to 
                                                 
 
716
 The World Bank: Kosovo Poverty Assessment. Promoting Opportunity, Security and Participation for 
All. June 2005. p. 50.  
717
 The World Bank: Kosovo Poverty Assessment. Volume I: Accelerating Inclusive Growth to Reduce 
Widespread Poverty. October 2007. pp. 21. 
718
 See chapter 5.2 Education for a detailed analysis of education in Kosovo.  
  
237 
protect welfare levels and thirdly, expanding and improving the targeting of social 
protection programs aimed at assisting the poorest.
719
 
5.1.1 The social protection system  
With 45 per cent of the population in Kosovo being poor, 15 per cent extremely poor 
and an additional 18 per cent vulnerable to poverty, a target-oriented, effective and 
affordable public social protection system is vital. The social protection system in 
Kosovo is still in its infancy and in need of development. Currently, the system consists 
of social assistance schemes and a network of social work centers that offer counseling 
and referral services to individuals and families at particular risk (for example, 
offenders, orphans and victims of domestic violence). There is no financial assistance 
for the unemployed yet; a network of employment offices started to provide job-search 
assistance but they are not dealing with this very successfully. A three-pillar pension 
system has been established which is further supplemented by special schemes for war 
invalids and their next of kin, early retirement for miners to accelerate restructuring of 
the sector, and disability benefits. However, social assistance and pension payments are 
mostly a drop in the ocean. Government aid is much less than a family needs to 
maintain even a substandard living in the country. Therefore, formal social protection 
programs are complemented by informal subsidies and private transfers. Remittances 
from the diaspora in Europe and North America are the most common subsidy and play 
a major role in keeping families out of extreme poverty. Moreover, aid is also granted 
by NGOs and charitable organizations.
720
  
5.1.1.1 The pension system  
During 2001−03, a completely new pension system was established in Kosovo. Before 
the war, Kosovo‘s pensioners were paid by the state under the former communist 
regime. However, the pension system simply ceased to exist during the conflict; it 
neither accepted contributions nor paid pensions to most former contributors. 
Contributions that have been paid for many years are locked in Belgrade. 
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The pension system before the war was on a ―Pay-As-You-Go‖ basis, with 
current workers supporting current pensioners. The pension rate was based on years of 
service and salary. This was a classical East European system, characterized by high 
contribution rates, repeated delays in pension payments, avoidance attempts by 
contributors, early retirement ages and a complex benefit formula as well as low 
coverage − roughly half of all over-65s were included. In short, the old pension system 
had many shortcomings and was simply inefficient.
721
 
After 1999, UNMIK initiated a social assistance program which covered 
payments to certain categories of elderly people. These payments, however, were not 
directed to those who had made past pension contributions and were regarded as a form 
of state aid rather than a pension. Due to the problems of the old system, it was decided 
not to revive the former Yugoslav socialist pension system but rather to adopt a 
completely new, modern scheme. The following principles were taken into 
consideration in developing the new system:
722
 
 Coverage of the entire population: In contrast to the pension system of the 
former regime which covered only half the elderly, the new system is intended 
to cover the entire population. 
 Meet the needs of all population groups: The new system should serve firstly, 
the elderly who contributed to the old system (up to 25,000 old-age pensioners 
or 1.5 per cent of the population and a further 25,000 over-65s who were 
receiving survivor or disability pensions); secondly, it should assist the elderly 
who did not contribute to the old system (about 90,000 or 5.0 per cent of the 
population); and thirdly, serve the current working population (about 1.4 million 
people aged between 16 and 65). 
 A sustainable system: A top priority was to develop a system that would be 
sustainable in the long-term. 
 Equal access: All pensioners and workers should be allowed to take part in the 
new system on equal terms, regardless of ethnicity. 
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 Promote economic development: The pension system should encourage savings 
and investment. Moreover, the new system should promote development of the 
labor market, suggesting that contribution rates be set at reasonable levels.      
In December 2001, UNMIK approved the implementation of a three-pillar 
pension system regulated by UNMIK Regulation 2001/35. 
Pillar I – Basic Pension 
Pillar I consists of an old-age ―basic pension‖ and a disability pension administered by 
the Kosovo Pension Administration, under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Welfare. The basic pension is paid to all residents of Kosovo and Kosovar 
refugees living outside the territory aged 65 and older, regardless of their work history 
and whether they paid into the previous pension system or not. Both the basic and the 
disability pension are funded from general government revenues rather than a 
earmarked tax on wages. The basic pension benefit is set at a level defined by the cost 
of a basket of food items supplying basic needs. It is adjusted annually during the 
budgeting process to reflect changes in costs and is based on Law 2002/1.
723
 The basic 
pension‘s aim is to ensure that all the elderly receive sufficient income to avoid falling 
below the poverty level, even if they did not contribute to the previous pension system. 
It also takes into account that nearly all older people in Kosovo live with families that 
support and care for them. Therefore, the scheme aims to give the elderly just enough 
income to cover their marginal cost to their families.
724
 
While the basic pension was introduced in 2002, the disability pension was 
introduced two years later, in July 2004, and is regulated by Law No. 2003/23. It 
resembles the basic pension in all aspects apart from eligibility. This is based solely on 
permanent and total disability, to ensure that limited resources are directed only to the 
completely disabled. Beneficiaries are not entitled to receive both a disability and a 
                                                 
 
723
 Law 2002/1 on the Methodology for Setting the Level of Basic Pension in Kosovo, and Determining 
the Commencement Date for Provision of Basic Pensions.  
724
 John Gubbels. David Snelbecker. Lena Zezulin: The Kosovo Pension Reform: Achievements and 
Lessons. The World Bank. April 2007. pp. 21.  
  
240 
basic pension.
725
 The following table shows basic pension benefits between 2002 and 
2006. 
   Table 11: Monthly basic pension benefit, 2002−06 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Monthly benefit (€)  28 35 40 40 40 
Source: John Gubbels. David Snelbecker. Lena Zezulin: The Kosovo Pension Reform: Achievements 
and Lessons. The World Bank. April 2007. p. 27. 
The current basic pension is either €45 or €75 per month. In March 2008, the 
Kosovo government approved an administrative directive, in response to continuous 
pensioners‘ complaints, increasing monthly payments to €75 for all those who made 
payments under the old pension system.
726
 
Figure 20 shows that the number of basic pension beneficiaries gradually 
increased by 21,915 between 2004 and 2008. In 2008, 138,847 beneficiaries received a 
total of €66 million. According to the latest figures for June 2009, recipients of basic 
pensions fell slightly to 138,774. Of these, about 28,855 received additional payments 
under the new provision.
727
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   Figure 20: Number of pensioners, 2004−08 
 
Source: Based on the Statistical Office of Kosovo: Social Welfare Statistics 2008. Prishtina 
2009. pp. 10. Statistical Office of Kosovo: Statistics of Social Welfare in Kosovo 2007. 
Prishtina 2008. p. 11.  
Disabled pension beneficiaries in 2008 were considerably fewer at 19,746. 
Pillar II – Individual Savings Pension 
Pillar II of the system is a mandatory, defined-contribution pension program under 
which all working, habitual residents of Kosovo must contribute five per cent of gross 
salary to the pension trust. Worker contributions are matched by a five per cent payment 
from the employer. Both workers and employers are entitled to make further voluntary 
contributions of up to ten per cent of gross salary. Contributions are obligatory for all 
workers over 18 who were born after 1946. Those aged over 55 are freed from 
obligatory payments at the beginning of the program because there is to be a ten year 
period before any pensions are paid out, allowing the scheme to accumulate funds. 
Workers who were born before 1945 are allowed to take part in the pension program 
voluntarily. Contributions and records are administered by the Kosovo Pension Savings 
Trust, an independent body with strict rules on governance and supervision, set up 
solely to administer the scheme‘s funds. The trust is tasked with selecting asset 
managers to invest participants‘ assets outside Kosovo. Each participant has an 
individual account and the pension paid on retirement at age 65 will depend on the 
amount accumulated in the account over the individual‘s entire working life. This will 
be used to purchase a pension annuity. While Pillar I aims at averting poverty, Pillar II 
also serves as an encouragement to saving.  
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The pension program was implemented in two phases: In August 2002, 
contributions became mandatory for employees in the public sector, socially and 
publicly owned enterprises and private enterprises with 500 or more employees. Phase 
two was implemented in August 2003 when contributions became obligatory for all 
workers, including the self-employed.
728
  
Pillar III - Supplementary Pension Schemes 
Pillar III of the pension system regulates the legal framework for supplementary, 
individual or employer-sponsored pension schemes. Voluntary pension schemes are 
available from various financial institutions, and they may be financed by the 
contributions of employers and/or employees. The Banking and Payments Authority of 
Kosovo licenses and regulates all third-pillar pension schemes as well as the Kosovo 
Pension Savings Trust. 
The following figure illustrates the pillars of the pension scheme: 
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Figure 21: Three-pillar pension system 
 
Source: Oleksiy Sluchynsky: The Kosovo Pension Saving Trust (KPST): Governance and 
Administration. The World Bank. November 2007. Online via Internet: URL: 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/241439/S23Sluchynsky.pdf [accessed 24 11 2009]. 
The new pension scheme has a number of useful features. The basic pension is 
funded from general revenues, so avoids wage-based contributions, which should avoid 
creating labor-market distortions. The basic pension‘s flat-rate benefit has proved an 
effective means of meeting the broader needs of Kosovo‘s elderly population. It reaches 
almost all those over 65, including individuals who did not have the opportunity to work 
during the 1990s, and has been successful in reaching minorities.  The basic benefit is 
linked to the cost of a basic monthly food basket in order to control long-term fiscal 
sustainability. However, a weakness is that high-income earners and contributors to the 
old system feel that they are under-compensated.
729
 
While those who played a significant role in developing and implementing the 
new pension system consider that it is one of the most successful social and economic 
programs in the country, with strong institutions providing efficient, safe services, the 
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Pillar I - Basic Pension 
Participants: Elderly over 65  Financing: General Budget Revenues 
 
Provider: Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare 
 
 
 
Pillar II - Individual Savings Pension 
Participants: All employed    Financing: 10% of Wages 
 
Provider: Kosovo Pension Savings Trust 
 
Pillar III – Supplementary Pension Schemes 
Participants: No restrictions   Financing: Voluntary contributions 
 
Provider: Employers, Insurance Companies, Banks 
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general public calls that claim into question and is rather critical of the new system. 
Indeed, when asked about their satisfaction with it, people become emotional and 
anxious. ―The pension system in Kosovo is very bad and corrupt like all the other 
systems, even worse‖,730 and ―the pension payment is too low to live‖731 are typical 
comments. Although the new pension system is claimed to already meet basic European 
standards, it will be some years before it is clear whether the promised robust and 
adequate pensions for future generations will be delivered or whether the new system 
alleviates poverty, manages risks, is fiscally sustainable and compatible with economic 
growth and development. 
5.1.1.2 The social assistance scheme 
The Social Assistance Scheme was established to provide a safety-net for poor and 
vulnerable families within the broader context of the social protection system in 
Kosovo. The scheme, regulated by Law No. 2003/15, provides financial support to 
eligible families according to criteria set out in the law and within the resources 
allocated for this purpose in Kosovo‘s Consolidated Budget. The scheme addresses a 
narrow group of poor and extremely poor households.
732
 To be eligible, all family 
members must be habitually residing in Kosovo and the families must fall into one of 
two categories. Category I includes families where no member is employed. Category II 
applies where a family member is able to work and the family includes at least one child 
under the age of five and/or an orphan under the age of 15 receiving full-time care.
733
  
An eligible family receives assistance for up to six months, provided it continues 
to satisfy the criteria during this period. After this, a new application is required to 
receive further assistance.
734
 The amount of the monthly social assistance payment is 
adjusted according to the number of family members and the consumer price index.
735
 
Payments, which were set in 2003 when the social assistance law entered into force, are 
shown in the following table: 
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 Table 12: Monthly social assistance payments, 2003 
Family size 
Monthly gross  
standard rate (€) 
One member  35 
Two members  50  
Three members 55 
Four members 60 
Five members 65 
Six members 70 
Seven or more members 75 
Source: Law No. 2003/15 on the Social Assistance Scheme in Kosovo.  
Section 9. Calculation of Monthly Social Assistance Payments. 
Figure 22 shows that the number of families receiving social assistance between 
2005 and 2009 fell steadily from 42,052 in December 2005 to 34,307 by December 
2008. However, the Ministry of Economy and Finance reported an increase to 35,773 
families in June 2009.
736
 Social assistance payments totaled around €26 million in 2008. 
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Figure 22: Numbers of families and family members benefiting from social 
assistance, 2005−09 
  
Source: Based on the Statistical Office of Kosovo: Social Welfare Statistics in Kosovo 2006. 
Prishtina 2007. p. 21. Social Welfare Statistics 2008. Prishtina 2009. p. 23.  
Data are taken from the months of December of the particular year. 
The Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance explains this decline as resulting 
from strengthening the monitoring and supervision of registration and the application of 
new criteria, rather than improved social and economic conditions or a reduction in 
poverty levels. Likewise, the recent increase was probably due to management 
changes.
737
 
5.1.1.3 Employment programs 
Employment services and vocational training
738
 to improve the high unemployment rate 
are unfortunately limited. Services in this area are still basic, doing little more than 
registering households for social assistance. In general, active labor-market programs 
attempt to match demand and supply through training and re-training, counseling and 
guidance and placement services. According to the World Bank, such interventions 
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have at best mixed outcomes and need to be implemented with caution to avoid 
squandering resources.
739
  
In Kosovo, training programs and employment offices − within the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Welfare − have a very limited impact on employment. According to 
data recorded through employment offices, the total number of job placements between 
January and the end of June 2009 reached 3,098, marking an increase of 22 per cent 
compared to the same period of 2008, when the number of placements was 2,451. 
However, this increase is more likely to have been caused by the continued growth of 
economic activity in Kosovo, in particular, the continued implementation of a 
considerable amount of public works funded by a substantial increase in capital 
expenditure in Kosovo‘s budget. A significant proportion of capital expenditure is 
focused on infrastructure improvements, particularly road building, which has resulted 
in higher than normal activity in the construction sector.
740
 
However, assisted job placement is highest in the trade sector and not in 
construction. Figure 23, comparing assisted job placements in selected sectors in the 
first half of 2008 with those in the same period of 2009, shows trade sector placements 
in the first half of 2009 at about 34.8 per cent of the total. This was lower than in the 
same period of 2008, as was the case with placements in manufacturing and education, 
while placements in construction and agriculture and forestry rose. The rise in assisted 
employment in the agriculture and forestry sector was particularly notable, with its 
share of total placements during the first half of 2009 rising to 22.3 per cent from 9.6 
per cent in the same period of 2008. 
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Figure 23: Placements in selected sectors, first half of 2008 and 2009 
 
 
Source: Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance: Semiannual Macroeconomic Bulletin. 
January−June 2009. Macroeconomics Department. Prishtina 2009. p. 7. 
It is hard for employment offices to facilitate employment when jobs are scarce, 
so investment in them cannot be expected to have much effect until the general 
economic situation recovers sufficiently to create enough sustainable jobs. Resources 
spent on employment services and vocational training might be better spent on well-
planned temporary work programs, providing low-wage jobs to those qualified and 
willing to take them, backed up by social assistance schemes.
741
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5.1.1.4 Impact of the social protection system on poverty 
World Bank studies on the impact of social protection programs on poverty in Kosovo 
show that the programs have one desirable feature: good targeting − meaning that the 
benefits of the social assistance program reach mostly the poor. Almost 90 per cent of 
social assistance recipients are either poor or vulnerable. However, the programs suffer 
from three weaknesses. First, the coverage is low. According to the World Bank, social 
assistance is received by about 13 per cent of the population, with only about 23 per 
cent of the poor and about 34 per cent of the extremely poor reached by the program. 
About six per cent of the population benefit from the different types of pensions. 
Second, the value of benefits is very low. Third, the limited coverage and the modest 
size of the benefits together have meant that the social protection programs have had 
little impact on improving the welfare of the population.
742
 
 Without social assistance, overall poverty would be higher by about two 
percentage points and by about four percentage points in the absence of pensions. 
However, extreme poverty would be about 40 per cent higher if both were 
withdrawn.
743
  
Given the limited scale of Kosovo‘s social protection programs, they must 
become more efficient and still better targeted to increase their impact on poverty in 
Kosovo. Above all, poverty cannot be overcome by social assistance alone. This can 
only be achieved by the creation of new jobs. Therefore, first and foremost, Kosovo 
needs to be transformed into a functioning economy in which earnings from 
employment can be supplemented by adequate welfare programs.  
The formal social protection system is backed up by private transfers. While 
there is a large variety of these, remittances from the diaspora are undoubtedly the 
largest and most widespread. 
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5.1.2 Migration and remittances as ways out of poverty 
Migration has been a tradition among Kosovars for many decades and still is the most 
important strategy for escaping unemployment and poverty. Kosovo is among the 
countries with the highest emigration rates in Europe.
744
 Nearly a quarter of Kosovars 
have migrant members abroad whose remittances play a decisive role in keeping 
families out of extreme poverty. Migration is generally prompted by economic 
problems and 63 per cent of those intending to emigrate from Kosovo cited 
dissatisfaction with the economic position of their family as their key motive. Another 
25 per cent cited general economic conditions in Kosovo.
745
 It is hard to overstate the 
impact of the simple lack of prospects in Kosovo, particularly on its younger 
population, most of whom would leave immediately if they could. Given the fact that 45 
per cent of the population is poor, the Human Development Index is the lowest in the 
Balkan region
746
 and the unemployment rate is the highest in the region, it is not 
surprising that the majority of young Kosovars between the ages of 20 and 35 aim to 
migrate.  
5.1.2.1 Socio-economic profile of the Kosovo diaspora 
About 17 per cent of Kosovars live abroad. The diaspora is estimated to include more 
than 400,000 people, of whom 315,000 are Kosovo Albanians and 100,000 are Kosovo 
Serbs and other ethnicities. One in every four households in Kosovo has one or more 
family member living in a foreign country.
747
 Most of the emigrants are in Germany (39 
per cent), followed by Switzerland (23 per cent), Italy and Austria (each with 6−7 per 
cent), the United Kingdom and Sweden (each with 4−5 per cent), the United States (3.5 
per cent), and several other countries including France, Canada and Croatia accounting 
for around two per cent each. The diaspora can be divided into three groups according 
to when emigration took place: the so-called ―old emigration‖ Kosovars left Kosovo 
during the 1960s through to the 1980s (14 per cent of the total); the migrants of the 
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1990s account for 59 per cent and the remaining 27 per cent of the diaspora left Kosovo 
after the war.
748
 
The majority of migrants come from rural areas. Prizren and Prishtinë/Priština 
are the two main municipalities from which emigration takes place, followed by the 
municipalities of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Ferizaj/Uroševac, Pejë/Peć and 
Gjakovë/Dakovica – which rank among the poorest regions. Over 70 per cent of those 
receiving remittances from emigrants live in rural areas.
749
 The highest proportion of the 
population receiving remittances are in the municipalities of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and 
Prizren.
750
  
The demographic statistics of the diaspora are akin to those of Kosovo itself 
except that the gender distribution is heavily slanted towards males. While in Kosovo 
the proportion of men and women is almost equal, 65 per cent of emigrants are male 
and 35 per cent are female. This is not surprising given the economic basis of migration 
– in Kosovar society it is predominantly men who are responsible for making a living. 
The Kosovars living abroad are, like the domestic population, very young, with an 
average age of 28 years. There are also similarities in educational level.
751
 The majority 
(92 per cent) of migrants have attained no more than secondary education. This means, 
as noted by the World Bank: ―The type of migration that Kosovo has experienced so far 
cannot be qualified as a ‗brain drain‘.‖752 
The generally low level of qualifications is reflected in the type of jobs attained 
by workers in the diaspora. The large majority (82 per cent) of the diaspora are low-
skilled workers as shown in Figure 24 below.  
 
                                                 
 
748
 Forum 2015: Diaspora and Migration Policies. Prishtina 2007. pp.7. The study is based on the research 
conducted in Kosovo, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, the UK, Sweden, Austria and the US.  
749
 As noted in chapter 5.1, about 60% of Kosovans live in rural areas. 
750
 The World Bank: Statistical Office of Kosovo. Kosovo Poverty Assessment. Volume I: Accelerating 
Inclusive Growth to Reduce Widespread Poverty. October 2007. p. 32.  
751
 Compare chapter 5.2. Education.  
752
 The World Bank: Kosovo. Unlocking Growth Potential: Strategies, Policies, Actions. A Country 
Economic Memorandum. 29 April 2010. p. 76.  
  
252 
Figure 24: Employment pattern in the Kosovar diaspora, 2007 
 
              Source: Forum 2015: Diaspora and Migration Policies. Prishtina 2007. p. 33.  
Almost 39 per cent of all Kosovars working abroad are employed in 
construction, 13 per cent work in restaurants and hotels and about 13 per cent in 
manufacturing. These are the same sectors that are among the most developed in 
Kosovo. The percentage of emigrants working in sectors that are not fully developed in 
Kosovo like health, education and finance, is comparatively small (see Table 13). 
Therefore, gains from transfers of knowledge and skills by those returning from abroad 
are expected to be slight. The World Bank also notes that only eight per cent of all 
returned migrants, improved their educational level while abroad, although this applies 
to 14 per cent of female returning migrants. Only six per cent of males returned better 
qualified.
753
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     Table 13: Employment by sectors of Kosovars working abroad, 2007 
Sector 
Share of 
employed 
(%) 
Sector 
Share of 
employed 
(%) 
Construction 38.6 Health and Education  4.7 
Hotels/restaurants 13.0 Public utilities 2.3 
Production 12.7 Financial sector 2.1 
Agriculture 5.3 Public administration 1.5 
Trade 5.3 Mining 1.3 
Transport and 
communication 
5.1 Other 8.1 
      Source: Forum 2015: Diaspora and Migration Policies. Prishtina 2007. p. 32. 
The average monthly salary in the diaspora amounts to €1,700. As Table 14 
shows, well over a quarter of emigrants earn between €500 and €1,500 a month and few 
earn more than €5,000. The average family income of emigrant families is about 
€3,000. 
Table 14: Monthly earnings of Kosovar emigrants, 2007 
Monthly earnings (€) Percentage in earnings band 
500−1,500 27.04 
1,501−3,000 40.05 
3,001−5,000 20.35 
5,001−8,000 8.80 
Over 8,000 2.93 
Source: Forum 2015: Diaspora and Migration Policies. Prishtina 2007. p. 33. 
5.1.2.2 Disadvantages of the diaspora and remittances 
Remittances by emigrants make an indispensable contribution to Kosovo‘s economy 
but, as with any country experiencing large-scale emigration there are also 
disadvantages such as loss of skills and manpower. Remittances also contribute to 
growing inequalities in Kosovar society. Where migration is permanent, the emigrant‘s 
skills and manpower are irrecoverably lost by the home country. The better educated, 
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qualified and experienced the emigrant, the greater the loss, particularly where the state 
invested in the individual‘s education. 
Where migration is temporary rather than permanent, the loss of skills and 
manpower is not necessarily irrecoverable and Kosovar migration is typically 
temporary. According to surveys about 76 per cent of emigrants intend coming back to 
Kosovo, of which two-thirds state they want to return after retirement and one-third 
intends to come back earlier.
754
 The crucial factor here is the strong familial bonds in 
Kosovar society. However, since the majority plan to return after retirement and given 
the generally low skills of the diaspora already described, the potential of returnees to 
contribute in terms of human capital is rather small. 
By far the most important impact of migrants on the home country is that they 
tend to send a high proportion of their income back to Kosovo. This has both positive 
and negative connotations. While remittances make a crucial contribution to alleviating 
poverty in the country a severe disadvantage of the diaspora and its remittances is 
undoubtedly their contribution to the growing inequalities in Kosovar society. Since 
migration is itself expensive, emigrants are mainly from families that are already a little 
better off than the average and it is these families that then benefit from remittances. In 
general, the poorer households get less financial support of this kind. This is particularly 
true in rural areas where the better-off households receive considerably larger 
remittances than the poor. The difference is less in urban areas. This phenomenon 
explains the increasing wealth disparities within the population especially as between 
urban and rural areas.
755
  
5.1.2.3 Impact of remittances on poverty 
About 70 per cent of migrants send remittances to their relatives in the home country. 
The sums involved amount to about 16−17 per cent of monthly Kosovar household 
income. According to the World Bank, remittances amounted to about €500 million in 
2009 and were the largest source of external income for Kosovo.
756
 While remittances 
have helped to reduce poverty, they have not played a major role in developing the 
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economy. Only 18 per cent of households say they use the money to invest in business 
and less than ten per cent use it for education. The bulk of remittances is used for 
immediate consumption. About 90 per cent of households indicate that the main uses of 
remittances are food and clothes while 25 per cent mention house building (see Figure 
25). 
Figure 25: Use of remittances, 2009 
 
Source: The World Bank: Kosovo. Unlocking Growth Potential: Strategies, Policies, Actions.  
A Country Economic Memorandum. 29 April 2010. p. 79. 
These sums involved make a significant contribution to lowering Kosovo‘s huge 
foreign trade deficit and have some impact on the unemployment problem. However, 
where the latter is concerned, entrepreneurial activities among the diaspora are still 
inadequate. Those who do invest in Kosovo and start businesses there mainly focus on 
the construction sector and the diaspora has contributed roughly ten per cent of total 
investment in the privatization process in Kosovo. The main reason why emigrants are 
not motivated to invest more in their homeland is lack of information on business 
conditions. Other reasons given are unfavorable fiscal policies, high levels of 
corruption, and bureaucratic obstacles.
757
 Nevertheless, investment by the diaspora is 
seen as crucial to boosting Kosovo‘s weak economy, and to encourage Kosovar workers 
and potential investors living abroad to return to Kosovo, the national authorities need 
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to address the same issues, such as corruption, that deter foreign firms. Information 
campaigns about the state‘s investment potential would be particularly helpful as would 
better investment incentives for emigrants. More efficient communication and 
cooperation mechanisms are also needed if Kosovo is to benefit from the potential of 
the diaspora. 
Migration and remittances have been an effective means of insulating Kosovar 
households from the deepest levels of poverty. The proportion of the population 
receiving remittances, at some 20 per cent, is significantly higher than that receiving 
social assistance. (see Table 15), and the amounts received in remittances greatly 
exceeds social welfare payments. With 72 per cent of emigrants sending €100−1,000 to 
their relatives in Kosovo annually, and 18 per cent sending €1,000−3,000,758 the sums 
involved are about three times higher than the average value of the social protection 
programs described in the previous chapter. 
Table 15: Families receiving social assistance and remittances, 2007 
 Social assistance benefit Remittances 
Number of families  37,140 73,500 
Percent of total population 13 20 
Source: Based on Forum 2015: Diaspora and Migration Policies. Prishtina 2007. p. 39. 
The World Bank: Kosovo Poverty Assessment. Volume I: Accelerating Inclusive Growth to Reduce 
Widespread Poverty. October 2007. p. 32.  
A World Bank assessment of poverty in Kosovo finds Kosovars who report 
receiving remittances from at least one family member abroad, have higher levels of 
consumption and are less likely to be in poverty than their equivalents who do not 
benefit from emigration. The incidence of poverty among families with migrants is 
seven percentage points lower than in the general population.
759
  
Without migration, poverty in Kosovo would be considerably greater. It would 
also be even more concentrated in rural areas. Additionally, remittances are an efficient 
means of wealth transference, since they go directly to individuals without being filtered 
through inefficient bureaucracies. They also tend to respond immediately to crises 
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suffered by beneficiary families. Remittances usually increase when conditions in 
recipient countries worsen and decrease when they improve. 
In summary, migration and remittances are one of the most important sources of 
income for a significant share of Kosovo‘s population and will continue to be of utmost 
importance for the foreseeable future. The Central Bank of Kosovo notes that since the 
end of the war in 1999, the only year when migrant transfers to Kosovo fell was 2009 
(see Figure 26). This was a result of the global financial crisis, which has considerably 
affected employment in the developed countries where many Kosovar migrants are 
concentrated and consequently suffered from job cuts. The decline of migrants‘ 
transfers to €505 million currently not only has negative implication for Kosovo‘s 
economy, but also the potential to seriously aggravate the tense economic and social 
situation. 
Figure 26: Remittances to Kosovo, 2005−09 
 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo: Annual Report 2009. June 2010. pp. 53. 
Clearly the authorities need to avoid any policies entailing radical reductions in 
migration, which would have the potential to lower welfare standards in Kosovo, to 
increase the already present rural–urban inequalities, and possibly to lead to instability, 
particularly in the rural areas.
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5.1.2.4 Active migration policies toward the EU labor market  
According to the European Commission 2009 Progress Report on Kosovo, about 30,000 
young Kosovars each year enter a labor market that can offer them very limited 
prospects.
761
 Therefore, a very substantial proportion (about 50 per cent) of the 
population between the ages of 20 and 35 are currently intending to emigrate. There 
does not seem much chance of the numbers falling without an improvement in 
economic growth allowing the young and growing labor force to be absorbed. As things 
stand, labor is Kosovo‘s biggest export. Andreas Wittkowsky, former deputy head of 
the EU Pillar responsible for the economic development of Kosovo, comments on the 
―absurdity of European development policy ... shoveling millions into the country, 
while at the same time shutting down the borders for all those whose labor could 
contribute to development‖. Since the end of the war in Kosovo, says Wittkowsky, 
―Europeans block emigrants from the Balkans, who, a few decades ago, ranked 
among the favored guest-workers ... Ten-thousand Kosovo Albanian refugees 
had been sent back home by the turn of the millennium. However, short-term 
work contracts or chances for seasonal employment somewhere in the richer 
parts of Europe could help Kosovars a lot.‖762  
Besim Beqaj, president of the Kosovar Chamber of Commerce, agreed that ―regulated 
opportunities for temporary migration would give us [Kosovars] decisive backing.‖763 
This should be considered, since there will be insufficient jobs in Kosovo well into the 
future. Exploiting the opportunity of regulated temporary migration to reduce the 
pressure on Kosovo‘s labor market, would require active labor market and migration 
policies and, in particular, appropriate training and education programs in the skills 
needed in European countries. If Europe is serious about development in Kosovo, it will 
need to come up with opportunities through which Kosovars can find temporary work 
abroad. However, the alternative is to send ever more policemen to Kosovo to deal with 
a new generation of angry and desperate young men.
764
 
As things stand, the poor socio-economic conditions in Kosovo are encouraging 
illegal migration, which many individuals believe is their only way out of poverty. In 
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order to scale down illegal migration and improve opportunities for legitimate 
movement abroad, the International Organization for Migration, in close cooperation 
with Kosovo‘s Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
has established a Migrant Service Center in Prishtinë/Priština as the first of a planned 
regional network of such centers in Tirana, Podgorica, Skopje, Belgrade, Sarajevo and 
Zagreb. The Migrant Service Center aims to promote local capacity to develop 
migration policies and provide migrants and potential migrants with effective 
information, advice and referral to appropriate services. The Center also organizes 
training courses and counseling sessions on specific topics of interest, such as basic IT-
skills, internet research, curriculum vitae drafting and interview preparation.
765
  
Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, Gjergj Dedaj, is convinced that 
visa liberalization for Kosovo‘s citizens is necessary to create greater opportunities for 
Kosovars to work abroad and alleviate the country‘s very high rate of unemployment.766 
However, this seems very unlikely given that Kosovo has been excluded from the EU‘s 
visa liberalization program, which, as already discussed in chapter 4.3.3, generates anti-
EU feelings in Kosovo and reduces the government‘s incentive to make reforms.767  
As long as migration flows continue, Kosovo can count on remittances. 
However, despite the importance of migration as a mechanism for protecting welfare, a 
development strategy that is over-dependent on remittances is neither desirable nor 
sustainable. It is essential to move gradually away from over-reliance on migration and 
remittances and the same is true of social assistance: poverty cannot be eradicated 
simply by handing over benefits. The only effective strategy for mass poverty reduction 
is economic growth that generates a high level of employment. In planning the way 
forward for Kosovo, it is important to heed the call of Labor and Social Welfare Deputy 
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Minister, Gjergj Dedaj: ―Let‘s not transform Kosovo into a social state in which people 
live off social assistance [and remittances]; let‘s transform it into a place of work.‖768  
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5.2 Education  
Kosovo is committed to policies that are conducive to economic growth and in this 
regard, human capital plays a crucial role. Economic growth is a joint product of capital 
accumulation and productivity gains, and education serves as a link between these two. 
Education increases the skills of individuals and reduces the mismatch between labor 
market demands and the available supply. In Kosovo, it would also help to reduce the 
inequities in society by promoting access to the labor market by marginalized groups 
and minorities. Improving educational standards is therefore seen as one of the Kosovar 
government‘s highest priorities.769 
5.2.1 The Kosovo education system  
The education system in Kosovo was severely weakened during the 1990s when 
Albanians faced discrimination and were excluded from social institutions.
770
 As 
Slobodan Milošević stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, initiated a forced restructuring of 
public institutions and fired Albanian civil servants, schools and the University of 
Prishtina were closed to Albanian students. These and other discriminatory measures 
encouraged Albanians to create an underground education system that operated in 
parallel to the official system. About half a million young people pulled out of the 
official system – some 360,000 students from primary schools, 81,000 at secondary 
levels and 30,000 from the University of Prishtina.
771
 The unofficial system, with 
mainly Albanian subjects taught and classes held in private houses, was financed by an 
informal income tax paid by Kosovo Albanians. Eventually, the war disrupted the 
parallel as well as the formal education system and most schools were shut down. Thus, 
an entire generation suffered from educational deficiencies, resulting in the 
comparatively small number of people in Kosovo who have completed their 
education.
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 The reformation of the whole education system – school and university − which 
was started by UNMIK in June 1999, has been essential as the unofficial education 
system has left significant gaps in the curriculum, and inadequate teaching methods and 
access to information. The reform of pre-university education was carried out in two 
main stages: the emergency phase and the development phase. The main goal of the 
emergency phase, between 1999 and the end of 2002 was simply to get education going 
again. UNMIK initially focused mainly on fighting immediate problems rather than 
developing a long-term education strategy. First measures included the reconstruction of 
school infrastructure and the provision of basic facilities in order to start classes. The 
education sector, however, was not initially given top priority by the international 
administration. A large amount of the money earmarked for education was spent on 
infrastructure but spending on teachers‘ wages and advanced training for teachers 
remained low.
773
 Besides reconstruction and stabilization of the education system, there 
were efforts in areas such as teachers‘ training and europeanization of higher education 
as well as drafting, approving and implementing new laws and regulations.  
During the second − development − phase between 2003 and 2007, the Ministry 
of Education, Science and Technology, responsible for the oversight of education 
services in Kosovo, undertook a wide range of reforms – some of them still ongoing. 
These focused on the development of educational policies; a new curricular framework 
for pre-school, primary and secondary education; teacher training; modern teaching 
methods; human rights perspectives and vocational education as well as drafting and 
preparing new text books. An outstanding government concern is to create facilities for 
children not currently enrolled in primary schools, such as those with special needs and 
from minority communities. Therefore, a strategy for integration and empowering of 
Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in Kosovo was developed for the years 
2007−2017.  
Another major item on the reform agenda was implementing a new education 
structure, which was completed in school year 2006−07.774 Before the reform, 
compulsory education in Kosovo lasted eight years, following a 4+4 model. It now lasts 
for nine years with the starting age lowered from seven to six years of age and with a 
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5+4+3/4 system. This reform brought the Kosovo school system into line with most EU 
countries.  
Figure 27 illustrates the structure of the current education system. This consists 
of pre-school education, from nine months to six years, compulsory education organized 
in five academic years of primary, and four academic years of low-secondary education, 
and upper-secondary education that lasts either three or four academic years.  
Preschool education, which is not mandatory in Kosovo, consists of kindergarten 
for children aged between nine months and five years old and pre-primary for children 
between five and six years old. 
Upper Secondary Education (ages from 15−18 years), also not compulsory, lasts 
for three or four years depending on the educational program set by the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology. Students can choose between ―general‖ secondary 
education (high schools) and vocational secondary schools. ―General‖ secondary 
education largely aims to develop students‘ academic skills and prepare them for 
university education, while vocational schools prepare students for work or continuing 
studies at Universities of Applicative Sciences.
775
 
The informal education sector consists of eight public Vocational Training 
Centers (VTCs), which are under the umbrella of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Welfare, as well as a number of courses provided by NGOs and private organizations 
for various groups including disabled persons. The latter are unattached to any ministry 
and their certificates, unlike those of the VTCs, are not recognized by the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology or any other government body. VTCs are also 
responsible for providing free training programs for job seekers who are beyond 
compulsory school age. However, as mentioned in chapter 5.1.1.3, the current capacity 
of VTCs is very limited in relation to the prevailing unemployment rate. It is estimated 
that these centers can give training to fewer than two per cent of newly registered job 
seekers each year.
776
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Figure 27: Structure of Kosovo‟s education system 
 
Source: Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology: Review on Statistics of Education in 
Kosovo 2004/05. Prishtina 2005. p. 6. 
5.2.2 Indicators of educational outcomes 
Education is a major component of welfare and is taken to evaluate the quality of life as 
well as the economic development of a country. The indicators of educational outcomes 
discussed below – literacy, school enrollment and access to education – describe the 
current situation in Kosovo and the background against which the current reforms are 
being implemented.  
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Given that Kosovo‘s population is very young, with 46 per cent below the age of 
19,
777
 its education system is more than usually important to the development of society. 
As mentioned in chapter 3.1, the education index, measuring educational attainment, is 
one of the three main indices on which the overall HDI is based. It is calculated from 
adult literacy rates and the combined gross enrollment ratio for primary, secondary and 
tertiary schooling, and weighted to put the emphasis on adult literacy.
778
 According to 
UNDP, its approximate value is based on 2006 data on attendance in primary, 
secondary and university education. As Figure 28 shows, Kosovo, with an education 
index of 0.883, ranks higher than the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Turkey in the Balkan region.  
         Figure 28: Education Index in the Balkan region, 2006 
 
          Source: UNDP Kosovo: Energy for Development. Kosovo Human Development Report 2007. p. 4. 
Literacy 
Illiteracy is a major dimension of poverty that restricts individuals‘ ability to access 
essential information and to understand and adapt to a fast changing world. Kosovo‘s 
overall illiteracy rate at 5.8 per cent is relatively high but has been declining over recent 
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years from 11.9 per cent in 1991 and 6.5 per cent in 2000.
779
 As shown in Figure 29 
below, illiteracy is strongly correlated with age and is consistently higher among 
women in all age groups. However, among younger people the difference between male 
and female illiteracy has almost disappeared. While the level of illiteracy is about 0.5 
per cent among those under 26 years old, it reaches 49 per cent among the over 65s.
780
 
Among women between the ages of 65 and 69 the illiteracy level exceeds 50 per cent, 
while the corresponding figure for males is a little over ten per cent. Such a difference 
in literacy levels between old and young is a potential source of inter-generational 
tension as it lessens the ability of older people to understand the lifestyles and ambitions 
of the younger generation. 
Figure 29: Illiteracy by age and gender, 2004 
 
Source: Statistical Office of Kosovo: Literacy in Kosovo. 2004. p. 1. 
Not only are people in rural areas poorer, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
they are also worse-off in terms of literacy than urban areas. Almost 14 per cent of 
women living in rural areas are defined as illiterate, while male illiteracy is 4.0 per 
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cent.
781
 While urban males receive the most education, rural females receive the least. 
There are also differences between ethnic groups. It is estimated that the highest 
illiteracy rates are among minorities other than Serb.  
In summary, educational attainment among Kosovars varies widely and the 
following educational pattern can be identified: on average, a Kosovar has roughly ten 
years of education, but the rural population lags behind urban dwellers, women behind 
men and non-Serb ethnic minorities behind Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs.
782
 
This pattern emphasizes yet again the pervasive inequalities within Kosovo society.  
School enrollment and access to education 
Apart from literacy, two other education performance indicators are school enrollment 
and access to education. The numbers of children/students at various levels of education 
in the school years from 2004−05 to 2008−09 are given in Table 16.  
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Table 16: Students by educational level 
All students (female students) by educational level 
 2004−05 2005−06 2006−07 2007−08 2008−09 
Pre-school 
5,904 
(2,868) 
5,108 
(2,579) 
5,051 
(2,363) 
 
24,864 
(n/a) 
5,091 
(2,338) 
Pre-primary 
17,596 
(8,384) 
20,750 
(9,961) 
21,089 
(10,203) 
19,679 
(9,283) 
Primary & lower 
secondary 
327,207 
(156,566) 
322,180 
(154,728) 
324,618 
(156,210) 
325,544  
(n/a) 
322,975 
(153,669) 
Upper secondary 
60,760 
(30,820) 
74,781 
(32,202) 
88,691 
(38,581) 
91,536 
(n/a)  
96,172 
(43,295) 
TOTAL 
411,467 
(198,638) 
422,819 
(199,470) 
439,449 
(207,357) 
441,944  
(n/a) 
443,917 
(208,585) 
Source: Based on Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology: Indicators and Statistical data 
in Education. Data School Years 2004/05, 2005/06, 2006/07. Prishtina 2008. p. 102. 
Data for 2007−08 were taken from Statistical Office of Kosovo: Education Statistics 2007−2008. 
Prishtina 2009. p. 97. Data for 2008−09 were taken from Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 
of Kosovo: Shënime Statistikore 2008/09. Arsimi Publik Parauniversitar. p. 2. Online via Internet: URL: 
http://www.masht-gov.net/advCms/documents/Arsimi_publik_parauniversitar_2008-09.pdf  [accessed 13 
01 2010]. 
In Kosovo the pre-school education system is almost nonexistent, with pre-
school institutions accounting for only 40 of the country‘s overall total of 1,123 
schools.
783
 The second Millennium Development Goals Report for Kosovo indicates 
that only about 11.8 per cent of children in 2004−05 had access to pre-school education. 
The majority of existing kindergartens and pre-schools are located in urban areas. Since 
state-provided early childhood education services did not exist in rural areas before the 
war, there is still little awareness of the concept or processes of early learning.  
The situation is considerably more encouraging where basic education is 
concerned. Not only is the number of schools considerably higher, with 969 primary 
and lower secondary schools and 108 upper secondary schools, but also attendance is 
much more satisfactory, with a very high enrollment rate. Figures from such 
organizations as the World Bank, UNDP and UNICEF indicate near-universal primary 
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school enrollment for the Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb communities, with 97.5 
per cent and 99 per cent respectively. However, rates are significantly lower for children 
from non-Serb minority groups with only 77 per cent of children in the age group six to 
14 enrolled in school. Here, gender inequalities are even more distressing with only 69 
per cent of girls from non-Serb minorities enrolled.
784
 
The gender structure at pre-school, pre-primary, primary and lower secondary 
level is about in line with the general population, which is approximately 48 per cent 
female and 52 per cent male. At the upper secondary level, around 45 per cent of 
students are female and 55 per cent of students are male (compare Table 16).  
Enrollment rates for upper secondary education have increased considerably 
over recent years, but, unlike at the primary and lower secondary levels, they continue 
to be inadequate. Fewer than 75 per cent of children who complete compulsory 
education sign up for upper secondary school while less than 55 per cent of Kosovo 
Albanian girls , and only about 40 per cent of girls from non-Serb minority communities 
continue their education at this level.
785
 This is partly due to traditional customs, 
particularly in rural areas. The lack of schools oriented towards minority language 
groups has also had a negative impact on enrollment rates for minorities. 
 The following figure demonstrates the substantial drop of enrollment rates at 
upper secondary level.  
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    Figure 30: Number of children/students by education level, 2008−09 
 
Source: Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Kosovo: Shënime 
Statistikore 2008/09. Arsimi Publik Parauniversitar. p. 2. 
Poverty is an important factor impeding enrollment of young people in upper 
secondary education. According to 2006 World Bank data, while about 84 per cent of 
better-off young people continue their education to this level, only 71 per cent of the 
poor are enrolled.
786
 
Apart from poverty and general lack of motivation, the poor conditions of the 
learning facilities are another deterrent to students and a particular problem is that they 
can be faced with a long and often arduous commute to get to the nearest upper 
secondary school. This problem is augmented by the general lack of transport, 
particularly in rural areas. Yet another reason for the high student drop-out rates at this 
level can be traced to the perception of some parents that schooling does not bring any 
important advantages. Kosovars in general do not believe that education is of prime 
importance in getting a job; surveys have shown that family connections are considered 
the most important factor here. The ability to bribe potential employers and, after these, 
vocational training, are also considered as important as formal education at least where 
employment in the public sector is concerned.
787
 These factors all mean that much 
needs to be done to increase uptake of upper secondary education in the next few years. 
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5.2.3 Weaknesses of the Kosovo education system and its reforms 
The inauguration of Enver Hoxhaj as Minister for Education, Science and Technology 
in January 2008 was expected to give a substantial boost to education. Hoxhaj, who has 
been educated in Austria, is deeply convinced of the importance of education as an 
impetus for social change and holds that educational reform is Kosovo‘s most 
fundamental requirement:  
―For the Government of Kosovo, education is defined as a state priority of the 
first order and which should be decisive for Kosovo. The second priority is that 
we see education as an economic priority and not as a social policy as it was in 
the past. The third priority, a major goal for us as a government, is all inclusive 
primary and secondary education.‖788  
However, the impact of the recent investments, measures and reforms will only be felt 
in the medium- and long-term, and, while the decision to establish education as a 
national priority is important, there are still major weaknesses in the education system. 
5.2.3.1 Pre-university education  
Due to the long phase of institutional disruption and conflict in Kosovo the education 
system faces a long recovery process to bring standards up to European levels. The 
system remains caught between various reforms and hampered by institutional 
infighting, while Serb parallel structures pose the biggest challenge. Just as the Kosovo 
Albanians introduced an informal education system in the 1990s, a decade later the 
Kosovo Serbs decided to have their own educational system, and education in the 
country is again divided into two separate worlds. Since the Kosovo Serb community 
does not want to integrate into the Kosovo education system, Kosovo Serb children 
continue to pursue their studies in their own language according to the Serbian 
curriculum, textbooks and other materials. Differences are huge: while Kosovo Serb 
students are taught that Kosovo still belongs to Serbia, Kosovo Albanian students are 
taught that Kosovo is now an independent state. The Serb government in Belgrade does 
not only provide the Serb schools‘ curricula but also the teachers‘ salaries. Therefore, 
Kosovo Serb teachers draw double salaries; one from the Kosovo Ministry of 
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Education, Science and Technology and the other from the Serbian ministry. This is a 
hangover from the policy of paying salary supplements and other bonuses to Serbian 
public sector workers introduced by Milošević after the war as an incentive to Serbs to 
remain in Kosovo. But this approach has become increasingly difficult to continue 
given the severe budgetary constraints caused by the global economic crisis. Belgrade 
has been forced to cut back, further reducing its influence and control. The International 
Crisis Group reports that at its peak in 2006−07, Serbian aid to Kosovo reached about 
€500 million annually, most of which was spent on salaries, pensions, social schemes 
and capital expenses. Serbia‘s financial support is now estimated to have fallen to 
between €200 and €230 million per year, and of that between €110 and €130 million 
goes to the north.
789
 In any event, such financial inducements do not entail a sustainable 
future for Serbs in Kosovo. Belgrade funding for the educational needs of the Serbs may 
imply jobs for Serbian teachers, but it does not produce conditions that would 
encourage young Serbs to remain in Kosovo. Once they graduate, many leave for 
Serbia. The long-term future of Serbs in Kosovo can only be secured through 
integration into Kosovo institutions and society.
790
 
However, two years after Kosovo‘s independence, the Serbs remain unwilling to 
integrate into the Kosovo education system because they are afraid that this would be 
seen as recognizing Kosovo‘s independence. Diploma recognition is at the core of the 
problem. For Belgrade, recognition of diplomas issued by Kosovo‘s Ministry of 
Education would indicate acceptance of independence. 
The existence of a Serb parallel system in education, as well as other fields such 
as healthcare, welfare, local governance and infrastructure, is a major source of 
fragmentation in the system and ethnic tensions generated by this situation often take on 
political connotations, particularly in debates over public funding. It is important to note 
that Kosovo Serbs consider their structures as being no more ―parallel‖ than those of the 
Kosovo Albanians. The following statement by a Kosovo Serb illustrates their views:  
―I wouldn‘t agree with the term parallel structure. Maybe we are parallel, but if 
we take the fact that Kosovo proclaimed independence without agreement of the 
United Nations Security Council, they‘re also parallel, according to international 
law. So in this way somehow we are both irregular; they see us as parallel 
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institutions and we see them as transitional until the United Nations recognizes 
them. They are not a state and I think, or I hope, they will never be recognized 
by the United Nations, so as I see it we are both irregular.‖791  
Whatever the different interpretations of the term, the impact of parallel 
structures are felt by everybody – regardless of ethnicity − in the same way. The parallel 
system provokes further ethnic division and the disruption of Kosovo‘s society. As long 
as Kosovo Serbs and Albanians do not live, work and go to school with each other, 
Kosovo‘s long-term stability will be threatened.  
To some extent, Kosovo Albanians blame the international community for 
keeping these parallel structures alive and thus creating estrangement instead of 
harmonization between the two communities.  
―Education has never been the international community‘s concern. They are here 
to make politics and not help improve the education and the well-being of the 
people. Education, healthcare, social welfare and infrastructure were rarely part 
of their daily agenda. Why would internationals suspend Serb parallel 
structures? When it comes to dealing with Serbs, internationals say: Kosovo is 
an independent country and must be able to extend full control over its 
territory.‖792  
In this regard, one of the recommendations of the International Crisis Group to the 
international community is:  
―The EU should use its leverage over Serbia, as a would-be member, to insist 
that it act constructively in Kosovo, cease support for parallel structures and not 
oppose Serb integration into Kosovo structures.‖793  
As the most international organizations can do in this area is be supportive, Kosovo‘s 
future political and economic stability is now up to the governments in 
Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade, which are strongly encouraged to find a compromise on 
this and many more issues. Most citizens, however, find themselves caught in a political 
game between the two governments. This political seesawing on many issues arouses 
some strong feelings of resentment towards the government, which people feel does not 
really care about their basic needs. Despite many ongoing reforms, regulations and 
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laws, people sense that the government is not taking them seriously because they cannot 
see and feel any changes in their daily lives. The following view is prevalent:  
―The biggest problem that Kosovo is facing is the extremely bad governance; the 
political leaders simply do not care about the problems and concerns of the 
population. The only thing they care about is money: how to become richer and 
richer. The only time they turn to the people is at elections. After that they mind 
their own business. They simply serve themselves and not the people.‖794  
The thought-provoking fact is that the UNDP‘s recommendations on the parallel 
system in its 2006 Human Development Report and in Kosovo‘s Internal Security 
Sector Review, still apply today − four years later:  the education system for all 
employees and students needs to be unified by disbanding parallel systems and 
developing synergies. The entire Kosovo education system needs to focus more on 
integration rather than division. Integration of Kosovo Serbs into the official Kosovo 
system would help to improve interethnic relations and increase social cohesion.
795
 
Without educational reform and without some movement toward reconciliation in the 
classroom, the long-term stability of Kosovo as a state as well as the chances of 
successful economic development will probably remain tenuous at best. 
The educational sector faces other numerous and serious problems. The 
weaknesses, at both pre-university and higher education levels include poor quality 
teaching due to the shortage of well qualified academic staff and low teacher salaries, 
lack of adequate infrastructure and resources and budgetary constraints.
796
 Many 
teachers are not adequately qualified for the job. The Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology reports that about 18 per cent of teachers are under-qualified at pre-
school level, 17 per cent at primary and lower secondary levels and as many as 24 per 
cent at upper secondary level.
797
 Teachers‘ motivation is severely reduced by low 
salaries and the inadequate career system. Insufficient teacher training programs to 
include all teachers and the shallowness of these courses are some of the concerns that 
need to be addressed urgently. There is also a crucial task ahead to raise the status of the 
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teaching profession to improve the quality of teaching. Teaching is further hampered by 
insufficient textbooks and other learning materials and equipment.  
The condition of educational infrastructure varies between urban and rural areas. 
The massive relocation of the population from rural to urban areas over recent years has 
resulted in a surplus of primary school capacity in rural areas and an insufficiency in 
cities. In urban areas, high student numbers meant that most schools until recently 
operated in multiple shifts, which clearly had a negative effect on pupils given the 
reduced hours in the classroom. However, the situation has improved slightly as of 
September 2009, when all schools started to operate a maximum of two shifts. Serious 
problems still continue with sanitary facilities and water quality in schools especially in 
rural areas.  
To overcome such problems, the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology, has developed the ―Strategy for Development of Pre-University Education 
in Kosovo 2007−2017‖. It aims at:  
―Building an inclusive education system that offers conditions for quality 
education and training for all individuals by promoting lifelong learning habits 
and values of democratic citizenship.‖798  
The strategy defines seven objectives to be achieved in pre-university education by 
2017:
799
 
1. High quality and efficient governance, leadership, and management of the 
education system  
2. A functional system for providing quality learning based on standards 
comparable with those of the developed countries 
3. All-inclusiveness, equity, and respect of diversity in education 
4. An effective system of in-service and pre-service training of the teaching staff 
5. An adequate and healthy physical environment for teaching and learning 
6. A sustainable connection between education and general social and economic 
development 
7. Advancing the financial position of education   
                                                 
 
798
 Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology: Strategy for Development of Pre-University 
Education in Kosovo 2007−2017. p. 9.  
799
 Ibid. p. 10.  
  
276 
Key objectives of the strategy are to increase access and enrollment in light of 
demographic changes and improve the quality of education by addressing issues related 
to teachers‘ salaries. The strategy aims to raise enrollment rates to 90 per cent at the pre-
primary level, 100 per cent at the compulsory primary and lower secondary level and 85 
per cent at the upper secondary level by 2017.
800
 These targets are challenging, though 
not impossible to reach, but they require improved demographic data – in particular 
through holding a population census – in order to make more accurate estimates of the 
number of additional schools that must be provided. Improvements in the quality of 
education have so far been impeded by inadequate teachers‘ salaries. However the 
teachers‘ wages fund was increased in 2009 by an additional €4.5 million.801 The extent 
to which this will change the situation remains to be seen. 
5.2.3.2 Higher education  
Partly because of the ―lost education period‖ of 1990−99, only about 13 per cent of 
Kosovars between 25 and 64 years old have completed higher education. This is less 
than in any other Balkan country.
802
 Although there has been a steady increase in 
students at higher education facilities, enrollment rates are still very low. 
Higher education in Kosovo is currently provided by two public universities, 
which, like the rest of the education system are ethnically segregated. The University of 
Prishtina enrolls mainly Albanian students and the University of Mitrovica, which 
operates as an unofficial offshoot of the Serbian University system under the authority 
of Belgrade, enrolls mainly Serbs. In 2004, the University of Mitrovica was requested to 
integrate into the Kosovo legal framework but refused to do so.  
 The University of Prishtina recorded about 28,757 students in undergraduate 
studies and 2,118 in postgraduate studies in 2007−08. Approximately 3,000 students 
obtain bachelor or master‘s degrees at the university each year.803 It is divided into 17 
faculties, each with a legally autonomous status and administrative structure – unlike 
most European universities. There are also some private institutions, now called 
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colleges, where the number of students has increased particularly rapidly with a total of 
20,128 registered students over the period 2004−05 to 2007−08.804 
Despite reforms, severe weaknesses still prevail in the higher education system: 
academic freedom has not been officially restricted, but appointments at the University 
of Prishtina are considered to be highly politicized.  The continuing ethnic segregation 
is also a problem and the overall capacity of the system is inadequate to meet demand 
from applicants. The ratio of applicants to accommodated students at the University of 
Prishtina is three to one, which means that two-thirds of young people interested in 
pursuing higher education must to give up their ambition because other options are too 
expensive. 
This situation should improve with the opening of a new university in Prizren in 
October 2010. This is seen as a great step forward because, as well as enlarging the 
capacity of higher education generally, it will provide the first chance of a university 
education to young people in the region around Prizren who can not afford to travel 
further afield.  
Another problem is that higher education is not immune from corruption. 
Students of all ethnic communities hold that the allocation of university places is based 
less on applicants‘ knowledge or application criteria than on their having the right 
connections or, even more importantly, paying bribes. These are said to be needed not 
only at the applications stage, but throughout the whole duration of study. According to 
the UNDP Early Warning survey, the education sector – although not as severely 
affected as the energy provider KEK − ranks among the institutions where ―large-scale‖ 
corruption is perceived to be present.
805
  
As at the pre-university level, the quality of education at university level is poor.  
As outlined in the UNDP Human Development Report, a large number of students are 
convinced that those who graduate abroad are better prepared than those of the 
University of Prishtina. Moreover, business community representatives state that the 
quality of today‘s students, whether at public or private universities, does not meet their 
requirements.
806
 The recent USAID report on workforce development also notes that 
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employers complain about university graduates‘ poor preparation for the world of work 
as well as about the qualifications of the teaching staff.
807
  
Another weak point is the undetermined quality of the private education 
institutions that have mushroomed in Kosovo over recent years. In order to improve the 
quality of higher education and move towards compliance with EU standards, the 
Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology has worked on an accreditation 
process. In January 2008 the Kosovo government asked the British Accreditation 
Council to evaluate the private universities. Its conclusion was that not one of them 
should retain the status of university. The Kosovo Accreditation Project Report 
indicated that of the 30 private higher education providers, none except the American 
University in Kosovo meets the criteria to be accredited or licensed to confer academic 
qualifications. The second phase of accreditation, which included 50 international 
experts from different European countries, was concluded in July 2009. This confirmed 
the institutional accreditation of the University of Prishtina and six private colleges.
808
 
However, at the same time new problems arose as the term ―college‖ is not yet defined 
by the Law on Higher Education in Kosovo (2002/3), which is currently under review.  
A comprehensive reform program is now underway to address the weaknesses of 
the higher educational sector: the ―Strategy for Development of Higher Education in 
Kosovo 2005−2015‖. This ten-year strategy hopes for:  
―Kosova – A democratic society, integrated into the European Higher Education 
Area, where knowledge and scientific research have a particular role and 
importance for enduring and long-term cultural, social and economic 
development.‖809  
In order to achieve this, the strategy aims at:  
―The development of an efficient system of higher education that will contribute 
to increasing the wellbeing of Kosovar society by offering high quality 
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education and research, with equal opportunities for all, in accordance with the 
values of freedom, democracy and diversity.‖810  
The strategy makes clear which areas particularly need improvement by defining 
six main objectives for the fulfillment of the mission:
811
  
1. Elaborating and implementing a contemporary and all-inclusive education policy 
and finalizing higher education legislation 
2. Advancing management and coordination in higher education 
3. Developing the management of higher education quality 
4. Advancing the capacity for research and scientific work 
5. Establishing mechanisms for the provision and efficient management of 
financial resources for higher education development  
6. Developing a complete and functional infrastructure for higher education  
Given the current indicators of educational outcomes discussed above, the 
achievement of the strategy‘s objectives will clearly be difficult. Key to success is the 
availability of essential financial and human resources.  
Recent recommendations for achieving reform made by the Commission of the 
European Communities in its Kosovo 2009 Progress Report are that the pace of 
institutional and legal reforms must be stepped up, better coordinated and translated into 
practice. Further, central and local teaching capacity has to be notably improved. 
Significant efforts are also needed to increase participation in education and to set up a 
system to monitor the quality of the education provided.
812
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5.2.4 Investing in education 
―Investment in education is investing in the future of the country‘s safety and the 
citizens‘ safety for real economic development; for creating new jobs and our 
children to grow with standards equal to all children in the democratic world,‖813  
Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi stated during the inauguration of a new elementary school 
in Suharekë/Suva Reka in September 2009.  
The Kosovo education system is funded from the following sources: (i) the 
central budget, both directly and through targeted transfers to municipalities; (ii) 
revenues generated by municipal governments; (iii) international donors through a 
consolidated Public Investment Program as well as other projects; (iv) parents‘ 
contributions; (v) student fees; and (vi) transfers from Belgrade to Kosovo Serbian 
education facilities. The Kosovo Consolidated Budget is by far the largest source, 
accounting for more than 97 per cent of education funding.
814
 
Since the government has identified education as a priority for its social and 
economic development, it is committed to expand inter-ministerial cooperation and to 
invest more resources in this sector (some €170 million for the period 2009−11).815 
Table 17 shows the projected budget of the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology as presented in the latest (January 2010) budget report by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. 
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Table 17: Budget of the Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 
2009−12  
Budget of the Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2009−12  
 2009 
(SAR)
816
 
2010 
Budget 
2011 
(Estimate) 
2012 
(Estimate) 
Operational Expenditures (€) 6,520,373 11,446,111 9,242,436 9,307,170 
Capital Expenditures (€) 45,794,549 24,490,147 29,600,272 29,535,538 
TOTAL (€) 52,314,922 35,936,258 38,842,708 38,842,708 
No. of employees 955 995 995 995 
Source: Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance: Budget of the Republic of Kosovo for the Year 2010. 
January 2010. p. 35. Online via Internet: URL: http://mef-rks.org/download/kosovo-consolidated-
budget/2255-2010?lang=en [accessed 24 02 2010]. 
As shown in Figure 31, the composition of the government‘s spending has 
undergone some significant changes during the period of 2005−08. 
Figure 31: Composition of expenditure by government function, 2005−08 
 
Source: Based on the Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance: Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
2009−2011. Prishtina 2008. pp. 25.  
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While in 2005 and especially in 2006 ―General public services‖ took the largest 
proportion of government spending, accounting for 24.0 per cent of the total in 2006, in 
2007 spending in this area fell to 18.8 per cent of the total with more funds diverted to 
―Economic Affairs‖ and ―Education‖. The second largest share of expenditure in 
2005−07 was allocated to ―Economic Affairs‖, which covers energy and mining, 
transport, telecommunications and agriculture. In 2005, this category accounted for 19.4 
per cent of total expenditure, decreasing to 15.7 per cent in 2006, but rising to 18.6 per 
cent in 2007 and shooting up to 34 per cent in 2008.  
One of the current challenges facing the government of Kosovo is ensuring an 
efficient and well-targeted social welfare service. During 2008, spending on ―Social 
Protection‖ accounted for 14.1 per cent of total expenditures which compares with 17.9 
per cent and 19.3 per cent in 2007 and 2006 respectively. 
―Education‖ is the fourth largest area of spending after ―Economic Affairs‖, 
―General public services‖ and ―Social Protection‖. While spending on ―Education‖ 
showed a gradual rise between 2005−07, it declined to around ten per cent in 2008.  
Spending on ―Public order and safety‖ decreased to 7.5 per cent of total 
expenditure in 2008 from 11.3 per cent in 2007. Spending on ―Health‖ took a consistent 
share of total spending across the 2005−07 period of just over ten per cent but also 
decreased to 7.1 per cent in 2008. 
In comparison with other countries
817
 that have been surveyed by the World 
Bank, Kosovo tends to overspend in some areas and underspend in others. In particular, 
Kosovo spends substantially higher amounts on ―General public services‖ and 
―Economic Affairs‖ than do other countries while it spends less on other areas including 
―Education‖ as well as ―Health‖ and ―Social Protection‖.818  
Kosovo‘s heavy spending in ―Economic Affairs‖ mainly reflects the need for 
substantial investment on infrastructure, in particular for transportation and energy. 
Within ―Economic Affairs‖, transport accounts for a substantial 14.8 per cent of the 
budget mainly reflecting road reconstruction and building, while energy and mining 
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took an even higher 16.5 per cent of the total budget reflecting the sector‘s urgent need 
for modernization.
819
 
Despite the government‘s lip service to the importance of education, it spends 
considerably less of its budget on this area than comparable countries. The Strategic 
Environment Review and Security Threat Analysis published by the Kosovar Institute 
for Policy Research and Development in 2006 came to the following conclusion: 
―Education remains a significant challenge in Kosovo and currently insufficient 
attention is being paid to its reform.‖820 While the government says that reform is now 
being put in hand, no more than modest progress can be reported so far. To transform 
Kosovo‘s education system, it is not enough to identify the necessary policies and issues 
in theory; they must be effectively put into practice. The current challenge is to 
coordinate the various measures being taken and monitor the strategies‘ implementation 
closely. Additionally, to accomplish the vision of a future Kosovar society fully 
integrated into European processes, greater efforts need to be made to change popular 
perceptions of education. One of the most important things – which is often paid 
insufficient attention – is raising awareness of the importance of education among 
children and, in particular, among the vast number of parents who did not benefit from 
an adequate education due to the disruptions of the war. It is not enough for the decision 
makers to be aware of the importance of education for Kosovo‘s future; the general 
population must also be persuaded. An education system that contributes to economic 
growth and provides better opportunities for all citizens of Kosovo can only be 
implemented by informing as well as involving the local population in the 
transformation process. 
Currently, Kosovars – in particular the young people − are experiencing some, 
but still far too little, benefit from the reform measures which are mostly on paper thus 
far. Most people continue to be dissatisfied with educational provision. It is obvious that 
as long as this core function of the state is inadequate, public confidence in state 
institutions will be undermined, providing fertile ground for social upheaval to grow. 
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5.3 Health 
Healthcare is one of the most important factors influencing public welfare, having a 
considerable impact on both social and economic development. A healthy population is 
essential to sustaining economic growth. The available indicators suggest that 
healthcare in Kosovo is, by a wide margin, poorer than in neighboring countries, 
particularly those in the EU, resulting in generally poor standards of health and well-
being in the country.  
5.3.1 Indicators of health outcomes 
Life expectancy and infant mortality rate are two of the best indicators of the overall 
health status of a population. Kosovo‘s life expectancy821 is the lowest in the region at 
only 69 years, compared with approximately 79 years in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 78 
years in Albania, 75 years in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 74 years 
in Serbia.
822
  
Kosovo also has very poor indicators of maternal and child health. The statistics 
for infants from birth through the first year of life are particularly distressing. Child and 
infant mortality are considered to be the most intractable issues impeding Kosovo‘s 
development. About 35,000 children are born in the country each year.
823
 The infant 
mortality rate is estimated to be between 35 and 49 per 1,000 live births, while the 
perinatal mortality rate
824
 is estimated at 23 per 1,000, and the mortality rate among 
under-fives is 69 per 1,000. Again, these rates are considerably higher than those of 
neighboring countries. Additionally, although more than 95 per cent of mothers give 
birth in a health facility, maternal mortality is high, estimated at seven per 100,000 live 
births.
825
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Immunization rates are currently over 90 per cent, however due to low 
awareness, parents tend to delay some of the vaccines. Immunization remains 
particularly low among Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities.
826
 
Other health outcome indicators that raise concerns relate to malnutrition, 
tuberculosis, disability and mental health. Inadequate nutrition is a particular problem 
that affects a relatively large number of children in Kosovo, with five per cent 
considered malnourished. Further, one in three children under the age of five suffers 
from vitamin A deficiency and two out of ten children have stunted growth.
827
 
Data on the health status of older children, young people, adults and elderly 
people in Kosovo is very limited. However, available figures indicate that tuberculosis 
and disability rank among the major problems. Although the occurrence of tuberculosis 
has decreased, it is still far above the average among western European countries. 
Between five and 7.5 per cent of the overall population and 50 per cent of the 
population over 65 suffers from some kind of disability. Mental health problems are 
also prevalent, and not just among the older generation. Young people are particularly 
affected due to traumas experienced during the conflict, the high risk of social exclusion 
and the general frustration and despair.
828
  
In addition, environmental pollution and contamination, as well as high tobacco 
use, pose serious health risks to the population. Cancer is a growing health problem and 
according to healthcare staff, the number of people suffering from cancer, tumors and 
birth defects increased significantly after the war. The reason for that is believed to be 
not just high tobacco use, but also the effects of the depleted uranium that NATO used 
in its 78-day air campaign in 1999.
829
 In July 2000, NATO provided the UN with a 
detailed map indicating sites where depleted uranium munitions had been used and 
acknowledged that 31,000 rounds of depleted uranium – about ten tons of the munitions 
– had been used during about 112 attacks. Depleted uranium-tipped weapons were used 
west of the Pejë/Peć−Gjakovë/Dakovica−Prizren highway, around the town of 
Klinë/Klina, around Prizren and north of Suharekë/Suva Reka and Ferizaj/Uroševac, all 
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densely populated areas.
830
 Although opinions differ over whether the depleted 
uranium-rounds present a significant health and environmental hazard, it is obvious that 
NATO air raids substantially added to pollution in the whole area after dozens of oil 
refineries, petrochemical plants and factories were destroyed. Unexploded mines are 
also a potential hazard left over from the war. 
Kosovo‘s environment has not only been damaged by years of pollution, but also 
by neglect and impunity. Environmental quality is far below European Union standards. 
Lack of industrial and urban waste collection, a low level of water recycling, illegal 
logging, inadequate urban and industrial planning and a very low public awareness of 
environmental issues all contribute to the sad state of affairs.
831
 Air pollution and heavy 
metal pollution are alarming, in particular lead pollution in the municipality of 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, which has one of the highest blood lead levels in the world. Most 
of the industrial pollution comes from Kosovo‘s power plants which are estimated to 
generate 25 tons of ash and dust per hour, or 74 times the level permitted by EU 
standards.
832
 Water pollution is also a serious problem. Poor drinking water quality is a 
major health threat, particularly in rural areas. Only 64 per cent of the population has 
access to clean water. On average less than 50 per cent of households are connected to 
public sewage and in rural areas this figure falls to around seven per cent.
833
 In 2003, 70 
per cent of water samples taken from rural areas were bacteriologically contaminated 
although the figure is a less daunting eight per cent in urban areas. Chemical 
contamination was found in 46 per cent of rural samples and four per cent of urban 
water samples.
834
 All these problems have led to visible degradation of the environment, 
in some cases irreparable, which has a directly negative impact on the health of the 
population. The European Commission‘s 2009 Progress Report on Kosovo notes that 
while Kosovo is at an early stage of aligning with European environmental standards 
and the capacity of the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning and related 
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institutions remains limited, some progress is being made.
835
 However, this evaluation 
is far too optimistic. That only 0.5 per cent of the Kosovo budget is allocated for 
―environmental protection‖ shows how much importance the Kosovo government really 
attaches to the country‘s environment.836 
Kosovo, like other low-income countries, is also likely to be particularly 
vulnerable to pandemics due to the increase in global transportation, as well as 
urbanization, overcrowded living conditions and already strained healthcare 
resources.
837
 
Yet another problem is the growing incidence of sexually transmitted infections 
that has been observed in the country since 1999 partly due to the expanding 
commercial sex industry. The incidence of HIV/AIDS, though it is currently low, is 
likely to rise for this reason as well as the more risky sexual behavior among young 
people and the rise in injecting drug use which is often the initial cause of HIV/AIDS 
spread. The recording of HIV/AIDS in Kosovo started in 1986. Since then, fewer than 
100 cases have been registered in the country, but the real number of individuals 
infected is likely to be higher. It is estimated that there are four new cases per year.
838
 
The high population growth and the very youthful population will put increasing 
pressure on the health sector. Kosovo‘s demographic characteristics make it particularly 
necessary to invest in preventive care particularly among young people. Currently, 
budgetary resources are focused on programs like curative care and drug administration 
programs, while there is too little spent on preventive and primary healthcare so far. 
Given these poor health indicators, it is obvious that Kosovo needs to make 
considerable strides in improving basic healthcare. This will be quite a challenge for the 
healthcare system if Kosovo is also to achieve the Millennium Development Goals for 
2015, which specify reducing the infant mortality rate by two-thirds and decreasing the 
level of maternal mortality by three-quarters.
839
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5.3.2 Weaknesses of the Kosovo health system and its reforms 
Kosovo‘s healthcare system is still based on the Shemasko model – the centrally 
planned National Health Service model of the Former Soviet Union. Under this direct-
provision model, the financing and provision of healthcare is integrated and managed by 
the same organization and the budget is derived from the general state budget.
840
 
At present, the National Healthcare System is administered by the Ministry of 
Health, which was established in 2001. It is responsible for policy-making, development 
and implementation of health strategies, and provision of secondary healthcare facilities 
at the regional level (hospitals) and tertiary health services at centers such as the 
University Clinical Center of Kosovo and other specialized institutions. Primary care is 
provided by the municipalities, which are directly funded by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance.
841
  
The overall capability for providing services is far below the EU average and the 
considerable needs of the population. Many people in Kosovo suffer from inadequate 
healthcare, particularly minorities who have problems in accessing healthcare facilities 
at all.  
As in education, Serb parallel structures also exist in the health sector. The two 
largest medical centers in Serb areas are in North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and 
Gracanicë/Gracanica. Both are overstaffed and reports of large-scale corruption are 
frequent.
842
 The Kosovo government does not have any authority over the hospital in 
North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. The problems that arise from the parallel health system are 
akin to those presented by the parallel education system. Steps should be taken to unify 
both systems not only for political reasons, but also to allow policy coordination, 
sharing of information and monitoring of security risks such as epidemics.  
According to the European Commission 2009 Progress Report on Kosovo, 
health infrastructure, including medical equipment, drugs supply and hospital 
capacities, remains poor. Hospitals and primary care facilities remain outdated. Overall, 
the sector urgently requires increased attention by the Kosovo authorities.
843
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One of the most frequent complaints is the shortage of essential drugs and other 
supplies. Theoretically, basic drugs are provided to patients free of charge; however, 
insufficient public funding means that this does not always happen. The situation is 
summed up by Hamdi Berisha:  
―You can hardly get what you need without bribing government service 
providers. A good example is the hospitals, which are horrible. Normally the 
hospitals have to provide patients with free drugs, but the doctors will tell you 
that the hospital is out of supply. So you can either buy from the doctors who 
sell the hospital‘s drugs or go to the drugstore and buy them there.‖844 
At least 80 per cent of Kosovo‘s pharmaceutical market is financed by patients‘ out-of-
pocket payments. In addition, there are businesses selling out-of-date or fake drugs. 
Other problems include the lack of adequately trained healthcare staff. As in the 
education sector, most healthcare personnel were forced out of the public health service 
during the 1990s and now suffer from a gap in technical training and professional 
capability. 
Although Kosovo reports the lowest bed density in Europe, with 148 hospital 
beds per 100,000 people, the utilization rates in public primary healthcare centers and in 
hospitals are low.
845
 Financial barriers presumably exclude many people mainly those in 
vulnerable groups, from care, while those who can afford to pay higher fees seek care in 
the growing private sector as well as abroad. Private healthcare is expanding in Kosovo. 
As of October 2009, 563 private health facilities have been licensed. Law No. 2004/50 
regulates the private practices in the health sector, however the monitoring mechanism 
need to be improved in order to ensure quality of care. 
The increasing demand for private sector care is driven to some extent by 
doctors working in both the public sector and private practice who try to augment low 
salaries paid to public healthcare personnel
846
 by enticing patients away to their private 
facilities. Sylë Ukshini reports: 
―If you go to the public hospital you find so many corrupt doctors that only work 
for money and who also have their own private clinics. A doctor once did not 
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treat me well, so I was forced to go to a private clinic. But when I came there, I 
saw that the private doctor was the same person as in the public hospital.‖847    
As well as being short of funds, the health sector is in general seen as plagued by 
mismanagement and large-scale corruption.
848
 A Kosovar citizen dependent on the 
health sector puts it this way:  
―They [hospitals] don‘t provide services. They simply sell their services to the 
public. Corruption, nepotism, unaccountability and disrespect for society are not 
only crumbling the education sector but also the health sector. If you have 
wealth, you can buy the services you need. If not, may God help you. In a 
normal country, when someone gets ill, you rush to the phone to call an 
ambulance but here you have to run to your wallet and see whether you have 
enough money before you proceed to get medical treatment.‖849  
Some kinds of surgery, such as organ transplantation, cannot be carried out in 
Kosovo, and, in some cases, treatment may take place abroad. However, the 
bureaucratic procedures associated with cost estimates, visas, transport, escorts and 
interpreters are time-consuming and complex, so that in some cases patients have 
passed away before treatment can take place. More than 1,000 patients are currently on 
the waiting list for treatment abroad, but there is no adequate budget for such surgery. 
Further, as is the case in the education sector, people believe that to get treatment 
abroad it is necessary to have the right connections. 
Kosovo‘s budgetary constraints preclude increasing public spending on health, 
so it is crucial to deploy existing resources more efficiently to get better health results. 
Strong policy and institutional reforms to strengthen public sector financial 
management, administrative capacity and mechanisms for ensuring accountability are 
needed.
850
  
Fundamental decisions concerning the health sector were taken prior to the 
establishment of the Ministry of Health. Work on a legislative framework was initiated 
by the former Department of Health within UNMIK‘s Joint Interim Administrative 
Structure which drafted an ―Interim Health Policy for Kosovo‖ in September 1999, 
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followed by the ―Health Policy for Kosovo‖ in 2001. Both framework documents were 
intended to start a comprehensive reform program.
851
 
The government aims to strengthen the health system through health financing 
reforms and modernization of healthcare delivery. The legal basis for health financing 
reform is enshrined in Kosovo Health Law No. 2004/4, which proposes to establish a 
single health insurance fund that will pool all government health funds, and pay for 
basic care in public health facilities.  
However, moving toward a health insurance system is currently hampered by 
Kosovo‘s economic problems. No social health insurance has yet been implemented and 
this has stalled improvement in the healthcare sector at all levels. In April 2006 the 
Kosovo parliament passed a health insurance law to introduce insurance financed 
primarily through payroll taxes. However, the law was returned to the government. The 
revenue potential of such payroll-funded insurance was estimated to be modest given 
Kosovo‘s relatively small formal employment sector and high unemployment rate. 
Concerns were also raised about the legislation‘s financial and economic implications 
and whether the benefits would justify the costs of the scheme, bearing in mind the 
limited availability of human, organizational and institutional capacity to implement and 
manage a health insurance fund.
852
  
Just as the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology developed the 
―Strategy for Development of Pre-University Education in Kosovo 2007−2017‖ and the 
―Strategy for Development of Higher Education in Kosovo 2005−2015‖, the Ministry of 
Health published the ―The Strategy for Health Care in Kosovo 2005−2015‖ in June 
2004. The strategy sets out the Ministry of Health‘s ambitions for health provision with 
main goals including: a healthy start in life, improving the health of young people, 
improving mental health, reducing diseases, developing human resources, institutional 
reforms and improvement of management in healthcare.
853
 According to the Health 
Law, chapter III, Section 12, provision of healthcare will be based on the following 
principles: equity, quality, responsibility, inclusiveness and non-discrimination in 
service delivery and employment, sustainable financing, cost-effectiveness and co-
financing.  
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Other recently developed programs include the ―Strategy for Mental Health 
2008−2013‖, the ―Health Sector Strategy 2010−2014‖ and the ―Kosovo Strategy Plan 
against HIV/AIDS 2009−2013‖.854 However, just as in other sectors, while numerous 
strategies exist, a lot remains to be done to accomplish them. People often raise 
concerns that the government is focusing more on drafting strategies than on actually 
implementing them. As one Kosovo Albanian puts it:  
―Our government comes up with more and more strategies. However, they 
should focus on their implementation before they start drafting new strategies. 
Once a new strategy is published, the work is considered as completed and no 
further actions are taken, but the strategy should be the beginning of the actual 
work.‖855 
5.3.3 Investing in health   
As shown in chapter 5.2.4, Kosovo spends relatively less on health than comparable 
countries. Moreover, most people hold that the government is not interested in spending 
money on health, as summed up by Hamdi Berisha:  
―The government is only focusing on construction. They do not have money for 
public health, which is the basis for society, but they have money to build roads, 
highways, schools, very tall buildings, shopping malls. They have money for all 
that but they don‘t have money for hospitals.‖856  
In the absence of a health insurance system, the entire public health budget is 
allocated from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget, whose allocations are estimated to 
provide less than 30 per cent of the health needs of the population, while private sources 
are estimated to contribute 40 per cent of overall spending on health. The government 
spends approximately three per cent of GDP and seven per cent of general government 
expenditures on the healthcare system.
857
 Under the old-style centralized system, the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance transfers health funds from the central budget to 
hospitals (51 per cent of the total in 2007), to municipalities in the form of an earmarked 
health grant for the provision of primary healthcare services (26 per cent) and to the 
Ministry of Health for other services (22 per cent). In addition, patients co-finance their 
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healthcare by meeting their out-of-pocket expenditures.
858
 Since the health system in 
Kosovo is publicly financed and is meant to provide universal coverage with a generous 
exemption policy through the co-payment principle, there should not be a significant 
proportion of the population reporting excessive costs as a main barrier to access, but as 
is clear from the forgoing this seems to be the case.
859
 
In 2008, the Ministry of Health spent about €57 million.860 Spending in 2009 and 
forecasts to 2012 are shown in the following table from Ministry of Economy and 
Finance‘s 2010 budget report. 
Table 18: Budget of the Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2009−12 
Budget of the Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2009−12 
 2009 
(SAR)
861
 
2010 
Budget 
2011 
(Estimate) 
2012 
(Estimate) 
Operational Expenditures (€) 61,167,383 59,880,133 60,107,788 59,047,788 
Capital Expenditures (€) 12,928,100 10,945,059 11,333,647 12,393,647 
TOTAL (€) 74,095,483 70,825,192 71,441,435 71,441,435 
No. of employees 7,409 7,266 7,266 7,266 
Source: Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance: Budget of the Republic of Kosovo for the Year 2010. 
January 2010. p. 31. 
Given the decline in international donor assistance and the low public spending 
on health, real improvements in the currently poor quality of health services and 
unsatisfactory health outcomes will be hard to obtain.
862
 The relative insignificance of 
the health budget becomes evident by comparing it with expenditure on the current 
highway construction program of €700 million (see chapter 4.2.1) and EULEX‘s 
mission budget of €265 million (see chapter 4.3.3). 
In contrast to the education sector, where Kosovars are now noticing some 
positive changes and improvements, the healthcare sector looks set to remain very 
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inadequate with significant gaps in provision for the population‘s needs. Kosovo needs 
to make considerable progress if it wants to reach its healthcare sector objectives, 
defined as: the ―development of a sustainable health system able to provide quality 
health services for all the people in the Republic of Kosovo, aimed at meeting European 
standards.‖863 
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5.4 Youth bulge  
Recent studies have found that countries with a ―youth-bulge‖ − defined as where a 
large proportion of the working-age population (ages 15 to 64) are young adults (aged 
between 15 and 29) – are at a high risk of internal armed conflict and civil strife.864 
Moreover, societies with rapidly growing young populations often suffer from extensive 
unemployment and large pools of disaffected youths who may be prone to recruitment 
into rebel or criminal groups. Theorists such as Jack Goldstone, Gunnar Heinsohn and 
Richard Cincotta argue that countries with weak political institutions are most 
vulnerable to youth-bulge-related violence and social unrest.
865
  
    Although youth-bulge societies are most prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, 
southern Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Islands, Kosovo is in much the same 
league. Of its estimated total population of approximately 2.2 million  
 33 per cent are below the age of 15  
 46 per cent are below the age of 19  
 50 per cent are below the age of 25  
 70 per cent are below the age of 30  
 61 per cent are aged between 15 and 64  
 6 per cent are 65 years and older866  
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Kosovo‘s population is not only the youngest, but also the fastest growing in the 
Balkans. Various estimates put its annual growth rate between 1.5 and 1.7 per cent.
867
 
This is significantly higher than population growth elsewhere in the region, which is, for 
example, 0.2 per cent in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 0.5 per cent 
in Albania, where there are declines of -0.9 per cent in Montenegro and -0.4 per cent in 
Serbia.
868
 Projections indicate that Kosovo will have 2.7 million inhabitants by 2025 
rising to 3.2 million in 2050.
869
 
The problems generated by a rapidly growing, youthful population are 
highlighted by Population Action International in its report ―The Shape of Things to 
Come‖. The report concludes that the age structure of a country‘s population has a 
significant impact on its security, economic development and social welfare, and it 
identifies four main types of age structure present in current populations: very young, 
youthful, transitional and mature, each with its particular characteristics. 
The very young age structure is defined as where youth (below the age of 30) 
accounts for 67 per cent or more of the total population, with mid-adults (aged 30−59) 
accounting for 18−27 per cent and seniors (aged 60+) for just three to six per cent. The 
youthful age structure profile is: youth: 60−67 per cent; mid-adults: 27−32 per cent and 
seniors: six to eight per cent. Kosovo clearly falls into one of these categories, but an 
accurate classification is not currently possible since the country‘s demographic 
statistics are largely based on estimates. 
The Population Action International report shows that between 1970 and 1999, 
80 per cent of civil conflicts occurred in countries where 60 per cent of the population 
or more were under the age of 30 (in other words where the age structure is classified as 
young or very young). Today 67 countries have youth bulges, and 60 of them are 
experiencing social unrest and violence. Clearly, countries with a large proportion of 
young adults are more prone to outbreaks of low-level political violence and instability 
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than countries with more mature age structures. However, demographers also 
emphasize that youth bulges do not exclusively explain civil conflict and violence − 
corruption, ethnic tensions, poverty, and poor political institutions also contribute. 
While youth bulges may generally increase the risk of conflict, the contextual factors 
that determine when this is true, and under what circumstances large youth cohorts may 
be beneficial, are not yet well understood. 
In addition to the youth bulge theory there is the relative deprivation theory 
elaborated by Ted Gurr. Gurr contends that people become aggressive in response to 
specific social conditions and that grievances and frustration arise when the gap 
between expectations and reality widens. Political violence is seen as a means of 
redressing these grievances. Gurr emphasizes that ―the potential for collective violence 
varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a 
society.‖870 
In line with Gurr‘s theory and the findings of the Ppulation Action International 
report, Kosovo‘s higher-than-average population growth, especially in the 1980s when 
the average Kosovo Albanian rural woman gave birth to seven children,
871
 has indeed 
resulted in many unemployed, dissatisfied young people, angry and in the worst case 
prone to violence and criminal activity due to the dismal hopelessness of their situation. 
The surge of young people entering the employment market outpaces job growth, 
leaving even educated youths unemployed and frustrated. The sections of this study 
dealing with the state‘s welfare provision paid particular attention to the situation of 
young people and also demonstrated that it is the young people who are particularly 
affected by Kosovo‘s persistent problems of poverty and unemployment because of the 
lack of opportunities, vocational training and education.  
Kosovo‘s civil disturbances of March 2004 are a good example of how lack of 
prospects can increase young people‘s disposition towards violence, including 
ethnically motivated crimes. The same combination of a youth bulge, high 
unemployment and poor economic conditions may further give rise to a generally 
increased willingness to engage in illegal activity as the only way to escape poverty and 
hardship, and facilitate recruitment into insurgent organizations, criminal and drug 
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networks
872
 or even religious extremist groups.
873
 With no options or prospects, and 
neither work nor even much in the way of simple amusements, there is little to deter 
young people from joining such groups. Educational attainment is in general a positive 
factor, increasing opportunities (although to a limited extent
874
) and thereby the 
opportunity cost of recruitment into an antisocial group. 
Young Kosovo Albanian Artan Kasumi articulates the general worries of his 
generation: 
―The main problem is that I really don‘t see my future clearly, I mean the way 
things are going with this high rate of unemployment in Kosovo … I really don‘t 
have a clear vision of my future because my government has no clear vision of 
my own future and their future, so it‘s going to be very, very difficult.‖875  
On the other hand, youth-bulges can also have positive effects. With the right 
conditions and policies as well as continued progress through the demographic 
transition, a large young population may represent a significant resource that can boost 
economic development − a so-called ―demographic dividend‖.876 
Age structures are dynamic and can be controlled and shaped by societies and 
especially governments through policies that affect the demographic forces − births, 
deaths and migration − that determine these age structures. To deal with the risk of 
youth unemployment in the short term, the Kosovo government should invest in training 
and job creation, and promote entrepreneurship among young people. But necessary 
long-term changes in Kosovo‘s age structure can only occur through a reduced birth 
rate. This means the support of programs that promote the demographic transition, such 
as family planning, girls‘ education, maternal and child health, and HIV/AIDS 
prevention, care and treatment, must be a central part of development assistance. 
Extreme poverty, disease, inadequate healthcare, and lack of educational and economic 
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opportunity − particularly for women − all pose risks, not only in terms of human well-
being but also for state security.
877
 
Given this challenging situation, it is crucial that the government starts to pay 
attention to the problems of Kosovo‘s young people; not just because they may create 
social unrest but even more importantly because they are Kosovo‘s future workers, 
business people, parents, citizens and leaders. 
However, while population characteristics are of great importance, they are 
frequently ignored or insufficiently addressed by policy makers. Ignoring the challenges 
of the youth bulge and population growth outpacing the country‘s economic potential 
has been a serious mistake. 
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5.5 Social inequality in Kosovo  
As the previous chapters have shown, social inequality is widespread in Kosovo. Apart 
from the disadvantaged position of Kosovo‘s younger generation, gender inequality is 
also particularly pronounced. Women are under-represented in the leadership of the 
country, particularly those from minority groups and rural areas. They are 
disadvantaged in practically every area including education, employment, decision-
making and participation in the public sphere, and, in addition to this structural 
violence, actual physical violence against women is also growing.  
5.5.1 The role of women – a complex of tradition and emancipation 
Although gender inequality remains a serious problem in Kosovo, there is another side 
to the picture. Any description of the role of women in Kosovar society is complicated 
by the presence of two contradictory sets of influences. On the one hand are the 
traditional, patriarchal attitudes, particularly in rural areas, that often limit a woman‘s 
ability to gain an education or even choose her own marriage partner; on the other hand, 
there is now a powerful Western influence as a result of the international presence, the 
diaspora and the availability of international media. The impact of the latter, while 
important, remains limited only to a proportion of the population and concentrated in 
urban areas. Elsewhere the traditional influences prevail. A 2006 study found that about 
93 per cent of Kosovo families are headed by a man, with most exceptions being 
households headed by widows. In many rural areas, women are effectively excluded 
from public life and ―family voting‖. The same UN study found that in 76 per cent of 
families it is the father who makes the important decisions, and, where this is not the 
case, mothers do not necessarily take charge. They are the decision makers in only 
seven per cent of all households while other members of the family have this role in 17 
per cent.
878
 Many traditions in Kosovo present serious obstacles to female 
emancipation, whether in the social, political or personal spheres. The average age of 
marriage for women is 26, and it is considered a matter of shame for the family if a 
female member is not married by the age of 30. Divorce remains rare, due to a 
combination of social and economic constraints. There was a sharp increase from a very 
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low base between 2000 and 2003 when the annual divorce rate quadrupled from 325 to 
1,385, but it then declined again to 1,026 in 2008.
879
 Given Kosovo‘s inadequate social 
security net, women have poor prospects without family support. They have equal rights 
under the laws governing inheritance, but hardly ever claim them due to lack of 
information and low educational levels.
880
 An interviewee quoted by the European 
Stability Initiative explained that the main reasons why so few women gain secondary 
education are poverty and the lack of any real prospect of even educated women earning 
a living. Families that are more affluent due to having members working abroad have 
not absorbed a different approach to education from the diaspora; largely because 
education does not increase a girl‘s social status. Indeed, the ability to emigrate can be 
seen as more desirable than education:  
―A girl with papers is more valuable, she enjoys a higher social status, than a 
female doctor or engineer working here in Kosovo. There are few reasons here 
for girls to continue studying … Some even quit and throw away their university 
degree even if they are only 2−3 exams away from finishing, if there is a chance 
to marry a person with papers. Education has lost its value.‖881  
Two indicators used to assess gender inequalities in human development are the 
Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure 
(GEM). The GDI measures the degree of equality between men and women with 
reference to the same basic capabilities as measured by the Human Development Index 
in respect of the whole population.
882
 The GEM attempts to quantify gender inequality 
in the spheres of political and economic participation. While the GDI focuses on 
expansion of capabilities, the GEM is concerned with the use of those capabilities to 
take advantage of opportunities in life.
883
 Although a slight increase in Kosovo‘s GDI 
can be seen between 2002 when it was calculated for the first time at 0.70 and 2009 
when it had risen to 0.76, this score continues to show that women are substantially 
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disadvantaged with Kosovo‘s GDI remaining the lowest in the Balkan region. Kosovo‘s 
GEM at 0.465 puts it in approximately 52nd place globally.
884
 
However, in contrast to the traditional role of women in the rural areas, there are 
a growing number of urban westernized women, emancipated and with the same 
opportunities as men. 
During the 1990s, when Kosovo Albanians created their underground parallel 
system, women in Kosovo started to attain a more important, though still subordinated, 
social position. They were engaged in setting up the parallel structures, particularly in 
the education and health sectors, both areas traditionally dominated by women. In this 
period, the first women‘s movements and NGOs addressing women‘s issues developed 
in Kosovo. The number of women‘s organizations addressing areas such as violence 
against women and women‘s rights, health, education, economic position and 
empowerment increased significantly after the war. Today, more than 80 women‘s 
organizations of all ethnic groups and regions of Kosovo are associated with the Kosovo 
Women‘s Network, an important umbrella organization established in 2000 and a 
partner of the United Nations Development Fund for Women. However, the war also 
brought redefinitions of manhood and the role of men in society. Constructions of 
masculinity based on martyrdom, heroism and patriotism led to further consolidation of 
male influence and exclusion of women from sociopolitical areas.
885
  
Clearly, the role of women in Kosovar society can vary dramatically according 
to circumstances. The challenge for policymakers is to take account of the whole picture 
and not assume that the traditional stereotype applies universally.
886
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5.5.2 Failures in promoting gender equality 
As the international community started its work of reconstruction and institution 
building in Kosovo, many women activists hoped that the reorganization of society 
would strengthen the position of women and bring about enhanced women‘s rights 
regulated by law. Women pinned their hopes on the international community and 
believed that now they would be treated as equal to men and be included in rebuilding 
Kosovo. However, these expectations have not been met. The international community 
chose to be guided by the traditional image of Kosovar women, and as a result they 
weakened the position of women even further. This can be explained by a simple lack 
of cultural knowledge and understanding of Kosovo on the part of those involved, 
especially at the very beginning of the mission but unfortunately often still today. For 
example, the traditional kanoon, a fifteenth century code of honor,
887
 was considered by 
many international members to be still valid for every Kosovo Albanian and it was 
erroneously believed to explain everything about Kosovo‘s society. It is true that before 
1999, many Kosovo Albanians preferred to settle their problems according to the rules 
of the kanoon rather than to contact Serbian law and order institutions in which they 
lacked confidence. However, the kanoon‘s significance was eroded by the 
institutionalization of modern laws under the socialist system and it was further 
undermined by the new laws introduced by UNMIK. Although some extreme 
traditionalists, particularly in rural areas, still live according to the kanoon, this is far 
from the case for the general population, which regards it as a thing of the past. 
Unfortunately, many international representatives, even in key positions, still believe in 
the importance of the kanoon and argue that its dictates prevail throughout Kosovo.
888
 
These are mainly people who have never had personal contact with the local population 
or prefer to rely on mission briefings that are sometimes outdated or wrongly interpreted 
rather than to believe Kosovo Albanians who have been trying to explain the real 
position to them for the past ten years. This is not an isolated example. The same 
approach has been a consistent theme of the entire mission period and explains the 
international representatives‘ often limited understanding of what is really going on in 
Kosovo in many areas including the role of women. 
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As a result, the international community focused on the traditional picture of 
women and simply ignored the fact that there were emancipated women who wanted to 
be included in decision-making. This lack of sensitivity has caused increasing 
estrangement between the international community and the local female population, 
whose disappointed expectations have led first to lack of trust in the international 
organizations and later to active demonstrations against UNMIK.
889
  
Igballe Rogova, Executive Director of the Kosovo Women‘s Network, sums up 
the disappointment experienced by emancipated Kosovo Albanian women:  
―In Kosovo in the 1990s, women and men kept society together for ten years. 
Women and men operated schools and health clinics and provided social 
assistance under the Serbian oppression. Women and men were involved in 
politics together; together women and men kept the peaceful resistance; together 
women and men fought in the Kosovo Liberation Army. Then in 1999 UNMIK 
came and first of all divided men and women. No women were involved in the 
reconstruction process; no women were involved in the negotiation process. 
Many accuse my government for that but I think it was the model of UNMIK 
that came to Kosovo. We were divided by the same institution that adopted UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325.‖890  
UNSCR 1325, passed on 31 October 2000, stresses the importance of full and 
equal participation by women in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security, 
and the need to increase their role in decision-making. However, one of the most 
obvious failures of UNMIK has been the lack of women‘s participation in the postwar 
political processes in Kosovo, as well as their exclusion from the highest levels of 
decision-making over the whole mission period. Within the UNMIK structure itself 
only a few senior positions have been held by women. There have been seven SRSGs in 
Kosovo but none of them was female. The same applies to the heads of the four 
UNMIK Pillars. Women were not only excluded in the postwar phase but continued to 
be excluded later on. The most telling example of what Igballe Rogova is complaining 
about is that the Kosovo Negotiation Team, which led the final status negotiations in 
Vienna, did not include any women.  
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These examples clearly show that it is not enough for the international 
community to establish institutions and pass laws and regulations. What matters are the 
individuals in those institutions and their readiness to implement those laws. The best 
laws − and this applies to all areas, not just where gender equality is involved − are of 
no value if those who are responsible for monitoring their implementation do not follow 
them themselves. UNMIK did not set a good example in its treatment of women and 
therefore lost its credibility with them, but this was not the first time this had happened. 
5.5.3 Success in promoting gender equality  
Despite many shortcomings, Kosovo managed to create a solid basis of legislation and 
institutional mechanisms for the accomplishment of gender equality in Kosovo.
891
 
However, as noted above, there has been no satisfactory progress towards implementing 
this legislation. One of the most important steps to promote gender equality has been the 
development of the National Action Plan for the Achievement of Gender Equality in 
Kosovo, which was approved by the Government of Kosovo in April 2004. The 
approval of the National Action Plan led the way for the Law on Gender Equality, 
promulgated in June 2004, which includes provisions relating to the economy, political 
parties, property and employment. It provides for monitoring mechanisms and sanctions 
if the law is violated.  
Due to these and other laws, significant progress has been made in improving 
female representation in Kosovo‘s institutions, particularly at the lower levels, but a lot 
remains to be done to reach the degree of female representation envisaged by the law on 
gender equality. Women in leading positions are still outnumbered by men by 
approximately ten to one.
892
    
5.5.3.1 Women in civic life  
Given the depressing statistics on women‘s education referred to in chapter 5.2, and the 
prevailing patriarchal attitudes, it is not surprising that women‘s participation in politics 
is low. One approach to increasing women‘s political involvement has been the 
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introduction of quotas. Since 2002, following a decision by the Central Election 
Commission, all political parties in Kosovo must ensure that one-third of candidates in 
their election lists are women. However in May 2009, female politicians called for 
changes to bring the election laws into line with the gender equality law (Section 3.2) 
under which the quota should be at least 40 per cent. 
893
 
In the elections for the National Assembly in 2004, 27.5 per cent of elected 
members were women and 28 per cent of all seats in municipal assemblies were 
occupied by women.
894
 In the November 2007 elections,
895
 women increased their 
numbers, winning 38 seats in the 120-seat Assembly, or 32 per cent.
896
 (However, of the 
205 candidates running for mayor in the 2009 municipal elections, only 11 were 
women.
897
) 
Despite this progress, women are still under-represented at the highest decision- 
making levels and all parties are currently led by men.
898
 At the time of writing, two out 
of 18 ministers are women – the Minister of Public Administration and Minister of 
Energy and Mining. Other senior positions held by women include three deputy 
ministers, the Director of the Kosovo Center for Public Safety Education and 
Development and the head of the Central Election Commission. 
In the security sector, about 15 per cent of uniformed officers in the Kosovo 
Police are female, with ten per cent of female officers in decision-making positions.
899
 
In the Kosovo Protection Corps about two per cent are female.
900
 The number of women 
in the Kosovo Police is quite remarkable and is further evidence that many Kosovar 
women do not correspond to the conventional traditionalist image.  
On the other hand, women are not adequately involved in the judicial system. In 
2007, women held 27 per cent of all positions in courts and 20 per cent of the 83 
prosecutor positions. No known steps have been taken towards establishing special 
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chambers for rape, trafficking and domestic violence cases, however some municipal 
courts have judges specializing in domestic violence cases. The judicial system suffers 
from weaknesses that are particularly related to domestic violence and human 
trafficking cases. Judges and prosecutors are in need of training in gender equality and 
women‘s human rights.901 
Many of the above figures appear encouraging for those concerned with 
women‘s rights, but this is to a large extent superficial. As long as the integration of 
women into public life is more a matter of box ticking to comply with regulations rather 
than based on a genuine conviction of women‘s competencies on the part of decision 
makers, true gender equality cannot be said to have been achieved. And so far, this 
unfortunately seems to be true of the participation of women in all social, economic and 
political areas. To achieve equal participation of women in all areas of public life, it will 
be necessary to take account of gender issues, including those related to personal safety, 
in the process of policy development and strategic planning by the Kosovar authorities 
and institutions involved in security.
902
 
5.5.4 Violence against women  
Data and analyses of personal safety issues produced by the Kosovar Gender Studies 
Center show that women and girls in Kosovo are increasingly vulnerable, especially to 
domestic violence and human trafficking.
903
 KFOR, OSCE, UNMIK and various NGO 
reports mainly deal with two forms of violence: interethnic and political. This can give 
the impression that these are the major aspects of violence in Kosovo today. However, 
violence against women is at least as common − if not even more common going by the 
statistics shown below − and might become even more prevalent in future. As Igballe 
Rogova, Executive Director of the Women‘s Network explains: 
―Violence is growing in Kosovo and mostly it‘s violence against women and the 
reason that violence is growing is economic underdevelopment and 
unemployment. More and more people get angry and depressed because they 
have no jobs and then what they do is hit their loved ones. And depression is 
really growing in Kosovo and as a nation we are told do not react, do not 
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complain, do not criticize, so we are sitting like zombies not expressing anger 
that something is happening and then we go and hit people in our family and 
express anger there.‖904  
Domestic violence against women was particularly prevalent during and 
immediately following the war but it remains a serious problem as does violence 
towards sexual minorities. Several UN studies indicate that when the war ended in 1999, 
23 per cent of women had experienced domestic violence.
905
 Rape, human trafficking, 
sexual slavery and prostitution were also serious issues affecting women in Kosovo 
during the war. 
The report ―Security Begins at Home‖, published by the Agency for Gender 
Equality in the Prime Minister‘s Office and the Kosovo Women‘s Network, indicates 
that about 43 per cent of Kosovars − 46.4 per cent of all women and 39.6 per cent of all 
men − have experienced domestic violence in their lifetimes.906 Only a small fraction of 
cases are reported, mainly because of shame and fear of ostracism by the family and 
community. As a result, most cases of domestic violence are never brought to justice so 
official data underestimate the importance of the problem and domestic violence is 
almost ignored in policy debates. Between 2002 and 2007, the Kosovo Police received 
7,660 reports of domestic violence. Of those cases reported between 2005 and 2007, 
women were reported as the victims in 79 per cent of instances whereas in 2008 1,073 
women reported cases of violence to the police (90 per cent of all cases) and, in 90 per 
cent of the cases, the perpetrator was a man.
907
 From these figures it is difficult to 
conclude whether violence has increased or decreased but there is no question that the 
incidence is very high. 
Unfortunately, the state has limited powers to protect the victims of domestic 
violence. In the absence of adequate public funding, support to victims and the 
provision of safe houses must come from Kosovo‘s women‘s rights groups. Public 
awareness of domestic violence also remains low.
908
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Additionally, women are victims of organized criminal groups that procure 
women for prostitution and trafficking. Kosovo serves as a source, a transit route and a 
destination for women and children trafficked for prostitution. There are considerable 
discrepancies between the international organizations‘ accounts of the origins of the 
trafficked victims in the country. While UNDP reports that most come from Moldova 
(about 50 per cent), Romania (20 per cent) and Ukraine (about 13 per cent), with a 
smaller number from Kosovo itself, the European Commission indicates that most 
victims are internally trafficked (60 per cent) and only 20 per cent originate from 
Moldova.
909
 
Poor economic conditions after the war, high unemployment, lack of education, 
the presence of organized criminal groups, porous borders and a large international 
community, which provided a relatively affluent clientele for the trade, rank among the 
reasons for the growth of trafficking of women in Kosovo. With the downsizing of the 
international peacekeeping forces, the international community has subsequently 
declined in importance as potential customers and the sex industry has developed to 
serve a wider client base. Amnesty International estimates that the local community 
constitutes about 80 per cent of the clientele.
910
 
There is no central database for recording cases of trafficking. Therefore 
statistics refer to the number of victims assisted by different international and national 
agencies. Between 1999 and 2007, about 658 trafficked persons were assisted, the 
majority female.
911
 Children from disadvantaged backgrounds and in rural areas are 
particularly vulnerable to trafficking as well as forced labor. 
According to the European Commission 2009 Progress Report on Kosovo, only 
limited progress in combating human trafficking has been achieved. The number of 
identified victims remains low and child trafficking for the purpose of forced begging is 
an increasing problem. Services for victims, including shelters and vocational training, 
depend largely on support from women‘s organizations. The poor record of 
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investigation and prosecution of trafficking crimes by the Kosovo authorities remains a 
concern.
912
 
As mentioned in several Kosovo Women‘s Network reports, domestic violence 
imposes a significant cost on society, in terms of expenses related to healthcare, 
policing, prosecution and social assistance to victims.
913
 Consequently, fighting 
violence and abuse of women in Kosovo is a priority requiring a constant commitment 
from the authorities to support and extend the efforts of women‘s rights organizations, 
and to ensure that domestic violence is dealt with as a crime. Recommendations for 
tackling domestic violence include firstly, that violence against women should be 
addressed in the context of women‘s rights rather than merely as a welfare issue and 
secondly, that campaigns and education to heighten public awareness of the problem 
need to be intensified. Both of these are critically important to change public attitudes as 
well as to empower women to demand justice in all types of gender-based violence. A 
third recommendation is that adequate public funding should be provided to ensure that 
there is a safe house for victims of domestic violence in every municipality. Fourthly, 
existing laws should be implemented strictly and legal procedures should be revised. 
Fifthly, there should be training for police, prosecutors, judges and healthcare staff in 
how to deal with violence against women as a violation of human rights.
914
 
Social inequality is often an important cause of social and political instability; 
therefore the issue needs to be addressed effectively by Kosovo‘s authorities. In 
particular, women‘s participation in the effort is essential to address not only problems 
specific to women, such as rape and domestic violence, but also to ensure that the whole 
population is represented in policy-making. Moreover, improving women‘s status will 
have a beneficial influence on social environments and ultimately accelerate the 
demographic transition.
915
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the Kosovo authorities are failing to provide adequate 
social welfare provision – one of the core functions of the state – and thus undermining 
public confidence in state institutions. Services are largely insufficient and do not cover 
the needs of the growing population. 
One out of every two Kosovars is without a job and half the population lives in 
poverty. Stronger commitment and effective action are urgently required to overcome 
the country‘s high levels of unemployment and poverty. Otherwise the country‘s 
development will be crucially hampered and security threatened as people are forced 
into illegal businesses as a survival strategy. Kosovo‘s social protection programs have 
only a marginal impact on poverty. Far more effective are remittances from Kosovars 
living abroad, without which some families would struggle to survive. 
Despite numerous reforms, educational standards are a matter of concern and 
educational outcomes remain unsatisfactory. Lack of skills contributes to the 
unemployment problem and illiteracy in Kosovo, particularly among rural women, is an 
obstacle to long-term social and economic development and equality. Lack of proper 
control over educational institutions, poorly trained teachers and their extremely low 
wages are just some of the factors plaguing the system. Additionally, the system 
continues to divide Kosovo Albanians and Serbs through their attendance at separate 
schools with diverse curricula. It is clear that as long as Kosovo Serbs and Albanians do 
not live, work and go to school together, interethnic relations will remain tense, 
threatening Kosovo‘s long-term stability. 
Healthcare services are also far below EU standards and the needs of the 
population. Environmental protection exists merely on paper and is the area on which 
the Kosovo government spends least. Pervasive inequality, particularly affecting 
women, youth, minorities and people in rural areas, characterizes Kosovo‘s society. 
Children and young people, who comprise a very large component of the 
population, are the most affected by poverty and unemployment. Youth access to decent 
work remains a major challenge and in many cases lack of employment is intrinsically 
tied to psychological instability, depression, crime, violence and social exclusion. Large 
pools of unemployed, disillusioned and idle youth are a major potential cause of social 
instability and violence. 
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The net result is a fragile social situation in Kosovo, often described as a time 
bomb ticking. Kosovars eager expectations that independence would solve the most 
pressing social problems have not been realized. The Kosovo state cannot afford to 
neglect this alarming situation. It will need to identify policies, institutions and 
resources to respond to the growing social crisis. However, rapid improvement in the 
economic and social situation is impossible given the structural nature of the main 
problems, and Kosovars must look to the medium or long-term for any real advance. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The main assumption of this study is that there is a relationship between the fulfillment 
of the state functions of providing security and welfare and the achievement of peace, 
which, following Johan Galtung, may be defined as either negative, in the sense of the 
absence of violence or positive in the sense of enabling citizens to achieve their full 
potential. If the security function alone is adequately fulfilled, then there is peace in the 
negative sense, while if both the security and welfare functions are fulfilled, then 
positive peace is achieved. After a thorough evaluation of the important problem areas 
for the Kosovar state: security, the political system, and the social and economic 
dimensions, what can be said about the achievements and failures since the end of the 
war of all those attempting to establish peace in Kosovo? The main findings of our 
study are summarized in this chapter.  
6.1 Security 
6.1.1 Control over the integrity of national territory  
Kosovo has only limited sovereignty over the integrity of its territory since the authority 
of the Kosovar government is still not recognized in the north. The country remains 
divided, de facto, into a Serb north and an Albanian-dominated south. The two ethnic 
communities continue living separate lives, which poses an obstacle to the country‘s 
development and stability. While Belgrade has to some extent moderated its stance 
towards Kosovo, it holds the key to the reactions of the Kosovo Serb community and 
consequently to stability in Kosovo. Interference by Belgrade is considered by more 
than half the Kosovo Albanian population as the main factor destabilizing interethnic 
relations. So far, neither UNMIK nor EULEX have been able to do anything to prevent 
the partition of the country. As long as the north remains an unsolved security 
flashpoint, the situation in Kosovo is assessed as ―calm but fragile‖. 
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6.1.2 Control of external borders  
Kosovo does not currently have the capacity to face threats alone, but is dependent on 
external help, in particular from KFOR. The Kosovo Border Police, which operates 
within the framework of the Kosovo Police, still faces considerable problems such as in 
fighting drug trafficking. In April 2010, the Kosovo Border Police took over control of 
the country‘s border with Albania from KFOR, demonstrating KFOR‘s faith in the 
police. 
Kosovo‘s Security Force is not yet able to defend the country against external 
threats or to control Kosovo‘s borders. Perceptions of the Kosovo Security Force vary 
between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. While Kosovo Albanians see the 
establishment of the Security Force as the foundation for a secure Kosovo, Kosovo 
Serbs perceive it as a step towards further division along ethnic lines. The presence of 
KFOR is still needed to maintain a safe and stable environment until the national 
security structures and forces can provide security for all population groups in Kosovo 
to the same degree. Consequently, Kosovo remains dependent on the international 
military presence for its internal and external security for the foreseeable future. 
6.1.3 Ethnic and other violent conflicts 
Kosovo does not have to deal with continuing violent conflicts. One of the greatest 
accomplishments since 1999 has been the significant improvement of the security 
situation and the containment of direct violence. Despite this improvement, the 
persistence of isolated low-level security incidents perpetuates a perception of 
insecurity. Northern Kosovo, with its majority Serb population, continues to be a 
security flashpoint and the potential for violence remains whenever authorities in 
Prishtinë/Priština or EULEX try to assert their authority in the north. The transition of 
KFOR to a ―deterrent presence‖ symbolizes the positive trend in the security situation. 
At the same time, non-state armed groups no longer pose a threat to security in Kosovo. 
Their relevance is reduced given the changed political reality. 
KFOR will keep its role as third responder, in support of the Kosovo Police as 
the main internal security provider and EULEX as the second responder, to help 
maintain a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo. The positive evolution of 
the overall security situation in Kosovo depends on continual work in areas like the 
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fight against corruption and organized crime, improving the rule of law and establishing 
a climate for social and economic development.   
6.1.4 Condition of the state‟s security apparatus  
The establishment of the Kosovo Police was UNMIK‘s greatest achievement. The 
police are one of Kosovo‘s few multi-ethnic institutions, with Serbs and other minorities 
integrated at all levels. UNDP poll results reveal that public satisfaction with the police 
is at a consistently high level of around 80 per cent, which makes the force the most 
trusted of all national institutions. Nevertheless, much remains to be improved. The 
police are poorly managed, lack strong senior leaders and are short of vital skills as their 
leadership increasingly neglects training. The force can deal effectively with everyday 
and low-level crimes, but is very weak at solving serious crimes and has limited 
capability to fight organized crime, fraud, drugs and human trafficking. The police 
remain prone to political interference and as in the other sectors, the low salaries of the 
officers have considerable influence on the force‘s overall work. Moreover, the police 
are not backed up by an effective justice system (see below, page 316). 
6.1.5 Crime and development of crime rates 
Kosovo is afflicted by a considerable image problem as regards crime. However, when 
the situation is studied closely, there is a wide gap between perceptions and realities on 
the ground. In some ways, Kosovo‘s reputation for being a haven for criminals is 
overstated. Data show that Kosovo has a low rate of violent crime and interethnic crime 
is rare — Serbs in most of Kosovo live securely. Forms of violent crime, such as 
robbery, burglary and motor vehicle theft, are well below the EU average. Although 
Kosovo‘s homicide rate is still higher than the EU average, the rate has decreased 
considerably from 11.8 killings per 100,000 citizens in 2000 to 2.6 in 2006. The real 
problem in Kosovo is not petty crime, but large-scale organized crime. The lack of 
cooperation between Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade and between the central Kosovo 
authorities and structures in the north considerably hamper attempts to fight organized 
crime, which, along with corruption, is defined as a key European-partnership priority. 
The organized crime activities focused on in this analysis include: drug trafficking, 
firearms trafficking, smuggling of cigarettes and fuel, money laundering and trafficking 
in human beings, especially women. Kosovo‘s efforts to tackle these problems are still 
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quite weak and the country has made only limited progress in the fight against 
organized crime. 
6.1.6 Corruption  
Corruption is prevalent in many areas and affects the everyday life of citizens. The 
Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency is ineffective against the corrupt practices in which 
members of the Kosovar political class are involved. The country continues to face 
major challenges in the fight against corruption and needs to intensify its efforts in this 
area. However, not only do Kosovar institutions need to step up their actions, but so 
does the international community, whose passive policy towards corruption as well as 
organized crime has contributed to the ability of organized crime structures to stabilize 
and flourish. EULEX in its first year was hesitant to take decisive measures against 
corruption and organized crime. However its raids on the transportation ministry in 
April 2010 have taken anti-corruption investigations to a higher level and raised hopes 
among the population that EULEX will finally deliver on its promises. 
6.1.7 Rule of law 
The rule of law is the bedrock upon which democratic states are based. Indeed, the 
litmus test for an effectively ruled state is the presence of a vital and well-functioning 
rule of law system. However, rule of law is the most fragile aspect of governance in 
Kosovo and one of the greatest challenges to the full consolidation of the country‘s 
statehood. Kosovo‘s judicial system is weak, inefficient and prone to political 
interference. Courts are considerably understaffed, lacking capable judges and 
prosecutors. A large number of unresolved criminal cases and the huge ever-increasing 
backlog of cases nourish the people‘s mistrust in the courts and legal system. 
The courts and prosecutors are failing in important aspects. Corruption, poor 
educational standards, low salaries, inadequate infrastructure and the lack of a joint 
database to record and track criminal cases greatly hamper the performance of the 
judiciary, which is difficult to improve due to the non-existence of adequate monitoring 
and control mechanisms. Each of Kosovo‘s rule of law institutions – the police, the 
public prosecutors and the courts – works on its own. To improve this, high-level 
political will as well as coordination are urgently needed and it can only be realized 
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when the Kosovo government, the European Union, the United States, the International 
Civilian Office and EULEX combine their efforts. 
6.2 Welfare 
6.2.1 Economic situation 
The roots of economic hardship in Kosovo lie in the former Yugoslav era, but the 
economic impact of the war in 1999 was fatal and brought an already struggling 
economy to a halt. Agricultural production fell and industrial output collapsed. Despite 
providing enormous financial assistance, the international community has failed to 
improve the country‘s economic position. Two-and-a-half years since independence 
Kosovo‘s economy continues to be extremely feeble and the majority of the main 
macroeconomic indicators continue to be strongly negative. Although the country‘s 
integration into global markets is limited, it could not escape the problems of the global 
economic crisis. These were reflected in a decline in Kosovo‘s already meager exports, 
lower levels of bank lending and foreign direct investments, and reduced remittances, as 
migrant workers were hit by the impact of the recession on labor markets everywhere. 
The latter development has considerable potential to exacerbate Kosovo‘s already 
alarming socio-economic difficulties. 
In addition, severe unemployment, low productivity, very low exports, a 
widening trade and budget deficit, a small domestic market, infrastructure weaknesses 
and chronic energy shortages contribute to the calamitous state of Kosovo‘s economy. 
6.2.2 Unemployment 
Kosovo‘s alarming poverty level is the inevitable result of its high level of 
unemployment – the highest in the Balkans. The country‘s labor market situation is 
worse than bleak: the unemployment rate stands at about 48 per cent and the 
employment rate is extremely low at only 24 per cent. Most of the job-seekers are long-
term unemployed; 90 per cent have been out of work for more than 12 months, with 
their chances usually impaired by their low level of skills. Women, minorities and 
young people are particularly hard hit. Youth unemployment is particularly alarming, 
amounting to about 75 per cent. Kosovo‘s population is not only the youngest in 
Europe, with two-thirds aged under 35, but also the fastest growing in the Balkans. 
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Every year about 30,000 young Kosovars enter a labor market that can offer them very 
limited prospects. Given the high poverty and unemployment rate, the majority of 
young Kosovars between the ages of 20 and 35 aims to migrate. Active labor market 
and migration policies are needed to reduce the pressure. However, the EU is currently 
not offering Kosovars anything positive in terms of immigration rights. The exclusion 
of Kosovo from the visa liberalization process is a prominent example of this and has 
caused despair and disappointment with the EU to rise still further. 
6.2.3 Equal access to economic resources 
There is no systematic exclusion of particular sections of society from economic 
resources; however, some have difficulty participating effectively in economic as well 
as social life. Equal access to housing, education, employment and social security is not 
always respected. Cases of discrimination often go unreported and more government 
awareness campaigns to fight discrimination are needed. 
At the same time there are severe socio-economic disparities across regions and 
between urban and rural areas, and women generally are severely disadvantaged in 
terms of health, education and employment. Further, there are large disparities between 
different age groups. Young people are in a worse economic position than their elders 
due to the difficulty of finding decent employment, and this contributes to their lack of 
participation and voice in Kosovo society. 
6.2.4 Poverty and the urban–rural divide 
Poverty is rife in Kosovo, and without the safety-net provided by migration and 
remittances by migrants, a large part of the population would literally be unable to 
survive. Poverty afflicts the large bulk of the population with 45 per cent living on less 
than €1.42 per day. Of these, 15 per cent of the population are defined as extremely 
poor, living on less than €0.93 per day. Another 18 per cent of Kosovars are classified 
as vulnerable to poverty. Unemployment is the major cause of poverty and women, 
youth, the low-skilled and families with disabled members are suffering the most. 
Kosovo‘s urban–rural divide is particularly prominent, with about two-thirds of 
the poor living in rural areas. People in rural areas are not only poorer, but also suffer 
from lack of access to key public services as well as lower quality services where they 
are available. 
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6.2.5 Inequalities in human development 
Kosovo is notable for its inequalities in human development. The most pressing socio-
economic inequities derive from location, ethnicity, gender and age. Gender inequity, 
particularly marked in education and the labor market, remains widespread and interacts 
closely with ethnicity. 
Women over 60 are particularly likely to be illiterate, especially in rural areas 
where both male and female illiteracy are higher than in towns. Almost 14 per cent of 
women living in rural areas are illiterate, while the corresponding figure for men is four 
per cent. The pervasive inequities in Kosovo‘s society are illustrated by educational 
attainment: on average, a Kosovar has roughly ten years of education, but the rural 
population lags behind the urban, women behind men and non-Serb minorities behind 
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. 
6.2.6 Public social protection systems 
Although social protection is one of the bigger areas of Kosovo government spending – 
accounting for 14 per cent of total expenditure in 2008 – this is a smaller proportion 
than in comparable countries, and limited resources overall mean that Kosovo‘s social 
protection programs are still in their infancy. The main programs – the pension system, 
the social assistance schemes and employment programs – have very little impact on 
public welfare. The social assistance programs fail to reach over 75 per cent of the poor 
and over 65 per cent of the extremely poor. Only about 13 per cent of the population 
receives social assistance, while six per cent receives different types of pensions. For 
those who receive them, both forms of assistance are less than a family needs to 
maintain even a substandard living in the country and their value has remained flat since 
their introduction in 2002−03. Depending on the number of family members, the 
monthly social assistance payment ranges from €35 to €75. The monthly pension 
payment is either €45 or €75. 
Programs to tackle unemployment have very limited impact and resources used 
for these services might be better spent on well-planned temporary work programs. 
Given these weaknesses, Kosovo needs to improve the coverage and efficiency of its 
social protection system. However, only the creation of new jobs supported by social 
protection programs will have any real impact on welfare. 
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Migration and remittances are far more effective in insulating Kosovar 
households from poverty than anything the government is managing to do. About one in 
four Kosovars has at least one household member who lives abroad. The proportion of 
the population receiving remittances, at some 20 per cent, is significantly higher than 
that receiving social assistance, and the sums involved in remittances are about three 
times higher than the average value of the social protection programs. Without them, 
some families would struggle to survive, particularly in rural areas where most 
recipients of remittances live. Any policies leading to severe reductions in migration are 
likely to worsen the welfare of the Kosovo population, to enlarge the already present 
rural−urban inequalities in welfare, and possibly to lead to instability. However, the 
disproportionate significance of remittances contributes to the inequalities in society. 
6.2.7 Educational system  
Given that Kosovo‘s population is very young, with 46 per cent under 19, and the high 
levels of youth unemployment, education is seen as a key priority by the Kosovo 
government. However, despite numerous reform measures aimed at providing education 
to standards elsewhere in Europe, no more than modest progress has been achieved so 
far. Literacy, school enrollment and access to education still all need to be greatly 
improved. The illiteracy rate is 5.8 per cent across the total population but far higher 
among women and older people. In general, women are less well-educated than men at 
all levels. While the enrollment rate for compulsory education is high overall − although 
varying considerably between the ethnic communities − the enrollment rates for upper 
secondary as well as higher education continue to be inadequate. Access to education 
facilities for people in rural areas and particularly those with physical disabilities also 
needs to be considerably improved. Only ten per cent of children with special needs 
attend compulsory education. Overall, there is little awareness among Kosovars of the 
importance of education and it is widely believed that education is not the key to 
employment. However, those who are interested in attending university often have to 
abandon their goal since the capacity of the University of Prishtina is limited and 
university admission is often dependent on the right connections and payment of bribes.  
There is still a long way to go to bring Kosovo‘s pre-university and higher 
education system up to European standards. The system continues to suffer from severe 
problems such as unqualified academic staff, low teachers‘ salaries, lack of adequate 
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infrastructure and budgetary constraints. Moreover, Kosovo‘s education system is still 
ethnically segregated. The existence of a Serb parallel education system is at the core of 
the problem, provoking further ethnic division and disrupting not only the education 
system but still more importantly, Kosovo‘s society. 
Despite the government‘s lip service to the priority of education, it spends 
considerably less of its budget on education than comparable countries. While spending 
on education amounted to 16.7 per cent of total expenditures in 2007, this fell to around 
ten per cent in 2008.  
6.2.8 Healthcare system 
Kosovo‘s healthcare system is in need of urgent improvement. Indicators of health 
outcomes, such as life expectancy and infant mortality are the worst in the region. 
Healthcare provision is far below the EU average and the needs of the population. The 
health sector is plagued by poor infrastructure, lack of medical equipment, drugs and 
hospital capacity, inadequately trained healthcare staff, mismanagement and corruption. 
As in education, Serb parallel structures also exist in the health sector. The unification 
of both systems is essential to allow policy coordination, sharing of information and 
monitoring of security risks. Kosovo‘s economic problems hamper the implementation 
of a social health insurance system and the lack of it remains an obstacle to improving 
healthcare at all levels. While spending on health amounted to 10.3 per cent of total 
expenditures in 2007, it declined to 7.1 per cent in 2008.  
6.2.9 Public infrastructure 
Kosovo‘s transport and energy sectors are underdeveloped and in poor condition, and 
hence not conducive to sustainable economic growth. Transport infrastructure – road, 
rail and air − needs urgent development, although the period since independence has 
featured major road-building programs. These continue to place a significant burden on 
the Kosovo budget, draining resources from spending on other important areas. The cost 
for the construction of the 117km highway that will link Kosovo with Albania and 
Serbia amounts to more than €700 million. 
There has also been heavy spending on the effort to provide a stable energy 
supply, but the problems have not been solved. The country still suffers from serious 
power outages, which impede economic growth and deter investors. The planned 
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privatization of electricity supplier KEK and the construction of a new power plant, 
costing about €3.5 billion, are aimed at putting an end to Kosovo‘s long-standing energy 
crisis. 
6.2.10 Environment 
Kosovo‘s environment has been severely damaged by pollution as well as indifference 
for years and standards are consequently far from those in much of the rest of Europe. 
The environment is affected by poor waste management and water recycling, illegal 
logging, inadequate urban and industrial planning and a very low public awareness of 
environmental protection. Therefore, air, soil and water pollution all present serious 
problems. Moreover, Kosovo is unable to tackle the water shortages which occur 
particularly in rural areas during summer months. Most of the rural areas do not have 
access to running water but are dependent on wells with problematic water quality. 
Only 64 per cent of the population has access to clean water and only a third is 
connected to sewage systems. Kosovo‘s environmental problems need to be urgently 
addressed and this is crucial for improving public health. However, with expenditure on 
environmental protection accounting for less than one per cent of the Kosovo budget, 
the likelihood of improvement is as low as the budget itself.  
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6.3 Concluding assessment  
The findings of our study on the main dimensions of security, the political and 
economic situation, and the social system in Kosovo are now summarized in Table 19. 
The table lists key indicators of the provision of security and welfare, and Kosovo‘s 
performance on each of these indicators is rated from zero to three. A zero rating means 
complete failure to perform on this indicator; a rating of one means rudimentary 
achievement; a rating of two indicates moderate success and three means substantial 
success. Naturally these scores are based on subjective evaluation. 
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Table 19: Assessment of Kosovo‟s security and welfare performance 
(0: negligible performance; 1: rudimentary performance; 2: moderate performance;  
3: high performance) 
 
Indicators by Function 
 
Current performance 
assessment 
SECURITY FUNCTION  
Control over the integrity of national territory  1−2 
Control of external borders 1−2 
Prevention of ethnic and other violent conflicts 2−3 
Maintenance of the state‘s security apparatus  1−2 
Control of crime and development of crime rates  3 
Control of corruption and organized crime  1 
Maintenance of the rule of law 1−2 
WELFARE FUNCTION  
Maintenance of a stable economic situation  1 
Reducing unemployment  0 
Providing equal access to economic resources 1 
Reducing poverty and the urban–rural divide 0 
Reducing inequalities in human development 1 
Establishing public social-protection systems  1 
Ensuring an effective educational system 1−2 
Ensuring an effective healthcare system 1 
Providing adequate public infrastructure 1 
Improving the quality of the environment  1−2 
Source: Based on the author‘s own evaluation.  
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Table 19 clearly shows that in Kosovo the security function is performed 
considerably more successfully than the welfare function. In quantitative terms, the 
mean value of security function indicators amounts to 1.78 while the mean value of the 
welfare function indicators is only 0.90. While the fulfillment of the security function 
largely derives from the international organizations‘ contribution, the fulfillment of the 
welfare function depends more on the Kosovar authorities. 
Indispensable public functions, such as upholding the rule of law, providing 
infrastructure and services for basic needs, establishing equal access to basic goods and 
services and maintaining social harmony are inadequately performed. The lack of 
proper service provision and the unequal distribution of resources by the Kosovo state 
prevent its citizens from achieving their full potential. It was shown that the unequal 
distribution of resources applies not only to material wealth – as in, for example, the 
unequal distribution of income – but still more emphatically in non-material areas such 
as education, healthcare and literacy. Due to the deficits in these areas, Kosovo remains 
a state and society in which structural violence is still prevalent. Positive peace – going 
beyond the mere absence of direct violence − has not yet been achieved, even after 11 
years of international presence. 
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6.4 The Kosovo case in the context of other state-building 
missions  
Kosovo, primarily due to its failure adequately to provide a decent life for its citizens 
and hope for their future remains a fragile and unfinished state – a judgment which 
throws a negative light on the efforts of the international community since 1999.  
The Kosovo mission, ranks alongside the missions in Afghanistan, Liberia, 
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti as among the largest state-
building operations currently being carried out by the international community under 
the auspices of the United Nations.
916
 Kosovo and East Timor (1999–2002) were the 
first occasions on which the UN exercised full judicial power within a territory and also 
rank among ―third-generation‖ peacekeeping missions, with the mandate to organize 
and conduct elections, establish institutions to maintain law and order, re-establish 
financial systems and open markets, help maintain dialogues to reconcile former 
enemies, safeguard human rights and even establish basic health and education 
systems.
917
 Therefore, the mission in Kosovo was designed to be a long-term 
international engagement from the outset. The experiences and developments in Haiti, 
Rwanda and Sudan have shown that short-term interventions with insufficient resources 
are less promising. According to Bruno Schoch, more international resources were 
committed to the missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo than to all other 
comparable post-conflict societies. Since the end of the war in June 1999, the 
international community has spent in Kosovo 25 times more per head of population and 
deployed 50 times more soldiers than in Afghanistan.
918
  
UNMIK administered Kosovo from 1999 until 15 June 2008, when Kosovo‘s 
constitution came into force. Over this period its expenditure amounted to $2.7 billion. 
Its estimated budget for the period 1 July 2010–30 June 2011, to cover operational costs 
as well as the deployment of the remaining eight military observers, eight UN police 
officers, 166 international staff, 241 national staff and 28 UN volunteers, is an estimated 
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$48 million.
919
 Additionally, the EU spent about €2.3 billion between 1999 and 2008,920 
while the operational budget of the European Union‘s EULEX mission, which officially 
deployed throughout Kosovo on 9 December 2008, amounted to €265 million as of June 
2010. There has also been considerable expenditure by the countries providing KFOR 
contingents for which comprehensive figures are not available.
921
 
The large financial commitment and its wide range of tasks mean that the 
Kosovo mission is the most ambitious international peacekeeping and democratic 
institution-building project so far. However, there are question marks over how 
successful it has been. How well has it promoted lasting peace by establishing 
democratic political institutions and a political culture including the rule of law, fighting 
corruption and organized crime, developing a viable economy and improving the social 
order? 
Despite the enormous injection of resources by the international community, 
Kosovo continues to have critical problems, particularly in respect of the economic and 
social situation and the rule of law. The ambitious goals set out in UNSCR 1244, such 
as to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo, the 
safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes and the 
economic development and stabilization of the crisis region, are still – eleven years later 
– far from being realized.  
The serious problems that Kosovo as well as other post-conflict societies still 
face point to the weaknesses in the strategies and choice of priorities of the international 
community.  
On the positive side, with the help of UNMIK, it has been possible to establish 
democratic political institutions and to hold elections without major problems, which 
points to the willingness of political parties and politicians as well as Kosovo‘s citizens 
to accept the formal rules of modern parliamentary democracy. However, a democratic 
political culture, in which values such as mutual tolerance and respect for minority 
rights are taken seriously and put into practice, has not been developed. A major 
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hindrance to the development of a political culture is the sometimes close ties between 
politicians and organized crime structures. The political class in Kosovo also suffers 
considerably from clientelism and corruption. The fight against organized crime is 
another area of failure for UNMIK and KFOR. Their rather passive policy and 
halfhearted efforts against organized crime − not to mention their partial involvement in 
cases of corruption − has allowed organized crime structures to further stabilize and 
consequently impeded the overall development process in Kosovo. A strong democratic 
culture and a political class that seriously addresses the country‘s problems and acts 
according to the people‘s interests rather than aiming at their own enrichment is still far 
from being realized. Vedran Dţihić and Helmut Kramer arrive at the finding that  
―the strategies of UNMIK, the OSCE and the EU to support democracy-building 
in Kosovo have been only moderately successful, among other things owing to 
the role of the international community as representatives of a protectorate 
structure.‖922 
Another costly mistake by the international organizations when setting their 
priorities, not only in Kosovo but in the whole Balkans, was the failure to understand 
that democracy works only when it goes hand in hand with the establishment of the rule 
of law.
923
 Simon Chesterman, in his study of the UN missions in Kosovo, East Timor 
and Afghanistan, highlights that, while creating a rigid template for reconstructing the 
judicial system in postwar societies is wrong, and any foreign involvement must be 
sensitive to particularities of the specific country, the administration of justice should 
rank among the higher priorities of a post-conflict peace operation.
924
 However, the 
initial efforts of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as 
Kosovo were more focused on holding elections than in establishing the rule of law and 
fighting the criminal and corrupt structures that continued to dominate the political 
scene. This strategy has seriously hampered the establishment of functional institutions. 
The focus on early elections runs the risk of returning power to politicians who have no 
interest in strengthening civil society. One of the lessons learned is that elections should 
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be held after a basic level of the rule of law has been established.
925
 According to Simon 
Chesterman, the failure to prioritize law enforcement and justice issues also undermined 
the credibility of the international presence in Kosovo. The current EULEX policy, 
which indicates stronger action against politicians involved in corruption, demonstrates 
the complications that can arise from attempting to establish the rule of law after 
elections have taken place. 
While the international presence in Kosovo succeeded in creating and 
maintaining a secure environment as an absolute requirement for any peace-building 
effort, it did very little to achieve a real improvement in the economic and social 
situation of the country.   
According to the UNSCR 1244, the EU‘s initial responsibility in Kosovo was to 
promote economic development and stabilization in the region. This mandate was 
threefold: firstly, the reconstruction of key infrastructure and economic development; 
secondly, the establishment of economic institutions; and thirdly, the promotion of 
peace and stability. While the reconstruction of key infrastructure was achieved 
successfully, economic development was not accomplished. This failure can again be 
put down to the mistaken choice of priorities. The immediate priority was to improve 
the security situation, but while pursuing this objective, the development of a 
comprehensive economic strategy to promote a stable economy received too little 
emphasis. A striking example of the absence of economic strategy concerns rural 
development. Kosovo‘s agricultural sector, which is one of the biggest employers in 
Kosovo, was largely ignored. Also important steps such as privatization, resolving 
disputes over property rights, creating job opportunities and strengthening small and 
medium-sized enterprises were prepared poorly. In sum, UNMIK‘s economic aid 
initiatives have not been adequately tailored to the situation in Kosovo and 
consequently have largely failed to strengthen local institutions.  
However, lasting peace cannot be achieved as long as Kosovars have no security 
in their homes and their jobs. Based on case studies of Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo, 
Graciana del Castillo highlights that unless job opportunities are provided, particularly 
for the younger population, rebuilding war-torn states will not succeed and peace will 
be ephemeral:  
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―Consolidation of peace following violent conflict has very little chance of 
success unless jobs are created and the economy is quickly stabilized and 
brought onto a path of investment and growth with low inflation. Creating 
opportunities for employment in the short run is critical, as this will facilitate the 
long, complex, and expensive process of reintegrating former combatants, 
returnees, and displaced persons into society and into productive activities‖926.  
This insight was largely ignored by the international community. UNMIK‘s and the 
EU‘s mistaken choice of priorities have been perpetuated by EULEX. Its primary 
strategy for achieving peace and stability consists of the deployment of 1,400 
international police officers who have little impact on the country‘s development 
process. In light of the calm security situation and the well-functioning Kosovo Police, 
EULEX‘s police component should be reduced and its justice component strengthened. 
Given the immense costs of the EU mission in Kosovo and its dubious effectiveness, a 
reassessment of EULEX priorities is essential. The mission‘s priorities should be 
extended to include financial and operational support to foster economic development 
and a proportion of the massive expenditures of the mission should be aimed at clear 
improvements in Kosovo‘s social situation, for instance on Kosovo‘s education and 
health sectors which are in urgent need of improvement.
927
 It is also necessary for 
EULEX to strengthen civil society as well as to promote gender equality − further areas 
that have been neglected by UNMIK. The Kosovo government‘s budgets for education 
and health in 2009 are minute in relation to the huge spending of the international 
organizations amounting to about €50 million and €74 million respectively. 
However, Kosovo remains a fragile and incomplete state not only because the 
international community has pursued the wrong priorities and strategies, but also due to 
weaknesses and dilemmas that are intrinsic to an international intervention. These 
include lack of coordination and coherence, legitimacy issues, personnel problems and, 
last but not least, local ownership versus external hegemonic control in combination 
with the footprint-dilemma. 
Due to the multitude of international organizations, donors, non-governmental 
organizations and other actors involved, achieving coordination and coherence is among 
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the biggest challenges facing external actors engaged in state-building. In Kosovo there 
has often been strong competition and rivalry between the UN, EU, KFOR and the 
OSCE, so that, just as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the concept of ―interlocking institutions‖ 
in reality rather resembled ―interblocking institutions‖.928  
The Kosovo mission also has a particularly striking legitimacy problem. In 
chapter two, it was noted that mandates for peacekeeping missions often prove 
ineffective in the field. This applies to the UNSCR 1244. In contrast to the mission in 
East Timor, where the political goal − independence − was clear from the very 
beginning, UNMIK‘s mandate was highly ambivalent. Its central contradiction was that 
it failed to articulate a position on Kosovo‘s final political status. The ambiguity of 
Resolution 1244 is based on a compromise reached at the end of the NATO campaign in 
1999 with Russia and China, which feared that independence for Kosovo could provoke 
secessionist movements in their own countries. However, this obfuscation hampered the 
development of a mature political elite, deterred foreign investment and inhibited efforts 
to start interaction between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs.
929
 
Another weak point in international interventions is the selection of personnel 
and the frequently low qualifications and lack of experience of the international actors. 
Since the UN does not have a pool of experts to draw on, inexperienced people were 
often deployed and put into positions for which they lacked the necessary qualifications. 
The UN‘s difficulties with finance and personnel severely impacts on its work in the 
field, and one example is that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN 
headquarters in New York, which administers the UNMIK mission, is understaffed and 
largely overburdened with work. The many internal difficulties with which the 
Department of Peacekeeping has to struggle, has had a considerable effect on its overall 
control of UNMIK as well as other UN interventions. 
Short-term contracts are another dilemma that presents a serious obstacle to the 
efficient fulfillment of the mandate, whether by UNMIK, KFOR or EULEX. Mission 
contracts are generally issued for six months, which causes frequent staff rotation and 
the loss of valuable information. Moreover, national actors lose their personal contact 
with the international contingent every six months which substantially hampers the 
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building of trust. Another side effect of the perpetual rotation is that there is constant 
―reinvention of the wheel‖, which holds up progress and frustrates national actors who 
have to adapt to new approaches every six months.  
 As is the case with international missions in general, a high percentage of the 
mission expenditure goes on the high salaries of the international personnel. Due to the 
high salaries available, as well as for career reasons, many internationals turn into 
―mission-hoppers‖, moving to one mission after another. Many ―mission-hoppers‖ care 
rather more about their own job perspectives than Kosovo‘s development. This does not 
go unnoticed by the population and affects the image and credibility of the international 
institution.  
Moreover, the far superior income, living conditions and other privileges that 
international staff members enjoy, isolates them from ordinary Kosovars. KFOR 
soldiers are particularly affected by social isolation since they are accommodated in 
camps cut off from the outside world. But the civilian personnel of EULEX, UNMIK 
and the OSCE also live in a way that is totally detached from the reality of the poor and 
insecure living conditions of Kosovars, a situation that is often aptly described as 
―living in a bubble‖. The isolated and advantaged situation of international actors means 
that they do not empathize at all with the cultural and historical traditions of Kosovars. 
This often gives them a mistaken perception of the situation on the ground and leads to 
inept decisions. The commonly used term ―locals‖ is in itself pejorative and symbolizes 
the cultural distance between the internationals and the people they have come to help. 
Again, while the internationals are in managerial positions, Kosovars are employed as 
support staff such as drivers or interpreters. Michael Ignatieff describes this situation as 
follows: 
―Nation-building isn‘t supposed to be an exercise in colonialism, but the 
relationship between the locals and the internationals is inherently colonial. The 
locals do the translating, cleaning and driving while the internationals do the 
grand imperial planning.‖930  
All these dilemmas, let alone the involvement of some, if only a few, international 
personnel in corruption and mismanagement, lead to a situation in which international 
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intervention forces often lose their moral authority and have difficulties in achieving 
positive results.
931
 
There is also a general unwillingness on the part of the international 
organizations to accept honest criticism of their policy. It is common practice among 
them to overstate the success and achievements of their work and avoid systematic 
evaluation of their weaknesses. The majority of international reports and speeches are 
highly optimistic and give a totally unrealistic picture of the situation on the ground. 
Critical analysis of the mission‘s failures, problems and weaknesses are either ignored 
or dismissed as highly exaggerated, which makes it difficult to eliminate shortcomings. 
However, if international actors want to succeed, then rather than only highlighting 
successes, which are often only apparent to them, they should undertake full and honest 
evaluations of their mission‘s strengths and weaknesses. For EULEX in particular this 
would mean that the mission is made more accountable, transparent and open to 
oversight by the Kosovo and European public, which could be realized by establishing 
monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, EULEX needs to have clear benchmarks to 
evaluate progress and success and be held accountable for achieving them.
932
 
Despite the ambitious and well-intended goals of international interventions, 
many state-building efforts are considered, within the states concerned, as highly 
invasive forms of external regulation. This dilemma of ―ownership‖ versus external 
hegemonic control, which relates to the extent to which state-building measures should 
be managed by national or external actors, applies to numerous international peace 
operations. Where the peace process in the Western Balkans is concerned, the cases of 
Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina show how sluggishly the transfer of competencies 
from the international to the local authorities can proceed. Despite lip service to the 
concept of local ownership, for instance by EULEX whose slogan is ―supporting local 
ownership‖, it remains questionable if the concept can in any way be put into practice 
and how the local authorities, can ―be the owner‖ of a process that is driven from the 
outside.
933
 Anna Jarstad sums up the demonstrated problems and weaknesses of 
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international intervention forces in the context of the general dilemma of 
democratization from outside:  
―Both in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a problem of 
democratic accountability. Real power is not vested in the democratically elected 
governments, but in the international administration. These structures are not 
formally accountable to the citizens in these states. Such international 
intervention risks … undermining democratization.‖934  
Every major peace-building mission since 1989 has tended to consolidate peace 
through democratization.
935
 However, scholars such as Thomas Carothers, from the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, highlights that while there is great 
enthusiasm for democratization as the strategy for achieving peace, we know little about 
the process for achieving democratization: 
―.. democracy promotion remains remarkably understudied, and the gap between 
what we want to accomplish and what we really know about how to accomplish 
it remains dauntingly wide.‖936 
What we do know is that the process of democratization can exacerbate social 
tensions and provoke violence and thus undermine the prospects for stable peace. The 
question therefore arises as to if and how far an outside intervention can contribute to 
democratization in the sense of developing and realizing a democratic political culture, 
establishing the rule of law and improving the economic and social situation. 
Different positions exist on this matter and some researchers assert that external 
democratization of postwar societies is a ―mission impossible‖, and usually involves 
little more than faking democracy.
937
 Michael Ignatieff asserts that ―Achieving 
democratic goals through imperial means is, of course, an exercise in contradiction. A 
true democracy cannot be ruled by foreigners.‖938 
Bruno Schoch argues that the success rate of democratization processes 
conducted under compulsion is low since  
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―Democratisation introduced from the outside in post civil war societies faces 
particular dilemmas. Most important, it replaces self-determination by 
heteronomy. It also tends to establish the priority of democratisation vis-à-vis 
other issues which need to be clarified, like the territorial boundaries and the 
political status of the communities which are to be democratised.‖939  
According to Thomas Carothers, the relations between national and international 
factors in democratization processes are characteristically very vague and complex. He 
argues that international organizations hardly deal with the particular social, cultural 
and economic factors that are essential for an efficient promotion of democracy in 
postwar societies. Therefore, democratization efforts from the outside often have little 
impact on social development. Furthermore, he emphasizes that the most common and 
debilitating weakness of democracy programs is the manner in which they are carried 
out – above all, ―the failure to fit activities to the local environment and to give people 
and organizations of the recipient country a primary role‖.940 
Although there is no definite answer to the question of whether democracy can 
be imposed from the outside, there does not yet seem to be any alternative to 
international involvement in fragile states. Despite all the difficulties and failures, it 
appears that the international community must still try to find the right strategy for 
promoting democracy by external means. 
To improve the chances of peace consolidation, Thomas Carothers stresses that 
democracy promoters should certainly continue to grapple with the bigger questions, 
such as how to conceptualize and bring about the rule of law, economic development or 
the strengthening of civil society, and how to develop strategies appropriate to different 
countries. Finding the right relationship between aid for political development and aid 
for social and economic development is crucial.  
Last but not least, democracy is based on the sovereignty and self-determination 
of the people. As the Kosovo case shows, peacekeepers can help provide security and 
incentives for first steps towards democracy. However, since long-term protectorates 
can undermine the long-run development of domestically legitimate democratic 
structures, the principle of local ownership should not just be a lofty aspiration but made 
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a practical reality by the international intervention forces in the sense that nationals 
must drive the process in all circumstances. 
In sum, while the international community has an important role to play, 
Kosovo‘s achievement of positive peace will primarily depend upon the Kosovar 
authorities themselves. The measure of success or failure to achieve social justice will 
be less how many countries have recognized Kosovo, but whether Kosovo succeeds in 
improving the economic and social conditions of the citizens of the country.
941
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7 ABSTRACTS 
7.1 English abstract 
Consolidation of peace following violent conflict does not only depend upon creating 
and maintaining a secure environment but also requires improvement of the economic 
and social situation, without which peace will only be ephemeral.  
Eleven years after the end of the war in Kosovo, this study investigates how 
successfully peace has been established in this country. Using the framework of Ulrich 
Schneckener‘s theory of state functions and Johan Galtung‘s concept of direct and 
structural violence it analyzes the degree and forms of violence that persist in Kosovo 
and assesses the extent to which its authorities fulfill the state functions of providing 
security and welfare to the people. The study looks into the extent to which Kosovo has 
moved beyond negative peace – the simple absence of war and violent conflict – 
towards positive peace, which implies the entrenchment of social justice through equal 
opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, impartial enforcement of law 
and equal protection under it. 
The main assumption of this study is that there is a relationship between the 
fulfillment of the state functions of providing security and welfare and the achievement 
of positive peace. A thorough evaluation of the political system, the security situation, 
the social dimension and the state of the economy, brings the result that Kosovo, 
primarily due to its failure adequately to provide a decent life for its citizens and hope 
for their future, remains a fragile and unfinished state – a judgment which throws a 
negative light on the efforts of the international community since 1999. 
While the international engagement in Kosovo has successfully managed to 
improve security and considerably curtailed direct violence, the economic and social 
position of the country is still calamitous, and unemployment and poverty are Kosovo‘s 
most intractable problems. Structural violence, which Galtung describes as violence 
built into the structure of a society, showing up as unequal power and consequently as 
unequal life chances, pervades the young state. Positive peace has not been achieved 
even after 11 years of international presence. 
Although the international community has an important role to play, Kosovo‘s 
achievement of positive peace will primarily depend upon the Kosovar authorities. The 
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measure of success or failure to achieve an end to violence, will be less how many 
countries have recognized Kosovo‘s independence, but whether Kosovo succeeds in 
improving economic and social conditions. 
7.2 German abstract 
Friedenskonsolidierung nach gewaltsamen Konflikten hängt nicht nur davon ab ein 
sicheres Umfeld zu schaffen und aufrecht zu erhalten, sondern verlangt auch die 
Entwicklung der ökonomischen und sozialen Situation, ohne die sich Friede nur als 
vorübergehend erweisen wird. 
 Elf Jahre nach Beendigung des Krieges im Kosovo untersucht die vorliegende 
Arbeit, inwieweit sich Frieden im Kosovo erfolgreich etabliert hat. Aufbauend auf 
Ulrich Schneckeners Ansätzen über die Funktionen eines Staates und den Theorien des 
Friedens- und Konfliktforschers Johan Galtung über direkte und strukturelle Gewalt 
untersucht diese Studie, inwieweit und in welcher Form Gewalt im Kosovo vorhanden 
ist, und beurteilt, in welchem Ausmaß der Staat seinen Bürgern Sicherheit und 
Wohlfahrt bietet – Lebensdimensionen die einen Staat unter anderem ausmachen. 
Zugleich wird analysiert, in welchem Ausmaß über den vorhandenen negativen Frieden 
– das ist lediglich ein Nichtvorhandensein von Krieg und direkter Gewalt – 
hinausgehend Ansätze zum positiven Frieden vorhanden sind, welcher Verwirklichung 
sozialer Gerechtigkeit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, gleiche Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten, gleiche 
Verteilung von Macht und Ressourcen sowie die Garantie menschlicher und sozialer 
Sicherheit voraussetzt. 
 Die Hypothese dieser Arbeit lautet, dass es einen Zusammenhang zwischen der 
Erfüllung der Staatsfunktionen Sicherheit und Wohlfahrt und der Verwirklichung eines 
positiven Friedens gibt. Eine gründliche Analyse des politischen Systems, der 
Sicherheitssituation und der sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Lage ergibt, dass Kosovo − 
vor allem dadurch, dass er seinen Bürgern kein angemessenes Leben und 
dementsprechende Zukunftsperspektiven bietet − ein fragiler und unvollendeter Staat ist 
– ein Ergebnis, das auf die Bemühungen der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft seit 
1999 ein schlechtes Licht wirft. 
 Während der internationale Einsatz eine deutliche Verbesserung der 
Sicherheitslage und eine Reduzierung der direkten Gewalt brachte, bleibt die 
wirtschaftliche und soziale Lage des Landes weiterhin katastrophal; Arbeitslosigkeit 
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und Armut stellen die hartnäckigsten Probleme dar. Strukturelle Gewalt, welche 
Galtung als Gewalt in der Struktur einer Gesellschaft definiert, die sich in ungleicher 
Macht und ungleichen Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten manifestiert, durchdringt den jungen 
Staat. Positiven Frieden gibt es auch nach elf Jahren internationaler Präsenz nicht. 
Obwohl die internationale Gemeinschaft eine entscheidende Rolle spielt, hängt 
die Erreichung eines positiven Friedens in erster Linie von den kosovarischen 
Autoritäten selbst ab. Der Maßstab, ob Gewalt erfolgreich bekämpft werden kann oder 
nicht, ist nicht darin zu sehen, wie viele Staaten Kosovos Unabhängigkeit anerkannt 
haben, sondern ob es Kosovo schaffen wird, seine ökonomische und soziale Lage zu 
verbessern.  
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8 APPENDIX 
8.1 Kosovo municipalities
942
 
1. Deçan/Dečani 24. Suharekë/Suva Reka 
2. Gjakovë/Dakovica 25. Ferizaj/Uroševac 
3. Glogovc/Glogovac 26. Viti/Vitina 
4. Gjilan/Gnjilane 27. Vushtrri/Vučitrn 
5. Dragash/Dragaš 28. Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok 
6. Istog/Istok 29. Zveçan/Zvečan 
7. Kaçanik/Kačanik 30. Malishevë/Mališevo 
8. Klinë/Klina 31. Hani i Elezit/General Janković 
9. Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje 32. Mamushë/Mamuša 
10. Kamenicë/Kamenica 33. Junik/Junik 
11. Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 34. Kllokoti/Klokot  
12. Leposaviq/Leposavić 35. Graçanicë/Gračanica  
13. Lipjan/Lipljan 36. Ranillug/Ranilug 
14. Novobërdë/Novo Brdo 37. Partesh/Parteš 
15. Obilic/Obilić  
16. Rahovec/Orahovac  
17. Pejë/Peć  
18. Podujevë/Podujevo  
19. Prishtinë/Priština  
20. Prizren/Prizren  
21. Skënderaj/Srbica  
22. Shtime/Štimlje  
23. Shtërpcë/Štrpce  
 
                                                 
 
942
 Municipalities web sites of the Republic of Kosovo: Online via Internet: URL: http://kk.rks-gov.net/  
[accessed 10 09 2010]. 
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8.2 Registered political parties in Kosovo as of 2009
943
 
1. Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo) 
2. Alternativa Demokratike e Kosovës ( Democratic Alternative of Kosovo) 
3. Aleanca Kosova e Re (Alliance New Kosovo) 
4. Bashkimi Demokratik I Ashkalive (Democratic Union of Ashkalis) 
5. Balli Kombëtar (National Front) 
6. Partia e Aksionit Demokratik të Boshnjakëve të Kosovës (Bosniac Party of 
Kosovo) 
7. Partia Boshnjake e Kosovës (Bosniak Party of Kosovo) 
8. Partia Demokratike e Boshnjakëve (Democratic Party of Bosniacs)  
9. Partia Demokratike Vatan (Democratic Party Vatan) 
10. Iniciativa Qytetare e Gorës (Citizens‘ Initiative of Gora) 
11. Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosovës (New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo) 
12. Kosova Demokratik Türk Partisi (Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo) 
13. Lëvizja për Bashkim (Movement for Unification) 
14. Lidhja Demokratike Dardanisë (Democratic League of Dardania) 
15. Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo)  
16. Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës (National Movement for Liberation 
of Kosovo) 
17. Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës (People‘s Movement of Kosovo) 
18. Demokracia e Re (New Democracy) 
19. Partia e Re Demokratike (New Democratic Party) 
20. ORA (ORA)  
21. Partia e Drejtësisë (Justice Party) 
22. Partia Demokratike e Ashkanlive të Kosovës (Democratic Ashkali Party of 
Kosovo) 
23. Partia e Integrimit Demokratik (Party of Democratic Integration) 
24. Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic Party of Kosovo)  
25. Partia Demokristiane për Integrim (Christian Democratic Party for Integration) 
26. Partia Ekologjike e Kosovës (Kosovo Ecological Party) 
27. Partia e të Gjelbërve të Kosovës (Green Party of Kosovo) 
                                                 
 
943
 Central Election Commission: Online via Internet: URL: http://www.kqz-ks.org/ [10 09 2009]. 
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28. Partia Liberale e Kosovës (Liberal Party of Kosovo) 
29. Partia Nacionale Demokratike Shqiptare (Albanian National Democratic Party) 
30. Partia Rome e Bashkuar e Kosovës (United Roma Party of Kosovo) 
31. Partia Republikane Shqiptare (Albanian Republican Party) 
32. Partia Social Demokrate e Kosovës (Social Democratic Party of Kosovo) 
33. Partia Shqiptare Demokristiane e Kosovës (Albanian Christian Democratic Party 
of Kosovo) 
34. Partia e Aksionit Demokratik (Party of Democratic Action) 
35. Partia e Ndryshimeve Demokratike (Party of Democratic Changes) 
36. Partia Demokratike Serbe e Kosovës dhe e Metohisë (Serbian Democratic Party 
of Kosovo and Metohija)  
37. Partia Serbe e Kosovës dhe Metohisë (Serbian Kosovo and Metohija Party) 
38. Partia e Pavarur Liberale (Independent Liberal Party) 
39. Partia Popullore Serbe (Serbian People‘s Party) 
40. Lidhja e Socialdemokratëve të Pavarur të Kosovës dhe Metohisë (Alliance of 
Independent Social Demokrats of Kosovo and Metohija)  
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8.3 UNMIK mission expenditures, June 1999−June 2011 
Table 20: UNMIK mission expenditures, June 1999−June 2011 (US$‟000) 
Category of 
expenditure 
Jun 99− 
Jun 00 
Jul 00− 
Jun 01 
Jul 01− 
Jun 02 
Jul 02− 
Jun 03 
Jul 03− 
Jun 04 
Jul 04− 
Jun 05 
Military and 
Police 
Personnel 
2,696.2 5,918.4 125,532.0 115,208.7 106,598.1 106,253.3 
Civilian 
Personnel 
216,543.4 280,113.5 184,775.0 170,595.0 163,458.9 156,162.2 
Operational 
Requirements 
188,425.6 73,816.0 49,941.0 44,164.1 45,452.2 32,081.5 
Other 2,426.5 839.1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Gross 
Requirements 
410,091.7 360,687.0 360,248.0 329,967.8 315,509.2 294,497.0 
Staff 
Assessment 
Income 
16,970.1 22,775.0 25,989.0 25,082.5 23,467.6 22,720.5 
Net 
Requirements 
393,121.6 337,912.0 334,259.0 304,885.3 292,041.6 271,776.5 
Total 
Requirements 
410,091.7 360,687.0 360,248.0 329,967.8 315,509.2 294,497.0 
 
Category of 
expenditure 
Jul 05− 
Jun 06 
Jul 06− 
Jun 07 
Jul 07− 
Jun 08 
Jul 08− 
Jun 09 
Jul 09− 
Jun 10 
(estimate) 
Jul 10− 
Jun 11 
(estimate) 
Military and 
Police 
Personnel 
70,230.2 64,172.3 73,254.1 38,258.8 704.9 804.7 
Civilian 
Personnel 
135,815.5 120,802.7 123,048.4 105,561.4 33,929.2 35,650.7 
Operational 
Requirements 
27,707.9 25,217.0 24,164,1 24,703.1 12,447.9 11,902.5 
Other n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Gross 
Requirements 
233,753.6 210,192.0 220,466.6 168,523.3 47,082.0 48,357.9 
Staff 
Assessment 
Income 
19,321.3 16,365.3 16,720.4 15,295.3 3,992.4 4,558.1 
Net 
Requirements 
214,432.3 193,826.7 203,746.2 153,228.0 43,089.6 43,799.8 
Total 
Requirements 
233,753.6 210,192.0 220,466.6 168,523.3 47,082.0 48,357.9 
Source: Based on Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Online via Internet: 
URL: http://www.un.org/ga/acabq/subject_results.asp?desc=PKI-
UNMIK%20United%20Nations%20Mission%20in%20Kosovo [accessed 04 10 2010]. UN Documents: 
A/54807; A/56/763; A/57/678; A/58/634; A/59/623; A/60/637; A/61/675; A/62/610; A/63/569; 
A/64/604; A/63/803; A/64/661. 
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8.4 KFOR troop contributing countries, 2010 
Table 21: KFOR troop contributing countries, 2010 
NATO Countries Non-NATO Countries 
 
Country 
Number of 
soldiers 
Country 
Number of 
soldiers 
Albania 2 Austria 434 
Belgium 99 Finland 242 
Bulgaria 10 Ireland 232 
Canada 5 Morocco 213 
Croatia 20 Sweden 253 
Czech Republic 321 Switzerland 206 
Denmark 188 Ukraine 187 
Estonia 1 TOTAL 1,767 
France 807   
Germany 1,507   
Greece 366   
Hungary 241   
Italy 1,409   
Luxembourg 29   
The Netherlands 10   
Norway 6   
Poland 227   
Portugal 279   
Romania 145   
Slovakia 146   
Slovenia 387   
Spain 3   
Turkey 465   
United Kingdom 5   
United States 1,480   
TOTAL 8,158   
Source: NATO: KFOR Troops. Updated 26 February 2010. Online via Internet: URL:  
http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf [accessed 18 06 2010]. 
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8.5 Austrian Army expenditure on KFOR, 1999−2010 
Table 22: Austrian Army expenditure on KFOR, 1999−2010 
Year Total expenditure  
1999 €24,027,878 
2000 €37,078,360 
2001 €29,866,947 
2002 €31,096,440 
2003 €28,826,582 
2004 €26,459,351 
2005 €21,454,419 
2006 €29,338,269 
2007 €30,860,254 
2008 €32,849,871 
2009 €30,243,703 
    2010
944
 €17,223,758 
TOTAL €339,325,832 
Source: Data were made available by Franz Enz.  
Section Logistic Support. Austrian Army in October 2010.  
                                                 
 
944
 End of September 2010.  
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8.6 Composition and strength of the UNMIK Civilian Police,  
1999−2008 
 
Table 23: Composition and strength of the UNMIK Civilian Police, 1999−2008 
Country „99 „00 „01 „02 „03 „04 „05 „06 „07 „08 TOTAL 
Argentina 38 22 22 24 26 8 13 10 10 7 180 
Austria 49 52 57 39 39 29 23 23 22 4 337 
Bangladesh 67 104 18 86 76 80 32 29 23 12 527 
Belgium 5     2             7 
Benin   5                 5 
Brazil         3 3 3   2 2 13 
Bulgaria 51 34 64 43 45 29 25 35   26 352 
Cameroon (Rep of)   24 1   20           45 
Canada 88 106 74 36 10           314 
Chile 5                   5 
China           19 18 18   18 73 
Cote D'Ivoire   1                 1 
Croatia             2 9 13 10 34 
Czech Republic 10 20 2 7 11 6 11 7 20 9 103 
Denmark 23 47 42 42 36 27 27 26 26 13 309 
Dominican Republic   16                 16 
East Timor             10       10 
Egypt 61 12 74 67 50   20 16     300 
Estonia 10                   10 
Fiji 35 41   35 31 33 19       194 
Finland 2 20 26 16 11 9 6 3 8   101 
France 80 138 130 132 105 85 65 55 44 18 852 
Gambia   5                 5 
Germany 214 409 352 412 356 230 263 176 151 103 2,666 
Ghana 35 126 120 110 58 34   15 40   538 
Greece   22 10 10 20 18   10     90 
Hungary 10   5 1 4 7 6 2 13 1 49 
Iceland 2 2 4 2             10 
India 119 273 289 262 180 216 91 57 86 38 1,611 
Italy 56 33 48 55 26 49 21 28 43 16 375 
Jordan 52 228 213 200 171 192 42 58 68 74 1,298 
Kenya 24 26 26 51 18 28 17 15     205 
Kyrgyztan 4 3   4   4 2 3 6 4 30 
Lithuania 10 9   10 8 8 9   6 2 62 
Malawi   19   21 17   8 5   4 74 
Malaysia 48 49 33 46 33   12       221 
Mauritius         5           5 
Mozambique 5                   5 
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Country „99 „00 „01 „02 „03 „04 „05 „06 „07 „08 TOTAL 
Nepal 50 54 50 40 33 45 19 17     308 
Netherlands 1         1         2 
Niger   5                 5 
Nigeria 17 134   72 54 53 34   20 21 405 
Norway 1 29 27 26 19 20 20 18 16 5 181 
Pakistan 85 82 39 50 45 84 1 40 65 19 510 
Philippines 23 63 63 62 43 87 20 47 28 26 462 
Poland 10   9 10 9 9 9 8   10 74 
Portugal 36 16 8 19 5 8 6 2 4   104 
Romania 48 30 46 47 22 50 35 35 38 8 359 
Russian Federation 137 7 104 88 80 87 35 15 18 12 583 
Senegal 16   16   16           48 
Slovenia   16 6 10 13 14 15 15 15   104 
Spain 50 14 32 8 8 13 12 10 10 13 170 
Sweden 44 54 56 54 50 38 45 38 33 26 438 
Switzerland   10 9 8 6 7 5 8 8 1 62 
Tanzania 5                   5 
Tunisia 10 5   6   5 5       31 
Turkey 49 92 84 146 124 197 134 123 90 44 1,083 
Uganda                 4   4 
Ukraine 30 20 24 37 22 49 19 13 6 7 227 
United Kingdom 67 115 137 92 83 65 40 54 53 15 721 
USA 476 514 353 354 251 202 163 126 145 71 2,655 
Zambia 14 44 38 9 23 11 10 10 10 10 179 
Zimbabwe 24 50 61 67 54 25 30 18 17 7 353 
TOTAL 2,296 3,200 2,772 2,918 2,319 2,184 1,402 1,197 1,161 656 20,105 
Source: Data were made available by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Situation Center. 
Research and Liaison Unit in March 2009.  
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8.7 Composition and strength of the UNMIK Special Police,  
2000−08 
Table 24: Composition and strength of the UNMIK Special Police, 2000−08 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL 
Argentina  248 230 230 230 115    1,053 
Bangladesh         125 125 
India 399 239 240 120 120 80    1,198 
Jordan 480 480 480 480 480     2,400 
Pakistan 113 116 115 115 116 112 114 114 111 1,026 
Poland 116 123 236 232 231 232 230 234 115 1,749 
Romania   116 115 115 115 115 116 115 807 
Spain 224 225 227 4      680 
Ukraine 152 144 157 162 156 164 156 155 33 1,279 
TOTAL 1,484 1,575 1,801 1,458 1,448 818 615 619 499 10,317 
Source: Data were made available by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Situation Center. 
Research and Liaison Unit in March 2009.  
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8.8 Composition and strength of the UNMIK Military Liaison 
component, 1999−2009  
Table 25: Composition and strength of the UNMIK Military Liaison component, 
1999−2009 
Country „99 „00 „01 „02 „03 „04 „05 „06 „07 „08 „09 TOTAL 
Argentina   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   9 
Austria 2 2 2                 6 
Bangladesh 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2   11 
Belgium 1 1   1   1           4 
Bolivia 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1   12 
Bulgaria   1   1 1   1 1 1     6 
Canada 2 1 1                 4 
Chile   1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1   10 
Czech Rep   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   9 
Denmark 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 3   18 
Finland 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1     18 
Hungary 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1     8 
Ireland 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 3   4   31 
Italy 1 1 1   2 1 1 1       8 
Jordan 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2     15 
Kenya 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2     10 
Malawi 1   1 1   1 1   1     6 
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1     9 
Nepal 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1     13 
New 
Zealand 
1 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1   19 
Norway 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2   14 
Pakistan 1 1 1 1   1 1   2 1   9 
Poland 1 1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1 9 
Portugal           1 2   1     4 
Romania 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 2   16 
Russia 2 2   2 2   2 1 1     12 
Spain 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 1 35 
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1             5 
Ukraine 1   1 2 2 2 3 2 1 3   17 
United 
Kingdom 
  2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1     11 
USA 4 8 4 4 5 1           26 
Zambia 1 1   1 1   1   1     6 
TOTAL 40  46  40  43  41  38  44  34  35  27  2  390 
Source: Data were made available by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Situation Center. 
Research and Liaison Unit in March 2009.  
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9.2 Interviews 
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